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THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


AN  OUTLINE  OF  LECTURES 

ON 

INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 


BY 

JOSEPH  ALEXANDER  LEIGHTON 

ProfeetOT  of  Philosophy  in  the  Ohio  Sute  UniTenitj 


,  *    »  *  .  •  *     »= 


Columbus,  Ohio 
R.  G.  ADAMS  &  CO. 

1918 

AU  Bighu  Resenred 


i-4 


COPYRIGHT,  1918 

BY 
J.  A.  LEIGHTON 


Published  March,  1918 


**    it 


Printed  by 

THE  F.  J.  HEER  PRINTING  CO. 

Colwnbus,  Ohio,  U,  S.  A, 


PREFACE 


The  following  work  has  been  prepared  pri- 
marily for  the  use  of  classes  in  The  Ohio  State 
University.  I  hope  it  may  be  found  of  service  else- 
where. 

For  some  years  past  I  have  experimented  and 
pondered  as  to  the  best  method  of  giving  an  intro- 
ductory course  which  might  really  introduce  be- 
ginners to  the  basic  problems  and  theories  of 
philosophy  and  quicken  them  to  some  appreciation 
of  the  role  played  by  philosophy  in  the  whole  move- 
ment of  civilization,  while,  at  the  same  time,  giving 
them  at  least  an  inkling  of  the  work  of  the  greatest 
thinkers  and  arousing  in  them  a  desire  to  go  to  the 
sources. 

A  course  in  the  entire  History  of  European 
Philosophy,  if  seriously  given,  is  beyond  the  reach 
of  many  beginners  in  the  subject.  Only  the  ex- 
ceptional student  can  make  much  out  of  it.  The 
others  are  bewildered  by  the  rapid  succession  of 
theories  not  easily  distinguishable  and  become  con- 
fused as  to  the  fundamental  issues  and  standpoints. 
They  are  likely  to  carry  away  from  the  course  the 
feeling  that  philosophy  has  no  close  relation  to  cul- 
ture and  everyday  experience  and  that  it  is  a  be- 
wildering mass  of  speculations  "shot  out  of  the 
blue".  The  History  of  Philosophy  should  be  a 
second  course. 

(v) 


385101 


VI  PREFACE 

On  the  other  hand  a  purely  topical  and  system- 
atic introduction  fails  to  bring  the  student  in  con- 
tact with  the  great  historical  doctrines  in  other 
than  the  scrappiest  fashion.  Moreover,  the  miscel- 
laneous and  varied  characters  of  the  intellectual 
backgrounds  of  students  who  elect  a  first  course  in 
philosophy  make  it  imperative  to  supply  something 
in  the  way  of  a  common  background  and  also,  at 
the  risk  of  being  dogmatic,  to  indicate  the  main 
directions  in  which  solutions  of  the  chief  problems 
of  philosophy  may  be  sought. 

The  present  outline  is  thus  a  combination  of 
the  historical  and  the  systematic  methods  of  treat- 
ing the  great  problems  and  theories.  Its  plan  is 
to  discuss  systematically  the  chief  problems  and 
standpoints  of  modern  philosophy  from  the  vantage 
point  acquired  by  a  rapid  sketch  of  the  most  signifi- 
cant stages  and  types  of  philosophical  thinking 
from  the  primitive  world  view  up  to  the  beginning 
of  modern  thought. 

My  conception  of  the  structure  of  an  intro- 
ductory text  is  that  it  should  be  in  the  nature  of  a 
comprehensive  outline  —  an  extended  syllabus  —  to 
be  filled  in  by  the  teacher  in  his  lectures  and  by  the 
student  in  his  collateral  readings.  Therefore,  I 
have  avoided  discussing  the  more  technical  and 
finely-drawn  distinctions  within  the  main  types  of 
doctrine  that  would  be  dealt  with  in  a  more  elabo- 
rate treatment.  The  teacher  who  uses  this  book 
can  easily  select  and  make  omissions  from  the 
material  presented,  according  to  his  tastes  and  the 
needs  of  his  classes. 


PREFACE  VH 

It  would  not  have  been  possible  for  me  to 
bring  ouit  this  preliminary  edition  now,  had  not  my 
colleague,  Dr.  R.  D.  Williams,  generously  volunteered 
to  report  my  lectures.  Mr.  W.  S.  Gamertsfelder, 
Fellow  in  Philosophy,  was  good  enough  to  type  the 
reports,  and  I  have  revised  them.  Nearly  two- 
thirds  of  the  book  is  a  transcript  from  lectures.  Dr. 
Williams  and  Dr.  A.  E.  Avey  have  rendered  valuable 
assistance  in  proof  reading.  To  them  I  am  much 
indebted  also  for  preparation  of  the  index.  Dr. 
Williams  has  also  aided  me  in  several  places  with 
illustrations  and  references. 

Some  haste  in  preparation  for  the  press  was 
necessary,  in  order  to  have  the  book  ready  for  the 
use  of  the  classes  in  the  present  semester.  I  shall 
be  grateful  for  any  criticisms  and  suggestions  that 
may  help  me  in  the  preparation  of  a  second  and 
revised  edition. 

Joseph  Alexander  Leighton. 

Columbus,  Ohio, 
February  15,  1918. 


CONTENTS 


Chapter  I. 
1. 
2. 

3. 

4. 

Chapter  II. 
1. 
2. 
3. 

4. 
5. 

Chapter  III. 

1. 
2. 

Chapter  IV. 

1. 
2. 
3. 

Chapter  V. 
1. 

PAGE 

Philosophy,  Its  Meaning  and  Scope 1 

Definition  of  Philosophy 1 

The  Relation  of  Philosophy  to  Practical 

Life,  Especially  to  Conduct  and  Religion  4 

Methods  of  Religion  and  Philosophy. ...  6 

Poetry  and  Philosophy 7 

Primitive  Thought 9 

The  Primitive  World- View 9 

Primitive  Idea  of  the  Soul 9 

Tabu    11 

Magic   12 

Mythology     17 

The  Differentiation  of  Philosophy  and 

Science  from  Religion 22 

The  Rise  of  Philosophy  to  Independence  22 
The  Development  of  Early  Greek  Phil- 
osophy     31 

The  Personality,  Mission  and  Influence 

of  Socrates 43 

The  Personality  of  Socrates 43 

The  Method  of  Socrates 48 

The  Substance  of  Socrates'  Teaching. . .  50 

Plato    55 

The  Problem  of  Truth  and   Knowledge 

(Logic) 55 

2.  The  Platonic  Theory  of  Reality   (Meta- 
physics)       61 

3.  Plato's  Doctrine  of  the   Soul    (Psychol- 
ogy)      69 

4.  Plato's  Theory  of  Human  Good   (Ethics 

and    Social   Philosophy) 70 

(ix) 


X  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Chapter  VI.     Aristotle *  77 

1.  Aristotle's  Theory  of  Reality 77 

2 .  Aristotle's  Psychology 80 

3 .  Aristotle's  Theory  of  Knowledge 82 

4.  Summary     of     Aristotle's     Theory     of 
Reality    85 

5.  Aristotle's  Doctrine  of  the  Good  (Ethics)  87 

Chapter  VII .     Atomistic  Materialism 89 

Chapter  VIII .     The  Decline  of  Greek  Speculation ...  95 

Chapter  IX .     Skepticism    99 

Chapter  X .     Stoic  Pantheism  108 

Chapter  XI.     Mysticism  —  Neo-Platonism   115 

Chapter  XII.     Early  Christian  Philosophy 125 

1.  The  Ethical  Content  of  Christianity 127 

2.  The  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity 129 

Chapter  XIII.     Mediaeval  Philosophy   133 

Chapter  XIV.     Realism,  Nominalism  and  the  Problem 

of  Individuality  140 

Chapter  XV.     Modern    Philosophy:     Its    Spirit,    Its 

Chief  Problems  and  Its  Standpoints 148 

Chapter  XVI.     The  Problem  of  Reality 155 

Chapter  XVII .     Dualism   159 

Chapter  XVIII.     The   Scientific   Notion   of   Material 

Substance    167 

Chapter  XIX.     Materialism  * 173 

Chapter  XX.     Spiritualism  or   Idealism 178 

1 .  Berkeleyan  Idealism 178 

2 .  Leibnitz'   Monadology    182 

3 .  Hegelian  Idealism 188 

Chapter  XXI.     The     Identity     or     Double     Aspect 

Theory 191 

Summary    192 

Chapter  XXII.     Singularism  and  Pluralism  (The  One 

and  the  Many) 195 

1.  From  Naive  Pluralism  to  Singularism..  195 

2.  The   Spinozistic   Conception   of  the  Ab- 
solute     205 


CONTENTS  XI 

PAGE 

t                              3 .     The  Hegelian  Conception  of  the  Absolute  210 

'                               4.     Further  Implications  of  Singularism . . .  216 

^^                               5.     Criticism  of  Singularism 219 

f"                              6.     Pluralism    221 

7.     My  Own   Standpoint 223 

Chapter  XXIII.     The  Problem  of  Evolution  and  Tele- 
ology      230 

,                                1.     The  Rise  of  the  Doctrine  of  Evolution. .  230 

I                                2.     The  Method  of  Evolution 235 

'  3.     The    Mechanical    and    the    Teleological 

Aspects  of  Evolution 239 

Chapter  XXIV.     The  Self 252 

Chapter  XXV.     The  Fundamental  Concepts  of  Meta- 
physics    270 

^l .     Substance    272 

2.     Causality    273 

-  3.     Finality  and  Individuality 278 

4.  Order,  Law,   Relation  and  Individuality  280 

5.  Space  and  Time*-. 287 

Chapter  XXVI .     Epistemology  293 

1.  The  Problem  of  the  Sources  of  Knowl- 
edge      294 

2.  Knowledge  and  Reality 305 

3.  Critical  Realism  or  Teleological  Idealism  308 

I              Chapter  XXVII .     The  Criteria  of  Truth 314 

3                               1 .     The  Copy  Theory  of  Truth 314 

^                         K^.2  •     Pragmatism    315 

3.     The  Rationalistic  Theory  of  Truth 325 

Chapter  XXVIII.     The    Special    Philosophical   Disci- 
plines —  The  System  of  Philosophy 330 

1 .  Psychology  and  Philosophy 331 

2.  Logic    334 

3.  Ethics  and  Social  Philosophy 336 

4 .  Aesthetics   339 

5 .  The  Philosophy  of  Religion 341 

Chapter  XXIX .     The  Status  of  Values 345 

Chapter  XXX.     The  Philosophy  of  History 364 


II 


Xll  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Appendix  —  Current  Issues  in   Regard  to   Conscious- 
ness, Intelligence  and  Reality 389 

1.  The  New  Realism 389 

2.  Neutral  Monism    396 

3.  The  Instrumentalist  View  of  Intelligence  399 

4.  Irrationalistic  Intuitionism  403 


ERRATA 


On  page  69  line  18  §  2,  for  "next  lowest  part"  read 
"next  lower  part." 

On  page  85  lines  3  and  4  for  "The  organization,"  etc., 
read   "In   the   organization   of   sense   experience   the   mind 
uses"  etc. 
I  i  On  page  103  line  1  for  "Differences"  read  "Variations." 

i  On  page  105  line  8  for  "cause"  read  "course." 

On  page  214  line  24  for  "purporsive"  read  "purposive." 


CHAPTER  I 
PHILOSOPHY,   ITS   MEANING  AND    SCOPE 

1.      DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  word  "philosophy"  is  derived  from  the 
Greek  words  "philein"  meaning  to  love  iand  "sophia" 
meaning  wisdom.  Hence  the  true  philosopher  is  a 
lover  of  wisdom. 

The  philosopher  strives,  as  Plato  so  finely  puts 
it,  to  attain  a  synoptic  vision  of  things,  to  see  things 
as  a  whole  or  together,  that  is,  to  see  all  the  main 
features  of  experience,  life  and  conduct  in  their 
inter-relationships.  The  philosopher  strives  to  be 
"the  spectator  of  all  time  and  existence."  This 
does  not  mean  that  the  philosopher  must  compass 
in  minute  detail  all  knowledge  and  all  experience. 
It  means  rather  that,  in  trying  to  reach  a  unified 
and  consistent  view  of  things,  the  philosopher  will 
not  neglect  to  consider  the  general  significance  of 
any  of  the  main  fields  of  human  experience,  knowl- 
edge or  conduct. 

Plato  distinguished  between  Ignorance,  Right 
Opinion,  and  Knowledge  or  Wisdom.  Ignorance  is 
not  to  know,  nor  to  know  why  you  do  not  know. 
Right  Opinion  is  a  belief  which  corresponds  to  the 
facts  but  is  devoid  of  reasoned  insight  into  its  own 
foundations.  Knowledge  is  belief  with  reasons.  If 
one  knows  wherein  his  own  ignorance  lies  or  the 
limitations  of  the  possibilities  of  the  subject,  he 


2  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

may  be  rightly  said  to  possess  knowledge  of  the 
subject. 

Philosophy  is  more  fundamental  and  compre- 
hensive than  science,  otherwise  they  are  identical 
in  their  aims.  Philosophical  knowledge  has  these 
three  characteristics :  — 

1.  It  is  fundamental  knowledge. 

2.  It  is  most  comprehensive  or  general- 
ized knowledge 

3.  It    is    most    unified    and    consistent 
knowledge. 

The  aim  of  philosophy  is  to  discover  the  full 
meanings  and  relations  of  Truth,  Beauty,  and  Good- 
ness and  to  determine  their  places  in  the  universe 
of  reality.  Philosophy  is  an  attempt  to  interpret 
reflectively  human  life  in  all  its  relations.  The 
philosopher  aims  to  "see  life  steadily  and  to  see  it 
whole."  Plato  says  "the  unexamined  life  is  not  a 
truly  human  life."  Philosophy  is  rational  reflection 
upon  experience,  belief,  and  conduct.  It  is  closely 
related  to  science,  conduct  and  religion. 

Science  is  a  careful  scrutiny  of  the  grounds  of 
our  common  sense  beliefs.  It  analyzes  and  de- 
scribes our  common  experiences.  It  is  organized 
common  sense.  The  special  sciences  are  the  chil- 
dren of  philosophy,  and  can  never  replace  phil- 
osophy. Among  the  Greeks  philosophy  included  all 
science.  In  fact  Aristotle  was  the  first  to  map  out 
the  field  of  knowledge  into  distinct  sciences.  In  the 
course  of  intellectual  history  the  various  sciences 
have  gradually  been  split  off  from  philosophy  in 
the  following  order —  ;  mathematics,   astronomy. 


PHILOSOPHY,  ITS  MEANING  AND  SCOPE  3 

physics,    chemistry,    biology,    psychology    and    so- 
ciology. 

1.  All  sciences  make  assumptions.  Phil- 
osophy examines  these  assumptions. 

2.  The  mutual  adjustment  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  several  sciences  into  a 
unified  and  coherent  view  of  things  is 
a  philosophical  task. 

3.  The  adjustment  of  the  principles  of 
science  and  the  principles  and  beliefs 
which  underlie  the  practical  conduct  of 
life  is  a  task  of  philosophy. 

The  data  of  the  sciences  are  really  sense-data 
or  perceived  facts.  In  reducing  these  data  to 
orderly  and  compact  bodies  of  conceptual  descrip- 
tion and  explanation,  science  makes  assumptions. 
These  basic  assumptions  of  the  sciences,  philosophy 
must  critically  examine;  e.  g.,  the  uniformity  of  the 
causal  order  —  like  causes  produce  like  effects. 
Moreover,  it  is  generally  assumed  in  the  practical 
affairs  of  the  common  social  life  that  each  individual 
is  responsible  for  his  own  acts.  But  if  we  are 
machines,  as  the  physiologist  might  assume,  this  is 
not  true.  Philosophy  is  thus  a  clearing  house  for 
the  sciences,  adjusting  their  several  conclusions  to 
one  another  and  to  practical  life. 

In  brief,  the  assumptions  and  conclusions  of 
the  several  sciences  call  for  critical  examination  and 
co-ordination,  and  this  is  a  principal  part  of  the 
work  of  philosophy.  For  example,  what  are  Matter, 
Life,  Mind,  Space,  Time,  Causality,  Purpose?  What 
are  their  interrelations?    Is  the  living  organism 


4  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

merely  a  machine,  or,  is  it  something  more?  Wliat 
is  the  mind  or  soul,  and  what  are  its  relations  to 
life  and  matter?  What  are  Space  and  Time?  Is 
the  world  really  boundless  in  space  and  endless  in 
duration?  What  are  the  enduring  realities?  Or, 
does  nothing  really  endure?  What  is  the  status  of 
purpose  in  the  universe?  Does  everything  that  hap- 
pens happen  blindly  and  mechanically?  Are  our 
human  beliefs  in  the  permanent  significance  of  the 
purposes  and  values  achieved  by  the  rational  in- 
dividual illusions?  What  may  we  hope  for  in  re- 
gard to  the  realization  and  conservation  of  the 
highest  human  values?  Such  are  the  exceedingly 
difficult  and  important  questions  to  which  phil- 
osophy seeks  reasoned  answers. 

Judgment  should  not  be  passed  as  to  the  mean- 
ing of  human  life  and  its  status  in  the  cosmos  until 
all  the  evidence  is  in.  The  one  fundamental  faith 
or  postulate  in  philosophy  is  that  nobody  can  be 
too  intelligent.  Great  evils  have  come  in  the  past 
through  lack  of  intelligence. 

2.      THE  RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  PRACTICAL  LIFE, 
ESPECIALLY  TO  CONDUCT  AND  RELIGION. 

Natural  science  is  impersonal  and  indifferent 
to  human  weal  or  woe.  It  is  not  concerned  with 
the  values  of  life ;  it  is  essentially  non-human.  Mate- 
rial progress  does  not  necessarily  mean  improve- 
ment in  human  nature. 

There  is,  besides  the  physical  realm,  the  human 
realm  or  the  realm  of  human  values.  Two  kinds 
of  human  values  may  be  distinguished,  viz. :  — 


PHILOSOPHY,  ITS  MEANING  AND  SCOPE  5 

1.  Instrumental  values,  which  are  of  use 
as  means  to  realize  ends ; 

2.  Intrinsic  values  realized  within  the 
self,  experiences  valued  in  themselves 
or  for  their  own  sakes. 

The  good  life  is  the  life  which  contains  great 
intrinsic  or  satisfying  values.  Ethics  deals  with 
intrinsic  values  or  goods  for  selves.  Ethics  is  thus 
the  philosophy  of  intrinsic  or  immediate  values. 
Aesthetics,  dealing  with  the  beauUfvl,  is  also  a  part 
of  the  philosophy  of  values. 

Religion  claims  to  answer  the  question:  How 
do  values  endure?  The  life  that  is  best  is  the  only 
one  that  endures,  on  account  of  its  harmony  with 
the  supreme  purpose  of  the  universe, — such  is  the 
central  tenet  in  religion.  All  religion  is  faith  in 
the  supremacy  in  the  universe,  and  therefore  the 
permanence,  of  the  best  life,  the  life  having  the 
most  worth.  Religion  is  close  to  conduct  because 
it  attempts  to  give  firm  foundation  for  the  intrinsic 
values  of  life. 

The  atheistic  or  materialistic  view  of  the  uni- 
verse is  that  blind  physical  forces  will  finally  over- 
come human  existence  and  effort,  and  engulf  all 
human  values.  Philosophy  is  interested  in  what 
nature  is,  but  also  in  what  are  the  values  of  life, 
and  what  is  the  status  of  the  highest  human  life, 
i.  e.,  philosophy  asks :  What  is  the  status  of  values 
in  the  real  world? 

What  are  the  highest  values  of  life,  is  the 
problem  of  ethics,  an  important  branch  of  philos- 
ophy.    Religion  affirms  dogmatically  that  what  a 


6  THE  FIELD   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

society  or  individual  members  thereof  regard  as  the 
highest  values  are  promoted  and  conserved  by  a 
Higher  Power.  Religion  pictures  the  highest  values 
of  life  as  incorporated  in  the  Supreme  Reality  or 
Perfect  Power  who  rules  the  Cosmos. 

3.      METHODS  OF  RELIGION  AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  procedure  of  philosophy  is  intellectual, 
finding  reasons  for  our  beliefs  and  rejecting  beliefs 
that  are  inconsistent  with  facts  or  with  well- 
grounded  principles.  Religion  is  not  primarily  in- 
tellectual. It  is  based  chiefly  upon  tradition-  and 
feeling.  The  factor  of  personal  need  may  change 
one's  religion.  The  influence  of  social  tradition  and 
the  sentiments  of  the  group  together  with  personal 
feeling  chiefly  determine  a  man's  religion.  Seldom 
does  the  individual  break  away  from  the  religion  of 
the  group.  The  method  of  philosophy  is  sustained 
rational  inquiry.  Philosophy  originates  and  flour- 
ishes in  the  rational  activity  of  the  individual  mind. 
The  group-mind  is  seldom  guided  by  reason.  The 
scope  of  philosophy  is  wider  than  that  of  religion. 
Philosophy  must  determine  not  only  the  nature  and 
meaning  of  religion,  but  also  its  relation  to  the 
principles  of  the  sciences  and  to  life. 

Philosophy  has  two  main  problems,  viz. :  — 

1.  The  interpretation  of  nature,  and, 

2.  The  interpretation  of  human  values. 

Why  the  conflict  between  religion  and  philos- 
ophy? Religion  is  conservative  and  philosophy  is 
not  conservative  but  radical  and  constructive.  Since 


PHILOSOPHY,  ITS  MEANING  AND  SCOPE  7 

religion  is  based  largely  on  social  customs  and  per- 
sonal feeling  it  is  not  always  very  careful  as  to 
whether  there  is  consistency  in  its  beliefs  or  not. 
Philosophy  seeks  consistency  above  all  things  else. 

Does  philosophy  make  assumptions?  No. — 
But  it  has  progressively  realized  that  there  is 
some  kind  of  intelligibility  in  the  world,  that  the 
world  can,  in  part,  be  understood,  and  that  we  have 
experiences  which,  if  properly  interrogated,  will 
yield  answers  to  our  questions. 

4.      POETRY  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

The  more  serious  poetry  of  the  race  has  a 
philosophical  structure  of  thought.  It  contains 
beliefs  and  conceptions  in  regard  to  the  nature  of 
man  and  the  universe,  God  and  the  soul,  fate  and 
providence,  suffering,  evil  and  destiny.  Great  poetry 
always  has,  like  the  higher  religion,  a  metaphysical 
content.  It  deals  with  the  same  august  issues,  ex- 
periences and  conceptions  as  metaphysics  or  first 
philosophy.  For  example,  Aeschylus,  Sophocles, 
Euripides,  Pindar,  Lucretius,  Omar  Khayyam, 
Dante,  Milton,  Shakespeare,  Coleridge,  Wordsworth, 
Matthew  Arnold,  Browning,  Tennyson,  Goethe, 
Schiller,  Moliere,  are  philosophical  poets.  Poetry  is 
more  concrete,  vivid  and  dramatic  in  its  treatment 
of  these  high  themes;  it  is  more  intuitive  in  its 
thought  processes  and  expressions  than  philosophy; 
hence  it  makes  a  more  direct  appeal  to  the  emotions 
than  philosophy.  A  philosophical  poet  is  a  meta- 
physician who  does  not  think  in  a  predominantly 
conceptional   and  ratiocinative  manner.    A  meta- 


8  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

physician  is  a  poet  who  cannot  think  in  concrete 
pictures,  or,  if  he  can,  is  unable  to  express  himself 
in  rhythm,  color  and  swift  movement  of  speech  as 
does  the  poet,  and,  at  the  same  time,  has  a  genius 
for  analysis  and  ratiocination.  Sometimes,  as  in 
Plato,  a  genius  is  supreme  in  both  orders  of  spiritual 
creativeness  and  then  we  get  the  absolute  best  in  the 
spiritual  realm,  the  profoundest  thought  wedded  to 
the  noblest  expression. 

REFERENCES 

F.  Paulsen,  "Introduction  to  Philosophy",  Introduction. 

J.  Royce,  "The  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy",  Intro- 
duction. 

W.  James,  "Some  Problems  of  Philosophy",  Chapter  I. 

O.  Kiilpe,  "Introduction  to  Philosophy",  Chapters  I 
and  IV. 

B.  Russell,  "The  Problems  of  Philosophy",  Chapter 
XV. 

R.  B.  Perry,  Approach  to  Philosophy,  Chapters  I-V. 

Encyclopedia  Britannica,  11th  edition,  article,  Phil- 
osophy. 

Plato,  "Symposium"  and  "Phaedo". 

Other  introductions  to  philosophy  by  Fletcher,  Fuller- 
ton,  Jerusalem;  Calkins,  "Persistent  Problems  of  Phil- 
osophy"; Perry,  "Approach  to  Philosophy";  Watson,  "Out- 
line of  Philosophy";   Sellars,  "Essentials  of  Philosophy". 


CHAPTER  II 
PRIMITIVE  THOUGHT 

1.  THE  PRIMITIVE  WORLD-VIEW. 

Although  prehistoric  man  has  left  no  records 
of  his  inner  life,  the  earliest  literature  throws  light 
on  primitive  views  and  the  facts  entitle  one  to  as- 
sume that  savage  belief  and  thought  today  is  very 
like  primitive  belief  and  thought.  This  assumption 
is  supported  by  the  study  of  the  earliest  literature 
of  civilized  peoples,  of  savage  lore,  and  of  the  theory 
of  evolution. 

Primitive  man  believed  that  everywhere  in  the 
world  everything  was  alive,  —  there  was  a  uni- 
versally diffused  energy.  The  world  was  not  orderly 
to  him,  it  was  only  alive.  Man  had  not  yet  arrived 
at  the  distinction  between  animate  and  inanimate 
things.  Moreover,  he  had  no  conception  of  per- 
sonality. Wherever  anything  was  done,  there  was 
life.  This  theory  may  be  called  pan-biotism  or  ani- 
matism  (a  better  term  than  "animism"  which  seems 
to  imply  the  idea  of  a  soul  differing  in  kind  from 
the  body) . 

2.  PRIMITIVE  IDEA  OF  THE  SOUL 

Primitive  men  do  not  think  of  the  soul  as  im- 
material. The  soul  has  no  specific  mass  or  weight. 
It  is  of  much  more  tenuous  material  than  the  body. 
It  is  an  active  principle.    But  it  is  not  different  in 

(9) 


10  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

kind  from  the  physical  objects  with  which  it  is  asso- 
ciated. It  differs  only  in  degree.  It  is  elusive.  It 
can  leave  the  body  and  enter  into  other  bodies.  It 
hovers  around  after  death;  so  food  and  drink  are 
given  for  it.  Many  primitive  peoples  do  not  regard 
the  soul  as  being  generated  with  the  body.  The 
Australian  savages,  it  is  said,  (according  to  Spencer 
and  Gillen,  "Northern  Tribes  of  Central  Australia",) 
do  not  regard  generation  and  birth  as  a  result  of 
the  sex  relation.  They  think  the  child  is  the  result 
of  a  pre-existing  soul  —  a  reincarnation.  Many 
consider  the  soul  as  a  manikin,  like  an  image  or  a 
shadow  of  the  body.  Mysterious  powers  are  at- 
tributed to  a  person's  shadow.  Savages  are  often 
afraid  to  have  their  pictures  taken  because  their 
souls  might  be  harmed  by  exposure  on  the  photo- 
graph. The  soul  is  sometimes  conceived  as  like  a 
bird,  also  as  air,  e.  g.,  by  the  ancient  Hebrews  and 
Romans.  Nervous  affections,  they  believe,  are 
caused  by  strange  spirits. 

The  causes  for  making  a  distinction  between 
and  a  separation  of  body  and  soul  were  reflection 
upon  dreams  and  visions  of  terror  and  delight,  the 
mysteriousness  of  death,  disease  and  misfortune, 
and  the  feeling  of  being  environed  by  mysterious 
forces  potent  for  good  and  evil. 

The  third  conception  is  that  of  spirits.  The 
great  spirits  were  believed  to  be  free  from  the 
hampering  influence  of  ordinary  physical  events.  A 
striking  phenomenon  will  cause  the  supposition  of 
spirits.  Some  spiritual  agencies  are  beneficent  and 
others  are  maleficent.     The  high  spirits  would  be 


PRIMITIVE  THOUGHT  11 

called  the  high  gods.     Most  savage  tribes  believe 
in  a  creator  god,  remote  and  inaccessible. 

Primitive  man  draws  no  clear  distinction  be- 
tween man  and  animals.  Totemism  considers  some 
animals  sacred.  The  totem  is  an  animal  having  a 
mysterious  connection  with  the  origin  and  well-being 
of  the  clan  or  tribe.  Members  of  a  totem  clan  do 
not  kill  the  animal  of  their  totem  except  under 
special  circumstances.  They  must  marry  out  of 
their  totem.  Plants,  too,  are  supposed  to  be  con- 
trolled by  the  spirits.  Moreover  the  spirit  of  an- 
cestors may  or  may  not  be  deified.^ 

3.     TABU 

This  is  an  important  item  in  primitive  beliefs. 
Anything  which  is  tabu  must  not  be  touched.  It 
is  set  apart  —  sacred.  A  prohibition  of  any  kind 
of  food  is  tabu,  e.  g.,  with  the  Jews,  pork,  and  with 
the  Hindus,  the  cow.  To  violate  tabu  would  bring 
injury  to  the  clan.  A  woman  after  childbirth  is 
tabu,  also  a  dead  body.  At  puberty,  boys  and  girls 
are  tabu.  The  person  of  the  king,  and  even  words, 
may  be  tabu. 


^  The  distinction  between  soul  and  spirit  is  not  sharply 
drawn  in  primitive  thought.  The  distinction  between  body, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  mana  soul  or  spirit  on  the  other  hand, 
is  made  in  terms  of  behavior.  Anj^hing  that  behaves  in  an 
unusual  or  unexpected  manner  has  mana  soul  or  spirit  in  it. 
The  arrow,  fishing  spear  or  canoe  that  behaves  queerly  is 
possessed  by  mana  or  spirit.  The  body  is  that  which  be- 
haves in  the  ordinary  fashion.  At  the  points  where  social 
groups  behave  or  need  to  behave  in  an  unusual  way  the 
great  spirits  or  gods  are  conceived  and  invoked. 


12  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Why  are  things  tabu?  Because  there  is  be- 
lieved to  be  some  mysterious  power  (in  Polynesia 
called  mana,  among  the  North  American  Indians, 
wakanda,  orenda,  manitou),  resident  in  them  or 
associated  with  them  in  some  way,  which,  if  the 
tabu  is  violated,  will  work  injury  to  the  violator 
or  his  tribal  associates.  Anthropologists  employ 
the  word  "mana"  to  designate  the  mysterious  force 
or  influence  which  primitive  man  believes  to  be 
widely  distributed  through  nature  and  which 
operates  through  all  sorts  of  objects. 

4.      MAGIC 

One  of  the  most  striking  features  of  primitive 
conduct  is  the  belief  in  and  use  of  magic.  Magic 
consists  of  various  special  devices  and  procedures 
through  which  control  of  the  mysterious  powers 
which  surround  man  is  obtained  for  the  advantage 
or  the  group  or  the  individual. 

Out  of  the  technique  of  primitive  magic  has 
arisen  two  very  different  types  of  technique.  One 
is  the  technique  of  science  which  aims,  by  the  use  of 
delicate  and  standardised  instruments  of  observa- 
tion, measurement  and  calculation,  such  as  fine 
balances,  micrometers,  microscopes,  microtomes, 
dividing  engines,  statistical  tables  and  algebraic 
formulas,  at  acquiring  an  accurate  and  economic  in- 
tellectual control  or  shorthand  formulation  of  the 
order  of  nature.  The  other  is  religious  technique, 
which  aims,  by  its  symbols,  rites,  prayers,  et  cetera, 
at  bringing  into  right  relation  with  one  another  the 
human  group  and  individual  on  the  one  hand,  and 


PRIMITIVE   THOUGHT  13 

the  Supreme  Power,  who  is  the  custodian  and  dis- 
penser of  the  values  on  participation  in  which 
depend  individual  and  social  well-being,  on  the  other 
hand.  In  brief,  religious  technique  aims  at  vital, 
moral  and  spiritual  control.  Both  these  techniques 
have  grown  out  of  primitive  magic  which  was 
primitive  science  and  religion  in  one.  Religion  and 
magic  became  differentiated  as  religion  came  to 
embody  more  clearly  and  rationally  the  organization 
of  human  values  into  a  coherent  and  socialized 
whole,  and  thus  to  furnish  explicitly  the  motives 
and  sanctions  for  a  higher  social-moral  order ;  while 
magic,  incapable  of  development  into  an  agency  of 
social  moralization  and  rational  spiritualization,  re- 
mained merely  a  technique  for  the  satisfaction  of 
isolated  interests  and  irrational  passions.  The 
Hebrew-Christian  and  the  Greek  lines  of  develop- 
ment are  most  instructive  and  significant  in  this 
regard. 

Magic  is  the  ancestor  of  technology,  the  an- 
cestor of  what  we  call  applied  science.  Medicine 
springs  from  it.  The  individual  medicine  man  or 
Big  Medicine  among  the  aboriginal  inhabitants  of 
this  continent  was  a  man  who,  by  reason  of 
special  ability  and  training,  was  able  to  do  things 
that  the  ordinary  individual  could  not  do  in  the  way 
of  controlling  mysterious  forces  of  nature.  The 
word  "medicine"  was  applied  not  merely  to  what  we 
call  medicine,  but  to  rain  making,  cloud  making, 
wind  making,  getting  strength  into  the  war  party, 
harming  their  enemies,  etc.  When  we  want  any- 
thing done  in  what  we  call  the  arts  of  technology, 


14  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

we  go  to  a  special  individual,  e.  g.,  physician, 
engineer,  carpenter,  plumber,  who  has  a  special 
training.  The  medicine  man  was  a  man  technically 
trained  and  able  to  control  mysterious  forces.  Of 
course,  the  ordinary  member  of  the  tribe  as  a  hunter, 
fisher,  etc.,  had  his  training,  and  he  could  do  the 
ordinary  things  in  the  ordinary  way.  But  if  he 
wanted  anything  special  done,  he  went  to  the  medi- 
cine man  —  the  Shaman. 

Two  kinds  of  magic  are  found,  i.  e.,  two  kinds 
of  magical  control,  viz. :  — 

1.  Contagious 

2.  Homeopathic. 

The  basis  of  the  belief  in  contagious  magic  is 
that  power  is  transmitted  by  contagion,  by  contact 
with  some  being  in  whom  this  power  resides.  That 
belief  is  the  source  of  one  of  the  most  wide-spread 
and  solemn  ceremonies  in  religion,  the  partaking 
of  the  god  in  the  sacred  meal  —  the  banquet  with 
the  gods. 

Where  totemism  exists,  we  find  that,  whereas 
ordinarily  the  individual  would  not  kill  the  animal, 
a  certain  part  of  that  animal  is  eaten  in  the  sacred 
meal  and  strength  is  derived  therefrom.  Can- 
nibalism is  partly  due  to  this.  The  savages  did 
not  always  eat  the  bodies  of  their  enemies  because 
they  were  hungry.  Possibly  they  had  plenty.  But 
if  the  enemy  were  particularly  strong,  they  would 
get  some  of  the  strength  by  eating  their  bodies. 
And  similarly,  if  the  individual  or  the  tribe,  not 
being  able  to  get  hold  of  the  whole  persons  of  their 
enemies,  could  get  hold  of  some  parts  of  them,  they 


PRIMITIVE  THOUGHT  15 

could  do  them  deadly  injury.  If  you  have  the  hair, 
clothes,  scalp-lock,  et  cetera,  you  have  the  enemy  in 
your  power.  The  magical  power  of  names  of  birds 
was  due  to  the  supposition  that  power  resided  in 
the  names. 

The  other  form  of  magic  is  homeopathic.  Not 
only  like  cures  like  but  like  causally  affects  like.  The 
original  dogma  of  homeopathy  is  found  deeply  im- 
bedded in  primitive  thought.  So,  if  you  could  not 
get  hold  of  anything  belonging  to  your  enemy,  you 
might  make  an  effigy  and  vent  your  anger  on  it. 
This  practice  has  come  down  to  modem  times. 
Primitive  man  believed  that  he  was  hurting  the 
original  by  injuring  the  image.  Rain  making,  wind 
making,  cloud  making,  the  dance,  imitating  the  com 
planting,  imitating  the  activities  of  war  and  the 
chase,  —  these  procedures  were  means  of  tapping 
mana,  the  mysterious  force  pervading  nature. 

As  a  familiar  instance  of  homeopathic  magic, 
I  would  cite  the  story  of  the  brazen  serpent.  The 
Israelites  on  the  way  through  the  wilderness  were 
attacked  by  a  plague  of  serpents,  and  the  brazen 
serpent  was  the  means  of  curing  that  plague  by 
homeopathic  magic. 

There  is  a  tendency  to  believe,  and  there  are 
people  who  still  believe,  in  the  efficacy  of  the  bones 
of  the  saints,  even  the  very  small  bones  and  frag- 
ments of  their  garments,  to  cure  diseases.  People 
still  believe  that  by  a  few  words  a  priest  actually 
transforms  bread  and  wine  into  body  and  blood. 
Some  people,  especially  the  peasantry  of  Europe, 
have  recourse  to  love  charms  and  to  injurious  magic. 


16  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

In  the  course  of  the  development  of  civilized 
society,  a  differentiation  took  place  in  the  magic, 
between  black  and  white  magic.  The  rulers  and 
the  people  of  Israel  were  forbidden  to  have  re- 
course to  soothsayers.  We  find  in  the  Middle  Ages 
in  Europe  a  belief  in  black  art,  black  magic,  evil  eye, 
and  various  forms  of  witchcraft,  a  belief  which  is 
still  in  existence  in  the  minds  of  a  good  many  people 
who  still  live  in  the  Dark  Ages.  Many  students  of 
that  subject  have  argued  that  from  the  first  there 
was  a  fundamental  difference  between  magic  and 
religion.  I  believe  they  have  one  origin  —  the 
belief  that  superhuman  agencies  may  be  employed 
for  either  human  ill  or  weal.  The  differentiation 
into  magic  and  religion  takes  place  gradually. 
Those  special  and  mysterious  methods,  through 
which  the  mysterious  powers  which  environ  man 
are  controlled,  are  placed  in  some  person  or  group 
of  persons.  Of  course,  whatever  ceremony  or  deed 
is  for  the  welfare  of  the  group  is  good.  But  now 
the  individuals  who  want  to  satisfy  their  desires, 
their  loves  and  hates  as  individuals,  will  have  re- 
course to  magic  to  gratify  a  passion  which  may  dis- 
turb the  order  of  the  group.  An  individual,  for 
example,  falls  in  love  and  has  recourse  to  a  magician 
to  get  another  person  as  a  husband  or  wife,  which 
may  be  bad  for  the  social  order.  One  has  a  grudge 
against  an  individual  and  tries  to  bring  him  to  de- 
struction. There  thus  arises  a  difference  between 
anti-social  magic  and  religion.  Magic  in  general  is 
a  specialized  kind  of  method  for  obtaining  control 
over  these  mysterious  forces  that  surround  and  in- 
vade the  life  of  man. 


PRIMITIVE  THOUGHT  17 

5.      MYTHOLOGY 

Among  all  primitive  peoples  and  in  the  early- 
literature  of  civilized  peoples  we  find  a  great  variety 
of  stories  to  account  for  the  origin  of  the  various 
things  in  the  world  and  to  account  for  how  things 
took  place.  Man  asks  from  the  beginning,  why  and 
how?  Why  and  how,  are  the  questions  which  we 
try  to  answer  by  science  and  philosophy.  Myth  is 
the  lineal  ancestor  of  science  and  philosophy.  Myths 
are  stories  invented  to  account  for  that  which  exists, 
to  account  for  the  world,  for  man,  and  for  his 
various  customs  and  beliefs  —  in  short,  to  explain 
why  and  how.  We  have,  for  example,  cosmogonic 
myths,  stories  to  account  for  the  origin  of  the  world, 
and  anthropogenic  myths,  to  account  for  the  origin 
of  man.  Then  we  have  stories  to  account  for  the 
origin  of  culture.     We  have  culture  heroes. 

Death  is  not  regarded  as  a  natural  affair  by 
primitive  man.  Death  is  believed  to  be  due  to  the 
intervention  of  some  malevolent  or  at  least  not  well 
disposed  power.  Normally  it  should  not  take  place. 
So  we  have  all  through  history  crude  explanations 
of  death,  as  e.  g.,  the  influence  of  the  serpent,  the 
devil,  sin.  Now  the  fact  that  many  of  the  stories 
seem  very  childish  should  not  blind  us  to  their  pur- 
pose. St.  Paul  said :  "When  I  was  a  child,  I  spake 
as  a  child,  I  felt  as  a  child,  I  thought  as  a  child ;  now 
that  I  am  become  a  man,  I  have  put  away  childish 
things".  At  the  time  of  the  origin  of  these  myths, 
mankind  was  in  a  state  of  intellectual  childhood. 

The  savage  gave  free  play  to  his  imagination 
and  was  not  checked  by  any  acquired  body  of  scien- 


18  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

tific  principles  and  of  scientific  methods  of  pro- 
cedure. Nor  was  he  checked  by  the  evidence  of  the 
validity  of  these  principles.  Consequently  he  thinks 
in  pictures,  and  just  as  he  interprets  the  phenomena 
of  nature  in  the  way  we  have  seen,  so  he  must  make 
use  of  his  own  crude,  disjointed  picture-thinking  to 
account  for  the  origin  of  things.  For  instance, 
today,  if  anybody  asks  a  scientist  how  man  came  on 
this  earth,  the  scientist  will  say  that  he  descended 
from  an  ape-like  ancestor  who  lived  in  trees  and 
later  developed  language,  invented  fire  and  tools,  and 
organized  societies.  That  is  the  evolutionary  ex- 
planation of  the  how  of  things.  We  say  that  the 
earth  was  formed  through  the  condensation  of  a 
nebula,  or  through  the  aggregation  of  meteoric  star 
dust  on  the  little  core  of  the  planet.  Development  or 
evolution  by  natural  processes  extending  through 
immense  periods  of  time  and  proceeding  from  the 
simple  to  the  more  complex  —  such  is  our  evolu- 
tionary doctrine  of  the  origins  of  the  earth,  animals 
and  man. 

When  we  come  to  the  higher  types  of  myth  as 
to  the  origin  of  things,  we  find  two  main  kinds  or 
types,  —  though  not  all,  perhaps,  can  be  thus  classi- 
fied. One  type  of  explanation  of  the  origin  of  things 
is  that  they  are  due  to  a  male  and  female  principle. 
It  is  very  obvious  why  man  would  explain  things  in 
terms  of  his  own  experience,  as  due  to  male  and 
female  powers.  Another  type  is  the  notion  that 
from  the  beginning  there  were  two  opposing  natures 
in  things.  The  whole  process  of  creation  is  due  to 
the  conflict  of  these  principles.     This  notion  em- 


PRIMITIVE   THOUGHT  19 

bodies  on  a  cosmical  scale  that  conflict  which  is  so 
universal  a  feature  of  common  life.  The  Chinese, 
for  example,  have  two  principles,  Yang  and  Yin  — 
light  and  darkness.  And  I  do  not  think  that  they 
regard  these  principles  as  male  and  female.  They 
are  opposed  principles,  positive  and  negative.  All 
things  have  sprung  into  being  from  them.  The 
ancient  Persians  have  two  conflicting  principles. 
Sometimes  in  Persian  literature  we  find  the  view 
that  these  two  principles  sprang  from  the  same 
original  source;  but  on  the  whole  the  Persian 
thought  is  that  two  opposing  principles  worked,  viz., 
Ahura  Mazda  and  Ahrimanes. 

We  find,  among  other  peoples,  various  con- 
ceptions confusedly  intermingled.  For  example, 
one  myth  is  that  the  sky  is  the  female  principle  and 
the  earth  the  male  principle,  and  from  these  all 
things  came,  from  a  primeval  chaos.  Without  any 
consistency,  the  ancient  Egyptians  believed  the 
separation  of  earth  and  sky  was  due  to  the  sun. 
They  forgot  their  own  myths  of  the  genesis  of  the 
sun  by  the  earth  and  that  the  sun  was  formed  from 
chaos.  Another  conception  was  that  the  sun  god 
is  the  father  of  gods  and  men. 

The  Hebrew  and  Babylonian  myths  have  a  fun- 
damental similarity.  They  both  presuppose  a  pri- 
meval chaos.  Tiamat  is  the  primeval  chaos.  The 
Babylonians  conceived  it  as  water.  And  the  origin 
of  things  was  due  to  Marduk.  In  the  book  of 
Genesis  it  is  stated  that  "in  the  beginning  God 
created  the  heavens  and  the  earth",  the  meaning  be- 
ing, not  out  of  nothing,  but  out  of  chaos.    And  the 


20  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

word  that  occurs  for  this  primeval  chaos  is  Tehom 
—  "the  abyss".  There  is  no  question  but  that  the 
story  of  genesis  in  the  book  of  Genesis  is  an  elevated 
form  of  the  Babylonian  story. 

It  is  of  special  interest  to  note  briefly  the  features 
of  some  of  the  main  Greek  cosmogonies  because 
mankind  emancipates  itself  first  from  this  confusion 
we  are  dealing  with  among  the  Greeks.  Homer  does 
not  represent  a  very  religious  point  of  view.  Some 
of  the  actions  of  the  gods  as  depicted  by  Homer 
aroused  the  ire  of  Plato  and  other  philosophers.  Of 
course,  we  are  not  to  take  these  seriously.  The 
book  was  compiled  in  the  present  shape  in  a  very 
sophisticated  civilization  tinged  with  skepticism  and 
irony.  The  original  beings  in  Homer  are  Oceanus 
— heaven,  and  Tethys — earth.  But  behind  both 
stands  the  goddess  Night.  The  Orphic  cosmogony 
is  similar.  Water  and  land  are  the  offspring  of 
earth  and  heaven. 

Two  other  stories  are  worth  noting.  Hesiod 
says  that  all  things  sprang  from  chaos,  which  meant 
space.  From  space  first  came  Gaia,  the  earthly 
mass  and  Eros  —  love  or  desire.  Then  sprang 
Erebus  and  Night,  then  Ether  —  day.  Pherecydes 
brings  in  a  trinity  the  first  member  of  which  is  an 
eternal  spiritual  principle.  The  first  and  mightiest 
is  Zeus ;  then  comes  Chronos  —  time.  From 
Chronos  sprang  fire,  air,  and  water.  The  third 
principle  is  Chthonia,  Earth-Spirit.  These  three 
seem  to  be  alike  eternal,  although  Zeus  is  the  most 
powerful  and,  as  Zeus-Eros,  is  the  principle  agent 
in  creation. 


PRIMITIVE  THOUGHT  21 

REFERENCES  ON  GREEK  AND  HEBREW  RELIGION 

Ency.  Britannica,  11th  ed.,  Articles  Greek  Religion  and 
Hebrew  Religion. 

Murray,  G.,  Four  Stages  of  Greek  Religion. 

Adam,  J.,  The  Religious  Teachers  of  Greece. 

Cornford,  F.  M.,  From  Religion  to  Philosophy,  pp. 
73-122. 

Kautsch,  Religion  of  Israel,  in  Hastings'  Dictionary  of 
the  Bible. 

Article  Israel  by  Kennett  in  Encylopaedia  of  Religion 
and  Ethics. 

Robertson  Smith,  Religion  of  the  Semites. 

Fowler,  H.  T.,  History  of  Hebrew  Religion. 

REFERENCES  ON  THE  PRIMITIVE  WORLD-VIEW 

Encyclopedia  of  Religion  and  Ethics,  Articles  on  Cos- 
mogony and  Cosmology,  Mana  and  Magic. 

Carpenter,  J.  E.,  Comparative  Religion,  Chapters  III 
and  IV. 

Coe,  G.  A.,  The  Psychology  of  Religion,  Chapters  V, 
VIII,  IX. 

Clodd,  E.,  Animism,  sections  1-9. 

Frazer,  J.  G.,  The  Golden  Bough,  Vol.  I,  Chapters 
I-III. 

Haddon,  A.  C,  Magic  and  Fetishism. 

Kingsley,  M.  H.,  West  African  Studies,  Chapters 
V-VIII. 

Thomas,  W.  I.,  Source  Book  for  Social  Origins,  651- 
735. 

Reinach,  S.,  Orpheus,  Chapters  I-IV. 

Encyclopedia  Britannica,  11th  ed.,  Articles  on  An- 
imism^ Magic  and  Mythology. 

l/jevons,  F.  B.,  Introduction  to  the  History  of  Religion. 

Marett,  R.  R.,  The  Threshold  of  Religion. 

Brinton,  D.  G.,  The  Religions  of  Primitive  Peoples. 

Tylor,  E.  B.,  Primitive  Culture. 

Durkheim,  E.,  The  Elementary  Forms  of  the  Re- 
ligious  Life. 

Crawley,  E.,  The  Idea  of  the  Soul. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   DIFFERENTIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND 
SCIENCE  FROM  RELIGION 

1.      THE  RISE  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  INDEPENDENCE 

The  first  influence  that  made  for  independent 
intellectual  inquiry  into  things  was  the  break-down 
of  the  primitive  world  view.  In  order  that  man  may 
understand  and  control  the  forces  operative  in  the 
world,  it  is  necessary  that  he  discover  the  sequences 
among  phenomena.  Now  when  man  discovers  that 
there  is  regularity  of  sequential  relations  among 
phenomena,  that  is  a  discovery  of  what  we  call  the 
causal  relation,  that  is  to  say,  one  thing  is  invariably 
dependent  for  its  appearance  on  other  things.  The 
regular  antecedent  is  cause  and  the  regular  conse- 
quent is  effect. 

From  the  beginning  man  must  have  tried,  in  so 
far  as  he  exercised  his  intelligence,  to  discover 
causal  relations,  and,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  the 
primitive  world  view  is  a  theory  of  the  causal  de- 
pendencies, of  the  regular  sequences  of  events.  And 
from  that  theory  there  follows  certain  practices. 
Magic  and  religion  aim  at  methods  of  control  over 
the  causes  of  things.  Surrounded  by  mysterious 
forces  that  affected  him,  that  operated  on  him  for 
weal  or  woe,  early  man  formulated  a  theory  of  the 
characters  of  these  forces  from  his  experience.  He 
regarded  things  that  affected  him  as  expressions  of 

(22) 


DIFFERENTIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  23 

forces,  spirits,  gods,  as  mysterious  or  supernatural 
operations,  and  devised  means  to  control  them. 
Science  today  is  concerned  with  the  same  problem. 
But  between  our  science  and  practice  and  the  beliefs 
and  practices  of  primitive  man  lies  the  whole  his- 
tory of  science  and  philosophy  as  independent  enter- 
prises. 

There  are  three  fallacies  to  which  the  primitive 
man  was  prone.  There  are  many  fallacies,  but 
these  are  the  three  most  prevalent  and  persistent. 
The  modern  man  is  still  a  prey  to  them.  A  train- 
ing in  scientific  habits  of  investigation  and  of  per- 
sistency in  analyzing  things  into  their  elements,  is 
to  get  rid  of  the  influences  of  these  fallacies.  These 
are: 

1.  "Post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc". 

2.  The  neglect  of  negative  instances. 

3.  Classification  by  means  of  superficial 
resemblances. 

The  fallacy  of  "post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc"  in 
English  means  this :  That  because  we  once  or  twice 
observe  one  thing  to  follow  another,  therefore  that 
which  follows  is  the  effect  of  that  which  it  follows 
upon.  Conversely,  that  which  we  have  occasionally 
observed  to  immediately  precede  an  event  is  the 
cause.  Because  of  man's  native  propensity  to  jump 
to  conclusions,  a  single  instance  of  a  sequence  will 
be  taken  as  evidence  of  a  causal  dependence.  His 
primitive  and  persistent  credulity  makes  such  a 
belief,  once  formed,  very  difficult  to  dislodge.  The 
superstitions  that  still  prevail  among  human  beings, 
especially  feminine  beings,  are  due  to  the  persistence 


24  THE  FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

of  primitive  causal  theories  and  beliefs  that  owe 
their  rise  to  this  fallacy.  For  example,  that  it  is 
unlucky  to  take  journeys  on  Friday;  certain  things 
bring  bad  luck;  thirteen  is  an  unlucky  number,  be- 
cause disasters  have  occurred  when  something  was 
done  on  the  13th,  or  thirteen  were  at  the  table,  — 
these  are  instances  of  primitive  causal  theories. 

Now,  suppose  the  members  of  a  tribe  were 
starting  on  a  hunting  expedition  and  something 
unusual  happened,  as  e.  g.,  there  was  a  great 
clap  of  thunder,  a  brilliant  flash  of  lightning,  or 
strange  birds  flew  across  the  sky.  Anything 
strange  arrested  attention.  To  primitive  man, 
anjrthing  that  is  mysterious  has  supernatural 
significance.  They  started  out  with  that  in  their 
minds.  They  went  on  and  were  defeated,  or  did 
not  get  game,  or  the  game  turned  on  them  and  some 
of  them  were  killed.  Immediately  the  conclusion 
followed  naturally  that  there  was  a  causal  connec- 
tion, that  they  should  not  have  started,  or  that  they 
should  have  propitiated  the  spirits  who  sent  the 
birds  or  the  lightning.  We  only  are  able  to  eliminate 
these  fallacies  by  a  thoroughly  exact  analysis  which 
leads  us  to  determine  that  there  is  some  constant 
relation. 

Now  as  to  the  fallacy  of  making  further  obser- 
vation suit  one's  already  formed  belief  and  neglect- 
ing the  negative  instances,  having  observed  that 
once  or  twice  A  follows  B,  the  conclusion  that  A 
always  follows  B  is  made,  and  men  never  look  for 
the  instances  in  which  A  occurs  and  there  is  no  B ; 
and  they  never  try  to  analyze  A  and  B  to  separate 


DIFFERENTIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  25 

relevant  from  irrelevant  factors.  The  tendency  to 
neglect  negative  instances  is  a  consequence  of  that 
primitive  tendency  to  believe  what  one  sees  in  the 
lump,  without  further  inquiry.  Suppose,  for  ex- 
ample, you  believe  in  the  prophetic  significance  of 
dreams.  Whenever  a  dream  occurs  that  turns  out 
to  be  even  vaguely  anticipatory  of  a  later  occurrence, 
you  will  chalk  it  down  and  other  dreams  will  be  over- 
looked. This  is  often  the  sole  source  of  belief  in  the 
efficacy  of  certain  therapeutic  methods.  You  take 
some  medicine  and  get  well.  The  medicine  may  have 
had  nothing  to  do  with  it.  Nature  cures  ninety  per 
cent  of  ills.  So  the  doctor,  no  matter  what  the 
trouble  is,  has  a  tremendous  advantage  over  the 
credulous  patient,  because  when  a  person  is  in  dis- 
tress, physical  or  mental,  and  looks  for  some  remedy, 
and  is  told  by  someone  else  that  something  is  good, 
whether  faith  healing  or  medicine,  immediately,  if 
he  gets  well,  the  patient  concludes  that  it  was  the 
consequence  of  the  advised  remedy. 

The  following  is  a  story  from  the  ancient 
Greeks.  A  certain  Greek  was  skeptical  as  to  the 
power  of  Neptune  —  in  Greek  Poseidon  —  to  really 
control  the  waves.  A  friend  took  him  into  the 
temple  and  showed  him  a  large  number  of  votive 
offerings  that  had  been  put  into  the  temple  by 
sailors  and  fishermen  who  had  called  upon  Neptune 
and  the  sea  had  become  calm.  This  proved  the  case 
to  the  pious  believer.  But  the  skeptic  said,  "Before 
I  make  up  my  mind  I  would  like  to  hear  from  those 
who  were  drowned",  that  is,  to  hear  the  negative  in- 
stances of  those  who  had  called  upon  Neptune  in 


26  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

vain.  It  is  very  hard  for  humankind  not  to  make 
up  its  mind  until  it  hears  from  the  drowned.  Most 
people  tend  to  jump  to  conclusions. 

The  third  persistent  fallacy  is  classification  by 
means  of  superficial  resemblances.  Identity  of 
nature  and  operation  is  attributed  to  things  that 
look  alike  in  outline  or  behavior.  A  stick,  a  stone 
or  a  cloud  looks  or  moves  as  an  animal  or  man 
might,  therefore  it  is  animated  by  similar  motives. 
The  trees  in  the  forest  or  the  wind  at  sundown  or 
dawn  make  sounds  like  the  voices  of  men  or  animals, 
therefore  they  are  alive.  Animatism  has  one  of  its 
most  powerful  supports  in  this  mode  of  reasoning 
which  is,  of  course,  the  primitive  form  of  the  argu- 
ment from  analogy.  Resemblance  or  analogy  fur- 
nishes one  of  the  permanent  modes  of  arranging 
facts  in  order,  but  we  must  weigh  as  well  as  count 
the  points  of  likeness  and  balance  them,  as  to  both 
weight  and  number,  against  the  differences.  This 
precaution  the  primitive  mind  commonly  fails  to 
observe. 

What  leads  to  the  break-down  of  faith  in  the 
primitive  world  view?  The  development  of  civiliza- 
tion; the  growth  of  social  organization;  the 
establishment  of  stable,  well  ordered  states;  the 
development  in  the  arts  of  life ;  agriculture  and  the 
industrial  arts.  When  civilization  develops  so  that 
it  includes  a  large  number  of  families  with  stable 
civic  organization  and  advance  is  made  in  agricul- 
ture, works  of  architecture,  engineering  and  the 
household  arts,  and  especially  when  one  people  comes 
into  contact  with  other  peoples  and  observes  dif- 


DIFFERENTIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  27 

ferences  in  customs  and  arts,  keen  minded  in- 
dividuals make  discoveries.  They  discover  that  the 
primitive  theory  does  not  work ;  that  good  crops  do 
not  always  follow  on  the  propitiation  of  the  gods; 
that  success  in  war  does  not  always  follow  upon  the 
propitiation  of  the  deities  and  supernatural  powers. 
They  discover  that  beliefs  running  back  to  im- 
memorial antiquity  are  often  a  hindrance  to  the 
welfare  and  progress  of  the  individual  and  the 
group.  In  other  words,  a  question  arises  as  to  the 
validity  of  these  beliefs,  because  they  do  not  pro- 
duce the  results  expected.  In  fact  they  may  produce 
bad  results. 

By  familiarity  with  the  qualities  of  natural 
objects  gained  through  manual  work,  men  dis- 
covered that  there  is  a  regularity  of  sequence  and  a 
constancy  of  behavior  in  things  and  that  you  can 
get  certain  results  by  taking  account  of  certain 
qualities.  It  is  discovered  that  by  rubbing  amber 
you  can  get  sparks  and  if  you  do  not  rub,  no  incan- 
tation will  bring  forth  the  sparks. 

The  development  of  political  life  through  the 
organization  of  strong  and  stable  states  leads  to 
higher  moral  conceptions.  Some  of  the  old  customs 
are  seen  to  be  hindrances  to  the  proper  conduct  of 
business,  industry,  and  to  proper  administration 
and  the  progress  of  the  social  order.  The  develop- 
ment of  social  life  in  stability,  the  growth  of  justice, 
the  definition  of  property  rights,  rights  of  contract, 
the  growth  of  man's  whole  moral  and  social  life  as 
a  member  of  society,  brings  to  pass  an  increasing 
recognition  of  the  significance  of  the  personality  of 


28  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  individual.  There  is  more  leisure,  more  oppor- 
tunity, more  scope  for  exceptional  individuals,  for 
inventors  and  critics  of  the  established  beliefs  and 
customs.  The  discoveries  of  new  ways  of  thinking 
are  always  made  by  individuals.  Masses  of  men 
never  discover  anything,  never  invent  anything.  It 
is  always  the  exceptional  individual  who  creates  new 
ideas  and  values.  The  crowd  is  irrational,  imitative 
and  subject  to  the  influence  of  suggestion.  There- 
fore, the  type  of  society  in  which  there  is  develop- 
ment, scope  and  stimulation  for  the  exceptional  in- 
dividual, is  the  type  of  society  which  progresses 
most  rapidly  in  the  arts  and  sciences,  which  pro- 
gresses intellectually  and  spiritually. 

So  far  as  we  are  concerned,  we  belong  to  the 
European  culture  system.  Our  culture  is  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  European  culture,  and  what  I  have 
to  say  about  the  genesis  of  philosophy  and  science 
will  have  no  reference  to  the  history  of  India  or 
China.  Up  to  the  present  time  China  has  had  no 
influence  on  the  development  of  our  culture,  and 
India  has  had  hardly  any.  So  it  is  the  development 
of  European  science  and  philosophy,  of  which  we 
are  the  heirs,  that  I  am  concerned  with. 

The  earliest  important  civilizations  were  along 
the  rivers  —  in  the  fertile  river  valleys.  Babylonia 
and  Assyria  attained  a  high  degree  of  development 
in  written  language,  social  organization,  agriculture, 
and  the  mechanical  arts.  Some  of  their  archi- 
tectural achievements  are  still  sources  of  wonder, 
and  their  social  and  religious  ideas  were  the  ances- 
tors of  some  of  the  most  fundamental  ideas  of  the 
Hebrews  and  even  of  the  Greeks. 


DIFFERENTIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  29 

The  next  period  of  civilization  after  the  river 
period  was  the  Mediterranean.  The  shores  of  the 
Mediterranean  were  naturally  favorable  environs 
for  the  development  of  civilization.  It  is  not  very 
large,  the  shores  are  near  enough  together  to  pro- 
mote traffic,  the  climate  is  good,  there  are  clear 
skies,  varied  rocky  shores,  fertile  plains  and  pic- 
turesque river  valleys.  Apparently  in  the  island  of 
Crete  there  developed  a  high  degree  of  civilization, 
the  Minoan  civilization.  Crete  was  one  center  of 
advancement,  but  it  was  not  confined  to  Crete.  Asia 
Minor,  the  Hellespont,  and  other  contiguous  regions 
had  their  share  in  it.  This  civilization  spread  over 
the  whole  region  and  probably  over  a  large  part  of 
the  Mediterranean. 

There  came  down  upon  this  early  civilization 
and  conquered  the  representatives  of  it,  a  people 
whom  we  call  the  Greeks  and  who  call  themselves 
Hellenes.  They  were  in  many  respects  less  highly 
civilized  than  the  people  they  conquered.  They 
were  Aryans,  the  race  which  we  belong  to.  The 
Greeks  had  certain  common  features  in  their  physi- 
cal build,  the  shape  of  the  head,  et  cetera,  which 
characterized  them.^  A  great  advance  in  civiliza- 
tion, I  think,  has  always  involved  intimate  contact 
of  two  peoples.  An  isolated  people  does  not  ad- 
vance. And  the  contact  of  the  Hellenes  with  the 
other  peoples  stimulated  the  Hellenes.    It  gave  them 


^  Perhaps  the  invaders  were  of  the  same  racial  stock 
as  the  more  civilized  people  whom  they  conquered.  This  is 
an  unsettled  question. 


30  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

material  to  work  on,  and  they  worked  in  a  favor- 
able environment.  The  geography  of  the  eastern 
Mediterranean  is  favorable  to  the  development  of 
human  culture.  There  were  beautiful  promontories, 
inland  mountains  and  valleys,  good  climate  and 
plenty  of  sunshine,  which  afford  favorable  condi- 
tions to  stimulate  humankind.  The  economic  con- 
ditions were  also  good,  material  wants  were  easily 
provided  for  in  a  genial  clime  and  with  slave  labor. 

This  is  where  we  find  the  origins  of  science. 
Why  were  the  Greeks  so  keen  and  creative? 
Originally,  why  did  they  possess  such  eager 
curiosity,  such  fertility  of  thought?  They  must 
have  had  them  from  the  first,  to  some  extent.  Some- 
how, in  their  racial  characteristics,  there  was  a 
capacity  for  more  advanced  civilization.  They 
inter-married  with  the  aboriginal  inhabitants.  The 
most  progressive  races  are  always  mixed  races. 
The  parents  of  science  and  philosophy  are  the 
Greeks.  Science  and  philosophy's  first  independent 
disciples  appeared  about  600  B.  C. 

The  Greeks  were  traders,  industrialists,  trav- 
elers. One  of  the  richest  Greek  cities  of  that  time 
was  Miletus,  the  birthplace  of  science  and  phil- 
osophy. Thales  of  Miletus,  who  flourished  about 
585  B.  C.,  was  the  first  philosopher  and  physicist. 
His  school  was  called  the  Milesian  School.  Of  his 
school  were  Anaximenes,  who  flourished  about  540 
B.  C.,  and  Anaximander,  who  flourished  about  570 
B.C. 


DIFFERENTIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  31 

2.      THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  EARLY  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY. 

Thales  said  that  the  first  principle  of  things, 
the  substance  or  stuff  of  all  things,  was  water.  This 
does  not  seem  like  a  very  significant  statement. 
The  cosmogonies  had  already  said  that  Oceanus  was 
first.  We  have  traditions  that  Thales  did  various 
things.  He  was  a  mathematician  and  astronomer 
and  foretold  an  eclipse.  He  cornered  all  the  oil 
presses,  showing  his  business  shrewdness.  But  for 
our  purpose,  the  important  point  is,  what  is  the 
significance  of  the  theory  that  the  substance  of 
things  is  water?  Thales  held  that  every  finite  thing 
that  comes  into  existence  is  a  modification  of  water. 
He  held  the  view  that  by  condensation  and  rarefac- 
tion of  water  all  things  rise,  and  he  actually  at- 
tempted an  evolutionary  account  of  the  genesis  of 
man,  and  plants  and  animals.  Thales  regarded  the 
substance,  water,  as  having  in  it  life.  None  of  these 
early  thinkers  recognized  any  distinction  between 
living  and  non-living,  or  mental  and  non-mental. 
They  believed  that  every  particle  of  the  substance 
of  things  had  the  germ  of  life  in  it.  They  were  all 
Hylozoists.  They  were  all,  in  a  broad  sense.  Evolu- 
tionists. 

Anaximenes  said  air  or  the  ether  is  the  sub- 
stance of  things.  Anaximander  said  that  the  un- 
limited (to  apeiron),  a  boundless  animated  mass,  is 
the  substance  of  things. 

Why  does  Thales'  theory  constitute  the  birth 
of  independent  philosophy  and  science?  First,  it  is 
a  natural  principle,  one  natural  substance  or 
principle,  and  not  a  multitude  of  mysterious  spirits ; 


32  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

an  empirical  substance  is  made  the  stuff  and  cause 
of  all  things.  Second,  Thales,  I  think,  was  un- 
doubtedly led  to  his  view  by  observation  and  reflec- 
tion upon  the  mutations  that  water  undergoes,  its 
rarefaction  and  condensation.  It  solidifies  into  ice 
and  rarefies  into  vapor.  It  enters  into  so  many 
things;  into  rocks  and  breaks  them.  Things  die 
without  water,  with  enough  water  they  flourish. 
Thales  lived  on  an  island  in  the  ^gean  Sea  off  the 
coast  of  Asia  Minor,  and  his  situation  possibly  sug- 
gested his  hypothesis  that  water  was  the  basic  and 
all-inclusive  substance  of  things. 

Herein  lay  the  signiflcance  of  the  first  theories 
advanced  by  the  lonians,  Thales  and  his  disciples; 
these  theories  all  have  this  in  common,  however 
otherwise  they  may  conceive  the  one  substance,  that 
they  consist  in  the  notion  that  there  is  one  natural 
substance,  stuff,  material,  out  of  which  all  things 
are  fashioned,  and  that  the  whole  variety  of  par- 
ticular things  which  exist,  animals,  plants,  men,  as 
well  as  rocks,  air,  ocean,  the  whole  variety  and  the 
endless  succession  of  actual  beings,  are  fashioned 
out  of  the  one  natural  substance,  the  primeval  stuff 
which  is  not  conceived  as  merely  material.  Its 
material  characteristics  are  most  obvious,  but  it  is 
dynamic  and  living,  and  is  distributed  throughout 
the  entire  world,  and  all  things  arise  from  it 
through  the  operation  of  natural  causes.  So  this 
one  substance  is  living  matter  (Hylozoism). 

Now  once  a  conception  of  this  sort  has  been 
definitely  formulated  and  shaped,  there  are  several 
questions  which  logically  arise.     And  the  first  ques- 


DIFFERENTIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  33 

tion  which  arises  is  this:  What  is  permanent 
amidst  or  through  all  the  ceaseless  changes  in 
particular  beings?  If  the  primeval  stuff  is  con- 
stantly undergoing  modification,  then  it  never  exists 
as  such  in  the  form  in  which  it  is  conceived.  What 
is  it  that  is  permanent?  That  is  the  first  question. 
The  second  question  is :  What  is  the  cause,  or  the 
causes,  of  the  ceaseless  flux,  the  endless  modification 
of  things,  things  arising,  changing,  passing  away, 
and  new  ones  arising?  The  clearness  and  con- 
sistency ^vith  which  various  Greek  thinkers  raised 
and  tried  to  answer  these  questions,  once  they  hit 
upon  the  trail,  is  a  mark  of  their  genius. 

One  of  the  greatest  thinkers,  Heraclitus  of 
Ephesus  (538-475  B.  C),  a  city  of  Asia  Minor,  on 
the  coast,  answered  the  question  by  saying  that 
nothing  is  permanent,  all  is  change,  ceaseless  flux 
is  the  nature  of  things.  There  is  no  substance  that 
retains  the  same  characteristics  and  qualities.  The 
world  of  nature  is  the  theater  of  incessant  mutation, 
"panta  rei",  -n-avTa  >«",  all  things  flow.  But  all 
change  takes  place  in  an  orderly  fashion,  according 
to  the  eternally  fixed  law  or  decree  —  Logos,  which 
in  Greek  means  both  word  and  reason,  or  thought 
expressed. 

This  conception  of  Heraclitus  is  the  ancestor 
of  our  doctrine  of  natural  law.  So  far  as  the  actual 
course  of  particular  things  is  concerned,  their  un- 
ending fate  is  ceaselessly  to  arise  and  to  pass  away, 
but  this  fate  is  not  the  expression  of  the  wills  of 
animated  beings  or  spirits,  nor  is  it  the  result  of 


34  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

chance.  It  is  the  expression  of  rational  order  in 
the  universe,  and  that  rational  order  Heraclitus 
identified  with  God  —  Zeus. 

Now  as  to  the  causes  of  change,  the  doctrine  of 
Logos  or  Reason  or  Universal  Law  means  that  there 
is  no  disorder.  There  is  nothing  that  happens 
without  reason  or  cause.  As  to  the  question,  what 
is  the  ultimate  cause,  what  in  the  last  analysis  is  it 
that  keeps  things  going,  why  this  constant  cyclical 
process  of  generation  and  decease,  Heraclitus  says 
strife  is  the  father  of  all  things  finite.  Struggle 
or  conflict  is  an  inexpugnable  feature  of  reality. 
This  old  Greek  thinker  anticipated  by  many  cen- 
turies the  Darwinian  doctrine  of  the  struggle  for 
existence,  as  well  as  HegePs  doctrine  of  the  develop- 
ment of  reality  through  conflict.  "War  is  the 
father  and  king  of  all  things".  The  world  is  the 
theater  of  the  ceaseless  conflict,  with  ever  varying 
results,  of  two  opposing  tendencies,  the  tendency 
toward  discord,  and  the  tendency  toward  harmony. 
But  whichever  may  be  in  the  ascendency  at  a  par- 
ticular time  in  a  particular  region  of  the  universe, 
whichever  may  have  the  upper  hand,  whether  it  be 
peace  or  war,  all  takes  place  according  to  law,  ac- 
cording to  reason,  according  to  the  eternal  divine 
order. 

As  to  the  stuff,  the  substance  of  things,  Her- 
aclitus regarded  fire  as  the  best  symbol,  the  nearest 
approximation  that  we  have  in  experience.  That 
may  be  conceived  as  the  primary  stuff.  This  is  one 
radical  solution  of  the  problems  of  the  relations  of 
change  and  permanence,  multiplicity  and  unity. 


DIFFERENTIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  35 

But  another  equally  radical  solution  and  way 
to  get  rid  of  the  problem  of  the  opposition  between 
the  ceaseless  changes  that  the  world  shows  and  the 
permanence  of  the  primary  stuff,  is  to  say  that  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  change.  And  this  is  the  way 
that  Parmenides  of  Elea,  who  flourished  about  475 
B.  C,  solved  the  question.  For  him  the  substance 
of  things  is  one  and  unchangeable.  Consequently, 
all  the  changes  which  we  see  are  illusory,  and  all 
the  multiplicity  that  we  see  in  things  is  illusion. 
There  is  no  motion  or  change  in  reality,  that  too  is 
an  illusion  of  our  senses.  There  is  no  growth  and 
decay  in  reality,  and  there  is  no  plurality  of  beings, 
there  is  one  and  only  one  substance  —  "hen  kai 
pan",  ev  Kal  iravy  the  One  and  All. 

Parmenides  was  probably  stimulated  by  Xe- 
nophanes  who  was  a  religious  poet.  He  was 
especially  interested  in  the  religious  aspect  of 
philosophy  and  insisted  that  there  was  but  one 
supreme  and  divine  being.  He  criticised  the  popular 
doctrine  of  the  gods,  saying  that  the  Ethiopian's 
gods  were  Ethiopians  in  color  and  made  in  the 
image  of  the  worshipper  himself,  and  that  an  ox's 
god  would  be  like  an  ox.  He  criticised  the  attribu- 
tion of  human  qualities  to  the  gods.  Parmenides 
solves  the  problem  of  the  contrast  between  perma- 
nence and  change,  unity  and  plurality,  by  saying 
that  wnat  we  call  change,  growth  and  decay,  birth 
and  death,  are  illusions.  What  we  apparently  see 
through  our  senses,  that  there  exist  a  multitude  of 
beings,  the  things  I  see  with  my  eyes  and  touch  with 
my  hands,  all  these  perceptions  are  illusions.     There 


36  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

is  only  one  being.  He  conceived  the  One  as  like  a 
material  sphere,  because  the  sphere  was  round  and 
complete.  And  he  defended  his  theory  by  argu- 
ments, showing  the  irrationality  of  belief  in  change 
and  multiplicity.  Zeno,  his  disciple,  with  great 
acuteness,  developed  a  series  of  contradictions  in- 
volved in  the  assumption  that  motion  is  real  (the 
Achilles,  the  flying  arrow)  ;  that  there  exists  a 
plurality  of  beings  (the  infinite  divisibility  and  the 
infinite  extensibility  paradoxes).  These  contradic- 
tions, he  says,  show  the  utter  untrustworthiness  of 
the  senses. 

Now,  of  course,  Parmenides  and  Zeno  did  not 
have  to  solve  the  problem,  what  is  the  cause  of 
change?  There  is  no  need  for  a  cause  if  there  is 
no  change  or  plurality.  But  they  escaped  that  prob- 
lem to  face  another,  viz.,  what  is  the  cause  of  the 
illusion  that  we  are  all  under?  What  is  the  cause  of 
the  universal  belief  that  there  is  change  and  multi- 
plicity? They  failed  to  explain  this  satisfactorily, 
and  that  failure  is  an  immediate  factor  in  develop- 
ing a  consciousness  of  a  new  problem,  viz.,  that  of 
knowledge  and  error.  The  very  diflftcult  and  im- 
portant question  arises  as  to  why  we  should  err  and 
how  we  can  know  anything,  if  our  senses  are  wholly 
untrustworthy. 

The  Eleatics  solved  the  problem  of  permanence 
and  change  by  eliminating  change.  Heraclitus 
solved  it  by  making  change  universal  and  by  affirm- 
ing that  the  only  thing  which  is  permanent  is  the 
law  and  order  of  change.  Another  series  of 
thinkers  tried  in  various  ways  to  combine  the  two 


DIFFERENTIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  37 

notions.  Empedocles  of  Agrigentum  (495-435  B. 
C.)  advanced  the  theory  that  there  are  four 
elements.  These  are  permanent :  —  earth,  air,  fire 
and  water.  He  took  these  from  the  myth-makers, 
his  predecessors.  These  are  the  permanent  and 
original  things.  The  succession  of  particular 
beings  that  constitute  our  world  is  due  to  the  inter- 
mixture of  these  elements  in  various  proportions. 
They  are  always  being  mixed  and  separated,  com- 
bined, dissolved  and  recombined.  And  he  conceived 
every  particular  thing  as  a  mechanical  mixture  of 
the  four  elements.  As  to  the  cause  of  this  intermix- 
ture, he  says  there  are  two  forces  that  exist  through 
all  time,  they  are  eternal  —  Love  and  Hate.  This 
is  a  more  pictorial  form  of  Heraclitus'  doctrine  of 
harmony  and  discord.  And  because  love  and  hate 
are  always  striving  against  one  another,  is  the 
reason  why  we  have  in  nature  the  ceaseless  succes- 
sion of  all  sorts  of  things  and  events.  It  is  worth 
noting  that  Heraclitus,  Empedocles  and  others  be- 
lieved that  the  course  of  the  universe  runs  in  cycles. 
Leucippus  was  the  founder  of  the  atomic 
school.  The  mere  fact  that  Leucippus  first  formu- 
lated the  theory  of  atoms  marks  him  as  one  of  the 
most  important  thinkers  that  the  world  has  ever 
seen.  Leucippus'  theory,  more  fully  developed 
later  by  Democritus,  was  that  that  which  is  per- 
manent is  an  indefinite  number  of  indivisible  par- 
ticles of  matter,  the  atoms.  These  are  inde- 
structible, they  never  came  into  being  and  never 
can  pass  out  of  being.  They  exist  in  space.  Why 
do    they    exist?    There    is    no    why.     Space    and 


38  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

atoms  are  the  original  and  indestructible  con- 
stituents of  being.  The  atoms  differed  in  size  and 
shape,  and  consequently  in  weight  and  mass.  In 
tumbling  about  in  space,  they  jostle  one  another 
and  become  compacted  in  various  ways.  The  whole 
course  of  things  is  due  to  the  ceaseless  blind  dance 
of  atoms  in  space. 

Anaxagoras  of  Clazomenae  (500-428  B.  C.) 
was  another  early  Greek  thinker  who  formulated  an 
original  theory  of  permanence  and  change,  or  unity 
and  multiplicity.  Like  Empedocles  and  Leucippus, 
his  idea  was  that  the  substance  of  things  consists  of 
indestructible  elements.  His  elements  he  calls 
seeds,  spermata.  Aristotle  calls  them  homoiomeries 
—  like  parts.  Anaxagoras  says  that,  when  we 
analyze  our  perceptions,  we  find  a  very  con- 
siderable variety  of  distinct  qualities.  We  have, 
of  course,  to  begin  with,  the  qualities  perceived 
through  the  senses;  colors,  shapes,  sounds,  tactual 
perceptions,  temperature  sensations,  etc.  Besides 
that,  when  we  dissect  a  living  being,  we  find  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  stuff  or  structure,  bones,  nerves, 
blood-vessels,  muscles.  That  is  the  starting  point 
of  the  doctrine.  Corresponding  to  every  quality 
that  we  find,  there  is  an  indefinite  number  of  minute 
parts  or  elements  which  havo  the  same  qualities. 
Bone  is  made  up  of  bone  parts,  nerve  of  nerve  parts, 
muscle  of  muscle  parts,  heat  of  heat  parts. 

We  can  smile  at  Anaxagoras  because  he  did  not 
have  behind  him  the  history  of  scientific  analysis, 
of  the  minute  analysis  of  things  by  use  of  the 
microscope,  test  tube,  et  cetera,  which  we  have.  But 


DIFFERENTIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  89 

Anaxagoras'  doctrine  of  the  elements  is  the  ancestor 
of  the  modem  chemical  doctrine.  The  chemist,  as 
a  chemist,  does  not  say  that  he  can  reduce  all  the 
elements  to  the  same  kinds  of  atoms.  The 
physicist  says  that  all  the  chemical  substances  may 
be  composed  of  the  same  primary  stuff,  and  if  he 
is  a  metaphysical  physicist,  he  is  now  apt  to  say 
that  they  are  constellations  of  electrons.  But  the 
chemist  simply  reduces  the  physical  world  to 
things  that  cannot  be  further  analyzed  by  chemical 
methods. 

The  elements  of  Anaxagoras  represent  the  not 
further  analyzable  qualities  of  the  world,  and  he  re- 
gards these  qualities  as  due  to  the  presence  of  a 
large  number  of  minute  particles  which  have  the 
same  qualities.  That  is,  the  substance  of  things, 
and  all  the  ceaseless  variety  of  beings  which  exist 
in  our  world  are  due  to  the  intermixture  and 
separation  of  these  elements. 

As  to  the  cause  of  these  ceaseless  processes  of 
inter-mixture  and  separation,  Anaxagoras  is  quite 
original.  He  says  that  these  things  cannot  move 
of  themselves.  There  must  be  something  which 
moves  them.  He  says  we  know  that,  when  our 
bodies  undergo  a  change,  when  we  move  our 
bodies,  it  is  because  there  is  a  mind  causing  the  body 
to  move.  As  to  the  cause  of  movement,  therefore, 
he  argues  that,  just  as  you  and  I  intentionally  move 
our  bodies,  and  through  moving  our  bodies  move 
other  things  to  a  limited  extent,  so  there  is  a  univer- 
sal mind  which  is  the  cause  of  movement.  He  calls 
this  Noils  —  Universal  Intelligence,     He  does  not 


40  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

conceive  this  mind  in  a  strictly  immaterial  way,  and 
he  does  not,  so  far  as  the  preserved  fragments  of 
his  teaching  show,  work  out  the  difficulties  and 
problems  of  how  mind  can  act  on  matter.  He  does 
not  even  apply  his  theory  of  mind  as  the  prime 
mover,  except  when  he  can  find  no  other  explana- 
tion. Mind  imparts  only  the  original  rotatory 
movement  to  things. 

You  may  ask  for  the  difference  between 
Anaxagoras'  view  and  the  primitive  animistic  view. 
We  may  say,  on  the  one  hand,  that  Anaxagoras  has 
a  clearly  defined  doctrine  of  material  elements,  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  he  conceived  the  universe  as  a 
unity,  with  one  universal  mind  as  the  first  cause  of 
all  the  motion  in  the  world.  Neither  of  these  views, 
in  a  clearly  defined  form,  were  present  in  the  primi- 
tive animistic  view  of  the  world. 

All  of  these  conflicting  theories,  in  more 
elaborated  form,  have  engaged  men's  attention 
throughout  the  centuries,  since  the  doctrines  of  one 
or  more  natural  substance  and  cause  are  attempts 
to  account  for  the  mutation,  and  multiplicity  of 
things  in  various  ways.  We  have  the  doctrine  of  the 
universal  law  acording  to  which  all  change  takes 
place.  We  have  a  doctrine  of  a  multitude  of  elemen- 
tary substances  in  place  of  the  homogeneous  sub- 
stance. We  have  various  theories  as  to  the  causes 
of  change:  the  love  and  hate  of  Empedocles,  the 
harmony  and  strife  of  Heraclitus,  and  the  elements 
and  Nous  of  Anaxagoras.  We  have  also  the  very 
radical  doctrine  that  the  whole  world  of  sense  per- 
ception is  an  illusion. 


DIFFERENTIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  41 

The  conflict  of  these  various  theories  brings  into 
the  foreground  new  problems,  problems  of  which 
man  had  not  hitherto  been  conscious.  The  first, 
was  the  problem  of  knowledge.  The  debate  be- 
tween the  representatives  of  these  theories  begets 
the  critical  spirit  and  man  begins  to  ask  himself, 
what  is  the  relation  between  my  thought  and  the 
things  I  think  about,  between  my  senses  and  the 
physical  world,  between  my  intelligence  and  the 
world?  The  development  of  the  critical  spirit 
means  further  that  the  spirit  of  inquiry  does  not 
stop  with  theoretical  questions ;  more  particularly,  it 
takes  hold  of  the  questions  of  belief  and  conduct. 

The  critical  views  of  the  ancestral  mores  and 
religion  of  the  Greeks  resulted  in  the  dissolution  of 
the  authority  of  the  mores  and  traditional  beliefs. 
So  the  problem  of  conduct  becomes  a  central  prob- 
lem. The  critical  spirit  directs  the  light  of  intelli- 
gence upon  the  inherited  customs  and  beliefs  in 
matters  of  conduct,  statecraft  and  religion.  So  we 
have  the  nature  and  authority  of  the  good,  the  rules 
of  conduct,  and  the  rites  and  beliefs  of  religion,  be- 
coming problems  of  critical  study.  When  man 
becomes  conscious  of  the  fact  that  there  are  prob- 
lems of  knowledge,  conduct  and  religion,  and  sets 
about  to  deal  with  these  problems  systematically, 
then  he  has  become  conscious  of  the  central  position 
which  his  own  mind  occupies  in  relation  to  things. 
Out  of  these  problems  of  knowledge,  the  good  and 
religion  arises  the  consciousness  of  the  problem  of 
spirit,  of  the  meaning  and  nature  of  spirit  or  mind 
itself.    All  these  problems  come  to  a  focus  in  Plato. 


42  THE  FIELD  OP  PHILOSOPHY 


REFERENCES 

Cornford,  F.  M.,  From  Religion  to  Philosophy. 

Benn,  A.  W.,  Early  Greek  Philosophy. 

Burnett,  J.,   Early   Greek   Philosophy. 

Rogers,  History  of  Philosophy,  pp.  8-48. 

Thilly,  History  of  Philosophy,  7-50. 

Zeller,  Outlines  of  Greek  Philosophy,  pp.  35-101. 

Windelband,  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy,  pp.   16- 


151. 


Zeller,  E.,  The  Pre-Socratics. 

Gomperz,  Th.,  Greek  Thinkers. 

Grote,  G.,  History  of  Greece,  Vol.  VIII. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  PERSONALITY,  MISSION,  AND  INFLUENCE 
OF  SOCRATES 

1.      THE  PERSONALITY  OF  SOCRATES 

It  is  impossible  to  separate  the  teaching  of 
Socrates  from  that  of  Plato.  Plato  makes  Socrates 
his  mouthpiece.  It  is  a  difficult  and  perhaps  in- 
soluble problem  as  to  where  to  draw  the  line  of 
separation  between  their  doctrines. 

Xenophon,  who  wrote,  in  his  Memorabilia  of 
his  revered  master,  an  account  of  the  personality 
and  teaching  of  Socrates,  was  an  upright  soldier, 
but  was  incapable  of  conveying  an  adequate  account 
of  the  philosophical  teachings  of  Socrates.  He  con- 
veys only  the  reverence  of  an  honest  soldier  for  the 
greatest  man  he  ever  knew.  In  Aristotle  also,  we 
have  some  condensed  information  as  to  Socrates. 
Here  we  are  told  that  Socrates  was  the  first  phil- 
osopher to  develop  deduction  and  induction  as  a 
means  of  definition;  and  further,  that  he  was  the 
first  to  develop  the  process  of  division  or  classifica- 
tion of  concepts.  There  is  but  little  information 
further  than  this  concerning  Socrates  in  Aristotle. 

Socrates  was  born  in  B.  C.  469,  at  a  time  when 
Athens  was  passing  through  the  most  brilliant 
period  of  her  history.  From  479  to  431  Athens 
was  the  most  brilliant  of  all  city  states.     Socrates 

(43) 


44  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

died  in  B.  C.  399  by  drinking  hemlock  poison  in  ful- 
fillment of  the  sentence  of  death  imposed  upon  him 
by  the  Athenian  jury. 

Athens  had  entered  upon  the  greatest  period  of 
her  history,  upon  her  age  of  supreme  sacrifice  and 
effort;  and  it  was  in  just  such  an  age  that  she  de- 
veloped her  greatest  glory.  (The  age  of  Shakes- 
peare, and  the  present  situation  in  America  afford 
epochs  that  are  quite  similar  to  this).  Socrates' 
work  was  carried  on  (as  he  prophesied  it  would  be) 
by  Plato,  the  greatest  of  all  prose  writers.  He  in 
turn  was  followed  by  Aristotle,  "the  master  of  those 
who  know". 

The  age  of  Socrates  was  one  of  enlightenment, 
criticism,  an  age  of  keen  intellectual  activity.  This 
is  evidenced  by  the  great  activity  of  the  Sophists. 
This  age  of  inquiry  and  criticism  was  succeeded  by 
an  age  of  creativeness.  Athens  was  not  only  the 
center  of  politics  and  patriotism;  it  was  also  an 
intellectual  center.  This  age  in  Athens  was,  in  view 
of  its  brevity  and  the  comparatively  small  size  of 
the  Athenian  state,  the  greatest  intellectual  period 
in  the  history  of  the  world. 

The  Sophists,  sarcastically  so-called  by  Plato 
who  did  not  like  them,  are  contrasted  with  the 
philosophers  as  lovers  of  wisdom,  who  do  not 
pretend  to  be  wise.  The  Sophists  arose  in  response 
to  a  definite  social  situation.  They  were  profes- 
sional teachers  in  a  time  when  there  were  no  col- 
leges and  universities.  Plato's  Academy  was 
founded  and  directed  by  Plato,  and  it  is  here  that 
we  first  find  the  true  features  of  a  university,  viz. : 


PERSONALITY  AND  INFLUENCE  OF  SOCRATES       45 

1.  Research  into  all  fields  of  knowledge, 

2.  The  training  of  men  for  public  service. 
Plato  carried  on  his  work  in  the  belief  that  the  state 
could  not  prosper  without  using  the  best  trained 
men  that  were  available.  This  was  the  high 
standard  of  Plato's  Academy.  As  contrasted  with 
this,  in  our  state  life,  men  of  the  highest  training 
are  often  not  wanted  in  public  life. 

The  spirit  of  critical  inquiry  was  rife  in  Athens 
as  it  was  in  France  before  the  French  Revolution, 
and  as  it  is  in  America  today.  It  was  an  inevitable 
consequence  that  in  such  a  situation  hoary  customs 
and  time-honored  traditions  and  beliefs  would  be 
called  into  question.  Students  in  the  colleges  and 
universities  of  America  today,  coming  into  touch 
with  the  sciences  and  philosophy,  may  be  similarly 
disturbed  in  their  views.  But  this  questioning  atti- 
tude must  be  aroused  if  there  is  to  be  personal  de- 
velopment and  progress.  The  same  is  true  in  the 
life  of  a  state.  Traditions  and  customs  must  be 
critically  analyzed  and  subjected  to  rational  treat- 
ment. 

The  Sophists  made  many  claims,  one  being  that 
they  were  able  to  make  the  worse  cause  appear  the 
better.  Some  of  them,  notably  Protagoras,  held 
the  view  that  man  is  the  measure  of  all  things. 
There  are,  indeed,  two  ways  of  taking  this  attitude 
of  the  Sophists:  First,  the  individual  with  all  his 
limitations,  i.  e.,  the  particular,  changeable  in- 
dividual, may  be  taken  as  the  measure  of  all  things ; 
second,  human  nature  in  general,  i.  e.,  the  immutable 
and  necessary  rational  and  moral  element  common 


46  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

to  all  mankind,  may  be  taken  as  the  measure  of  all 
things.  If  the  first  view  be  accepted,  then  there  is 
nothing  objective  in  our  moral  distinctions  and  rules 
for  conduct,  and  it  may  even  seem  that  there  are  no 
means  by  which  objective  truth  and  good  can  be 
ascertained.  It  was  in  this  attitude  that  some  of 
the  Sophists  pandered  to  the  gilded  youth  of  their 
day  and  taught  them  that  whatever  one  may  want 
to  do  is  right.  Conservatism  took  alarm  at  this 
teaching.  The  standpatters  of  the  day  maintained 
that  Athens  was  going  to  ruin,  and  that  all  civic 
foundations  were  being  undermined.*  The  solu- 
tion offered  by  the  standpatters  of  the  day  was  that 
this  procedure  must  be  stamped  out  and  that  the  cus- 
toms of  the  city  state  must  be  blindly  and  unques- 
tionably accepted  and  obeyed.  "The  old  is  the 
best",  this  is  the  constant  attitude  of  the  standpat- 
ter. 

Socrates  saw  the  danger  that  would  result  to 
the  individual  and  to  the  state  from  both  of  these 
attitudes.  He  seeks  to  use  rhetoric  and  argumenta- 
tion for  other  purposes  than  to  justify  the  momen- 
tary whims  and  opinions  of  the  individual.  While 
men  were  openly  preaching  that  "might  is  right" 
and  declaring  that  the  only  test  of  conduct  is  "does 
it  pay  in  financial  or  political  success",  Socrates  saw 
another  way  out  of  the  dangers  of  the  situation,  viz., 
not  by  the  cessation  of  thought,  not  by  a  dumb  and 
blind  adherence  to  tradition,  but  through  earnest 
and  persistent  thoughtfulness.     The  way  of  reason 


*  See  the  plays  of  Aristophanes. 


PERSONALITY  AND  INFLUENCE  OF  SOCRATES       47 

was  the  only  way  out  for  Socrates.  The  cure  for 
the  ills  of  the  day  as  proposed  by  Socrates  was  not 
the  suspense  of  reason,  but  the  systematic  and  per- 
sistent exercise  of  reason. 

Socrates  felt  that  the  Sophists  were  not  in 
earnest  and  not  intellectually  equipped  for  the  work 
to  which  they  set  themselves.  He  looked  upon  them 
as  pretenders,  fakers,  (a  goodly  number  of  such 
Sophists  are  at  large  in  our  country  today),  men 
who  said  one  thing  to  one  crowd  and  something 
else  to  another  crowd.  Their  own  interest  was 
their  constant  aim.  The  trouble  with  Athens, 
Socrates  saw,  was  that  the  leaders  had  not  made  a 
deep  inquiry  into  the  principles  of  conduct  and  the 
social  order.  The  way  of  salvation  for  the  state  and 
the  individual,  Socrates  said,  is  to  think  out 
earnestly  the  problems  of  conduct.  It  was  the  prob- 
lem of  conduct  and  not  the  problems  of  the  early 
cosmologists  that  engaged  Socrates'  attention.  He 
cared  only  for  social  and  ethical  inquiries. 

Socrates  was  a  man  of  powerful  frame  and  of 
great  endurance.  He  was  abstemious  in  his 
habits,  but  not  ascetic,  and  was  not  given  to  eating 
or  drinking  to  excess  even  though  his  companions 
all  did  so.  He  was  kindly  and  good-humored,  but 
unflinching  in  his  devotion  to  the  right,  noble  and 
magnanimous  in  temper.  He  devoted  himself 
whole-heartedly  to  his  mission,  and  carefully 
avoided  mixing  in  politics,  believing  that  if  he  did 
his  life  would  be  shortened.  Three  times  he  had 
the  deciding  vote  on  public  questions,  and  at  these 
times  he  braved  the  clamor  of  the  multitude  and 


48  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  voice  of  authority.  He  faced  death  without  a 
tremor.  His  passions  and  his  body  were  the  com- 
plete servants  of  his  rational  will.  He  always  re- 
garded himself  as  entrusted  with  a  mission  from  on 
high  and  as  being  always  under  divine  guidance. 
He  repeatedly  spoke  of  his  "dsemon"  or  spirit,  the 
supernatural,  inner  voice,  which  gave  him  warning 
at  all  the  crises  of  life. 

Socrates  was  accused  of  the  following  three 
charges :  — 

1.  Corrupting  the  youth, 

2.  Teaching  atheism, 

3.  Introducing  false  divinities. 

The  real  causes  of  the  accusation,  however, 
were :  — 

1.  Desire  for  revenge  on  the  part  of  the 
exposed  humbugs  of  the  day, 

2.  The  democratic  reaction  against  the 
tyrants  with  some  of  whom  Socrates 
had  been  closely  associated,  notably 
Alcibiades. 

Socrates,  of  all  those  in  Athens  interested  in 
the  problem  of  knowledge,  knew  that  he  was 
ignorant.  The  first  step  in  the  acquisition  of  true 
knowledge  is  the  consciousness  of  ignorance. 

2.      THE  METHOD  OF  SOCRATES. 

Socrates*  method  was  directed  towards  eluci- 
dating or  educing  from  the  ordinary  opinions  of 
men  in  regard  to  virtue,  the  good,  temperance,  jus- 
tice, et  cetera,  consistent  and  adequate  conceptions. 


PERSONALITY  AND  INFLUENCE  OF  SOCRATES       49 

He  believed  that  there  is  latent  or  implicit  in  moral 
common  sense —  (in  the  opinion  of  the  average 
decent  citizen)  —  sound  conceptions  in  regard  to 
conduct,  but  that  these  conceptions  are  implicit,  i.  e., 
not  yet  thought  about.  The  ordinary  man  dealt 
with  particular  cases  as  they  arose  and  had  not 
thought  things  out.  Socrates  refers  to  his  art  as 
that  of  an  intellectual  midwife.  He  helped  men 
bring  forth  conceptions  that  were  latent  or  im- 
plicit in  their  ordinary  opinions. 

The  following  will  illustrate  his  method  of  pro- 
cedure: Suppose  the  question  to  be,  "What  is  jus- 
tice"? The  ready  answer  came:  "Justice  is  an  eye 
for  an  eye,  a  tooth  for  a  tooth,  good  for  good,  and 
evil  for  evil".  Socrates  would  ask:  "Is  the  man 
who  returns  good  for  evil  an  unjust  man"?  His 
answer  was :  "No ;  one  sees  that  such  a  man  is  just 
in  a  much  higher  degree".  Thus  by  questions  and 
answers  he  sought  to  elucidate  universal  ideas,  aim- 
ing to  get  definitions  that  were  applicable  to  every 
concrete  case. 

Instead  of  the  current  sophistical  view  that 
the  thing  to  do  is  simply  to  do  what  you  feel  like 
doing,  Socrates  maintained  that  we  must  reflect, 
think,  and  form  rational  notions  of  conduct.  We 
must  carry  rational  thinking  through  to  the  bitter 
end.  In  doing  this  Socrates  took  the  definitions 
given  off  the  bat,  as  it  were,  by  those  who  knew 
(thought  they  knew) ,  and  showed  that  such  defini- 
tions did  not  square  with  the  moral  common  sense 
of  man.  Socrates  took  a  definition,  set  it  up  as  an 
hypothesis,  and  then  examined  it  to  see  if  it  stood 


50  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  test  at  the  hands  of  particular  cases.  He  re- 
flected upon  facts  and  the  foundations  of  hypotheses, 
and  sought  to  test  them  by  concrete  cases.  Such 
was  the  nature  of  the  Socratic  method. 

3.      THE  SUBSTANCE  OF  SOCRATES*  TEACHING. 

The  substance  of  Socrates*  teaching  may  be  ex- 
pressed thus:  "Virtue  is  knowledge;  vice  is 
ignorance.  No  man  willingly  does  evil ;  every  man 
seeks  the  good."  This  seems  to  be  an  extraordinary 
statement.  Offhand  we  would  say  it  is  false.  "I 
see  and  approve  the  better,  but  I  do  the  worse"; 
this  statement  we  would  approve.  There  is  a  wide 
gap,  we  think,  between  knowing  and  doing.  We 
ordinarily  believe  we  know  what  is  right.  We  often 
say,  "where  ignorance  is  bliss,  'tis  folly  to  be  wise". 
We  often  think  that  knowledge  produces  corruption, 
and  that  it  is  wrong  to  think  upon  certain  sacred 
matters  and  other  matters  that  are  evil.  Socrates 
held  that  there  could  be  no  permanently  good  and 
useful  conduct  that  is  not  guided  by  sustained 
thoughtf ulness  and  that  knowledge  earnestly  sought 
and  used  would  never  lead  to  evil. 

If  Socrates  were  here  today,  he  would  doubt- 
less say  that  what  we  call  knowledge  he  would 
call  degraded  knowledge,  or  even  not  knowledge  at 
all.  Our  handing  out  of  cold  storage  pabulum  to 
blindly  accepting  pupils  is  not  the  true  way  of  im- 
parting and  acquiring  knowledge.  Knowledge  for 
Socrates  was  personal  insight  which  men  acquire  by 
their  own  persistent  activity.  No  one  has  any 
genuine  knowledge  which  he  has  not  discovered  for 


PERSONALITY  AND  INFLUENCE  OF  SOCRATES       51 

himself.  We  find  no  peptonized,  predigested,  after- 
breakfast  knowledge- tablets  in  Socrates.  Belief 
must  cost  the  sweat  of  the  intellectual  brow,  or  it  is 
not  knowledge.  It  was  knowing  that  had  reference 
to  conduct  that  chiefly  interested  Socrates.  If  one 
persistently  endeavors  to  find  out  what  is  right  or 
wrong,  one  will  do  so,  for  he  has  put  his  whole  per- 
sonality into  the  quest.  Knowledge  that  has  to  do 
with  conduct  is  only  attainable  through  an  active 
quest ;  it  is  the  result  of  a  voyage  of  self-discovery. 
This  voyage  of  self-discovery  must  be  made  by  each 
individual  for  himself.  Only  such  knowledge  is 
knowledge  at  all  in  Socrates'  view. 

In  literature  we  have  some  magnificent  presen- 
tations of  persons  like  Milton's  Satan,  who  knew  the 
difference  between  good  and  evil  and  deliberately 
chose  the  evil.  Satan  says:  "Evil,  be  thou  my 
good".  Such  an  attitude  Socrates  would  regard  as 
impossible.  He  would  say  that  Satan  must  have 
mistakenly  regarded  ruling  at  any  cost  as  the 
highest  good.  In  short  Satan's  choice  Socrates 
would  regard  as  based  on  a  lack  of  true  insight  into 
the  good.  And  indeed,  the  prevalent  notion  is  that 
goodness  requires  little  or  no  reflection.  This  is  the 
very  opposite  of  Socrates'  view.  This  view  is  only 
the  exaggeration  of  a  great  truth.  Enduring  good 
must  be  built  on  knowledge.  There  has  been  more 
evil  wrought  in  this  world  by  ignorant  fanatics  than 
by  all  the  wise  devils.  This  conception  is  strictly 
in  line  with  Socrates'  teaching.  There  is  urgent 
necessity  for  the  application  of  knowledge  to  the 
conduct  of  daily  life,  and  it  is  the  little  attention 


52  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

that  has  been  paid  to  the  theoretical  problems  of 
conduct  and  social  organization  that  is  perhaps 
responsible  for  our  present  international  situation. 
This  generation  needs  to  be  reminded  that  Socrates 
has  lived.  We  are  puffed  up  with  knowledge  about 
everything,  but  we  have  gained  but  little  knowledge 
about  the  social  and  political  conditions  of  good  con- 
duct, and  as  a  consequence  of  this  we  are  using 
knowledge  in  that  most  stupid  business  of  blowing 
each  other  to  pieces.  By  our  industrial  processes 
we  have  increased  a  thousand-fold  productivity  in 
material  things,  but  we  have  not  learned  how  to 
distribute  these  goods  equitably  so  as  to  increase 
the  common  weal. 

Socrates'  conception  of  goodness  was  this: 
Goodness  consists  in  the  health  or  harmony  of  the 
soul ;  it  is  the  subordination  and  organization  of  the 
appetites  and  impulses  under  the  guidance  of  reason 
and  the  good.  This,  said  Socrates,  is  the  truly  use- 
ful. There  is  nothing  of  use  that  is  comparable  to 
the  welfare  of  the  soul. 

There  is  a  view  current  that  philosophy  is  use- 
less, since  it  does  not  tell  us  how  to  pile  up  riches, 
win  law  cases,  achieve  political  preferment  and 
operate  machines.  Socrates  would  doubtless  ask  us 
today :  "Of  what  use  are  your  machines,  your  vast 
riches,  your  thousands  of  pairs  of  shoes  made  over 
a  similar  pattern,  your  fast  trains,  your  telegraph 
lines,  your  telephones,  and  motors"?  We  might 
reply:  "See  how  luxuriously  we  live,  how  sumptu- 
ously we  fare,  how  fast  we  ride,  and  how  readily 
we  communicate  with  each  other"!     But  Socrates 


PERSONALITY  AND  INFLUENCE  OF  SOCRATES       53 

would  reply :  "Does  all  this  contribute  to  the  health 
and  harmony  of  the  individual  ?  Does  it  add  to  the 
poise  and  harmony  of  the  people"  ?  The  health  and 
harmony  of  the  soul  are  the  only  ends  that  are 
supremely  worth  seeking,  and  thus  the  good  alone 
is  truly  useful. 

In  matters  of  religion  Socrates  never  spoke  dis- 
respectfully or  lightly  of  the  finer  aspects  of  the 
traditional  forms  of  Greek  religious  life.  Evidently 
his  own  belief  was  that  there  is  but  one  divine  being 
or  principle  —  the  guardian  of  righteousness  —  the 
moral  governor  of  the  universe.  The  deepest 
article  in  his  own  faith  was  this  —  "No  evil  can 
happen  to  a  good  man  either  in  this  life  or  in  any  to 
come."  A  supreme  righteous  order  rules  in  the 
universe,  and  ultimately  no  harm  can  happen  to  a 
good  man.  It  is,  indeed,  far  better  to  suffer  than 
to  do  an  injustice.  To  return  evil  for  evil  is  to  in- 
jure one's  own  self.  Such  were  the  moral  intuitions 
of  Socrates.  Coupled  with  these  he  had  also  a 
strong  hope  of  immortality. 

REFERENCES 

Britannica,  11th  ed.,  art's  Sophists  and  Socrates. 

Thilly,  History  of  Philosophy,  40-58. 

Benn,  The  Greek  Philosophers. 

Zeller,  Greek  Philosophy,  103-118. 

Burnett,  History  of  Greek  Philosophy. 

Grote,  History  of  Greece,  Vol.  VII. 

Gomperz,  Greek  Thinkers,  Vol.  I. 

Zeller,  Socrates  and  the  Socratic  Schools. 


54  THE  FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

Xenophon,  Memorabilia. 

Plato's  Dialogues,  transl.  by  Jowett;  especially  Pro- 
tagoras, Apology,   Phaedo,   Symposium,    Theaetetus. 

Aristotle,  Metaphysics  (I,  6;  XIII,  4),  transl.  by  W. 
D.  Ross. 


CHAPTER  V 
PLATO  —  427-347  B.  C. 

HIS  METHOD 

Plato  extends  the  Socratic  method  of  enquiry  to 
other  spheres  such  as  mathematics  and  the  physical 
sciences.  There  were  four  great  problems  which 
Plato  attempted  to  solve,  viz. :  — 

1.  The  problem  of  truth  and  of  knowl- 
edge (Logic  and  Epistemology) . 

2.  The  problem  of  the  nature  of  ultimate 
reality.  (Metaphysics  and  Philosophy 
of  Religion) . 

3.  The  problem  of  the  soul.  This  is  the 
problem  of  philosophical  psychology. 

4.  The  problem  of  values,  i.  e.,  what  is 
the  good  for  men  in  society,  and  by 

''  what  kind  of  conduct  and  social  or- 
ganization can  the  good  be  attained? 
(Ethics  and  Politics). 

1.    THE  PROBLEM  OF  TRUTH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  (LOGIC) 

In  the  skeptical  theory  of  the  Sophists,  knowl- 
edge was  derived  from  sense  perception.  Truth  is 
therefore  simply  what  you  taste,  touch,  smell,  feel, 
see.  This  theory  Plato  criticised.  If  this  is  the 
nature  of  truth,  he  argues,  then  there  is  no  truth. 
The  pig  or  dog-faced  baboon  is  a  measure  of  truth 

(65) 


56  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

equally  with  the  wisest  man.  Indeed  "wisest"  has 
then  no  meaning.  This  view  denies  that  there  is 
any  test  or  standard  of  truth.  Thus  these  skeptics, 
by  saying  that  there  are  no  standards  of  truth,  re- 
fute themselves.  If  there  is  no  truth  this  statement 
itself  is  not  true. 

Plato  does  not  deny  that  sensation  is  a  factor 
in  our  knowing.  Sensations  furnish  the  stimuli 
by  which  we  are  led  to  think.  True  knowledge, 
however,  is  the  soul's  conversation  with  itself.  By 
this  Plato  meant  that  knowledge  is  arrived  at 
through  the  activity  of  reason  or  of  thought,  and 
not  through  the  senses  alone.  The  senses  furnish 
the  stimuli  and  the  material  for  knowledge,  but  this 
material  must  be  reflected  upon  before  we  can  have 
knowledge. 

Plato  insisted  that  knowledge  is  reminiscence. 
Inasmuch  as  we  are  unable  to  account  for  knowl- 
edge in  terms  of  the  senses  and  inasmuch  as  we 
have  knowledge,  the  soul  must  have  been  bom  with 
an  inherent  capacity  for  it  and  only  gradually  does 
the  soul  awaken  to  a  consciousness  of  the  knowl- 
edge that  is  implicit  in  its  own  being.  Plato  is  here 
formulating  the  view  that  true  thinking  is  not 
something  derived  from,  but  applied  to,  sense  per- 
ception. True  knowledge  is  not  to  be  explained  as 
the  result  of  sensation  or  sense  perception.  We  do 
not  apprehend  the  contents  of  true  knowledge 
through  the  senses  alone;  there  must  therefore  be 
an  inborn  capacity  in  the  soul  which  comes  to  con- 
sciousness through  the  stimulation  of  sense  per- 
ception.    Sense  perception  is  merely  the  occasion 


PLATO  57 

for  getting  knowledge,  but  there  is  no  possibility  of 
deriving  knowledge  from  the  qualities  of  sense  per- 
ception alone.  This  position  of  Plato  is  expressed 
in  Wordsworth's  "Intimations  of  Immortality"  when 
he  says: 

"The  Soul  that  rises  with  us,  our  life's  Star, 
Hath  had  elsewhere  its  setting. 
And  Cometh  from  afar: 
Not  in  entire  fotgetfulness. 
And  not  in  utter  nakedness, 
But  trailing  clouds  of  glory  do  we  come 
From  Grod,  who  is  our  home:" 

Consider  some  of  the  kinds  of  knowledge  that 
Plato  has  in  mind.  Knowledge  of  relationships  is 
one  kind  or  type.  Relationships  are  not  proved 
through  the  senses.  Suppose  that  we  deal  with  the 
properties  of  a  triangle.  We  say  that  the  three  in- 
terior angles  are  equal  to  180  degrees.  Draw  as 
many  triangles  as  one  chooses;  they  all  differ  in 
size,  shape,  et  cetera,  and  of  them  all  we  say  that 
the  three  interior  angles  of  any  triangle  equals  180 
degrees.  But  it  is  not  true  of  these  particular 
triangles  as  we  measure  them,  for  we  cannot 
measure  them  absolutely.  All  actually  figured 
triangles  are  more  or  less  than  we  define  them  to  be. 
We  cannot  draw  a  line  having  no  breadth.  Thus 
all  the  way  through  the  complete  body  of  mathe- 
matical relations,  there  is  something  absolute  about 
these  relations  that  is  not  perceived  by  the  senses. 

Note  briefly  the  relations :  equals,  greater  than, 
and  less  than.  Suppose  I  say  that  John  Smith 
equals  in  height  John  Brown.     He  may  also  be 


58  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

shorter  than  X  and  taller  than  Y.  Therefore  John 
Brown  is  at  the  same  time  equal  to,  shorter  than, 
and  taller  than.  Columbus  is  north  of  Circleville 
and  south  of  Delaware.  Columbus  is  also  east  of 
Dayton  and  west  of  Zanesville.  Columbus  is  there- 
fore both  north,  south,  east  and  west.  We  do  not 
apprehend  the  relation  of  direction  through  sense 
perception  alone.  We  do  not  perceive  north  and 
south.  We  cannot  say  where  north  begins  and 
south  ends.  It  is  only  by  the  mind  that  these  rela- 
tions are  apprehended. 

In  knowledge  we  further  classify  data.  There 
is  no  knowledge  without  the  systematic  ordering  of 
things  we  have  knowledge  about.  We  order  things 
in  groups,  series,  classes.  I  refer  to  Teddy  (my 
dog).  There  are  dogs  and  men  with  this  name. 
What  do  I  mean  by  dog,  man,  bear.  By  man  I  mean 
a  specific  type  of  being  who  belongs  to  a  certain 
class  distinct  from  dogs,  and  that  this  class  is  dis- 
tinguished by  certain  characteristics.  The  empiri- 
cist claims  that  we  perceive  or  "sense"  those  charac- 
teristics. Suppose  that  we  had  seen  a  bear  that 
walked  like  a  man ;  would  it  be  necessary  to  inter- 
pret and  to  classify  that  bear  as  a  man?  There 
must  be  a  body  of  typical  ways  of  behavior  present 
before  we  classify  the  object  as  a  man.  As  every 
triangle  is  a  particular  case  of  triangularity,  so 
every  man  is  a  particular  case  of  humanity.  He 
shares  in  the  attributes  of  humanity  which  make 
him  such.  No  single  man,  however,  embodies 
absolutely  the  attributes  of  humanity.  Each  in- 
dividual  is   only   a  partial   embodiment  of  these 


PLATO  59 

attributes,  and  as  this  is  the  case  we  do  not  per- 
ceive the  attributes  of  humanity  by  the  senses.  We 
perceive  through  the  senses  only  the  particular  in- 
dividuals, and  no  individual  incorporates  all  the 
attributes  of  a  class;  no  individual  is  the  universal 
man.  No  man  is  humanity;  no  dog  is  caninity;  no 
horse  is  equinity.  One  perceives  this  man,  this  dog, 
this  horse,  and  that  exhausts  the  range  of  percep- 
tion. 

Justice,  injustice,  temperance,  and  intem- 
perance, —  what  about  these  moral  attributes  ?  We 
never  say  of  any  particular  act  that  it  is  the  com- 
plete embodiment  of  self-control.  We  never  think 
that  any  act  embodies  all  of  justice.  Each  act  is 
an  embodiment  of  some  universal  quality  or  quali- 
ties. Every  one  of  our  experiences  implies  that 
there  is  a  universal,  and  the  universal  is  thought, 
not  perceived;  apprehended  by  the  reason,  and  not 
through  the  senses.  Mathematical  relations,  logical 
relations,  class  terms  or  class  concepts  such  as 
humanity,  caninity;  ideas  of  value,  (good,  evil,  beau- 
tiful), these  are  universals  known  only  through 
the  intellect,  and  only  through  these  is  knowledge 
possible.  Without  reasoning  there  would  be  only 
a  disconnected  riot  —  no  sequence  —  of  perceptions. 
That  is  what  our  experience  would  be  without 
thought.  But  the  fact  that  our  experience  is  not 
such  a  riot  —  the  fact  that  we  order  and  classify  and 
serialize  all  the  facts  of  nature  and  the  moral  life 
implies  that  the  soul  is  born  with  the  capacity  to 
think  universals. 

The  main  types  of  these  universals  are :  — 


60  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

1.  Relationships. 

2.  Values. 

3.  Class  concepts. 

What  we  grasp  with  our  senses  alone  is  with- 
out thought:  Sense  material  is  mutable,  it  ever 
fluctuates.  Long  since  Heraclitus  said  that  the 
world  is  in  constant  flux.  -These  universals,  how- 
ever, are  not  in  the  flux;  they  are  changeless  and 
eternal.  The  propositions  of  geometry  are  eternally 
true;  they  do  not  depend  upon  someone  seeing  or 
smelling  them.  And  we  indicate  this  fact  by  saying 
that  truth  is  discovered  and  not  made  or  invented. 
The  same  consideration  is  true  in  regard  to 
all  relationships.  Relationships  never  fluctuate. 
Equality  remains  equality,  no  matter  what  the  em- 
pirical conditions  of  any  particular  object  may  be. 
The  relationship  **greater  than"  is  always  "greater 
than".  Particular  things  become  equal  to,  greater 
than,  less  than  other  particular  things ;  but  univer- 
sals remain  eternally  the  same.  The  fact  that  we 
judge  acts  as  just  and  unjust  means  that  there  is  a 
universal,  unchanging  justice.  There  is  a  universal 
of  temperance  or  self-control.  There  is  also  a  uni- 
versal of  beauty.  Men  may  come  and  men  may  go, 
but  "humanity"  remains  forever  the  same.  The  type 
remains  constant,  and  it  is  only  on  the  basis  of 
this  permanence  of  type  that  all  our  forms  of  classi- 
fication are  possible. 

Suppose  that  some  explorer  discovered  a  new 
type  of  animal  life  in  some  distant  country  and  that 
the  scientists  were  not  sure  whether  this  newly 
discovered  creature  is  an  anthropoid  ape  or  a  man. 


PLATO  61 

How  would  this  new  specimen  be  classified?  The 
scientist  seeks  to  know  whether  it  has  tools,  whether 
it  speaks,  whether  it  has  society,  art,  etc.,  i.  e.,  the 
scientist  applies  the  universal  idea  of  humanity  and 
only  on  this  basis  can  the  new  instance  be  ma- 
nipulated. 

The  means  by  which  we  acquire  or  develop 
knowledge  is  through  the  possession  by  the  soul  of 
this  capacity  for  grasping  universals.  True  knowl- 
edge comes  only  from  the  activity  of  the  soul  in  the 
acts  of  ordering  and  classifying  the  particular  data 
in  terms  of  the  universals. 

2.    THE  PLATONIC  THEORY  OF  REALITY  (Metaphysics) 

These  universals  through  which  we  know, 
Plato  calls  ideas,  —  eidos,  —  idea,  —  form,  —  kind, 
type,  —  universal.  These  words  all  mean  the  same 
in  Plato. 

In  the  Platonic  theory  there  are  two  realms. 
The  one  is  the  realm  of  the  forms,  which  is  the 
realm  of  the  eternal.  The  other  is  the  realm  of 
sense  perception.     This  is  the  region  of  the  mutable. 

It  is  important  to  guard  from  the  beginning 
against  a  confusion  which  prevails  even  in  the 
camps  of  philosophers  themselves  as  to  the  use  of 
the  Platonic  term  idea.  The  ordinary  man  takes 
ideas  to  be  something  in  someone's  mind.  This  is 
the  psychological  sense  of  the  term  idea,  and  this 
use  we  have  inherited  from  Locke,  Berkeley  and 
other  British  empiricists.  These  men  declare  that 
we  know  only  what  is  in  the  mind,  therefore  we 
cannot  know  an  objective  physical  world.     Plato  is 


62  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

not  a  subjective  idealist.  To  damn  a  dog  we  need 
only  call  him  a  bad  name  —  this  has  been  done  in 
the  case  of  Plato,  but  the  Platonic  idea  is  never  in- 
tended to  be  something  in  our  mind.  The  Platonic 
idea  is  a  form,  a  pattern,  a  universal  type,  and  exists 
whether  any  human  mind  apprehends  it  or  not. 
These  ideas  exist  eternally  in  the  realm  of  ideas. 
Thus  we  see  that  Plato  does  not  mean  what  we 
usually  mean  by  ideas  —  they  are  patterns,  forms, 
of  which  the  things  of  sense  are  merely  bad  copies 
or  imitations.  Or  again,  a  Platonic  idea  is  an 
eternally  existing  type  seeking  embodiment  in  par- 
ticular contents,  and  because  of  the  obstructing 
character  of  the  material,  no  single  particular  is  an 
adequate  embodiment  of  the  idea. 

This  brings  us  to  Plato's  conception  of  matter. 
He  called  it  non-being  (to  fxrj  6v) .  Matter  in  Plato  is 
the  primitive,  formless  stuff  out  of  which  individual 
specimens  or  beings  are  formed  through  the  in- 
fluence of  ideas  or  universal  types.  He  does  not 
mean,  however,  that  matter  does  not  exist;  he 
means  to  suggest  that  it  is  not  a  specific  type  of 
being.  He  means  to  imply  that  there  is  indefinite 
potentiality.  Matter  is  nothing  in  itself,  but  it  is 
that  out  of  which  all  particular  things  are  made. 

What  then  is  the  Platonic  conception  of  the 
mode  of  operation  of  universals  on  matter.  At 
this  point  Plato  has  a  variety  of  answers.  Things 
of  sense  and  also  our  particular  acts  get  their 
specific  characteristics  by  participation  in  or  imita- 
tion of  the  ideas.  Every  just  act  shares  in  the  idea 
of    justice;    every    man    shares    in    the    idea    of 


PLATO  63 

humanity.  The  realm  of  matter  exists  as  the  pos- 
sibility of  both  particular  beings  and  particular 
acts.  There  are  therefore  three  logically  distinct 
realms  in  the  Platonic  doctrine :  — 

1.  Realm  of  ideas,  the  perfect  realities. 

2.  Realm  of  particular  things  and  acts, 
which  actually  exist. 

3.  Realm  of  pure  matter  or  non-being. 
This  is  an  abstraction  and  does  not 
exist  as  sicch. 

The  ideas  are  dynamic ;  they  are  causes.  They 
effect  the  work  of  molding  matter  into  the  form  of 
particular  things  that  exist  in  the  world  of  our  ex- 
perience. Our  world  is  therefore  the  product  of 
the  causal  action  of  ideas  on  matter.  If  the  ideas 
are  eternal  and  thus  have  causal  efficacy,  why  do 
they  not  produce  perfect  particulars?  Why  does 
not  the  kingdom  of  God  immediately  emerge?  Why 
does  not  perfection  in  our  ethical  experience  mani- 
fest itself?  Here  in  our  world  there  are  no  perfect 
dogs,  no  perfect  justice,  no  perfect  wisdom.  Why 
not?  The  source  of  all  particular  things  is  perfect. 
The  reason  why  no  particular  instance  is  perfect  is 
that  matter  offers  obstruction.  It  is  recalcitrant  to 
the  operation  of  the  ideas.  Matter  is  mulish.  There 
is  a  brute,  irrational  necessity  in  matter  that 
obstructs  the  realization  of  ideas  in  matter.  The 
Platonic  view,  therefore,  is  a  teleological  idealism 
involving  a  dualistic  element.  It  is  teleological  in 
that  it  interprets  the  world  in  terms  of  purpose  or 
final  cause.  It  is  dualistic  in  its  conception  of  the 
two  kinds  of  existence,  matter  and  ideas. 


64  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Aristotle  holds  that  Plato  severed  the  realm  of 
ideas  from  the  world  of  sense.  Whether  or  not 
Aristotle's  criticism  be  just,  at  any  rate  we  are  justi- 
fied in  saying  that  there  is  a  dualistic  tinge  in 
Platonism.  There  are  two  clearly  distinct  realms  of 
being :  — 

a)  Realm  of  ideas, 

b)  Realm  of  perceptual  existence. 

The  realm  of  ideas  is  above,  but  it  enters  into  and 
shapes  the  realm  of  matter  into  perceptual 
existence.  The  realm  of  ideas  is  thus  both  trav^ 
scendent  and  immanent.  The  ideas  of  Plato  are 
transcendent  in  that  they  go  beyond  actual  experi- 
ence, and  are  immanent  in  that  they  are  indwelling 
and  operative  in  experience.  Plato's  theory  of 
reality  is  also  pluralistic  to  this  extent,  viz.,  that 
there  is  an  indefinitely  large  number  of  universals, 
each  of  which  really  exists.  The  essence  of 
pluralism  is  that  there  are  many  existents  —  many 
beings  that  exist.  But  Platonic  philosophy  is  not 
a  chaotic  pluralism.  The  ideas  constitute  a  system, 
the  copestone  of  which  system  is  the  supreme, 
unitary  idea  —  The  Good,  the  many  in  one  or  the 
one  in  many. 

There  is  a  doubt  if  Plato  meant  that  the  three 
logically  distinct  spheres  —  matter,  perceptual  exist- 
ence and  the  ideas  —  should  be  regarded  as  three 
worlds.  The  probability  is  that  he  regarded  them 
simply  as  logically  distinct  levels  of  existence.  It  is 
not  easy,  however,  to  say  what  Plato's  view  was. 
He  examines  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  his  own 
theories  and  repeatedly  revises  them.     His  mind 


,    PLATO  65 

did  not  crystallize  into  an  unyielding  structure.  In 
this  respect  Plato  is  the  paragon  of  scholars.  The 
constant  prayer  of  the  scholar  should  be  this :  "God 
deliver  me  from  having  a  crystallized  mind,  from 
having  a  shut  up  mind."  There  is  nothing  so  im- 
penetrable as  such  a  mind.  It  is  more  impenetrable 
than  steel.  There  are  minds  into  which  no  novel 
idea  can  penetrate. 

The  lowest  level  of  existence  is  that  of  brute 
matter  —  mere  matter  which,  in  itself,  is  non-being. 
The  precise  meaning  of  this  concept  in  Plato's 
system  is  not  clear.  Some  authorities  say  that  by 
mere  matter  he  meant  space.  At  any  rate  it  is  the 
formless  stuff  about  which  nothing  more  could  be 
said,  because  it  is  formless.  The  second  level  is 
the  realm  of  sense  experience,  and  in  this  realm  we 
can  distinguish  a  number  of  stages.  As  an  illustra- 
tion, one  may  take  a  tree.  The  tree  embodies  more 
universals  than  its  seed.  Imagine  this  tree  sawed 
into  planks.  The  planks  mean  more  than  the  log. 
These  planks  may  be  further  utilized  and  elaborate 
pieces  of  furniture  made  out  of  them.  The  fur- 
niture embodies  more  universals  than  the  planks. 
An  amoeba  is  not  a  very  highly  organized  being,  but 
man  is  highly  organized,  and  thus  he  expresses  more 
and  higher  universals.  The  scholar  is  much  higher 
than  the  ditch  digger  because  he  also  embodies  a 
greater  diversity  of  universals.  You  may  take  two 
volumes,  both  made  out  of  wood-pulp.  Suppose 
that  one  of  these  is  the  latest,  best  seller,  and  the 
other  a  volume  of  Plato  or  Bergson.  The  difference 
between  these  two  is  tremendous.     The  Plato  or 


66  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Bergson  is  vastly  richer  in  meanings,  i.  e.,  universals, 
than  the  best  seller.  The  third  level  is  the  realm 
of  ideas  or  universals.  Whether  this  is  for  Plato 
an  entirely  separate  realm  that  communicates  itself 
to  the  lower  stages  is  not  clear.  At  any  rate,  this 
much  is  clear,  that  it  is  the  rational  control  of  the 
lower  levels.  All  meanings  are  from  this  realm. 
However  small  and  ephemeral;  however  great  and 
permanent;  all  order  and  value  is  derived  from  the 
realm  of  universals. 

The  particular  thing  participates  in  many  ideas 
or  universals.  Plato  does  not  mean,  e.  g.,  that  man 
participates  in  nothing  but  humanity,  or  that  dog 
participates  only  in  caninity.  A  particular  is  a 
meeting-point  for  many  universals.  If  this  were 
not  the  case  one  could  never  predicate  any  attribute 
of  any  subject.  The  only  possibility  would  be  to  say, 
man  is  man  and  dog  is  dog,  et  cetera.     But  we  say, 

f  good,  \ 

I  wise, 
Socrates  is :  ^  older  than, 

I  shorter  than, 

\^  etc. 
Good,  however,  is  not  tall,  or  young,  or  old. 
Good  is  good.  But  unless  the  particular  does  par- 
ticipate in  a  multiplicity  of  universals,  it  would  be 
contradictory  to  make  any  judgments.  Only  on 
this  basis  is  predication  possible.  The  empirical 
world,  therefore,  is  seen  to  be  a  system,  not  a  chaos. 
For  the  universals  constitute  the  network  that  binds 
particulars  together.  Anything  may  have  anything 
in  common  with  something  else.     A  bottle  of  wine 


PLATO  67 

on  the  table  and  the  symbol,  square  root  of  two,  on 
the  blackboard,  have  the  common  character  of  being 
in  the  same  spatial  whole.  It  is  a  fact,  therefore, 
that  every  individual  is  a  meeting-point  of  ideas,  and 
thus  is  the  sense  world  constituted  a  system. 

Particulars  of  sense  perception  never  ad- 
equately embody  universals,  and  it  is  for  this  reason 
that  sense  particulars  are  always  imperfect.  In- 
asmuch as  particulars  are  a  system  through  sharing 
in  the  universals,  the  universals  themselves  con- 
stitute a  system.  All  the  ideas,  forms  (of  which 
the  particulars  are  the  imperfect  embodiments), 
constitute  a  system.  The  forms  are  all  inter- 
related, and,  though  we  may  not  see  how  all  the 
universals  are  related,  we  can  see  how  some  are, 
e.  g.,  ideas  of  justice  and  wisdom.  We  see  that  we 
cannot  be  truly  brave  without  being  just.  We  can 
see  how  moral  qualities  are  interrelated.  We  can 
also  see  how  certain  metaphysical  universals,  as  one 
and  many,  sameness  and  difference,  are  related. 
Sameness  has  no  meaning  apart  from  the  idea  of 
difference,  and  vice  versa.  If  the  world  were  a 
blank  identity  —  as  Hegel  said,  a  dark  night  in 
which  all  cows  are  black  —  then  our  judgments 
involving  predications  of  differences  in  all  their 
forms  would  be  impossible.  It  is  the  fundamental 
contention  of  Plato  that  universals  are  interrelated. 

The  work  of  knowledge  is  to  discover  what  are 
the  universals,  and  how  they  are  related. 

The  idea  of  the  good  is  the  copestone  of  the 
Platonic  system.  This  is  the  supreme  idea.  There 
is  an  absolute  beauty,  truth,  justice,  courage.    But 


68  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  principle  which  unifies  them  all  is  the  concep- 
tion of  the  good.  Our  imperfect  and  growing  ideas 
of  truth  are  only  imperfect  approximations  to  the 
realm  of  these  eternal  ideas.  We  make  this  ap- 
proximation through  right  thinking  and  conduct. 
It  is  by  these  two  devices  that  we  get  a  more 
systematic  grouping  of  this  ideal  realm.  This  realm 
is  a  realm  of  eternal,  perfect  bliss,  and  its  controll- 
ing idea  is  that  of  the  good.  Plato  perhaps  means  by 
this  doctrine  of  the  good  —  God.  All  the  order  and 
intelligibility,  all  the  meaningf ulness,  in  our  world  is 
an  expression  of  the  divine  and  absolute  reality.  In 
so  far  as  we  understand  and  feel  and  act  wisely, 
just  so  far  we  grow  in  character  and  intellect  into 
the  likeness  of  the  absolute  and  divine  reality. 

The  Final  Cause  of  the  world  is  the  Idea  of  the 
Good.  The  world  exists  in  order  that  the  good  may 
be  expressed  in  a  multitude  of  beings.  Plato  says 
that  God,  being  animated  by  love  and  having  no 
jealousy,  desires  that  there  should  be  as  many  beings 
like  him  as  possible. 

As  to  the  details  of  creation,  it  is  impossible  to 
give  any  exact  scientific  account.  The  doctrine  of 
the  ideas,  however,  Plato  holds  is  scientific.  It  is 
not  a  myth,  although  he  invents  many  myths,  and 
many  of  these  have  entered  deeply  into  the  texture 
of  Christian  theology.  Before  creation  there  was 
this  primeval  potentiality  of  things  (matter),  and 
out  of  this  God  fashions  the  world.  In  doing 
this  God  first  creates  the  demiurge.  This  is  the 
divine,  creative  principle  in  making  the  world.  Its 
functions  are  like  those  of  the  Logos  in  the  New 


PLATO  69 

Testament.  This  demiurge  is  the  energy  of  God  at 
work.  The  demiurge  then  fashioned  a  world  soul, 
and  then  fashioned  souls  for  each  planet  and  star, 
after  which  he  fashioned  souls  for  human  beings. 
Thus  we  have :  — 

1.  World  soul, 

2.  Planetary  souls, 

3.  Human  souls. 

All  this  process  is  effected  that  there  may  be  as 
many  souls  as  possible  in  the  likeness  of  the  divine. 
3.  PLATO'S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SOUL  (Psychology) 
The  soul  means  for  Plato  the  principle  of  life 
and  consciousness.  We  are  here  interested  in  his 
doctrine  of  the  nature  of  the  human  soul.  The 
human  soul  is  tri-partite: 

1.  Highest  part  (noetic  part),  "vov<s*';  its 
seat  is  in  the  head ; 

2.  Next   lowest    part    (executive    part) 
"6vfji6<s" ;  its  seat  is  in  the  thorax ; 

3.  The    lowest    part     (appetitive    part) 
"  'emOvfjiia' ;  it's  Seat  is  in  the  abdomen. 

In  the  human  being,  however,  these  parts  form  an 
interacting  whole. 

Plato  compares  the  human  soul  to  a  chariot 
drawn  by  two  steeds  and  driven  by  a  charioteer. 
The  two  steeds  are  the  spirited  part  and  the  animal 
desire  part.  Desire  wishes  to  turn  aside  and  delay 
at  the  pleasant  places  of  life  while  the  spirited  part 
is  impetuous  to  rush  on,  and  so  it  is  the  province  of 
reason  to  regulate  the  conduct  of  these  two. 


70  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

"Nov<s"  is  divine.  The  reason  of  man  is  the 
highest  source  of  knowledge.  It  is  through  the 
reason  that  we  apprehend  universals.  And  it  is  this 
part  of  the  soul  that  did  not  originate  with  the  body. 
It  is  this  rational  part  of  the  soul  which  shares 
directly  in  the  nature  of  the  ideas.  The  other  parts 
thus  share  only  so  far  as  they  are  penetrated  by 
reason.  The  origin  and  destiny  of  the  *Vo{is"  is  in- 
dependent of  the  body.  True,  it  is  now  immersed 
in  the  body,  but  it  is  independent  of  the  body.  In 
the  Phsedo  this  is  Plato's  main  argument  for  im- 
mortality. 

4.      PLATO'S  THEORY  OF   HUMAN   GOOD 

(Ethics  and  Social  Philosophy) 

Plato  does  not  separate  ethics  from  social 
philosophy.  His  position  as  to  the  true  nature  of 
man  is  the  same  as  that  of  Aristotle.  Man  realizes 
his  nature  only  through  a  well-ordered  society.  The 
function  of  the  state  as  the  highest  form  of  social 
organization  is  the  realization  of  virtue  on  the 
part  of  its  citizens.  The  state  exists  as  an  instru- 
ment of  culture.  The  chief  means  whereby  the 
state  fulfills  its  function  as  such  an  instrument  is 
education.  The  ends  of  education  are  the  develop- 
ment of  the  virtues  of  the  self.  Plato  is  here  ever- 
lastingly right.  This  is  the  only  sound  theory  of 
the  state's  function.  Plato  insists  that  the  state  is 
to  afford  the  means  for  the  fullest  development  of 
its  citizens,  and  that  education  is  the  chief  means. 
This  calls  for  a  clear  and  consistent  doctrine  of  con- 


PLATO  71 

duct  and  character.  Plato  bases  his  whole  social 
doctrine  on  his  psychological  analysis.  The  good  is 
the  harmonious  functioning  of  the  three  parts  of 
the  soul :  — 

1.  The  virtue  of  desire  is  self-control; 

2.  The  virtue  of  the  spirited  part  is  cour- 
age; 

3.  The   virtue   of   the   rational   part   is 
philosophic  insight; 

4.  The  virtue  of  the  whole  system  is  jus- 
tice and  righteousness. 

When  one  satisfies  appetites  under  the  con- 
sciousness of  consequences,  he  exercises  self-control. 
When  one  lets  loose  his  vigor  only  under  proper 
circumstances,  then  one  exhibits  courage.  Courage 
is  not  the  running  amuck  of  rashness.  Courage  for 
Plato  is  the  fixed  resolve  to  go  ahead  and  do  the 
right  with  a  clear  consciousness  of  the  dangers  in- 
volved. Wisdom  is  philosophy,  and  philosophy  is 
insight  into  the  relations  of  life.  It  is  love  of  the 
truest  and  the  best.  The  exercise  of  wisdom  is  im- 
possible to  one  who  has  a  keen  intellect  but  no  en- 
thusiasm, no  love  for  knowledge.  In  wisdom  there 
must  be  this  enthusiasm  as  well  as  keenness  of 
intellect. 

As  to  the  function  of  the  state,  Plato  holds  that 
it  is  to  provide  adequate  means  for  the  development 
of  virtues.  It  is  the  cultivation  of  the  individual 
as  a  member  of  society  that  the  state  is  to  effect; 
and  the  great  truth  in  Plato  is  that  he  bases  his 
social  and  educational  theory  on  the  psychological 


72  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

analysis  of  the  individual.  The  state  is  the  in- 
dividual writ  large. 

As  to  the  organization  of  the  state  in  regard  to 
its  end  and  the  mode  of  reaching  it,  Plato's  idea  is 
that  the  moral  culture  of  its  citizens  is  what  is  to 
be  furthered  by  this  organization.  And  this  end 
will  be  best  furthered  if  the  state  be  ruled  by  an 
aristocracy  of  character  and  intellect.  Etymo- 
logically  the  term  "aristocracy"  means  the  rule  of 
the  best  and  not  the  rule  of  those  who  have  in- 
herited wealth  or  special  privilege.  We  mean  by 
aristocracy,  a  class  having  special  privileges.  But 
this  is  not  Plato's  meaning.  He  invariably  means 
those  best  trained  for  the  service  of  the  state.  It 
is  to  make  one  fitted  to  play  his  part  in  the  state 
that  is  the  real  task  of  life.  When  one  is  so  fitted, 
he  will  have  personal  well-being.  This,  however,  is 
not  a  picture  of  an  actual  state;  it  is  the  ideal  of 
what  a  state  might  be,  ought  to  be. 

There  are  three  classes  in  this  ideal  state,  and 
they  correspond  respectively  to  the  three  divisions  in 
the  soul  of  the  individual.  A  large  number  of  in- 
dividuals, Plato  thinks,  are  born  without  capacity 
for  achieving  any  high  degree  of  intellectual  insight 
—  most  people  are  not  born  to  be  philosophers.  A 
good  many  also  are  not  born  to  be  defenders  — 
guardians — of  the  state  because  they  lack  that 
moral  courage  which  is  necessary  to  a  guardian. 
They  are  to  supply  the  material  conditions  of  life; 
they  are  to  be  agriculturists,  artisans,  business 
men,  bankers.  We  think  today  that  the  business 
man  exercises  a  much  greater  amount  of  insight 


PLATO  73 

than  Plato  ever  ascribed  to  men  following  this  type 
of  service.  The  virtue  which  stands  out  in  this 
class  is  self-control.  To  be  good  traders,  farmers, 
artisans,  bankers,  they  must  exercise  self-control. 
In  this  class  Plato  will  allow  private  property  as  a 
stimulus  to  their  more  effectually  providing  the 
physical  conditions  for  all  the  social  classes.  The 
two  upper  classes,  however,  are  to  be  supported  at 
the  expense  of  the  state,  but  are  not  to  be  allowed 
private  property.  For  Plato  is  of  the  opinion  that 
the  quest  for  riches  would  distort  their  sense  of 
service,  would  interfere  with  their  disinterestedness 
of  spirit. 

The  men  of  strong  will,  of  courage,  are  to  be 
the  guardians,  the  commanders  of  the  state,  —  here 
as  well  as  in  the  lowest  class,  Plato,  of  course,  as- 
sumes that  a  modicum  of  wisdom^  is  required. 

The  third  class  consists  of  philosophers  for 
whom  the  consuming  passion  in  life  is  knowledge 
and  virtue.  Only  the  wisest  and  best  should  rule. 
The  fundamental  virtues  of  the  lower  classes  are 
theirs  as  well  as  wisdom.  Self-control  and  courage, 
crowned  by  the  knowledge  of  the  nature  and  voca- 
tion of  human  life,  this  is  the  life  of  the  philosopher. 
Those  bom  with  the  highest  endowments  are  to  be 
trained  until  about  fifty  years  of  age.  There  are  to 
be  no  young  rulers  in  the  Platonic  republic. 

Education  is  the  one  instrument  for  realizing 
this  ideal,  and  in  the  Republic  he  outlines  his  theory 
of  education.  The  basis  of  education  in  early  youth 
is  bodily  exercises.  A  sound  physical  foundation 
must  be  laid.     There  must  also  be  moral  instruction 


74  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

and  this  is  to  come  through  narration  of  myths  and 
of  stories,  with  a  view  to  stimulation  of  the  imagina- 
tion in  the  direction  of  right  conduct.  There  is  to 
be  a  cultivation  of  the  feelings  and  an  inculcation 
of  right  ideals.  Before  teaching  the  youths  the 
stories  of  the  past,  Plato  would  take  the  poets  and 
their  stories  of  early  heroes,  and,  indeed,  also  the 
historians,  and  he  would  go  through  them  with  a 
blue  pencil ;  he  would  strike  out  all  unseemly  stories 
of  the  gods,  he  would  present  no  intellectual  food  to 
the  i31astic  imagination  of  the  child  that  is  degrading 
or  suggestive  of  evil.  Thirdly,  music  is  to  be 
taught.  By  means  of  music  the  individual's  feelings 
are  stirred,  refined  and  harmonized ;  and  for  all  the 
Greeks  the  sense  of  harmony  —  of  proportion  —  is 
indispensable  to  the  good  life.  Plato  rests  the  edu- 
cation of  the  child  on  a  threefold  foundation,  viz., 
physical,  moral,  and  aesthetic. 

At  the  age  of  about  twenty,  a  selection  can  be 
made  of  those  fitted  to  go  on  further,  and  to  those 
so  selected,  a  thorough  training  is  to  be  given  in 
mathematics.  Mathematics  is  the  type  of  science 
for  Plato.  Then  would  come  the  study  of  the  inter- 
relations of  the  subjects  already  studied  —  the  be- 
ginning of  dialectic  or  philosophy.  At  the  age  of 
thirty,  a  still  further  selection  of  those  excelling  in 
mathematics  is  made.  Those  who  show  a  capacity 
for  leadership  are  now  to  take  up  the  study  of 
dialectic,  this  to  continue  for  about  five  years,  after 
which  they  are  ready  to  serve  the  state  in  minor 
offices  and  military  commands.  Thus  at  the  age  of 
about  fifty,  having  already  served  the  state  for  ap- 


PLATO  76 

proximately  fifteen  years,  those  who  have  acquitted 
themselves  best  are  qualified  to  rule  and  to  continue 
to  do  so  until  they  retire,  whereupon  they  are  sup- 
ported at  the  expense  of  the  state,  for  they  have 
"done  their  bit". 

The  idea  of  the  science  of  eugenics  is  developed 
in  Plato.  We  are  beginning  today  to  think  that  a 
child  has  a  right  to  decent  parentage:  criminals, 
idiots,  and  confirmed  drunkards  ought  not  to  be 
allowed  to  propagate  their  kind.     Plato  thought  so. 

Plato  was  the  first  to  advocate  eugenics.  He 
would  place  marriage  under  the  control  of  the  state. 
The  state  exists  for  the  production  of  the  highest 
type  of  virtue  in  the  citizen,  and  for  this  the  in- 
dividual must  be  bom  with  good  capacities. 

While  we  are  so  diligently  and  aggressively 
making  the  world  safe  for  Democracy,  let  us  ask 
what  Democracy  is  and  what  are  its  limitations? 
Let  us  be  clear  as  to  what  Democracy  is  to  mean 
and  as  to  what  are  its  possibilities  and  problems. 
Plato  is  everlastingly  right  in  saying  that  no  amount 
of  demagogic  oratory  will  alter  the  fact  that  in- 
dividuals are  not  bom  with  equal  capacities.  No 
romancing  about  Democracy  will  alter  the  fact  that 
a  state  not  run  on  the  basis  of  merit  will  never 
realize  the  highest  good.  Any  state  policy  which 
prevents  the  best  from  serving  their  state  has  some- 
thing wrong  in  it.  Even  our  own  democracy  has 
many  defects,  among  which  is  a  general  lack  of 
recognition  of  need  of  the  highest  training  and  best 
character  for  service  of  the  state  and  society  in 
public  office. 


76  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


REFERENCES. 

Plato,  Dialogues,  transl.  by  Jowett,  especially  Pro- 
tagoras, Phaedrus,  Theaetetus,  Sophist,  Politicus,  Parmen- 
ides.  Symposium,  Phaedo,  Republic. 

Histories  of  Philosophy  previously  cited. 

Britannica,  11th  ed..  Art.  Plato. 

Taylor,  A.  E.,  Plato. 

Burnet,  History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  205-350. 

Ritchie,  D.  G.,  Plato. 

Pater,  W.,  Plato  and  Platonism. 

Stewart,  J.  A.,  Plato's  Doctrine  of  Ideas,  and  Myths  of 
Plato. 

Nettleship,  R.  L.,  Lectures  on  the  Republic,  and  Plato's 
Theory  of  Education. 

Zeller,  Plato. 

Grote,  Plato  and  the  Other  Companions  of  Socrates. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ARISTOTLE  —  384-322  B.  C. 

Plato  had  a  large  school  called  the  Academy. 
Of  that  school  Aristotle  was  the  ablest  member, 
and  he  in  turn  later  established  the  Lyceum,  an  in- 
stitution which  became  the  most  important  center 
of  learning  in  the  ancient  world  after  Plato's  demise. 
Aristotle  was  a  tutor  of  Alexander  the  Great,  and 
it  is  often  supposed  that  Aristotle  got  money  for 
his  school  from  Alexander.  Aristotle  made  great 
collections  in  the  departments  of  botany,  zoology 
and  other  fields  of  science.  While  Plato  was  a  man 
of  poetic  inspiration  and  great  speculative  insight, 
Aristotle  was  a  great  intellectual  organizer.  He 
systematized  and  developed  the  doctrines  of  Plato. 
His  logic  has  remained  the  basis  of  logic  to  the 
present  time  and  his  ethics  is  still  full  of  sound  in- 
struction. He  wrote  on  politics,  anatomy,  botany 
and  poetics.  He  also  wrote  treatises  on  meta- 
physics, or  the  first  principles  of  reality,  and 
psychology,  which  are  still  very  important. 

1.    ARISTOTLE'S  THEORY  OF  REALITY  (Metaphysics) 

Aristotle  accepts  the  Platonic  conception  of 
knowledge,  i.  e.,  knowledge  comes  only  through  uni- 
versal, concepts,  forms.  Yet  Aristotle  thinks  that 
Plato  erred  in  separating  the  universals  from  the 
particulars.  The  following  scheme  illustrates  Aris- 
totle's conception  of  reality. 

(77) 


78  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  individual  being   (cvTcAcxcia) 


Matter  (SvvafiL<s)  Form  (euipycLa) 


By  matter  Aristotle  means  the  potentiality  of 
forms.  There  is  one  pure  form,  namely,  God. 
There  is  no  matter  in  God.  EvreXexeia  is  that  which  is 
the  fulfillment  of  an  end.  Thus  we  see  that  Aris- 
totle has  a  teleological  conception  of  nature. 

AvvaiJLL<s  or  matter  is  the  possibility  of  being  an 
individual,  while  the  form  is  the  shaping,  the  organ- 
izing, the  dynamic  principle.  For  Plato  the  ulti- 
mately real  world  is  the  realm  of  eternal  forms. 
Aristotle,  however,  maintains  that  reality  is  a  de- 
velopment of  individuals  through  the  immanent, 
indwelling  force  of  the  forms.  The  universals  do 
not  exist  apart  from  the  particulars ;  they  exist  only 
in  the  individuals.  The  formative  principles,  there- 
fore, are  immanent,  not  transcendent.  We  may 
illustrate  this  doctrine  as  follows :  We  say  the  child 
is  father  to  the  man.  We  mean  by  this  that  the 
possibility  of  the  statesman,  poet,  or  artisan,  is  in 
the  child,  and  the  realization  of  that  possibility  is 
the  coming  into  being  of  the  individual  man.  The 
oak  tree  is  the  realization  of  the  matter  or  poten- 
tiality latent  in  the  acorn.  Thus  throughout  nature 
there  are  operative,  purposive  entities,  and  the 
realization  of  the  end  is  always  due  to  the  activity 
of  the  form  in  the  matter. 


ARISTOTLE  79 

Aristotle  criticizes  Plato  on  the  ground  that  he 
separated  ideas  from  the  sense  world.  Aristotle 
himself  seeks  to  make  ideas  the  immanent,  indwell- 
ing or  shaping  principles  in  the  world  of  sense  ex- 
perience, and  he  develops  this  view  as  follows: 
matter,  he  maintains,  is  the  potentiality  or  the  pos- 
sibility of  form.  Matter  does  exist,  but  not  by 
itself.  There  is  no  such  thing  in  reality  as  formless 
matter,  a  primeval  stuff  which  is  pure  chaos.  The 
notion  of  pure  matter  is  for  Aristotle  a  limiting 
concept.  Matter  which  is  to  some  degree  shaped 
by  forms  is  what  actually  exists.  Thus  his  concep- 
tion of  matter  represents  an  advance  over  the  view 
of  Plato.  The  forms  or  universals  of  Aristotle  are 
called  entelechies.  They  are  the  realization  of  the 
possibilities  of  matter  to  be  formed.  Reality  — 
what  is  real  — is  the  individual.  There  is  no  such 
thing  as  either  pure  matter  or  pure  form  except  in 
the  case  of  God,  who  is  pure  form  —  Form  of 
Forms. 

The  world  is  a  system  of  development  in  which 
there  are  an  indefinite  number  of  stages  or  levels. 
On  the  lowest  level  we  have  an  individual  that  has 
the  fewest  forms  embodied  in  itself,  e.  g.,  clay.  This 
lump  of  clay  may  be  taken  by  the  sculptor  and 
shaped  into  the  figure  of  an  Apollo  Belvedere,  or  a 
Venus  de  Milo.  Then  the  lump  of  clay,  under  the 
guiding  mind  of  the  sculptor,  becomes  the  embodi- 
ment of  the  Greek  ideas  of  manly  and  feminine 
beauty.  Into  the  making  of  any  individual,  accord- 
ing to  Aristotle,  there  enter  two  causes,  the  material 
cause  and  the  final  cause.     The  material  cause  of 


80  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  statue  is  the  clay  or  the  marble,  the  stuff  out  of 
which  the  individual  is  shaped.  The  final  cause  is 
the  purpose  or  idea.  There  are  three  phases  or 
aspects  of  the  final  cause :  — 

1.  The  end  —  reAos. 

2.  The  formal  cause,  i.  e.,  the  shape  the 
individual  takes  in  the  mind  of  the 
sculptor. 

3.  The  efficient  cause,  the  instrument  by 
which  the  end  is  realized. 

The  idea  of  artistic  creation  was  very  in- 
fluential with  Plato  and  Aristotle.  They  were  both 
Greeks,  and  these  above  all  other  peoples  were  en- 
dowed with  a  high  order  of  artistic  powers  and  ap- 
preciation. 

Aristotle's  interpretation  of  nature  is  both 
humanistic  and  artistic.  His  Philosophy  of  Nature 
is  what  may  be  called  an  artistic  teleology,  i.  e.,  he 
gives  us  an  interpretation  of  the  processes  of  nature 
in  terms  of  artistic  purpose.  God  is  a  cosmic  artist. 
Among  all  the  natural  sciences,  biology  is  the  one 
which  interested  Aristotle  most.  His  conception  of 
the  relation  of  life  and  matter  is  teleological  and 
artistic.  This  comes  out  clearly  in  Aristotle's  con- 
ception of  the  soul  and  its  relation  to  the  body. 

2.      ARISTOTLE'S  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  soul  is  the  entelechy,  the  principle  of  life 
which  shapes  the  body  to  its  ends.  Only  potential 
life  belongs  to  bodies.  Actual  life  is  due  to  the  in- 
fluence of  the  soul  —  body  is  the  instrument  of  the 


ARISTOTLE  81 

soul.  The  actuality  of  the  body  is  derived  from  the 
soul.  Aristotle  distinguished  between  three  levels 
in  the  soul :  — 

1.  Nutritive  soul:  This  is  the  principle 
of  life  and  reproduction,  and  is  com- 
mcin  to  all  plants  and  animals. 

2.  Sensitive  soul :  This  is  common  to  all 
animals.  It  is  the  soul  which  has  sen- 
sation and  feeling.  Aristotle  thinks 
that  plants  do  not  have  sensation. 
Among  the  senses,  he  makes  touch 
fundamental  and  the  source  of  all  the 
others. 

3.  Rational  soul:  Through  this  soul 
knowledge  and  reflection  come. 

In  man  these  three  interact.  Reason  gets  all  of  its 
material  through  the  senses  and  the  imagination. 
At  this  point  Aristotle  gives  us  a  psychology  of 
knowledge,  which  we  did  not  get  in  Plato.  While 
the  materials  come  from  sensation,  the  separate 
senses  have  not  the  power  of  discriminating  and 
reasoning. 

Aristotle  is  the  first  to  definitely  formulate  a 
theory  of  the  nature,  structure,  and  function  of  the 
judgment.  So  far  as  the  rational  soul  is  influenced 
by  the  lower  grades,  it  is  relatively  passive.  But 
reason  itself  is  active,  creative,  synthetic,  and  its 
activity  enters  into  all  true  knowledge,  and  true 
knowledge  consists  in  knowledge  of  the  universal 
concepts.  In  the  act  of  knowing,  the  mind  is  one 
with  what  it  perceives. 


82  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Reason  is  pure  activity,  whose  work  is  guided 
by  the  laws  of  thought.  Aristotle  holds  that,  while 
our  knowledge  of  the  world  is  derived  from  the 
senses,  yet  there  is  no  knowledge  except  in  so  far 
as  the  materials  of  sense  are  judged  by  reason. 

3.      ARISTOTLE'S  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

In  the  moment  of  knowing,  mind  is  one  with 
the  object  known.  The  knowing  process  is  one  with 
what  it  knows.  Aristotle's  position,  therefore,  is  what 
is  known  as  epistemological  monism.  This  view  of 
knowledge  is  to  be  contrasted  with  all  theories  of 
dualism.  Dualistic  theories  maintain  that  in  knowl- 
edge we  deal  with  symbols  or  copies,  and  not  with  the 
object  directly.  In  Aristotle  we  have  the  realistic 
position  —  mind  knows  the  objects  as  they  really 
are  —  which  is  opposed  to  phenomenalism.  In 
phenomenalism  the  mind  is  said  to  know  appear- 
ance, symbols,  copies  of  things,  and  not  things  as 
they  are.  In  Aristotle  we  have  this,  one  of  the  most 
persistent  of  philosophical  problems  explicitly  for- 
mulated. In  this  realistic  position  mind  and  object 
known  are  held  to  be  one  in  the  moment  of  knowing. 

All  forms  of  phenomenalism  agree  in  saying 
that  mind  knows  only  appearances.  There  are,  to 
be  sure,  several  types  of  phenomenalistic  theories. 
These  types  range  from  those  which  insist  that  the 
knowledge  copies  are  fairly  good  copies  to  those 
views  which  urge  that  through  our  copies  we  get  to 
know  nothing  whatever  about  the  object.  Realism 
denies  that  knowledge  is  concerned  with  copies.  It 
rests  directly  upon  the  assumption  that,  e.  g.,  in  the 


ARISTOTLE  83 

moment  of  my  perceiving  this  desk,  there  is  no  real 
distinction  between  my  perceiving  and  what  I  per- 
ceive. 

Aristotle  uniformly  held  that  sense  perception 
is  a  genuine  source  of  knowledge,  and  that  th«» 
reason  is  dependent  on  perception  for  its  knowledge 
of  objects  in  nature.  There  is  a  gradual  transition 
from  sense  perception  to  rational  thought.  In  the 
lowest  stage  there  is  direct  perception  of  objects; 
after  this  there  comes  the  process  of  forming 
images,  and  then  the  forming  of  conceptions ;  but  In 
all  this  reason  is  active.  To  illustrate  this  point, 
suppose  that  you  visit  some  strange  region  never 
before  visited  by  man,  and  in  that  strange  region 
you  see  strange  animals.  You  begin  to  gain  con- 
trol of  the  situation  by  classifying  the  animals  in 
question  and  you  form  images  and  class  concepts 
into  which  the  objects  fall,  and  then  you  make  a 
definition  of  the  class  then  discovered.  It  is  in  the 
formation  of  the  definition  that  the  mind  is  most 
active,  and  it  is  upon  the  basis  of  such  definitions 
that  the  reason  can  further  work  deductively.  This 
threefold  process  eventuates  in  scientific  knowledge 
only  through  the  unifying  power  of  the  reason.  It 
is  through  this  power  that  all  our  concepts  are 
synthesized  into  a  well  articulated  system,  and  this 
takes  place  under  the  guidance  of  the  first  principles 
of  thought.  These  first  principles,  we  intuitively 
perceive,  and,  while  they  do  not  have  their  origin  in 
experience,  they  do  have  application  in  experience, 
i.  e.,  these  first  principles  are  not  of  experience,  but 
do  have  application  in  experience. 


84  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Aristotle's  theory  of  knowledge  is  more  care- 
fully elaborated  and  systematized  than  Plato's.  He 
also  pays  more  attention  to  the  psychological 
process  by  which  knowledge  is  constructed.  It  is 
often  said  that  Aristotle  is  an  empiricist.  This 
is  not  true,  although  it  is  true  that  he  gave  far  more 
consideration  to  empirical  data  than  did  Plato. 
Aristotle  holds  positively  to  the  existence  of 
mtuitively  known  principles.  For  him  all  knowl- 
edge is  not  derived  from  sense  perception.  The 
individual  mind  is  not  purely  passive.  He  differs 
greatly  from  the  English  empiricists  who  maintain 
that  the  individual  is  a  passive  organism  on  which 
the  world  writes  or  perchance  scribbles.  Ration- 
alism holds  that  the  fundamental  principles  of 
knowledge  are  not  derived  from  sense  experience. 
Rationalism  need  not  deny  that  the  senses  do  give 
the  materials  of  knowledge.  A  rationalist  of  the 
Aristotelian  variety  does  not  excogitate  the  data  of 
perception  out  of  his  own  inner  consciousness ;  but 
the  reason  is  creative,  and  it  is  the  source  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  thought.  There  is  an  oft 
forgotten  and  withal  important  distinction  which 
Aristotle  makes  when  he  points  out  the  difference 
between  priority  in  the  psychological  order  and 
that  in  the  logical  order.  Psychologically  sensation 
is  prior  to  conception,  i.  e.,  the  child  has  sensations 
before  it  has  concepts ;  it  has  particular  experiences 
before  it  has  general  experiences.  Our  scientific 
knowledge  began  with  crude  data  and  proceeds  only 
gradually  to  the  refined  results  given  us  in  scientific 
formulae.     By  logical  priority  Aristotle  means  that 


ARISTOTLE  85 

there  is  implied,  or  actually  used,  universal  prin- 
ciples in  the  organization  of  our  sense  experience. 
The  organization  of  sense  experience  into  science 
uses  these  fundamental  principles  even  though  it 
may  never  know  what  these  principles  are. 

4.      SUMMARY  OF  ARISTOTLE'S  THEORY  OF  REALITY 

Aristotle's  conception  of  reality  is  that  of  an 
endless  process  of  passing  from  potentiality  to 
actuality,  or,  from  the  formless  to  the  formed. 
Forms  are  the  dynamic  principles  that  operate  in 
the  natural  order.  All  individual  beings  from  the 
simplest  crystal  to  the  very  highest  individual  are 
the  results  of  the  operation  of  the  entelechies  or 
formative  principles  in  nature.  Reality  is  the  con- 
stant process  of  the  actualization  of  forms. 

Nothing  in  the  natural  world  is  created  all  at 
once.  Everything  develops,  grows.  Broadly  speak- 
ing, therefore,  Aristotle's  philosophy  is  that  reality 
is  an  evolution.  It  is  an  evolution  towards  pro- 
gressively higher  types  of  individuality.  It  is  a 
teleological  evolution  including  in  its  purposiveness 
a  realization  of  a  multitude  of  purposes  or  ends. 
Such  a  conception  of  nature  implies  that  the  all- 
inclusive  purpose  is  operative  through  all  the  stages 
of  the  process.  In  other  words,  such  a  theory  im- 
plies that,  while  the  purpose  of  the  whole  is  realized 
in  time,  this  purpose  must  be  eternally  existent. 
There  must  be  a  form  of  forms,  a  pure  and  all- 
inclusive  form,  free  from  any  admixture  of  matter; 
and  this  form  of  forms  must  be  presupposed  in  order 
to  account  for  the  process,  and  indeed,  for  any 


86  THE   FIELD   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

stage  of  the  process.  This  form  of  forms,  this 
eternal  purpose,  this  universal  mover,  is  God.  He 
is  the  source  of  all  movement,  of  all  actuality. 

Matter  has  a  contingent,  irrational  character. 
It  is  not  wholly  subservient  to  the  realization  of 
form  and  purposive  reality,  and  it  is  this  character 
that  matter  has  which  is  the  cause  of  all  failure  in 
nature.  God  is  the  final  cause,  and  as  the  final 
cause,  he  is  the  eternally  first  cause  of  all  move- 
ment. He  is  eternal,  being  without  parts  or  pas- 
sion, and  unmoved  by  the  phantasmagoria  of  the 
world  of  sense.  He  is  pure  thought,  pure  activity, 
— pure  thought  unhampered  by  any  admixture  of 
sense.  He  is  the  eternally  tireless,  active  thought 
of  the  universe.  As  to  why  there  is  one  and  not 
a  plurality  of  gods,  Aristotle  replies  that  God  is 
one  because  the  world  is  one.  The  beauty  of  the 
world,  the  intelligent  and  harmonious  connections 
of  its  parts  are  evidence  of  a  supreme  purpose 
operative  everywhere  in  nature.  The  splendor  of 
the  stars  point  to  one  being  from  whom  comes  all 
unity,  harmony,  and  splendor  of  the  world.  This 
one  God  is  transcendent,  self-conscious  spirit,  the 
eternally  first  cause  of  all  change  and  development. 

Aristotle  believes  in  divine  providence,  but  that 
God  works  through  natural  means.  At  the  time  of 
Aristotle  there  were  two  ideas  in  Greek  religion 
which  he  readily  accepted: 

1.  Recognition  of  the  existence  of  gods ; 

2.  The  divinity  of  the  stars. 

As  to  how  God  acts  upon  the  world,  Aristotle  holds 
that  there  is  a  longing  of  matter  after  God.     In 


ARISTOTLE  87 

matter  is  the  desire  to  become  pure  activity.  It  is 
this  longing  of  the  world  to  become  like  God  that 
is  the  immediate  cause  of  all  the  world  process. 

5.      ARISTOTLE'S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  GOOD    (EtMcs) 

The  good  of  anything,  on  the  basis  of  the 
Aristotelian  conception  of  the  Good,  consists  in  the 
actualization  of  all  the  functions  that  belong  to  that 
being.  Every  type  of  being  has  its  own  modes  of 
activity,  and  it  is  the  realization  of  these  that  con- 
stitutes the  Good.  That  which  distinguishes  man 
is  his  reason,  and,  therefore,  the  Good  of  man  is  the 
activity  of  reason  unfolding  itself  in  all  the  virtues. 
When  man  exercises  his  functions  as  a  human  being, 
he  is  happy,  but  the  desired  end  of  such  functioning 
is  not  pleasure.  Pleasure  is  the  result  but  not  the 
motive.  Welfare  is  the  energizing  of  the  soul 
according  to  virtue.  Nowhere  in  the  whole  range 
of  ethical  literature  is  there  a  better  definition  of 
the  Good  for  man.  Aristotle  does  not  have  the 
ascetic  strain  of  Plato,  at  least  not  to  an5rthing  like 
the  same  degree.  The  body  is  not  a  prison  house 
for  Aristotle. 

Aristotle  gives  a  twofold  classification  of  the 
virtues,  viz.,  practical  and  theoretical.  By  prac- 
tical, Aristotle  means  the  fundamental  social  virtues; 
and,  like  Plato,  he  holds  that  human  life  can  be 
realized  only  in  society:  ethics  and  politics  for 
Aristotle  are  inseparable.  This  is  a  fundamental 
truth  —  politics  is  nothing  but  applied  ethics. 
These  practical  virtues  are  courage,  self-control, 
liberality,  high-mindedness,  friendliness,  truthful- 


88  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ness,  justice,  et  cetera,  and  each  of  these,  it  is 
evident,  is  a  functional  mean  between  two  extremes. 
The  theoretical  virtues  have  to  do  with  the  exercise 
of  thought.     Judgment  here  assumes  two  forms : 

1.  Judgment  as  to  means ; 

2.  Judgment  as  to  ends. 

The  highest  virtue  of  all  is  wisdom.  Applied  to 
life  as  a  whole,  it  is  self-knowledge  and  understand- 
ing of  things  in  relation  to  God.  It  is  pure  con- 
templation. This  is  the  sweetest  and  best  of  all 
things.  This  contemplation  of  all  things  as  de- 
pendent on  God  —  thinking  the  thoughts  of  God 
after  him  —  of  this  one  never  grows  tired.  When 
freed  from  the  vicissitudes  of  chance,  this  is  the 
highest  delight  of  man. 

REFERENCES 

Aristotle.     Nichomachean    Ethics,   transl's   by    Chase, 
Welldon,  and  Peters. 

Metaphysics,  transl.  by  Ross. 

Psychology,  by  Hammond,  Hicks,  and  Wallace. 

Politics,  by  Weldon  and  Jowett. 

Taylor,  A.  E.,  Aristotle. 

Wallace,  E.,  Outlines  of  the  Philosophy  of  Aristotle. 

Zeller,  Aristotle  and  the  Peripatetics. 

Grote,  Aristotle. 

Grant,  Aristotle. 


CHAPTER  VII 
ATOMISTIC   MATERIALISM 

Materialism  is  one  of  the  main  types  of  world 
view  or  metaphysics.  The  essence  of  materialism 
lies  in  the  following  four  doctrines :  — 

a)  All  qualitative  varieties  and  changes  in 
the  world  of  human  experiences  are  re- 
ducible to  quantitative  terms  and  state- 
ment. 

b)  All  perceptions,  feelings,  thoughts,  —  the 
whole  content  and  activity  of  mind,  are 
reducible  to  the  motions  of  mass  particles 
in  space. 

c)  Because  of-  this,  all  so-called  secondary 
qualities  of  objects  are  merely  phenomena 
in  the  human  organism  —  these  secondary 
qualities  do  not  exist  in  the  objects  them- 
selves. It  is  only  the  primary  qualities 
which  really  exist  apart  from  the  human 
percipient  organism. 

d)  Every  event  which  occurs,  every  happen- 
ing in  the  endless  process  of  things,  is  the 
result  alone  of  blind  mechanical  motion. 
There  is  no  purpose,  no  meaning,  either 
in  the  sum  of  things  or  in  the  elements  of 
things.  What  the  man  in  the  street  calls 
purpose  or  providence  are  illusions  of  his 
own  provincial,  self-centered  point  of  view. 

(89) 


90  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

What  really  goes  on  and  really  determines 
with  inexorable  necessity  the  sequence  of 
events,  is  the  eternal,  unmeaning,  uncon- 
scious dance,  the  collision  and  rebound,  of 
mass  particles  in  space.     No  one  guides  the 
process  to  an  end,  and  no  one  controls  it. 
Our  desires,   our   intents,   our   purposes, 
have  no  more  significance  in  the  blind  and 
insensate  organization  of  the  universe  than 
has  the  dancing  of  a  mote  in  the  sun- 
beam. 
Leucippus  (dates  unknown,  reputed  teacher  of 
Democritus)  is  the  originator  of  atomic  materialism. 
It   was   Democritus    (about  460-370   B.    C.)    who 
brought  the  theory  to  the  completeness  given  it  by 
the  Greeks.     The  Epicurean  School,  one  of  the  most 
important    Schools    after    Aristotle,    adopted    or 
affixed  atomic  materialism  to  its  theory  of  conduct. 
One  of  the  chief  causes  of  superstition  has  been 
the  fear  of  the  gods,  but  on  the  basis  of  this  atomic 
theory,  there  is  no  place  for  the  gods ;  and  it  was  for 
this  reason  largely  that  atomism  was  taken  up  by 
the  Epicureans.    The  great  Latin  poet,  Lucretius,  in 
his  philosophical  poem,  "On  the  Nature  of  Things", 
also  expounds  the  philosophical  system  of  atomism. 
The  influence  of  atomism  then  died  out,  and 
was  revived  again  when  adopted  by  Gassendi  and 
Hobbes.     And    in    modern    experimental   physical 
science,    it   has   played   an   important   part.     The 
electron  theory  is  only  the  latest  development  of  this 
atomic  theory.     The  modem  scientific  atomist  Is 
not  concerned  about  the  substrata  of  the  mind  or 


ATOMISTIC   MATERIALISM  91 

the  problems  of  value.  In  physical  science  the 
atomic  theory  is  simply  a  working  hypothesis  that 
best  seems  to  fit  all  the  facts.  It  is  the  best 
scientific  policy  there  is.  To  assume  that  matter  is 
discrete  and  not  continuous  enables  the  physicist 
and  chemist  to  get  forward  in  their  investigations. 
In  Democritus  and  Leucippus,  atomism  is  a  meta- 
physical doctrine.  It  is  put  forth  as  being  adequate 
to  explain  the  whole  of  reality.  Leucippus,  who 
was  younger  than  Parmenides  and  older  than 
Democritus,  was  a  contemporary  of  Empedocles  and 
Anaxagoras.  Democritus  was  a  contemporary  of 
Socrates  and  in  part,  of  Plato.  There  is  a  tradition 
that  he  lived  to  be  nearly  one  hundred  years  old, 
living  from  460,  B.  C,  to  360,  B.  C.  He  was  a 
native  of  Abdera,  the  home  of  Protagoras.  We 
have  only  a  very  fragmentary  account  of  Leucippus. 
Of  Democritus  we  know  that  he  had  the  greatest 
acquaintance  with  natural  science  next  to  Aristotle. 
Unfortunately  he  remained  in  the  provincial  town 
of  Abdera.  He  did  not  move  to  Athens,  and  it  was 
perhaps  because  of  this  that  Democritus'  teaching 
had  little  influence  in  Athens.  There  never  was  a 
vigorous  School  owning  Democritus  as  its  founder. 

Parmenides  of  Elea  had  taught  that  the  one 
substance  is  unchanging,  eternal,  and  homogeneous. 
Heraclitus,  on  the  other  hand,  taught  that  all  is 
change.  The  law  of  change  alone  is  permanent. 
Leucippus  combines  the  ideas  of  permanence  and 
change  in  such  a  way  as  to  admit  both  without 
making  either  illusory. 

The  way  out  of  the  opposition  between  per- 


92  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

manence  and  change  is  as  follows:  Reality  con- 
sists of  an  infinite  number  of  particles.  These  exist 
eternally.  They  are  ungenerated.  They  exist  and 
move  in  empty  space.  Atoms  and  the  void  are  the 
original  and  indestructible  data  of  reality.  These 
atoms  differ  in  size,  and  they  differ  to  an  infinite 
degree  in  their  forms  and  shapes.  Some  of 
them  have  hooks,  others  have  eyes,  grooves,  pro- 
tuberances, et  cetera.  While  moving  in  space,  these 
atoms  impinge  upon  one  another  and  rebound. 
They  incessantly  move,  and  the  falling  together  of 
the  atoms  produces  a  vortex  movement,  and  it  is 
this  movement  that  gives  rise  to  a  world.  There  is 
an  endless  procession  of  worlds  —  our  world  is  only 
one  of  an  endless  number  of  worlds  that  arise  and 
pass  away.  This  world  of  ours  swings  in  empty 
space  like  a  ball.  On  the  outermost  bounds  of  the 
world  is  a  rind,  as  it  were,  of  closely  packed  atoms. 
From  the  impact  and  rebound  of  atoms  arise  all 
things.  The  four  elements,  of  which  fire  is  the  most 
important,  also  arise  in  this  manner.  Inasmuch  as 
the  atoms  have  only  those  qualities  which  we  ap- 
proximately call  primary  —  i.  e.,  only  spatial  and 
mechanical  properties  —  the  question  arises,  how  is 
it  that  we  come  to  perceive  all  these  other  qualities 
in  the  bodies,  and  how  do  we  know  that  these  quali- 
ties exist  only  for  the  human  organism  ?  And  also, 
how  do  we  know  that  the  other  qualities  exist  in  the 
objects?  The  reply  to  this  question  is  given  us  in 
the  atomistic  theory  of  knowledge. 

The  soul  consists  of  the  motion  —  nothing  but 
the  motion  —  of  fine,  smooth,  round,  fiery  atoms. 


ATOMISTIC   MATERIALISM  93 

Objects  throw  off  eidola,  images,  and  these  images 
enter  the  sense  organs  and  then  give  rise  to  the  sec- 
ondary qualities.  These  images  are  not  good  copies 
of  the  objects  because  they  are  due  to  the  meeting 
of  the  motions  of  sense  organs  with  the  systems  of 
motion  in  the  form  of  the  images  thrown  off  from 
the  objects.  They  are  distorted,  and  therefore  the 
senses  do  not  acquaint  us  with  the  nature  of  reality. 
The  external  world  has  no  sounds,  no  tastes,  no 
odors,  no  colors,  no  harmony  or  discord,  no  warmth 
or  music.  There  is  simply  everlasting  motion  of 
mass  particles  in  space.  The  soul  itself  consists  of 
the  finest  motion  of  the  finest  particles.  Thus 
thought  is  also  regarded  as  being  the  resultant  of 
mass  particles.  It  is  through  thought,  urge  the 
atomists,  that  the  wise  man  knows  that  the  world 
consists  only  of  atoms  moving  in  a  void.  Most  men 
know  only  what  is  given  them  through  the  senses, 
but  the  wise  man  through  intuition  learns  the  truth. 
As  to  the  nature  of  the  Good,  Democritus  as- 
sumes that  happiness  is  to  be  attained  only  through 
the  exercise  of  thought.  Materialist  though  he  is, 
he  is  one  of  the  most  extreme  rationalists.  Genuine 
knowledge  of  the  real  is  attained  through  the  exer- 
cise of  thought  and  not  through  the  senses.  In  this 
type  of  intuitive  knowledge,  there  is  a  harmony  of 
the  soul,  a  calm,  a  gentle,  harmonious  reaction  of 
the  soul  atoms.  In  sense  knowledge  we  have  those 
passions,  those  hurricanes  that  lash  the  soul  and 
make  it  impossible  to  desire  true  knowledge. 


94  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


REFERENCES 

Burnet,  J.,  History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  Part  I,  105- 
125,  193-201. 

Bakewell,  C.  M.,  Source  Book  in  Ancient  Philosophy, 
57-66. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  DECLINE   OF   GREEK   SPECULATION 

There  are  two  tests  of  the  value  of  a  philosophy : 

a)  The  adequacy  of  the  philosophy  as  an  in- 
terpretation of  all  the  main  aspects  of 
human  experience,  i.  e.,  the  completeness, 
the  balance  of  its  interpretation  of  all  the 
facts ; 

b)  Its  fruitfulness  as  a  technique  in  stimu- 
lating further  inquiry. 

Judged  by  (a),  atomistic  materialism  is  not 
a  great  philosophy.  (This  aspect  of  the  problem  is 
to  be  discussed  later.)  Judged  by  (b),  atomistic 
materialism  is  a  valuable  philosophy.  It  has  been 
most  fruitful  as  a  method  of  inquiry  in  modem 
science.  Why  did  it  not  develop  more  fruitfully  in 
the  ancient  world?  Abdera  was,  as  already  stated, 
a  provincial  town.  Indeed,  it  is  not  certain  whether 
Plato  knew  anything  at  all  about  Democritus. 
After  the  Hellenic  philosophical  efflorescence  in  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  atomism  did  exercise  considerable 
influence  through  its  adoption  by  the  Epicureans, 
but  the  interest  of  this  School  was  not  in  scientific 
inquiry.  The  two  centers  of  scientific  inquiry  were 
the  Academy  and  the  Lyceum.  It  is  possible  that 
atomistic  philosophy  was  a  factor  in  the  scientific 
work  that  was  carried  on  after  the  time  of  Aristotle 

(95) 


96  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

in  Alexandria  and  other  points.  It  is  well  known 
that  in  geography  at  this  time  the  sphericity  of  the 
earth  was  taught.  The  heliocentric  theory  was  also 
advanced,  by  Aristarchus  and  others,  but  through 
the  influence  of  Aristotle  and  other  causes,  this 
theory  died  out.  At  this  period  Euclid's  "Elements 
of  Geometry"  was  systematized.  Archimedes  laid 
the  foundation  of  mechanics,  while  in  medicine  cer- 
tain important  discoveries  were  made. 

Experimental  science,  however,  after  flourish- 
ing for  several  centuries,*  died  out.  It  had  its  be- 
ginnings and  its  firm  foundations.  Although!  it 
did  have  a  firm  mathematical  basis,  it  did  not, 
until  after  the  lapse  of  over  fifteen  hundred  years, 
make  any  fruitful  application  of  the  method  devised 
by  Democritus.  The  spirit  of  independent  inquiry 
gradually  died  out.  The  old  Greek  world  of  city 
states  with  their  keen  intellectual  atmosphere  was 
submerged  in  the  all-devouring  imperial  Roman 
world.  This  world  of  Roman  imperialism  was  the 
melting  pot  of  the  ancient  world.  It  was  a  polyglot 
world,  a  world  of  all  sorts  of  races  and  nationalities, 
a  world  of  intellectual  and  religious  confusion,  and 
a  world  of  political  and  economic  confusion.  It 
was  largely  through  the  functioning  of  this  last 
form  of  confusion  that  the  Empire's  disintegration 
resulted.  There  was  no  spirit  of  individual  inquiry 
to  speak  of,  —  the  Romans  were  neither  phil- 
osophically nor  scientifically  minded.  They  were 
empire  builders  and  rulers,  they  were  city  builders, 
they  were  road  builders,  —  in  short,  they  were  prac- 

*  Especially  at  Alexandria. 


DECLINE  OF  GREEK  SPECULATION       97 

tically  minded.  They  did  not  make  even  second 
rate  contributions  of  the  creative  intelligence  in 
philosophy  or  science.  After  the  disintegration  of 
the  classical  Greek  world,  the  minds  of  men  turned 
more  and  more  to  the  questions  of  conduct  and 
religion.  In  all  ages  of  confusion,  in  periods  of  lack 
of  unified  culture,  in  epochs  where  there  is  an 
absence  of  stable  political  and  social  life,  when  the 
lives  of  local  communities  are  merged  in  the  vast 
welter  of  some  extensive  empire,  when  the  old 
religion  is  losing  its  regulative  power,  —  in  short, 
when  the  old  traditional  life  in  all  its  diversified 
forms  is  passing  away,  there  may  be  nothing  posi- 
tively constructive  and  able  to  replace  it.  At  such 
junctures,  the  minds  of  men  turn  from  philosophy 
and  science  to  the  practical  questions  of  the  hour. 
And  so  we  have,  at  this  special  period  under  dis- 
cussion, an  eclipse  of  the  spirit  of  philosophy  and 
science.  So,  it  seems  to  me,  it  may  be  in  this 
present  age.  If  this  war  continues  long  enough 
there  may  come  an  arrest  of  progress  in  civilization. 
There  may  appear  a  recrudescence  of  barbarism  and 
superstition. 

There  is  a  superficial,  optimistic  faith  as  to 
progress.  Some  think  that  progress  continues  in  a 
straight  line.  This  is  a  childish  faith.  Magnificent 
Greek  culture  with  all  its  bewitching  splendor  died 
out  and  was  succeeded  by  centuries  in  which  the  in- 
dependent thinker  never  dared  raise  his  head  and 
look  with  open  eye  at  nature  and  see  things  as  they 
are.  There  is  a  story  told  to  illustrate  this  point. 
It  is  of  an  incident  that  occurred  in  a  monastery 


98  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

about  the  year  1600.  A  monastic  student  of 
astronomy  discovered  the  spots  on  the  sun,  of  which 
there  was  no  mention  in  Aristotle.  He  was  told  by 
his  master  that  if  it  was  not  mentioned  in  Aristotle 
then  the  spots  were  either  in  his  eyes  or  his  glasses.* 
This  illustration  shows  the  blind  obedience  to  au- 
thority which  prevailed  through  the  Middle  Ages. 

REFERENCES 

Thilly,  History  of  Philosophy,  94-97. 
:    Marvin,  History  of  European  Philosophy,  164-191. 

Murray,  G.,  Four  Stages  of  Greek  Religion. 

Cumont,  F.  V.  M.,  Oriental  Religions  in  Roman  Pa- 
ganism. 

Mahaffy,  J.  P.,  Greek  Life  and  Thought,  Greek  World 
Under  Roman  Sway. 

Fowler,  W.  Warde,  The  Religious  Experience  of  the 
Roman  People,  Lectures  XVI  and  XVII. 

Dill,  S.,  Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius. 

Plutarch,  Morals. 


♦This  story  is  told  of  Scheiner,  circa  1600,  who  con- 
tests with  Galileo  the  honor  of  having  discovered  the  sun- 
spots. 


CHAPTER  IX 
SKEPTICISM 

Skepticism  literally  means  a  thoughtful  inquiry, 
the  looking  at  a  problem  in  a  disinterested  spirit, 
the  surveying  of  a  question  from  many  sides.  In 
this  sense  it  is  the  very  essence  of  philosophy  and 
science.  It  has  come  to  have,  however,  a  new  mean- 
ing, i.  e.,  it  doubts  the  possibility  of  knowledge. 
Skepticism  may  be  either  partial  or  complete.  Most 
of  the  great  Greek  philosophers,  Plato  among  them, 
not  only  doubted  the  validity  of  knowledge  derived 
through  the  senses,  but  they  denied  that  the  senses 
alone  give  us  true  knowledge.  These  great  thinkers 
held  that  we  could  know  reality  through  reason. 
Thus  they  were  rationalists,  not  skeptics.  In  fact 
there  is  scarcely  a  great  philosopher  who  was  a 
thorough  skeptic,  save  David  Hume,  and  even  Hume 
held  that  utter  skepticism  could  not  be  maintained 
in  practical  life. 

Under  the  head  of  complete  skepticism  we  have 
what  is  called  dogmatic  skepticism.  This  is  often 
identified  with  agnosticism.  (This  term  was  coined 
by  Huxley,  and  he  did  not  mean  dogmatic  skepticism 
but  an  attitude  of  ignorance  in  regard  to  ultimate 
problems.)  Critical  skepticism  involves  suspense 
of  judgment  on  all  problems.  This  form  of  skep- 
ticism was  first  formulated  by  Pyrrho,  365-275  B. 
C,  and  was  further  developed  by  Carneades,  215- 

(99) 


100  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

130  B.  C.  Dogmatic  skepticism  is  eelf-contradic- 
tory,  for  to  say  that  it  is  impossible  to  know  is  to 
make  a  dogmatic  statement  which  claims  to  be  truth. 
It  asserts  so  much  as  to  the  nature  of  mind  and 
reality  as  to  negate  its  own  presuppositions.  A 
skeptic  of  this  kind  is  an  arrant  dogmatist. 
Pyrrhonic  skepticism  tries  hard  not  to  contradict 
itself.  It  is  critical.  Its  standpoint  is  that  we  are 
not  certain  whether  we  know  something  or  whether 
we  can  know  nothing.  Since  we  do  not  know  whether 
we  do  know  nothing  or  something,  the  only  con- 
sistent attitude  is  that  in  which  there  is  a  suspension 
of  all  judgment.  To  be  thoroughly  consistent,  the 
Pyrrhonic  skeptic  would  have  to  hold  that  he  was 
not  certain  whether  we  ought  to  suspend  judgment. 
The  skeptic,  to  be  consistent  in  all  respects,  should 
add  that  he  cannot  know  whether  one  ought  to  say 
that  one  ought  to  suspend  judgment,  and  that  one 
cannot  know  whether  one  cannot  know  whether  one 
ought  to  say  that  one  ought  to  suspend  judgment 
and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  Cameades  argues  that 
since  certitude  is  impossible,  (a  dogmatic  state- 
ment!) then  probability  is  the  guide  of  life,  and  he 
further  holds  that  there  are  degrees  of  probability, 
viz. : 

a)  The  first  degree  is  plausibility. 

b)  A  proposition  may  be  not  only  plausible 
but  also  not  contradicted  by  other  isensa- 
tions,  and  thus  has  added  plausibility. 

c)  A  proposition  thoroughly  consistent  with 
other  propositions  is  still  more  probable. 


SKEPTICISM  101 

At  this  point  Carneades,  in  making  consistency  his 
basis  or  test  of  judgment,  is  inconsistent  with  his 
initial  proposition. 

Practically  all  the  arguments  of  present  skep- 
tics were  devised  by  the  Greek  skeptics.  The  first 
and  chiefest  argument  is  the  argument  against  the 
trustworthiness  of  the  senses.  Skeptics  for  the 
most  part  presuppose  a  sensationalistic  theory  of 
knowledge,  and  then,  noting  the  unreliability  of  the 
senses,  they  either  doubt  or  deny  the  possibility  of 
knowledge. 

Zeno,  a  pre-Socratic  rationalist  and  disciple  of 
Parmenides,  had  for  his  primary  aim  the  task  of 
refuting  the  assumption  that  reality  is  many  and 
changing.  Zeno  shows  that  belief  in  the  senses 
lands  us  in  contradictions.  If  knowledge  is  reached 
by  perception,  then  if  a  corn-measure  full  of  corn 
be  taken  and  the  corn  be  dropped  on  the  floor,  a 
noise  will  be  heard.  Then,  if  we  take  one  grain 
and  drop  it,  it  ought  to  make  a  noise,  but  it  does  not. 
Thus,  in  this  instance,  the  senses  deceive  us.  The 
senses  do  declare  that  many  things  exist,  but  if  the 
many  things  do  exist,  they  must  be  made  of  in- 
divisible units.  These  units  can  have  no  magnitude, 
but  if  the  component  units  have  no  magnitude,  then 
the  sum  has  no  magnitude.  If  there  are  any  two 
objects,  then  between  the  two  there  must  be  a  third, 
and  between  these  again  there  must  be  still  another, 
and  so  on  indefinitely,  therefore  being  must  have 
infinite  magnitude.  In  regard  to  the  phenomenon 
of  motion,  Zeno  shows  that  those  who  hold  that 
there  is  motion  appeal  to  the  senses.     And  in  the 


102  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

discussion  of  this  question  the  well  known  paradox 
of  the  flying  arrow,  and  that  of  Achilles  and  the 
tortoise  are  given.  An  arrow  in  order  to  pass  from 
one  point  to  another  must  pass  through  an  infinite 
number  of  points  in  a  finite  time;  moreover,  if  at 
one  instant  it  be  at  one  point  and  at  the  next  instant 
at  another  point,  it  must  have  passed  from  the  one 
to  the  other  point  in  no  time.  If  Achilles  runs  ten 
miles  per  hour  and  the  tortoise  one  mile  per  hour 
and  if  the  tortoise  be  given  one  hour's  start  Achilles 
can  never  catch  the  tortoise.  For  while  he  covers 
the  first  mile  the  tortoise  will  cover  one-tenth  of  a 
mile,  and  while  Achilles  covers  the  one-tenth  mile 
the  tortoise  will  cover  one  one-hundreth  of  a  mile 
and  so  on  forever.  Since  any  finite  distance  is 
made  up  of  an  infinite  number  of  positions  no  finite 
space  can  be  traversed  by  a  moving  object  in  a  finite 
time.  Motion  is  impossible.  Zeno's  arguments  are 
all  aimed  at  proving  the  utter  untrustworthiness  of 
sense-perception.  His  conclusion  is  that  through 
reason  alone  have  we  knowledge  of  the  one  and 
unchanging  Being  or  Reality. 

The  arguments  of  the  later  skeptics  are  not  of 
the  same  rationalistic  character  as  those  of  Zeno 
and  his  School.  The  later  arguments  are  of  a  more 
empirical  nature. 

The  first  and  chief  set  of  arguments  for  skep- 
ticism are  empirical  ones.  They  are  drawn  from 
considerations  involved  in  the  limitations  and  varia- 
tions of  sense  perception.  These  arguments  fall 
under  four  heads :  — 


SKEPTICISM  103 

a)  Differences  are  due  to  differences  in  the 
organization  of  animal  forms.  The  various 
species  have  various  degrees  of  sensitivity 
of  sensation.  Even  human  beings  differ 
in  their  sensory  reactions,  some  being 
duller  in  one  sense  and  more  active  in  some 
other  sense.  It  is  a  notorious  fact,  says 
the  skeptic,  that  there  is  no  value  in  dis- 
cussing tastes,  —  "de  gustibus  non  dis- 
putandum".  "One  man's  meat  is  another 
man's  poison." 

b)  The  second  body  of  items  in  support  of 
skepticism  is  drawn  from  the  variations 
of  an  object's  appearance  to  the  different 
sense  organs.  An  orange  is  round  and 
yellow  to  the  eye,  it  is  rough  to  the  touch, 
sweet  to  the  taste,  and  to  the  merchant  it 
means  a  certain  amount  of  cash. 

c)  The  same  individual's  organism  varies 
from  time  to  time.  If  one  has  a  bad  cold 
in  one's  head,  then  the  delicate  flavor  of 
food  does  not  exist  for  him;  and  to  one 
having  either  fever  or  chills,  the  tempera- 
ture conditions  are  quite  different  from 
what  they  are  to  the  same  individual  in  a 
normal  condition. 

d)  There  are  all  sorts  of  differences  in  men's 
reactions  to  their  surroundings  which  are 
due  to  moral  custom,  beliefs,  traditions, 
et  cetera.  The  effects  of  environment  and 
early  habits  largely  determine  what  we 
regard  as  right  or  wrong,  true  or  false, 


104  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

beautiful    or    ugly.     Our   so-called   judg- 
ments about  these  types  of  relations  are 
largely,    if   not    entirely,    determined   by 
education,    habit,    and    environment.     A 
study  of  the  different  peoples  at  different 
levels  of  social  development  also  indicates 
this.     These  four  types  of  argument  are  all 
based  on  the  relativity  of  the  percipient 
organism. 
There    is    still   another   group    of   differences 
which  make  valid  knowledge  impossible.     Here  fall 
cases  of  the  relativity  of  the  objects  themselves. 
The  object  depends  for  its  sensory  qualities  upon 
its  relation  to  other  objects.     A  distant  object  looks 
smaller  than  the  same  object  nearby;  an  object  in 
bright  light  has  a  different  color  from  the  same  ob- 
ject in  twilight.     This  holds  true  also  of  sounds. 
Qualities  differ  also  according  to  quantities.  A  man, 
for  instance,  may  take  a  little  wine  and  feel  good ;  he 
may  take  more  and  feel  bumptious;  he  takes  still 
more  and  he  gets  roaring  drunk.     Arsenic  in  its 
behavior  also  shows  pronounced  differences  in  re- 
action in  proportion  to  the  quantity  taken.  Qualities 
all  seem  to  vary  with  quantities. 

All  judgments  are  relative.  Thought  cannot 
give  us  the  truth.  Even  in  the  special  sciences,  it 
is  seen  that  demonstrations  proceed  from  under- 
lying assumptions,  and  these  assumptions,  which 
are  the  final  grounds  of  knowledge,  are  without 
proof. 

The  Stoic  philosophers  maintained  that  true 
propositions  are  those  which  are  clear  and  self- 


SKEPTICISM  105 

evident.  But,  says  the  skeptic,  clearness  and  self- 
evidence  is  a  matter  of  fallibility.  The  Stoics  for- 
mulated a  second  criterion,  namely,  the  "consensus 
gentium".  This  means  the  universal  consent  of 
mankind  to  a  proposition.  At  this  point  again 
the  skeptic  replies,  there  is  no  such  proposition. 
The  Stoics  had  also  argued  that  the  order  of 
nature,  the  cause  of  events,  was  evidence  of  the 
existence  of  a  world-reason  and  an  overruling 
providence.  To  this  argument  the  skeptic  replies 
by  pointing  to  the  manifold  evils  in  nature  and 
society.  Everywhere  it  is  a  case  of  "homo  homini 
lupus".  Misfortunes  assail  the  good,  while  the 
bad  goes  free.  This  was,  indeed,  the  poser  which 
was  too  much  for  the  Psalmist.  He  saw  the 
wicked  flourishing  like  the  green  bay-tree  and  the 
righteous  suffering.  How  can  this  be?  The  God 
who  rules  the  course  of  events  cannot  be  infinite 
nor  can  he  be  an  individual,  for  if  he  is  an  individual, 
he  is  limited  by  others.  He  cannot  be  either  body 
or  spirit.  If  he  is  pure  spirit,  then  he  cannot  act 
or  feel;  and  if  he  is  corporeal  then  he  is  either  a 
simple  or  a  compound  body ;  if  he  is  simple  then  he 
is  finite  and  if  he  is  a  compound  body,  he  is  made 
up  of  simples  and  is  liable  to  disintegration  and 
death. 

The  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter  is  this: 
The  wise  man  will  not  be  sure  that  he  can  be  sure 
of  anything.  He  will  guide  his  life  wholly  by  prob- 
ability. Like  Cratylus  and  others,  he  will  not  pass 
judgments;  he  will  not  even  wag  his  thumb. 


106  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

I  shall  at  this  point  briefly  indicate  the  nature 
of  the  reply  to  skepticism.  As  to  sense  perception, 
it  can  be  said  that  the  very  fact  that  mind  recog- 
nizes the  inconsistencies  of  different  reactions  of 
different  individuals  and  species  is  due  to  the  ability 
of  thought  to  formulate  standards  of  truth.  Doubt 
means  inquiry,  a  thoughtful  turning  over  of  things, 
and  this  in  turn  implies  reference  to  a  standard. 
I  cannot  doubt  the  deliverances  of  sense  unless  I 
already  have  a  standard.  In  physics  we  have  our 
standard  thermometer  and  our  standards  of  weight 
and  measure.  In  all  our  experimental  investiga- 
tions care  is  taken  to  have  the  standard  constant  and 
to  eliminate  all  disturbing  conditions.  In  science 
the  statistical  method  has  for  its  chief  function  the 
reduction  of  error  to  a  minimum.  As  to  thought, 
it  must  be  admitted  that  knowledge  does  ultimately 
rest  on  assumptions.  We  do  assume  the  validity  of 
certain  basic  principles.  The  three  laws  of  thought 
are  illustrative  of  this,  and  in  our  empirical  investi- 
gations we  assume  the  uniformity  of  nature. 
Having  made  these  the  most  universal  and  most 
fundamental  working  hypotheses,  we  then  proceed 
to  learn  to  control  nature. 

The  ultimate  standard  of  truth  is  not  a  judg- 
ment of  all  mankind,  —  "tot  homines,  tot  sententiae" 
—  so  many  men,  so  many  opinions.  There  are  all 
kinds  of  human  thinkers,  good,  poor,  and  in- 
different. Truth  in  science  is  not  determined  by 
counting  heads  or  noses.  Many  heads  have  very 
little  in  them.  Even  in  social  and  political  matters, 
the  majority  is  not  always  right.     But  there  is,  how- 


SKEPTICISM  107 

ever,  a  criterion  or  standard.  True  propositions 
are  those  that  are  consistent  with  one  another  and 
with  the  further  interpretation  of  experience. 

REFERENCES 

Rogers,  History  of  Philosophy,  160-165. 

Windelband,   History  of  Ancient   Philosophy,   329-336. 

Zeller,  Greek  Philosophy,  268-273. 

Thilly,  History  of  Philosophy,  116-120. 

MacColl,  The  Greek  Sceptics. 

Zeller,  Stoics,  Epicureans  and  Sceptics. 

Patrick,  Sextus  Empiricus. 


CHAPTER  X 
STOIC  PANTHEISM 

The  spiritual  conditions  of  the  last  centuries 
B.  C.  and  the  first  centuries  A.  D.  in  Greece  and 
Rome  have  already  been  touched  upon.  It  is  the 
task  of  the  historian  of  social  life  to  work  them  out 
more  fully.  What  we  do  see  is  that  there  is  an 
organic  connection  of  the  problems  of  philosophy 
with  the  life  problems  of  a  people.  Philosophy  is 
a  statement  of  the  spirit  of  the  time.  The  old  city 
state,  which  was  the  social  and  political  form  of 
Greece,  was  passing  away  and  now  large  hetero- 
geneous empires,  first  the  Macedonian,  which  split 
up  into  fragments,  and  then  the  Roman  threatened 
to  absorb  all  these  smaller  states.  As  these  empires 
grew  larger  they  presented  more  and  more  a  con- 
fusion of  races,  tongues,  customs,  beliefs  and  super- 
stitions. By  means  of  this  confusion,  the  morals  of 
the  city  states  were  broken  down,  and  this  was  done 
on  a  much  larger  scale  than  in  the  age  of  the 
Sophists.  The  Romans  were  a  formal,  utilitarian 
people,  who  adjusted  themselves  to  certain  grossly 
practical  needs,  but  they  were  never  able  to  adjust 
themselves  to  the  finer  intellectual  and  spiritual  de- 
mands without  importing  ideas.  The  Roman 
Empire  became  a  great  melting-pot  of  moral,  prac- 
tical, and  intellectual  interests.  The  Romans  were 
not  a  speculative  people,  and  with  the  single  excep- 

(108) 


STOIC  PANTHEISM  109 

tion  of  law,  they  made  no  great  creative  achieve- 
ments in  the  world  of  thought.  This  period  is 
characterized  by  the  growth  of  an  intense  feeling 
for  both  practical  guidance  and  emotional  consola- 
tion. Out  of  this  developed  the  Epicurean  and  Stoic 
schools.^ 

Epicureanism  is  a  doctrine  of  prudent  ami- 
ability. It  teaches  the  individual  the  advisability 
of  avoiding  all  entangling  alliances.  It  urges  men 
to  live  in  the  congenial  society  of  friends  and  to 
cultivate  only  the  gentle  pleasures.  This  is  a 
prudent  and  enlightened  gospel  of  selfish  amiability. 
It  did  not  appeal  to  the  nobler  feelings  and  aspira- 
tions in  man.     It  had  no  tonic  effect. 

The  best  forces  of  the  Roman  world  rallied 
under  Stoicism.  Zeno,  336-264  B.  C,  was  the 
founder  of  this  School.  He  was  followed  by 
Cleanthes,  264-232 ;  Chrysippus,  232-204 ;  Pansetius, 
180-110;  Seneca,  3-65  A.  D. ;  Epictetus,  first  century, 
and  Marcus  Aurelius,  121-180.  Stoicism  is  an 
ethics  based  on  a  religious  metaphysic,  namely, 
pantheism.  Pantheism  means  the  identification  of 
God  with  the  cosmos.  God  is  the  essence  or  the 
unity  of  the  cosmos.  He  is  wholly  immanent,  the 
One  in  All.  Theism  does  not  thus  deny  the  tran- 
scendence of  God.  For  the  Stoic,  however,  the 
world  is  pervaded  and  penetrated  by  one  spirit,  the 
universal  Reason,  and  this  world-reason  or  world- 


*The  two  great  postulates  of  Greek  thought  are:  (a) 
psychological  —  all  desire  the  good;  (b)  metaphysical  — 
nature  is  good,  the  good  is  sovereign.  For  the  Romans  lanv 
is  sovereign. 


110  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

soul  is  interpreted  in  other  than  idealistic  terms. 
On  the  whole  the  Stoic  conceived  this  permeating 
principle  as  a  fine,  all-pervading,  fiery  medium  or 
ether,  a  sublimized  breath,  the  cosmical  "pneuma". 
From  it  all  the  elements,  and  all  the  cyclic  trans- 
formations emanate.  The  "pneuma"  is  present  in 
all  things,  but  it  is  present  in  a  preeminent  degree 
in  man.  Reason  is  the  germinating  principle  of 
all  things,  but  in  man  it  exists  as  self-conscious 
reason.  It  is  the  universal  "logos"  of  which  there 
is  a  spark  in  every  man.  Man  is  an  individual  ex- 
pression of  the  world-soul,  and  because  of  this  he 
is  capable  of  communion  with  God.  Man's  des- 
tiny is  to  realize  himself  as  a  rational  individual  in 
communion  with  God.  Man  is  to  become  what 
he  is  capable  of  becoming.  It  is  given  to  man  to 
live  a  life  according  to  nature.  Such  a  life  is  one 
of  self-sufficiency,  of  independence  from  all  the 
mutations  of  life.  It  is  a  life  of  complete  imper- 
turbability of  mind.  In  such  a  life  man  realizes 
the  divine  image. 

The  "pneuma"  in  man  and  animals  is  part  of 
the  fiery  cosmical  spirit.  The  soul  is  a  unity  whose 
ruling  principle  is  reason.  The  Stoics  persistently 
emphasized  the  activity  of  mind  in  knowing. 
Knowledge  arises  in  perception,  but  for  perception 
to  become  knowledge  there  must  be  an  active  atti- 
tude of  mind.  The  act  of  perception  is  the  trans- 
mission of  the  perceived  quality  from  the  object  to 
the  mind,  —  and  the  mind  reacts  to  this  quality. 
In  all  of  this  process  of  the  mind  there  is  involved 
the  unconscious  operation  of  general  notions.     Mind 


STOIC   PANTHEISM  111 

has  general  principles  by  means  of  which  it  lays 
hold  of  those  qualities  that  are  transmitted  to  it 
from  the  object.  Each  act  of  perception  involves 
apprehension  (katalepsis,  begreifen),  the  laying 
hold  of  things.  This  active  apprehension  in- 
volves general  notions,  or  concepts,  or  types, 
which  are  unconsciously  and  spontaneously  present 
in  the  mind.  The  mind  is  adapted  by  virtue  of  its 
nature  to  grasp  truth.  This,  the  act  of  perception, 
is  one  which  involves,  on  the  part  of  the  percipient, 
a  laying  hold  on  the  object.  Isolated  perceptions 
do  not  constitute  science.  They  must  be  bound  to- 
gether by  reason.  And  it  was  to  characterize  this 
prerequisite  that  the  Stoics  used  the  word  "con- 
science". 

Reason  is  the  highest  quality  in  man;  it  is  the 
divine  spark.  Reason  unites  men ;  reason  is  social. 
Hence  the  Stoics  emphasized  the  social  nature  of 
man  so  far  as  he  is  rational.  We  were  made  for 
co-operation,  but  by  our  passions  we  are  divided 
and  sundered  from  each  other.  By  the  reason  we 
are  united.  Hence  the  Stoics  lay  stress  on  the  duty 
of  man  to  fulfill  his  social  obligations.  The  duty  of 
man  is  to  live  according  to  the  real  nature  of  things, 
and,  in  so  far  as  men  do  this,  they  are  brothers. 
Earth  is  our  dear  fatherland,  and  we  men  are  all 
brothers.     The  world  is  our  home. 

Man  is  man,  not  because  of  his  language,  or 
the  color  of  his  hair,  or  skin,  or  by  any  other  physical 
accident,  but  solely  through  the  exercise  of  reason. 
This  is  an  anticipation  of  the  Christian  doctrine 
of  the  universal  brotherhood  of  men.     By  virtue 


112  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  this  notion  of  a  common  rational  nature  in  man, 
the  Stoical  philosophy  became  the  rational  basis  of 
Roman  law.  When  Rome  passed  from  being  a  city 
state  to  the  form  of  an  empire,  the  practical  Romans 
were  confronted  with  the  problem  of  nationaliza- 
tion. The  problem  of  the  Parthian,  Mede,  Greek, 
Jew,  Gaul,  Briton,  Teuton,  etc.,  pressed  for 
solution.  All  these  tribes  were  parts  of  the  Roman 
government.  Now  the  Stoical  philosophy  suggested 
the  solution  in  that  it  had  developed  the  idea  of 
humanity  as  distinct  from  that  of  Greek,  Jew,  etc. ; 
and  on  this  basis  Roman  Imperial  law  was 
constructed.  Man  as  man  was  seen  to  be  worthy 
of  rights.  It  was  on  this  Stoical  principle  that 
Roman  law  was  made  to  rest.  This  idea  of  free 
personality  as  the  subject  of  rights  and  duties  has 
its  development  in  Roman  Imperial  law,  resting 
ultimately  upon  Stoical  philosophy.  This  step  was 
a  most  tremendous  one  for  the  organization  of 
civilization.^ 

Stoicism  became  the  rallying  point  for  the 
strongest  spirits  of  the  Roman  Empire,  and  in 
addition  to  its  appeal  to  these  spirits,  it  had  a 
very  wide-spread  influence.  Teachers  of  Stoicism 
traveled  about  like  itinerant  preachers.     They  were 


^  There  are  three  stages  in  the  development  of  the 
Roman  conception  of  law,  which  meet  the  developing  needs 
of  the  Roman  state:  (1)  the  law  of  the  city  (jus  civile) 
founded  on  custom  and  having  to  do  with  the  citizens  alone, 
(2)  the  law  of  nations  (jus  gentium)  which  applied  to  all 
freemen  and  (3)  the  law  of  nature  (jus  naturale)  which 
applied  to  all  human  beings. 


STOIC   PANTHEISM  113 

both  the  teachers  and  preachers  of  morals.  These 
itinerant  teachers  were  domiciled  in  the  homes  of 
the  great.  It  was  the  work  of  such  as  these  that 
really  prepared  the  way  for  Christianity.  St. 
Paul's  sermon  on  Mars  Hill  undoubtedly  refers  to 
the  Stoical  hymn  to  Zeus,  and  throughout  the  New 
Testament  many  terms  and  expressions  of  stoical 
origin  are  used,  as  e.  g.,  "in  him  we  live  and  move 
and  have  our  being". 

Stoicism  has  deeply  influenced  many  modem 
thinkers.  Descartes  was  really  a  Stoic  in  his 
ethical  attitude;  so  were  Spinoza,  Leibnitz,  and 
others. 

Why  was  Stoicism  not  the  salt  which  was  to 
save  Roman  society?  Why  was  it  not  sufficient? 
The  answer  is,  it  was  too  cold  and  lofty  for  the 
masses  of  men.  It  did  appeal  to  the  high-minded 
man,  but  it  did  not  supply  any  dynamic  that  could 
lift  the  average  man  above  the  range  of  his  senses. 
It  did  not  generate  any  consuming  passion  for 
humanity.  The  Stoic  proclaimed  that  the  masses 
were  fools  and  only  the  few  were  wise.  Stoicism 
thus,  with  all  its  optimism  in  theory,  did  not  supply 
a  strong  dynamic  and  a  transfiguring  hope  as  the 
days  of  the  Empire's  fall  drew  near. 

REFERENCES 

Rogers,  History  of  Philosophy,  137-159. 
Thilly,  History  of  Philosophy,  104-116. 
Bakewell,  Source  Book  in  Ancient  Philosophy,  269-289, 
317-339. 

Marcus  Aurelius,  Meditations,  transl.,  by  Long. 


114  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Epictetus,  Discourse,  transL,  by  Long,  Higginson. 

Seneca,  On  Benefits. 

Hicks,  R.  D.,  Stoic  and  Epicurean. 

Stock,  St.  Geo.,  Stoicism. 

Bevan,  E.,  Stoics  and  Sceptics. 

Arnold,  E.  V.,  Roman  Stocism. 

Pater,  W.,  Marius  the  Epicurean. 


CHAPTER  XI 
MYSTICISM  —  NEO-PLATONISM 

This  too  is  a  distinctive  type  —  it  is  a  new  type 
of  religious  philosophy.  Many  attempts  have  been 
made  to  define  mysticism.  As  I  understand  mys- 
ticism it  is  a  doctrine  which  holds  that  it  is  possible 
for  the  human  soul  to  have  direct  access  to  divinity. 
Mysticism  rests  on  the  assumption  of  the  possibility 
of  a  direct  and  immediate  communion  with  God, 
without  the  intervention  of  any  intermediate  agency. 
The  essence  of  the  mystic  doctrine  is  that  such  a 
communion  with  the  Godhead  is  possible. 

The  mystic  way  (Mystica  Via)  of  course  varies 
with  the  different  types  of  mysticism.  Quietistic 
mysticism,  emotional  mysticism,  sensuous  mysti- 
cism, et  cetera,  all  elaborate  various  techniques  for 
achieving  the  communion  with  the  Godhead. 

Philosophical  mysticism  has  its  greatest  ancient 
representative  in  Plotinus.  He  is  the  classical 
example  of  ancient  mysticism.  He  lived  in  the 
third  century  A.  D.  It  is  possible  to  trace  down  to 
the  present  the  various  lines  of  influence  which  he 
initiated.  St.  Augustine,  John  the  Scot,  Thomas 
Aquinas,  Bruno,  Boehme,  Spinoza,  Fichte,  Schell- 
ing,  the  German  Romantic  School,  Berkeley,  the 
English  poets  —  Wordsworth  and  Shelley,  Bradley, 
Royce,  Emerson,  Bergson,  and  many  others  reveal 
this  mystical  motive. 

(115) 


116  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

Of  late  years  there  has  been  a  pronounced 
revival  of  mysticism,  and  many  books  on  the  sub- 
ject have  appeared.  ''Studies  in  Mystical  Religion" 
by  R.  M.  Jones,  'The  Mystic  Way"  and  other  books 
by  Miss  Underbill,  "Christian  Mysticism"  by  W.  R. 
Inge,  and  "The  Mystical  Element  in  Religion"  by 
Fredrich  von  Huegel,  are  some  of  the  principal 
works  on  this  revival. 

Mysticism  as  a  movement  in  Greek  thought  goes 
back  to  both  the  Orphic  Mysteries  and  the  Pytha- 
gorean brotherhood.  The  Pythagorean  brotherhood 
was  a  society  which  had  political  tendencies.  For 
us  their  chief  interest  is  in  their  ethical  tendencies. 
The  reputed  founder  of  this  school  is  said  to  have 
taught  at  Crotona  and  to  have  died  about  500  B.  C. 
His  life  is  veiled  in  legend.  Plato  is  said  to  have 
visited  this  brotherhood  and  was  much  influenced  by 
it.  For  Pythagoreanism,  reality  consists  of  numbers. 
Numbers  are  the  ungenerated  principles  of  things. 
They  seem  to  find  in  the  properties  of  numbers 
analogies  of  the  facts  of  experience.  They  investi- 
gated the  mathematical  basis  of  music  and  were 
greatly  influenced  by  the  results  of  their  researches 
in  this  field.  These  numbers  are  akin  to  the  ideas 
of  Platonism.  The  Pythagorean  brotherhood  was 
one  that  by  dietetics  and  purgation  aimed  to  develop 
the  soul  to  where  it  could  have  the  mystical  union 
with  the  divine.  Such  was  the  motive  of  the  Orphic 
Mysteries.  Pythagorean  writings  had  increased  in- 
fluence in  the  last  century  B.  C.  and  in  the  first 
century  A.  D. 


MYSTICISM  —  NEO-PLATONISM  117 

The  failure  of  the  rationally  grounded  ethics 
of  Stoicism  to  satisfy  the  longings  of  the  time,  as 
shown  by  the  violent  reaction  against  sen- 
sualism and  the  protest  against  the  social  corrup- 
tions of  the  time,  brought  about  an  intense  feeling 
of  the  opposition  between  the  soul  and  the  world, 
and  between  the  spirit  and  the  flesh.  The  develop- 
ing influence  of  Pythagoreanism  and  of  oriental 
cults  brought  to  Rome,  all  point  in  the  direction  of 
the  increasing  craving  of  the  best  spirits  of  the 
time  for  direct  union  of  the  soul  with  the  Divine. 
There  is  an  insatiable  craving  for  an  authoritative 
communion  or  revelation  from  the  Divine.  In 
Platonism  there  was  much  to  fall  in  with  this  ten- 
dency, and  so  the  influence  of  Platonism  came  to 
be  felt,  and  it  was  this  movement  which  was  carried 
on  to  its  completion  in  ancient  times  by  Neo- 
Platonism. 

Neo-Platonism  is  thus  seen  to  have  been  pre- 
pared for  by  Pythagoreanism.  The  Neo-Pythag- 
oreans  were  eclectics  who  tried  to  fit  together  into 
a  harmonious  whole  the  fundamental  elements  of 
the  preceding  theories.  This  was  the  form  of 
Pythagoreanism  that  was  prevalent  in  the  time  of 
Plotinus.  In  various  quarters  we  find  that  the 
mystical  and  religious  side  of  Plato  is  eagerly  taken 
up  even  long  before  the  time  of  Plotinus.  The 
estimable  Plutarch  uses  Platonic  philosophy  to  in- 
terpret religious  differences.  Philo  Judseus  is  also 
seen  interpreting  Jewish  religion  in  terms  of 
Platonic  philosophy.  In  doing  this  Philo  posits  the 
Logos  as  the  creative  principle  of  the  world.     The 


118  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Logos  is  the  unity  from  which  comes  all  ideas  or 
logoi.  It  is  the  divine,  creative  word  by  which  the 
world  was  fashioned.  This  creative  word,  the  im- 
manent, dynamic  reason  of  God,  operates  in  the 
world,  and  it  alone  stands  between  God  and  the 
world. 

For  mysticism  the  goal  of  life  is  the  vision  of 
God  —  it  is  deliverance  from  the  world  of  sense  — 
it  is  ecstatic  union  with  God.  This  type  of  thinking 
was  given  its  classic  formulation  at  Alexandria,  the 
city  which  was  the  next  greatest  center  of  philosoph- 
ical activity  after  Athens.  In  this  great,  populous, 
rich,  manufacturing  city,  all  the  streams  of  higher 
thought  met,  and  here  the  foundation  was  laid  for 
Christian  philosophy  by  Origen. 

Plotinus,  204-269,  was  a  native  of  Egypt,  and 
a  pupil  of  Ammonius  Saccas.  In  the  year  244  A. 
D.,  he  established  a  school  at  Rome,  and  after  a 
period  of  ten  years  his  famous  school  had  the  Em- 
peror Gallienus  and  the  empress  aligned  with  it. 
Plotinus  himself  was  a  man  of  strong  personality 
attested  to  by  the  fact  that  many  noble  Romans 
made  him  the  guardian  of  their  children.  Having 
weak  eyes,  he  did  not  like  to  write.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  his  works  do  not  have  the  chiseled  and 
the  well-rounded  symmetry  which  is  characteristic 
of  many  other  philosophies.  His  fundamental 
thought  is  that  reality  is  through  and  through 
spiritual,  and  that  it  is  One.  The  One  or  Monad 
is  God,  the  Absolute.  Below  the  One  or  the  absolute 
Spirit  is  the  "nous",  and  below  "nous"  is  "psyche". 
Matter  is  potentiality.     It  is  potentially  all  things. 


MYSTICISM  —  NEO-PLATONISM  119 

At  this  point  Plotinus  also  develops  the  conception 
of  celestial  matter,  and  this  conception  prevailed 
until  the  days  of  Bruno. 

In  man  are  "nous"  (Spirit),  "psyche"  (soul), 
and  "sarx"  (flesh  or  body.)  Thus  there  is  a  trinity 
in  man.  Objectively,  body  is  the  world  as  it  is  per- 
ceived through  the  senses ;  the  soul  is  the  world  in- 
terpreted as  a  spatial  and  temporal  order  by  the 
discursive  reason,  while  spirit  is  the  world  as  appre- 
hended by  direct  intuition.  Reality  is  really  a 
trinity  in  unity.  It  is  the  intuiting  "nous",  the 
objects  apprehended,  and  the  act  of  intuition.  The 
summit  of  knowledge  is  the  attainment  of  a  divine 
insight  in  which  spirit  is  at  one  with  the  object. 
This  fruition  is  the  vision  of  God;  it  is  the  con- 
templation of  God  that  is  the  ultimate  goal  of 
knowledge.  The  world  of  appearance  is  of  scat- 
tered, disconnected,  diverse,  data.  It  is  what 
William  James  called  a  big,  blooming,  buzzing  con- 
fusion. But  as  this  world  is  illuminated  by  mind, 
it  is  seen  to  manifest  a  unity.  In  this  theory  of 
Plotinus,  there  are  two  aspects  which  in  a  rough 
way  correspond  to  the  two  phases  of  scientific 
analysis,  i.  e.,  to  the  inductive  process  of  discover- 
ing the  universal,  and  to  the  deductive  process  of 
applying  the  same.  The  first  of  these  aspects  in 
Plotinus  is  that  which  tells  of  the  descent  of  ex- 
istence from  the  Absolute.  By  the  second  aspect, 
Plotinus  shows  the  mode  of  ascent  of  the  soul  to  the 
Absolute.  The  Absolute,  the  One,  is  above  existence, 
it  is  without  form,  it  is  before  motion  and  rest ;  and 
to  reach  the  Absolute  one  must  pass  beyond  knowl- 


120  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

edge.  One  must  pass  to  the  unity  which  is  implied 
in  duality.  The  Absolute  is  also  the  one  universal 
good,  which  is  above  all  things  and  the  cause  of  all 
things.  It  cannot  be  named.  It  is  above  thinking : 
it  is  the  cause  of  thinking.  It  is  the  first  principle 
of  thinking :  it  is  the  root  of  the  soul.  In  brief,  it  is 
the  absolute  unity  of  truth,  beauty,  and  goodness. 
In  this  way  the  highest  form  of  reality  is  seen  to 
consist  of  these  ideas  as  a  unity.  This  unity,  this 
oneness  of  all  things,  is  the  indivisible  root  of  sub- 
jectivity and  objectivity,  of  thought  and  things.  We 
thus  see  that  this  doctrine  is  a  metaphysics  of  moral, 
aesthetic,  and  intellectual  values. 

How  do  the  many  arise  from  the  One?  This 
is  the  most  difficult  question  in  all  philosophy.  This 
is  the  question  as  to  how  we  are  to  conceive  of  the 
embodiment  of  universals  in  particular  existence. 
To  this  question  Plotinus  replies:  The  many  arise 
by  effulgence,  by  irradiation  from  the  One.  As 
light  radiates  from  the  sun,  so  by  reason  of  his 
very  fulness  of  being,  individual  objects  emanate 
from  the  One.  The  One  first  expresses  himself  in 
"nous".  This  is  the  first  step  down  from  the 
Absolute  to  the  many.  "Nous",  in  turn,  expresses 
itself  by  an  outflow  or  a  shining  forth  in  the  cosmic 
world.  The  world  comes  from  the  divine  spirit  or 
"nous".  The  soul  of  the  world  is  the  cause  of  all 
things.  This  world-soul  is  unmoved  and  eternal. 
The  One  in  thus  manifesting  itself  remains  un- 
diminished. 

It  is  interesting  to  ask,  what  does  Plotinus  mean 
by  the  distinction  of  spirit  and  soul?     The  cosmic 


MYSTICISM  —  NEO-PLATONISM  121 

soul  is  a  vaguer  principle  than  the  cosmic  spirit  or 
nous;  in  some  respects  it  seems  to  be  less  self- 
conscious  than  spirit.  From  the  cosmic  soul  comes 
all  individual  souls.  All  souls  are  derived  from  the 
universal  soul.  Plotinus  conceives  of  the  soul  as 
the  meeting-place  of  intelligence  and  body,  and  he 
holds  that  there  are  three  orders  of  souls,  viz. :  — 

a)  Heavenly  souls, 

b)  Souls  enmeshed  in  matter, 

c)  Souls  that  waver  between  these  two. 
Our  souls  have  pre-existed  in  the  celestial  world; 
they  have  fallen.  Why  did  they  fall  ?  At  this  point 
Plotinus  is  not  unambiguous.  In  some  parts  of  his 
works,  the  view  taken  is  the  same  as  that  in  certain 
of  the  Platonic  dialogues,  viz.,  that  the  fall  is  a  part 
of  the  divine  purpose,  while  in  other  parts  he  holds 
that  the  fall  is  due  to  acts  committed  by  the  soul. 
The  lowest  step  of  existence  is  ensouled  flesh.  In 
this  way  we  see  the  descent  from  the  One  to  the 
many. 

The  prime  interest  of  religion  is  to  point  out 
how  the  soul  may  ascend  to  God.  In  giving  his 
interpretation,  Plotinus  rests  continuously  on  the 
validity  of  his  assumption  that  nature  is  the  ex- 
pression of  the  cosmical  soul.  And  when  the  human 
mind  begins  to  get  its  orientation  in  experience  by 
ordering  things  in  space  and  time,  it  begins  to  make 
its  way  back  toward  the  Absolute.  Space  and  time 
are  both  modes  of  discovering  the  One  in  the  many. 
Now  the  universal  soul  is  not  in  the  world,  but 
the  world  is  in  it.  The  world  is  in  the  universal 
soul;  the  universal  soul  depends  upon  the  universal 


122  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

spirit;  the  universal  spirit,  in  turn,  depends  upon 
the  One.  Only  by  contemplating  the  One  is  it  pos- 
sible for  the  individual  to  realize  his  true  destiny. 
Man  has  in  him  a  fragment  of  the  Absolute,  and 
through  insight  and  spiritual  contact  he  becomes  one 
with  the  Absolute.  The  individual  passes  through 
several  stages.  The  first  step  in  this  ascent  is  the 
practice  of  social  virtues  such  as  wisdom,  courage, 
justice,  and  self-control.  The  second  step  is  the 
practice  of  purification  (katharsis).  At  this  stage 
there  is  effected  a  complete  subjection  of  the  flesh  — 
a  freedom  from  all  thraldom  to  passion  is  attained.^ 
At  this  point  Plotinus  uses  the  Platonic  idea  of 
philosophical  love.  Every  soul  by  nature  loves  and 
desires  oneness  with  another.  But  there  are  stages 
of  this  form  of  love.  True  love,  as  opposed  to 
earthly  love,  is  kindled  by  the  vision  of  all  things  in 
one.  The  living  soul  through  this  love  is  trans- 
formed and  embraced  in  the  unity  of  the  whole. 
The  final  step,  —  and  this  is  one  which  requires  in- 
tense concentration,  is  the  direct  union  with  the 
One.  This  stage  Plotinus  calls  "ekstasis".  It  is 
an  absolute  self-surrender,  "epidosis".  This  experi- 
ence is  that  to  which  we  referred  above  as  being 
higher  than  knowledge.  It  is  beyond  knowledge; 
it  is  oneness  with  the  One.     This  union  with  God 


^Compare  the  Four  Noble  Truths  of  Buddha:  (a)  suf- 
fering is  the  accompaniment  of  change;  (b)  desire  is  the 
cause  of  suffering;  (c)  the  suppression  of  desire  is  the  only 
means  of  escaping  suffering;  (d)  the  three  stages  in  the 
achievement  of  this  suppression  are  uprightness,  meditation 
and  wisdom. 


MYSTICISM  —  NEO-PLATONISM  123 

is  attainable  through  concentration  and  self- 
surrender.  It  is  a  spiritual  contact  in  which  we 
reach  the  fountain  of  being,  and  in  this  experience 
the  soul  is  alone  with  the  Alone.  Through  these 
three  types  of  experience,  the  individual  is  led  to 
God;  and  in  this  beatific  experience,  the  emotional 
aspect  of  which  is  characterized  by  Spinoza  as 
"amor  intellectualis  dei",  there  is  a  contemplation  of 
beauty,  truth,  and  love.  In  this  experience  all 
separate  existences  have  vanished  as  being  illusory, 
and  all  individual  souls  have  merged  into  oneness 
with  the  Godhead. 

This  Neo-Platonic  view  is  the  last  speculative 
and  religious  effort  of  Greek  genius.  It  is  a  uni- 
versal philosophy,  having  incorporated  into  itself 
elements  from  all  preceding  philosophies  save 
Epicureanism.  It  has  already  been  stated  that  the 
growing  demand  of  the  social  tissue  was  for  union 
with  the  Godhead.  This  union  is  here  made  pos- 
sible. This  system  also  represents  the  consumma- 
tion of  Greek  thought.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
many  modem  systems  of  philosophy  are  at  heart 
the  same  as  Neo-Platonism.  When  we  consider  the 
social  and  spiritual  chaos  of  the  time  of  Plotinus, 
it  is  not  strange  that  his  system  should  end  with 
contempt  for  the  present  world,  and  that  his  system 
should  embody  what  was  the  prevailing  attitude  of 
the  day,  viz.,  the  desire  for  union  with  God. 

Neo-Platonism  failed.  Christianity  conquered. 
Why?  Neo-Platonism  was  unable  to  tell  men  how 
to  make  the  state  of  peace  endure.  It  was  unable 
to  make  its  philosophy  take  hold  of  the  masses.     Its 


124  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

method  or  way  of  ecstatic  union  with  the  Godhead 
was  too  hard  for  the  ordinary  man.  It  did  not, 
and  indeed  by  the  nature  of  the  case,  it  could  not, 
present  its  way  of  life  and  salvation  incarnated  in 
a  historic  personality  able  to  stir  men's  affection 
and  command  their  loyalty.  But  this  is  precisely 
what  Christianity  did.  The  story  is  told  of  a  cer- 
tain propagandist  of  a  new  rose-water  religion  of 
universal  philanthropy  in  the  days  following  the 
French  Revolution  who,  disappointed  at  the  failure 
of  his  religion  to  make  headway,  asked  advice  of 
that  old  cynic  Talleyrand.  The  latter  replied:  "I 
recommend  that  one  of  you  be  crucified  and  rise 
again  the  third  day". 

REFERENCES 

Britannica,  11th  ed.,  art.,  Neo-Platonism. 

Hastings,  EncyclopaBdia  of  Religion  and  Ethics,  art., 
Neo-Platonism. 

Bakewell,  Source  Book  in  Ancient  Philosophy,  340-393. 

Whittaker,  T.,  The  Neo-Platonists. 

Bigg,  Neo-Platonism,  and  Christian  Platonists  of  Alex- 
andria. 

Inge,  W.  R.,  Christian  Mysticism. 

Dill,  Roman  Society  in  the  Last  Century  of  tho  West- 
ern Empire. 


CHAPTER  XII 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY 

The  original  Christian  Gospel  was  not  a  system 
of  philosophy.  It  was  a  religion  claiming  the 
definite  authority  of  a  revelation  from  God,  and  it 
appealed  primarily  to  the  emotions  and  consciences 
of  men.  It  enjoined  certain  principles  of  conduct. 
The  motives  to  enable  men  to  obey  these  principles 
were  offered  in  the  feelings  of  gratitude  and  love 
for  the  Savior  who  died  for  them  and  arose  again, 
in  the  promise  made  of  an  immortal  and  blessed  life 
for  the  faithful,  and  in  the  fear  of  divine  judgment 
upon  the  disobedient. 

While  primitive  Christianity  was  a  religion  and 
made  popular  appeal  on  these  grounds,  and  while  it 
continued,  as  in  its  origin  it  was,  a  movement 
within  the  Jewish  Church,  it  did  not  make  much  use 
of  philosophy.  As  soon,  however,  as  it  began  to 
spread  in  the  Roman  world  and  came  into  contact 
with  the  civilization  of  the  day,  and  indeed,  even 
before  it  thus  began  to  spread,  it  came  into  contact 
with  the  all-pervading  Greek  philosophy.  The 
highest  culture  of  the  Empire  was  Greek  in  char- 
acter, and  in  Alexandria  the  Jewish  theologian, 
Philo,  30  B.C.-50  A.D.,  had  already  been  deeply 
influenced  by  Greek  culture.  The  Logos  was  con- 
ceived by  him  as  the  creative  and  revelatory  Word 
of  God,  the  immanent  Divine  Reason,  operative  in 

(125) 


126  *     THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  world  and  the  unitary  principle  of  the  world  of 
Ideas,  Universal  Types  or  Patterns,  according  to 
which  all  things  were  made.  The  early  Christian 
philosophy  is  a  synthesis  of  the  Christian  religion 
and  Greek  philosophy  for  which  the  Jewish-Greek 
philosophy  of  Philo  paved  the  way.  It  was  an  at- 
tempt to  state  the  fundamental  principles  of 
Christianity  in  terms  of  Greek  philosophy.  Just 
so  in  every  age  religion  must  either  remain  dumb 
or  speak  in  terms  of  their  functioning  concepts,  if 
it  is  to  speak  to  the  cultured. 

The  ethical  content  of  Christianity  is,  in  some 
important  respects,  closely  akin  to  the  ethical  teach- 
ings of  Plato  and  the  Stoics.  The  Hebrew  and  the 
Christian  conception  of  God  as  the  Supreme  Good  is 
thoroughly  Platonic,  while  the  conception  of  God  as 
over-ruling  Providence  is  Stoic.  It  was  because  of 
the  incorporation  of  these  basic  principles  in  the 
more  spiritual  forms  of  late  Greek  philosophy  that 
Philo  and  others  recognized  an  identity  of  doctrine 
in  Plato,  Moses,  and  the  prophets.  The  Apologists 
of  Christianity  went  further  than  this  and  held  that 
the  Logos  was  manifested  in  Socrates  and  Plato. 
Justin  Martyr,  who  flourished  about  140,  the  first 
one  of  these  Apologists,  was  a  philosopher  dis- 
satisfied with  the  results  of  Greek  philosophy,  and 
he  turned  to  Christianity  because  of  its  practical 
fruits.  He  did  not,  however,  give  up  Greek  phil- 
osophy. He  showed  the  harmony  of  Greek 
philosophy  and  Christianity.  He  regards  Greek 
philosophy  as  being  a  preparation  for  Christianity. 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  127 

1.      ETHICAL  CONTENT  OF  CHRISTLA.NITY 

The  ethical  content  of  Christianity  may  be  sub- 
sumed under  the  following  eight  heads :  — 

1.  God  is  the  spiritual  Father  of  men. 

2.  Human  souls  are  of  supreme  value  in  the 
eyes  of  God  because  men  have  within  them 
by  birth  the  capacity  for  realizing  divine 
sonship. 

3.  Men  should  treat  one  another  as  brothers. 

4.  Divine  sonship  implies  the  practice  of 
sympathy,  service,  cooperation,  forbear- 
ance, and  forgiveness. 

5.  The  quality  of  man's  character  for  good  or 
ill  and  the  judgment  passed  upon  him  by 
God  depend  upon  motive  and  intent,  and 
not  upon  external  acts. 

6.  Nothing  in  the  world  has  any  value  as 
against  the  right  life  of  the  soul. 

7.  The  Christian  ideal  of  life  is  to  be  realized 
in  a  new  social  order  in  which  we  shall  treat 
all  men  as  brothers  in  God. 

8.  This  kingdom  is  to  be  ruled,  not  by  force  or 
external  authority,  but  by  motives  of  good 
will  and  love. 

Christianity  takes  its  origin  from  the  life  of 
an  historic  person  who  was  believed  to  have  sacri- 
ficed his  life  for  men  and  to  have  arisen  from  the 
dead.  His  resurrection  was  taken  to  be  the  final 
authentic  seal  of  the  divine  character  of  his  mission. 
Jesus  was  held  by  his  followers  to  have  been,  in  a 
unique  sense,  the  Son  of  God,     The  promise  which 


128  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

he  made  to  send  to  his  disciples,  after  his  departure, 
the  Holy  Spirit  to  guide  and  inspire  them,  was  be- 
lieved to  have  been  fulfilled.  Thus  the  Christians 
believed  in  a  triune  God  —  Father,  Son,  and  Holy- 
Spirit.  It  is  this  connection  of  Christianity  with 
an  historic  person  that  fundamentally  distinguishes 
the  Christian  religion  from  Greek  philosophy.  As 
against  this  association  with  an  historic  factor, 
Greek  philosophy  dealt  with  eternal  truths  which 
have  nothing  to  do  with  time  and  place.  As  time 
goes  on  in  the  last  centuries  B.  C,  there  becomes 
manifest  in  the  Grseco-Roman  world  an  increasing 
hunger  for  an  authoritative  revelation  and  way  of 
redemption.  Indeed,  it  was  taught  later  that  both 
Socrates  and  Plato  were  divine  revealers.  It  was 
because  of  this  general  demand  for  the  revelation 
of  a  divinely  authenticated  method  of  redemption 
that  Christian  teaching  found  ready  response  in  the 
Greek  and  Roman  world.  Plato  dealt  with  abstract 
principles  and  not  with  historical  processes  origin- 
ating in  specific  individuals  and  going  forward  in 
definite  places  and  times.  The  Logos  was  the  con- 
necting link  for  integrating  Greek  philosophy  and 
Christianity.  The  Logos  is  the  divine  reason  which 
manifested  itself  in  the  creation  and  the. order  of 
the  world.  It  is  the  power  of  God  immanent  in  the 
world.  God  in  his  fulness  of  being  transcends  the 
world  but  is  immanent  in  the  world  through  the 
Logos.  In  the  Gospel  of  St.  John  Jesus  is  identified 
with  the  Logos  or  creative  Word  or  Reason  of  God. 
The  divine  creative  Word  which  issues  from  the 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  129 

Father  is  held  to  have  been  fully  incarnated  in 
Jesus. 

2.      THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  TRINITY 

The  foundations  of  Christian  philosophy  were 
laid  by  Origen  of  Alexandria,  (185-254  A.  D.). 
God,  says  Origen,  is  pure  spirit,  the  Absolute 
Creative  Will,  and  the  Logos  is  his  expression. 
The  Logos  is  a  person,  a  being,  distinct  from  the 
Father,  but  eternally  generated  from  the  Father. 
The  Platonism  of  Origen  is  evident  in  his  concep- 
tion of  the  Logos  as  being  the  unity  of  all  ideas.  It 
is  the  idea  of  ideas.  The  creation  of  the  world  by 
God  is  an  eternal  process.  It  is  really  the  eternal 
procession  of  spirits  from  God.  Sin  is  the  result  of 
freedom  and  the  fall  into  matter  is  the  result  of  sin. 
Origen  maintains  that  all  souls  shall  finally  be  re- 
deemed. Salvation  is  the  eternal  procession  of 
spirits  from  their  alienation  back  to  knowledge  of 
and  union  with  God. 

As  to  the  relation  of  the  Father  and  the  Logos, 
it  must  be  said  that  there  was  a  long  controversy 
before  the  question  was  settled  by  the  Council  of 
Nicsea,  A.  D.  325.  The  Arian  party,  so  called  from 
Arius  its  leader,  maintained  that  the  Logos  was  a 
second  divine  principle,  created  by  and  subordinate 
to  the  Father,  and  that  it  was  not  of  the  same  sub- 
stance. The  Son  therefore  is  an  independent  being 
and  is  not  verij  God.  The  Son  is  a  creature  who  by 
his  own  will  raises  himself  to  moral  unity  with  the 
Father.  Athanasius,  who  flourished  about  338,  and 
his  party,  contended  against  the  Arians  that  God 


130  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

verily  entered  humanity  through  Christ.  They  held 
that  the  work  of  Christ  would  be  lost  if  God  had 
not  entered  into  Christ.  Christ  is  of  the  same,  not 
of  like,  substance  with  the  Father-God.  Christ 
has  come  to  make  us  divine.  Therefore  the  Son  is 
God.  The  Logos  is  eternally  begotten  of  the  Father, 
and  not  created  in  time.  The  Godhead  is  a  unity. 
Eternally  the  Father  implies  the  Son  as  the  spring 
implies  the  brook  or  as  the  sun  implies  the  light. 
Therefore  Christ  is  the  veritable  incarnation  of  God. 
He  is  of  one  and  the  same  substance ;  his  nature  con- 
sists of  a  duality  in  unity,  humanity  and  divinity  in 
one  self.  The  intent  of  this  doctrine  was  to  save 
the  full  value  of  Christ^s  work  of  revelation  and 
redemption  for  humanity. 

The  Athanasian  view  triumphed.  Its  final 
triumph  took  place  in  the  year  325.  Most  of  those 
who  passed  upon  the  question  were  utterly  ignorant 
of  the  finer  points  of  the  controversy.  But  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Emperor  on  the  Athanasian  side 
meant  the  overthrow  of  the  Arian  party.  This 
triumph  of  the  orthodox  doctrine  now  raised  new 
questions.  If  God  the  Father  was  in  Christ,  then 
he  suffered  when  Christ  suffered.  From  this  posi- 
tion (patripassionism)  many  recoiled.  The  dis- 
cussion at  this  point  gave  rise  to  the  question  of  the 
relation  of  the  two  natures  in  Christ,  the  Mon- 
ophysite  party  holding  that  there  was  but  one 
nature  in  Christ,  the  Docetic  party  maintaining  that 
the  incarnation  was  only  in  appearance.  The  view 
finally  adopted  at  the  Synod  of  Chalcedon  in  451 
was  that  there  are  two  natures  in  one  personality 


EARLY  CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY  131 

in  Christ.  The  next  problem  was  as  to  whether 
there  are  two  wills  or  one  will  in  Christ.  The  doc- 
trine established  as  orthodox  was  that  there  are  two 
wills  corresponding  to  the  two  natures,  the  human 
will  of  Christ  being  subordinate  to  and  in  harmony 
with  the  divine  will.  This  doctrine  is  called  dithe- 
litism,  the  heretical  view  monothelitism.  Finally, 
since  the  Holy  Spirit  was  recognized  as  a  distinct 
being,  the  immanent  Spirit  of  God  working  in  in- 
dividuals and  in  the  community  of  the  faithful,  the 
question  arose  as  to  the  relationship  of  the  three 
Divine  Beings.  The  orthodox  view  of  three  dis- 
tinct persons  or  beings,  but  so  united  as  to  form  but 
one  God,  was  finally  accepted.  This  was  a  hard  say- 
ing and  the  school  of  thought  which  gave  the  most 
plausible  meaning  to  it,  the  Modalists  or  Sabellians, 
held  that  the  three  beings  in  the  Trinity  were  only 
three  distinct  modes  or  relationships  or  phases  of 
the  life-activity  of  the  one  God.^  St.  Augustine,  353- 
430,  the  greatest  and  most  influential  theologian  of 
the  Christian  Middle  Ages  and  possibly  of  all  Chris- 
tian centuries,  was  a  Modalist.  He  explained  the 
Trinity  as  Divine  power,  wisdom  and  goodness,  after 
the  analogy  of  the  human  soul  which  is  a  trinity- 
in-unity  of  will,  thought,  and  feeling.  For  us  as 
students  of  philosophy,  the  important  point  is  that 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  was  the  vehicle  by  which 
the  Platonic  philosophy  was  transmitted  to  the 
Celtic,    Teutonic,    and    Slavic    peoples,    and    thus 


^  The    Greek    terms    for    person,    Latin    persona,    are 
viroaraais    and  irpoawTroi'. 


132  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

entered  into  the  thought  of  the  whole  Christian 
world. 

REFERENCES 

Thilly,  History  of  Philosophy,  120-125,  133-155. 

Britannica,  11th  ed.,  art.  Christianity. 

Marvin,  History  of  European  Philosophy,  Chapter 
XVIII. 

McGiffert,  A.  C,  The  Apostolic  Age. 

Wernle,  P.,  The  Beginnings  of  Christianity. 

Harnack,  A.,  The  Expansion  of  Christianity  in  the 
First  Three  Centuries,  and  History  of  Dogma. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
MEDIAEVAL   PHILOSOPHY 

The  period  called  the  Middle  Ages  extends 
approximately  from  450  to  1500.  It  is  a  period  char- 
acterized by  the  gradual  development  of  a  new  civil- 
ization. The  Roman  Empire  of  the  West  had  suf- 
fered disintegration  from  internal  complications 
and  the  impact  of  the  Teutons.  Even  in  its  original 
home  the  march  of  Roman  civilization  was  arrested 
in  many  vital  respects.  The  Mediaeval  civilization 
was  built  in  part  on  the  ruins  of  Roman  civilization, 
and  it  gradually  developed  into  a  type  of  civilization 
which  has  maintained  itself  on  into  modern  days. 

Modern  civilization  is  more  like  Greek  culture 
than  it  is  like  Mediaeval  culture.  It  is  rationalistic 
in  that  it  rejects  the  authority  of  organizations  like 
the  Church,  custom,  and  tradition,  and  in  that 
it  critically  examines  facts,  beliefs  and  theories. 
In  Mediaeval  culture  the  principle  of  authority  rules. 
Values  are  a  miraculous  contribution  from  an  alien 
and  supernatural  source.  Modem  culture  is  also 
naturalistic.  It  looks  with  open-eyed  interest  at  the 
facts  of  nature,  which  it  regards  worthy  of  con- 
sideration and  proving.  Mediaeval  culture,  how- 
ever, regards  the  world  of  nature  as  tributary  to 
a  world  of  grace.  The  supernatural  realm  is  the 
real  realm.  Such  hymns  as  "Oh  Mother  Dear, 
Jerusalem"  reveal  for  us  the  main  features  of  the 

(133) 


134  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Mediaeval  attitude.  There  is  embodied  here  that 
sense  of  other-worldliness,  —  we  are  but  "strangers 
and  pilgrims  here  below".  For  the  child  of  modern 
culture  their  point  of  view  has  lost  its  validity. 
Our  eyes  and  interests  are  fixed  on  another  realm 
—  this  present  world.  Furthermore,  modern  cul- 
ture is  humanistic;  it  aims  at  the  fullest  develop- 
ment of  human  powers  here  on  earth.  This  world 
is  the  loctts  of  the  modem  man's  interest.  For  the 
Mediaeval  thinker,  man  is  a  dual  being  whose  earthly 
interests  are  to  be  completely  subordinated  to  the 
heavenly;  he  is  a  brand  to  be  snatched  from  the 
burning.  This  is  the  dominant  motif  of  the  whole 
period. 

Man's  vocation  is  not  viewed  as  being  the 
process  of  developing  and  enjoying  all  his  powers 
and  interests.  Man  is  to  subordinate  the  so-called 
natural  man  to  the  spiritual,  the  supernatural  and 
the  super-rational.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that 
the  spirit  of  Neo-Platonism  and  Mediaeval  Chris- 
tianity are  identical.  Both  involve  the  dualistic 
conception,  and  both  explain  the  presence  of  spirit 
on  earth  as  the  result  of  its  sin  and  consequent  fall. 
The  way  of  redemption  is  the  way  of  escape  from 
the  prison-house  of  the  body  by  a  super-rational 
process.  It  is  indeed  no  accident,  but  part  of  the 
logic  of  thought  and  history  that  St.  Augustine, 
whose  thought  dominated  the  whole  Mediaeval 
Church,  was  a  dualist.  Before  becoming  a  Chris- 
tian, he  was  a  Manichaean,  and  still  later  he  was  a 
Neo-Platonist,  and  even  in  his  latest  stage  he  ad- 
hered to  the  refined  dualism  of  Neo-Platonism. 


MEDIEVAL  PHILOSOPHY  135 

Mediaeval  culture  was  begun  and  built  up 
chiefly  through  the  Church.  This  development  was 
peculiarly  facilitated  by  the  disintegration  of  the 
Western  Roman  Empire.  The  Church  was  well 
organized  and  the  Bishop  of  Rome,  by  virtue  of  the 
political  and  historical  prestige  and  power  of  Rome, 
became  the  head  of  the  Church.  The  Church  re- 
mained the  one  stable,  continuous  form  of  cultural 
organization  during  the  long  period  of  transition 
from  the  ancient  to  the  modem  civilization.  The 
Church  was  the  vehicle  by  which  there  was  pre- 
served something  of  the  old  Roman  culture  and 
through  which  that  culture  was  effectively  brought 
to  bear  upon  the  barbarian  peoples.  The  Church 
was  the  instrument  by  which  the  education  of  these 
crude  tribes  was  carried  on.  Deeply  indeed  were 
they  impressed  and  awed  by  the  Church.  The 
splendor  of  its  services  appealed  to  their  minds.  It 
was  thus  the  Church  that  laid  anew  the  foundation 
of  civilization  and  began  building  up  a  new  culture. 
It  was  the  one  all-embracing  social  institution.  It 
claimed  authority  over  all  principalities  and  powers ; 
it  controlled  the  individual  from  the  cradle  to  the 
grave,  and  beyond  the  grave. 

There  were  no  sharp  lines  between  political, 
religious,  scientific,  and  philosophical  thought  for 
the  Mediaeval  mind.  Theology  was  held  to  be  the 
queen  of  sciences  and  philosophy  was  but  her  hand- 
maid. Political  and  other  species  of  social  authority 
were  held  to  be  derivative. 

The  Mediaeval  mind  was  animistic.  It  believed 
itself  surrounded  by  hosts  of  spirits  and  demons. 


136  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Satan  strode  abroad  over  the  land.  Even  Luther, 
the  great  Reformer,  believed  in  Satan,  spirits  and 
demons,  in  the  same  way  as  did  the  typical  Mediseval 
man.  The  people  then  believed  in  magic.  Miracles 
frequently  happened  then  —  they  still  happen  in 
Quebec.  (This  is  the  point  of  view  of  primitive 
thought) . 

The  materials  which  the  Church  employed  for 
educational  purposes  were  the  following:  Trivium, 
which  gave  instruction  in  grammar,  logic,  and 
rhetoric,  and  Quadrivium,  which  was  a  course  in 
music,  arithmetic,  geometry,  and  astronomy.  These 
were  taught  from  compilations.  There  was  no 
direct  acquaintance  with  the  original  Greek.  There 
were,  it  is  true,  translations  of  parts  of  Aristotle's 
Logic  together  with  commentaries  by  Boethius. 
Plato's  Timseus  and  the  writings  of  Cicero  and  of 
the  Church  Fathers  were  also  available  in  the  Latin 
tongue.  From  500  to  1000  A.  D.,  a  period  which  is 
called  the  Dark  Ages,  there  was  only  the  most 
elementary  form  of  education,  and  in  this  long 
period  there  was  only  one  isolated  intellectual 
phenomenon  that  relieved  the  blackness  of  this  dark 
night.  He  was  John  Scotus  Erigena,  a  profound 
thinker  who  flourished  about  850.  After  1000  A. 
D.,  a  distinct  revival  of  philosophical  activity  took 
place.  Scholastic  philosophy  was  developed  at  this 
time.  Scholastic  philosophy  developed  rapidly  and 
culminated  in  the  thirteenth  century.  The  first 
great  Scholastic  philosopher  was  Anselm,  who 
flourished  about  1075  and  who  struck  the  key-note 
of  Scholastic  philosophy  when  he  said:  ''Credo  ut 


MEDIAEVAL  PHILOSOPHY  137 

intelligam*\  This  is  the  Scholastic  key-note. 
Abelard  showed  himself  to  be  a  heretic  by  assuming 
the  standpoint:  "Intelligo  ut  credam". 

The  Church  had  settled  all  fundamentals  as  to 
man's  origin,  nature  and  destiny.  The  Church  had 
settled  the  metes  and  bounds  of  all  knowledge.  God 
created  the  world  good;  man  fell,  the  Son  of  God 
was  sent  to  redeem  the  world;  the  Church  was  the 
one  custodian  of  all  the  instruments  of  salvation. 
Philosophy  was  to  move  and  operate  only  within  the 
limits  of  Church  dogma.  First  of  all  the  Scholastic 
philosopher  bows  to  the  authority  of  the  Church; 
he  then  proceeds  to  defend  the  whole  doctrine  of 
the  Church.  The  Church  gave  an  intellectual  map 
which  charted  all  things  —  the  origin,  destiny  and 
nature  of  everything  in  earth,  below  the  earth, 
above  the  earth,  and  in  heaven  above.  This  doc- 
trine culminated  in  the  Summa  Theologiae  of 
Thomas  Aquinas  (1225-1274).  He  was  the  great 
organizer  of  Scholastic  thought,  and  he  shows  that 
when  reason  reached  its  limits  then  revelation  com- 
pleted the  edifice  of  truth. 

One  of  the  main  causes  for  the  development  of 
Scholastic  philosophy  was  the  immaturity  of  the 
European  mind.  Even  in  the  thirteenth  century, 
with  all  its  great  activities  of  cathedral  building  and 
the  organization  of  industries,  there  was  this  general 
immaturity  of  thought. ^    It  was  about  this  time  that 


^  I  have  been  told  that  this  immaturity  of  mind  is  re- 
vealed in  the  construction  of  mediaeval  castles  which  some- 
times had  foundations  thirty  times  broader  than  was  neces- 
sary to  carry  the  superstructure. 


138  THE  FIELD  OP  PHILOSOPHY 

first-hand  knowledge  of  Aristotle  was  to  be  had  for 
the  first  time  in  western  Europe.  The  Greek  text 
was  now  brought  in.  This  system  quickened  the 
mind  of  Scholastic  thinkers  and  gave  them  method 
and  scope  which  they  had  not  had  before.  It  is 
christianized  Aristotelianism  that  we  have  in  St. 
Thomas  Aquinas.  Although  in  1215  Aristotle  was 
condemned,  he  was,  about  ninety  years,  later  recog- 
nized as  the  precursor  of  Christ,  and  was  made  the 
supreme  authority  in  philosophy. 

At  the  very  time  that  Scholastic  philosophy  cul- 
minated, the  seeds  of  decay  were  beginning  to 
germinate.  In  England,  the  Ionia  of  modern 
philosophy,  Duns  Scotus  (1265-1308)  denies  that 
philosophy  has  the  scope  which  Aquinas  main- 
tained, and  he  struggles  to  separate  religion  from 
reason.  This  brilliant  dialectician  was  followed  by 
William  of  Occam  who  went  still  further  in  attack- 
ing the  philosophical  presuppositions  of  the  Scholas- 
tic system.  At  about  the  same  time  Roger  Bacon 
turned  his  back  on  the  whole  system  of  Scholastic 
philosophy  and  forcefully  advocated  the  open-eyed 
study  of  nature. 

REFERENCES 

Thilly,  History  of  Philosophy,  pp.  155-163,  166-172, 
188-218. 

Rogers,  History  of  Philosophy,  197-222. 

Weber,  History  of  Philosophy,  201-261. 

Rickaby,  Scholasticism. 

Windelband,  W.,  History  of  Philosophy,  263-347. 

De  Wulf,  History  of  Mediaeval  Philosophy. 

Taylor  H.  O.,  The  Mediaeval  Mind,  Chapters  XXXV- 
XLIV. 


MEDIEVAL  PHILOSOPHY  139 

Poole,  R.  L.,  niustrations  of  Mediasval  Thought. 

St.  Anselm  (transl.  Deane),  Proslogium  and  Monolo- 
gium  (Open  Court  Series). 

St.  Thomas  Aquinas  (transl.  Rickaby),  Of  God  and 
His  Creatures. 

Thomas  a  Kempis,  Imitation  of  Christ. 

Dante,  Divine  Comedy,  and  the  New  Life  (transl.  C.  E. 
Norton). 

Essays  Commemorative  of  Roger  Bacon,  ed.  by  Little. 

Rashdall,  H.,  Universities  of  Europe  in  the  Middle 
Ages. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

REALISM,    NOMINALISM,    AND    THE    PROBLEM    OF 
INDIVIDUALITY 

The  preceding  lecture  has  emphasized  the  out- 
standing characteristics  of  Mediaeval  culture.  It 
has  done  this  by  contrasting  the  Mediaeval  culture 
with  Greek  culture.  In  the  twelfth,  thirteenth  and 
fourteenth  centuries,  which  are  the  great  centuries 
of  Mediaeval  philosophy,  the  Scholastic  philosophers 
debated  with  great  vigor  three  great  doctrines, 
namely,  realism,  nominalism,  and  individuality. 
The  relation  of  the  universal  to  the  particular  is  the 
quickening  motive  of  the  problem  of  individuality. 
This  problem  is  involved  also  in  the  application  of 
the  first  two  to  human  nature.  As  a  correlate  to 
these,  is  the  problem  as  to  whether  the  intellect  or 
will  is  central  to  human  nature. 

The  question  at  issue  between  realism  and 
nominalism  seems  to  us  very  much  like  hair  split- 
ting, but  such  feeling  is  due  to  our  ignorance  of 
the  real  nature  of  the  controversy.  This  same  prob- 
lem is  today  the  very  core  of  the  most  controversial 
aspects  of  our  basic  problems.  Mediaeval  realism 
is  the  doctrine  which  argues  that  the  universal,  in 
the  Platonic  sense,  has  an  existence  superior  to  the 
particular,  that  it  exists  eternally,  and  that  it  is  the 
caiise  of  the  particular.  The  universal,  or  type,  is 
not  only  logically  prior,  but  is  also  existentially 

(140) 


REALISM,  NOMINALISM,  ETC.  141 

prior,  to  the  particular.  The  universal  "humanity" 
is  the  cause  of  the  particular  human  beings.  The 
logical  and  existential  priority  of  the  universal  to 
the  particular  is  expressed  by  the  realist  in  the 
phrase:  Universale  ante  rem.  How  do  these 
universals  exist  before  the  things  ?  The  opinion  of 
the  Scholastics  is  that  they  are  the  forms,  or  types, 
according  to  which  God  creates  particulars.  They 
exist  before  particular  things  in  the  mind  of  God. 
The  second  position  of  realism  as  to  the  nature  and 
status  of  the  universals  is  expressed  in  the  phrase : 
Universale  in  re.  These  universals  are  the  com- 
mon nature  or  the  common  essence  of  particulars. 
If  we  have  a  given  lot  of  particulars,  we  discover 
that  the  universal  is  that  which  exists  in  them  as 
their  common  nature.  The  third  phrase :  Universale 
post  rem,  means  that  universals  exist  in  our  minds 
only  in  the  sense  that  through  reflection  we 
gradually  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  the  eternally 
existing  universal  real.  We  first  perceive  par- 
ticulars, and  then  get  their  common  nature.  We  do 
not  start  out  with  a  ready-made  kit  of  universals 
in  our  minds. 

The  position  of  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  is  that 
these  universals  first  exist  in  the  mind  of  God.  The 
name  Moderate  or  Aristotelian  Realism  has  been 
applied  to  this  standpoint.  Extreme  realism  main- 
tains that  all  individuals  are  illusions.  It  argues 
in  an  Eleatic  fashion  that  there  are  no  separate  in- 
dividuals; universals  alone  exist.  The  extreme 
realist  is  therefore  a  pantheist,  and  the  fact  that 
such  a  position  is  incompatible  with  Christianity 


142  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

doubtless  deterred  many  from  espousing  this  stand- 
point. Why  was  this  question  of  such  consuming 
interest?  To  show  the  interest  of  it  then  and  now, 
it  is  necessary  to  contrast  the  standpoint  of 
moderate  realism  with  that  of  nominalism.  Realism 
views  the  universals  as  being  superior  realities. 
Nominalism  says  that  universals  are  nothing  but 
words,  —  flatus  vocis,  empty  sounds.  It  was  about 
1090  that  nominalism  was  given  a  great  impetus 
by  Roscellinus.  For  over  two  hundred  years  the 
nominalistic  position  suffered  an  eclipse.  It  was  not 
till  the  time  of  William  of  Occam,  who  flourished 
about  1330,  that  nominalism  had  its  next  great 
advocate.  He  says  that  only  the  particulars  are 
real;  the  universals  are  mere  names.  There  is  no 
such  thing  in  reality  as  goodness,  justice,  or 
triangularity.  The  world  consists  of  an  aggregate 
of  particulars,  and  what  we  call  universals  are 
names  that  we  attach  to  the  similarity  between 
objects.  We  see  objects  and  we  note  that  they  have 
certain  common  features.  The  generic  term  human- 
ity is  a  name  for  those  that  have  those  common 
features.  We  give  these  generic  terms  not  only  to 
objects,  but  also  to  various  acts  and  processes 
which  are  like  each  other.  Nominalism  is  not  a 
defunct  doctrine.  It  is  what  is  known  in  modem 
thought  as  extreme  empiricism.  Such  empiricism 
holds  that  what  we  perceive  through  the  senses  is 
the  only  reality  that  exists.  What  you  think  is  but 
a  copy  of  what  you  perceive. 

Realism  is  a  term  frequently  used  with  regard 
to  a  movement  in  literature,  and  in  this  connection 


REALISM,  NOMINALISM,  ETC.  143 

it  means  that  art  is  to  embody  things  as  they  are 
in  the  outer  world.  Mediaeval  realism  has  a  dif- 
ferent meaning  from  this.  It  means  that  universals 
are  real.  Realism  in  literature  is  just  the  opposite 
of  this  type  of  realism.  The  fundamental  doctrines 
of  the  Church  were  given  a  philosophical  basis  by 
the  realistic  formula.  God  is  one  substance  in  three 
persons.  The  Church  also  taught  that  the  whole 
of  humanity  was  involved  in  the  consequences  of 
Adam's  transgression.  Humanity  is  one  and  so  the 
fall  of  Adam  entailed  the  whole  human  race.  "For 
as  in  Adam  all  die,  even  so  in  Christ  shall  all  be 
made  alive".  We  are  all  parts  of  a  whole,  and  not 
separate  individuals.  All  men  are  saved  in  Christ. 
He  is  the  typical  man,  the  universal  man,  present 
in  all  men.  The  Church  holds  that  it  itself  is  made 
after  a  pattern  laid  up  in  heaven,  and  because  of 
this  the  Church  is  more  real  than  the  individuals 
which  compose  it.  This  realistic  motive  is  also  the 
philosophical  basis  of  the  Church's  doctrine  of  the 
Lord's  Supper. 

The  culture  of  the  Church  conceived  all  exist- 
ence to  be  arranged  in  hierarchical  order.  At  the 
top  of  the  hierarchy  is  God,  and  next,  the  angels. 
In  God  and  the  heavenly  world  are  to  be  found  all 
the  types  of  earthly  existence.  After  the  fashion 
of  Dante,  our  earthly  existence  is  viewed  as  being 
only  an  allegory  of  the  divine  order.  The  earthly 
order  is  only  a  preparatory  stage  for  the  celestial 
order. 

If  the  world  of  universals  is  thus  so  much  more 
real  than  the  particulars,  the  latter  order  is  to  be 


144  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

saved  only  by  the  descent  of  the  universals  into  this 
order,  and  thus  is  the  earthly  order  transfigured 
into  the  semblance  of  the  divine.  If  the  universals 
are  so  much  more  real  than  the  particulars,  then 
what  is  to  become  of  the  particulars?  We  feel 
ourselves  to  be  separate  beings.  We  have  each  his 
ow^n  inaccessible  citadel  of  personality.  Each  per- 
son is  an  isolated,  unique  being.  How  often  do  we 
feel  that  nobody  understands  us!  Uniqueness, 
isolation,  privacy  —  these  are  marks  of  our  per- 
sonality. What  becomes  of  this  if  the  universal 
is  the  more  real?  Our  feeling  of  freedom  and 
our  sense  of  responsibility  point  to  the  reality  of 
the  individual.  How  can  this  be?  Aquinas  said 
that  matter  is  the  principle  of  individuation:  As 
forms,  all  souls  will  be  identical,  but  as  embodied 
they  are  different.  We  are  individuals  therefore  in 
consequence  of  bodies.  To  this  position  Scotus 
replies,  that  when  we  slough  off  this  mortal  coil, 
then  we  must  lose  our  individuality.  Scotus  said 
that  it  is  not  in  the  fact  of  the  mere  embodiment 
of  the  soul  that  individuality  is  effected.  It  is  not 
body  that  makes  individuality,  for  surely  God  has 
no  matter.  Each  individual  is  real  as  a  soul.  Each 
soul  has  its  hsecceitas.  Each  thing  is  a  unique 
thing  and  has  its  own  being.  The  fundamental 
thing  in  individuality  is  will,  says  Scotus,  and  in 
this  he  anticipates  current  psychology  and  phil- 
osophy. But  Aquinas  held  that  intellect  was  prior, 
and  in  doing  this  he  is  doing  just  what  we  would 
expect  him  to  do  in  the  light  of  the  rest  of  his 
system. 


REALISM,  NOMINALISM,  ETC.  145 

The  question  as  to  the  primacy  of  the  will  or  the 
intellect  comes  out  of  the  preceding  inquiry,  i.  e.,  as 
to  universals.  Will  is  primary  for  Scotus,  and  in 
consequence  of  this  he  defends  free  will  from  the 
indeterministic  position,  —  man  has  the  power  of 
free  choice.  As  time  went  on  nominalism  gathered 
constantly  increasing  momentum  and  in  William  of 
Occam  we  have  one  of  the  acutest  and  subtlest 
thinkers  championing  the  cause  of  nominalism. 
Universals  exist  only  in  the  thinking  mind,  says 
Occam.  Individual  things  alone  are  real.  Our  in- 
tuitions are  natural  signs  of  things  and  are  not  the 
immediate  presence  of  things  themselves.  We  do 
not  know  things  as  they  are.  We  know  them  only 
in  their  second  intentions.  With  the  increasing 
interest  in  the  study  of  nature  and  with  the  develop- 
ment of  nationalities,  which  involved  the  throwing 
off  of  ecclesiastical  and  political  authority,  there  is 
a  constantly  growing  interest  in  the  nominalistic 
standpoint.  The  great  development  of  dialects  and 
languages,  and  the  emergence  of  the  empirical  study 
of  nature  fostered  nominalism. 

The  empiricist  is  ever  prone  to  regard  concepts 
as  abstractions  which  are  derived  from  the  inspec- 
tion of  particulars.  Concepts  are  mere  names  for 
the  empiricist.  The  basic  motive  for  this  view  is 
the  fact  that  he  is  prone  to  say  that  the  psychological 
steps  by  which  we  get  knowledge  is  all  there  is  to 
knowledge.  He  does  not  seem  to  be  conscious  of 
the  difficulty  involved  in  the  assumption  of  laws 
and  abstractions  which  are  valid  for  our  own  ex- 
perience, but  which  have  nothing  in  nature,  as  per- 

10 


146  THE  FIELD   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

ceived  through  the  senses,  corresponding  to  them. 
In  science  we  constantly  classify  facts  and  correlate 
them  causally.  Every  exact  law  of  science  pre- 
supposes that  nature  is  a  kind  of  crystallized 
mathematics.  We  generalize  so  as  to  forecast  and 
predict,  and  this  certainly  implies  that  there  is  a 
rational  structure  in  nature.  But  nominalism  re- 
duces science  to  a  set  of  names  that  do  not  approxi- 
mate reality.  It  makes  reality  a  chaotic  mass 
or  aggregate  of  isolated  particulars.  Many  people 
today  smile  at  these  old  controversies.  They  do  not 
realize  that  the  same  controversy  is  involved  in  the 
existence  of  the  state.  Are  we  isolated  individuals  ? 
Is  society  simply  a  mass  of  separate  individuals? 
This  is  the  position  of  anarchy.  There  are 
thousands  in  our  own  Republic  who  do  not  realize 
the  significance  of  this  conception  with  reference 
to  the  nature  of  the  state.  For  very  many  the  state 
is  only  a  milk-bucket.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is 
the  equally  vicious  and  defective  view  that  all  in- 
dividuals exist  for  the  state.  The  question  today  is 
as  to  where  lies  the  seat  of  a  rational  and  just 
authority  of  society  over  the  individual.  Thus  the 
old  question  of  Scholasticism  is  the  central  question 
of  today.  Are  the  state,  justice,  —  merely  empty 
names  ?  Is  society  only  a  horde  of  self-seeking  in- 
dividuals ?  Plato  represents  the  state  as  the  magni- 
fication or  projection  of  the  individual.  It  is  the 
great  instrument  for  the  development  of  the  soul 
of  man.  The  anarchist  would  achieve  the  welfare 
of  man  by  shattering  the  state  and  all  social  authori- 
ties   into    fragments.     He    would    get    harmony 


REALISM,  NOMINALISM,  ETC.  147 

through  the  spontaneous  action  of  the  individual 
atoms  in  society. 

REFERENCE 
Windelband,  History  of  Philosophy,  263-347. 


CHAPTER  XV 

MODERN    PHILOSOPHY:      ITS    SPIRIT,    ITS    CHIEF 
PROBLEMS,  AND  ITS  STANDPOINTS 

Modem  philosophy  did  not  come  into  being 
suddenly.  Even  back  in  the  thirteenth  and  four- 
teenth centuries,  men  like  Roger  Bacon,  Duns 
Scotus,  and  William  of  Occam,  advocated  the  separa- 
tion of  philosophy  from  theology.  In  this  way  these 
men  claimed  for  philosophy  the  right  of  free  and 
independent  inquiry,  while  at  the  same  time  they 
recognized  the  practical  end  of  theology. 

Nicholas  of  Cusa,  1401  - 1464,  a  prominent 
churchman,  developed  a  system  of  philosophy  that 
was  quite  independent  of  Scholasticism.  This 
system  has  a  Neo-Platonic  and  pantheistic  trend. 
The  central  thought  of  this  system  is  the  concept  of 
the  unity  of  opposites;  God  is  the  unity  of  the  in- 
finite and  finite ;  man  is  the  unity  of  soul  and  body. 
In  the  next  century  Paracelsus,  1493-1541,  a  strange 
figure,  an  alchemist,  a  mystical  pantheist,  a 
physician,  founder  of  a  school  of  medicine  in  which 
were  made  some  of  the  first  systematic  experiments 
in  chemistry,  gives  us  a  philosophy  which  is  a 
strange  blending  of  superstition,  daring  speculation, 
and  anticipations  of  science.  His  system  is  a  mix- 
ture of  three  basic  motifs,  namely,  Neo-Platonism, 
animism,  and  science  (Vide,  Browning's  Para- 
celsus) . 

(148) 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  149 

The  first  really  modem  system  is  that  of  Gior- 
dano Bruno,  a  man  burned  at  the  stake  in  Rome  in 
the  year  1600.  He  was  burned  as  a  heretic  and 
thus  suffered  martyrdom  for  the  cause  of  free 
knowledge  and  science.  Three  hundred  years  later, 
a  great  bronze  statue  was  erected  to  him.  flis  work 
is  the  first  modern  system.  It  is  penetrated  through 
and  through  by  the  idea  of  the  infinitude  of  the 
universe.  God  is  held  by  him  to  be  the  immanent 
unity  of  the  universe,  the  all-pervading  soul  of 
things.  God  is  the  unity  of  opposites,  the  one  in 
the  many.  He  conceives  of  the  material  world  as 
being  made  up  of  indivisible  monads,  and  that  there 
are  physical  and  psychical  monads.  These  monads 
are  the  elements  of  which  the  world  is  made. 

The  first  scientifically  developed  system  is  that 
of  Descartes,  1596-1650.  The  poetic  impulse  of 
Bruno  is  lacking  in  Descartes,  who  is  a  rigorous 
thinker.  Soon  after  Descartes  developed  his  system 
Hobbes  worked  out  his  materialism,  and  in  rapid 
succession  we  have  given  us  the  systems  of  Spinoza, 
Leibnitz,  Locke,  and  Berkeley.  These  names  show 
that  the  seventeenth  century  was  a  period  of  great 
metaphysical  systems. 

All  modem  philosophy  is  rationalistic.  It 
uniformly  rejects  authority  and  persistently  works 
independently  of  ecclesiastical  dogmas  and  religious 
beliefs.  Its  one  standpoint  is  that  of  rational  in- 
quiry into  nature  and  the  meaning  of  experience. 
This  revolt  against  authority  and  tradition  is  seen 
in  other  fields  than  science,  and  philosophy.  In  the 
reformation  movement  we  have  the  rejection  of  the 


150  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

authority  of  the  Pope  in  ecclesiastical  and  religious 
matters,  and  particularly  the  rejection  of  his  right 
to  interfere  in  matters  of  state.  The  Reformation 
is  thus  partly  religious  and  partly  political.  This 
revolt  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  development  of 
nationality  and  of  regional  government,  and  the 
beginnings  of  movements  toward  democracy. 

The  demand  for  representative  government 
which  was  successively  successful  in  England, 
France,  and  America,  is  now  engaged  against  the 
last  citadel  of  feudalism  in  Europe.  Out  of  this 
movement  developed  the  doctrine  of  the  natural  and 
inalienable  rights  of  man,  a  doctrine  which  was  ex- 
pressed in  its  most  classic  form  at  the  time  of  the 
French  Revolution. 

The  chief  social  and  cultural  influences  which 
resulted  in  modem  thought  are  the  following :  — 

1.  The  influence  of  the  Crusades  in  contact 
with  the  culture  of  the  Saracens. 

2.  The  culture  of  the  Renaissance.  Here  we 
have  the  first-hand  acquaintance  with  the 
classics  of  Greece. 

3.  The  growth  of  the  spirit  of  nationality,  or 
a  sense  of  the  rights  of  the  local,  social  and 
political  organizations. 

4.  The  influence  of  the  Reformation  in  the 
matter  of  the  rejection  of  papal  authority 
in  matters  of  religious  observance  and  be- 
lief. 

5.  The  influence  of  the  doctrine  of  natural 
rights. 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  151 

6.     The   new    discoveries    in    geography    and 
natural  science. 
Of  these  influences  the  new  natural  science  is  by- 
far  the  most  potent. 

The  second  great  characteristic  of  the  spirit  of 
modem  philosophy  is  that  it  develops  in  the  closest 
association  with  the  special  sciences.  Until  the  very 
end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  mathematics, 
astronomy,  and  physics  not  only  exercised  a 
great  influence  upon  philosophy;  they  even  de- 
termined the  very  structure  of  philosophy,  and 
in  the  nineteenth  century  the  biological  sciences, 
with  their  all-embracing  generalization  of  evolu- 
tion, also  molded  the  new  types  of  philosophical 
doctrine.  This  close  relation  of  the  sciences  and 
philosophy  in  modem  times  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that  many  of  the  leaders  in  the  development  of 
science  have  been  philosophers.  Descartes  was  a 
great  mathematician  and  physicist.  Analytical 
geometry  is  largely  a  creation  of  his  genius.  Leib- 
nitz, an  eminent  mathematician,  geologist,  physicist, 
chemist,  comparative  philologist,  philosopher,  et 
cetera,  invented  the  calculus,  and  in  this  way  we  see 
the  organic  relation  between  philosophy  and  science 
in  his  case.  Locke  and  Hume  were  analytical 
psychologists,  and  furthermore,  they  were  great 
psychologists  and  political  thinkers  or  social  phil- 
osophers. It  is  not  until  William  James  that  we 
have  another  English-writing  psychologist  who 
ranks  with  them.  Locke  was  a  great  political  phil- 
osopher, and  Hume  was  an  eminent  historian.  Kant 
was  a  mathematician  and  a  physicist ;  he  formulated 


152  THE   FIELD   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

the  nebular  hypothesis.  It  is  only  our  second  or 
third  rate  philosophers  and  scientists  that  fail  to 
see  the  close  relation  between  science  and  philosophy. 
The  significant,  new  thing  in  the  background 
of  modern  philosophy  —  the  novel  standpoint  in 
thought  that  shapes  the  point  of  view  of  much  of 
modern  thought,  is  the  development  of  a  mechanical 
view  of  the  world.  It  is  the  conception  of  nature  as 
a  vast  mechanism,  infinite  both  in  extent  and  in  the 
complexity  of  its  details.  At  the  same  time  it  is  a 
mechanism  whose  fundamental  principles  of  opera- 
tion are  known.  Nature  is  viewed  as  a  self-running 
mechanism.  Four  men  of  the  highest  importance 
have  elaborated  this  doctrine.  They  are  Copernicus, 
Kepler,  Galileo,  and  Newton.  Copernicus  in  his 
astronomical  theory  originated  what  is  perhaps  the 
most  revolutionary  thought  of  the  ages.  His  theory 
loosened  all  the  foundations  of  science  and  religion. 
Kepler  formulated  the  laws  of  planetary  motion. 
Galileo  gave  an  experimental  foundation  to  this 
theory  and  established  many  principles  of  modern 
physics.  In  addition  to  this  he  made  many  dis- 
coveries of  apparatus  for  laboratory  purposes.  One 
of  the  many  things  which  he  worked  out  was  the 
determination  of  the  concept  of  acceleration.  In 
this  way  he  showed  that  the  rate  of  falling  bodies 
is  not  a  function  of  mass.  Thus  at  this  time  a 
dogma  which  was  accepted  from  the  days  of 
Aristotle  was  shown  to  be  invalid.  Newton  by  his 
formulation  of  the  laws  of  motion  was  able  to  bind 
all  into  one  comprehensive  synthesis.  His  formula 
is  a  generalization  which  involves  the  result  of  the 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY,  ETC.  153 

researches  made  on  falling  bodies,  the  pendulum, 
and  the  planets. 

Galileo  had  a  clear  conception  of  scientific 
method.  He  argues  that  what  we  can  measure  we 
can  know.  The  book  of  the  universe  is  written  in 
mathematical  characters.  All  changes  in  nature 
are  the  results  of  movements  of  atoms,  but  the 
secondary  qualities  of  bodies  are  only  subjective. 
In  the  year  1633,  Galileo  was  forced  to  recant,  but 
a  little  after  having  made  his  recantation,  he  raised 
his  eyes  to  the  stars,  and  while  looking  into  that  far- 
off  region  which  he  knew  so  well,  he  involuntarily 
exclaimed:  "And  yet  it  moves".  The  background 
of  modem  philosophy  is  this  development  of 
the  mechanical  conception  of  the  universe.  The 
mediaeval  philosopher  viewed  nature  animistically 
and  teleologically.  A  problem  that  becomes  acute 
for  the  modern  philosopher  is  this:  If  nature  is 
blind  and  insensate ;  if  all  that  takes  place  in  nature 
is  the  result  of  mechanical  impact;  and  if  all  the 
motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  and  all  the  changes 
that  take  place  in  the  universe  can  be  explained 
without  assuming  any  interference  of  mind,  then 
what  becomes  of  mind,  of  the  soul  and  spirit  in  the 
universe  ?  Are  these  not  superfluous  and  antiquated 
conceptions?  The  first  and  greatest  problem  of 
modern  philosophy  is  this:  What  is  the  character 
of  reality?  and  how  are  the  soul  and  body  to  be 
related?  If  nature  is  only  an  infinite  machine;  if 
this  is  all  that  there  really  is,  then  spirit  seems  to 
be  a  mere  by-product  of  this  machine,  and  science, 
language,  art,  music,  and  religion,  seem  to  be  re- 


154  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

duced  to  the  status  of  glandular  secretions.  If 
nature  is  only  mechanism,  then  there  is  no  ground 
for  assuming  that  purpose  operates,  and  we  must 
abandon  entirely  the  teleological  conceptions. 

The  great  17th  century  systems  are  attempts 
to  answer  in  all  the  logically  possible  ways  the  ques- 
tion as  to  what  is  the  relation  of  mind  and  body, 
spirit  and  matter. 

REFERENCES 

Thilly,  History  of  Philosophy,  221-240,  250-254. 

Marvin,  History  of  European  Philosophy,  Chapter  XXI. 

Hoeffding,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  Vol.  I.,  103- 
148,  167-183. 

Bury,  A  History  of  Freedom  of  Thought. 

Lecky,  W.  E.  H.,  History  of  the  Rise  and  Influence  of 
Rationalism. 

Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  I. 

Burckhardt,  J.  C,  The  Civilization  of  the  Renaissance 
in  Italy. 

Lindsay,  T.  M.,  History  of  the  Reformation. 

Galileo,  Dialogues  Concerning  Two  New  Sciences. 

Berry,  Short  History  of  Astronomy,  76-409. 

Cajori,  F.,  History  of  Physics,  and  History  of  Mathe- 
matics. 

Whewell,  Wm.,  History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
THE  PROBLEM   OF  REALITY 

In  this  problem,  there  are  two  main  questions  at 
issue :  (a)  What  is  the  nature  or  character  of  that 
which  is  real?  (b)  What  is  the  relation  of  the  part 
to  the  whole,  or,  what  is  the  place  of  the  individual 
in  the  Universe?  The  central  interest  in  this  latter 
question  for  us  is :  What  is  the  place  of  personality 
in  the  universe?  In  connection  with  this  latter 
question  emerge  the  problems  of  the  meaning  of 
personality,  freedom,  and  immortality. 

The  first  question  seeks  to  determine  what  is 
the  abiding  substance  of  things,  or,  what  are  the 
substances?  It  is  in  terms  of  the  concept  of  sub- 
stance that  the  four  typical  answers  to  this  ques- 
tion were  given  in  the  17th  century.  By  substance 
was  meant  that  which  is  permanent,  that  which 
exists  on  its  own  account.  Substance  is  that  which 
is  an  independent  and  not  dependent  existence.  In 
the  textbooks  on  metaphysics,  the  ordinary  classifi- 
cation of  problems  and  theories  is  as  follows:  on- 
tology, cosmology,  and  psychology.  Ontology  is  the 
theory  of  the  nature  of  being.  Cosmology  is  the 
theory  as  to  the  nature  of  the  universe.  I  find  it 
unprofitable  to  thus  separate  ontology  and  cos- 
mology. 

What  is  the  substance  or  permanent  qualita- 
tive nature  of  things?  We  have  four  types  of 
answers  to  this  question: 

(155) 


156  THE  FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

1.  Dualism, 

2.  Materialism, 

3.  Spiritualism  or  Idealism, 

4.  Neutral  Monism,  or  the  Identity  Hypothe- 
sis. 

Dualism  is  the  common  sense  theory,  and  has  its 
classical  formulation  in  Descartes  (1596-1650). 
This  theory  is  held  also  by  Locke  (1632-1704), 
Kant  (1724-1804),  McDougall,  Bertrand  Russell, 
Bergson,  and  many  others.  This  theory  rests  on  the 
assumption  that  there  are  two  substances,  viz., 
mind  and  body  in  man,  spirit  and  matter  in  the 
universe  at  large.  The  three  remaining  theories 
are  all  monistic.  Materialism  is  the  view  v/hich  we 
find  in  Hobbes  (1588-1679),  Priestley  (1733-1804), 
Holbach  (b.  1789),  La  Mettrie  (1709-1751),  Biich- 
ner  (1824-1889),  and  Haeckel  (b.  1834).  There 
is  one  substance,  viz.,  matter  in  motion,  and  to  this 
view  belong  some  of  our  current  views  resting  upon 
the  conceptual  constructs  of  atoms  and  electrons. 
Spiritualism  or  Idealism  assumes  that  the  substance 
of  things  consists  of  minds,  their  activities  and  their 
contents.  The  leading  representatives  of  this  view 
are  Berkeley  (1685-1753),  Leibnitz  (1646-1716), 
Fichte  (1762-1814),  Hegel  (1770-1831),  Schopen- 
hauer (1788-1860),  Lotze  (1817-1881),  Green 
(1836-1882),  Bradley  (b.  1846),  Bosanquet  (b. 
1848),  and  Royce  (1855-1915).  Neutral  Monism 
or  the  identity  theory  is  the  doctrine  that  reality 
is  neither  physical  nor  mental  —  it  is  both  physical 
and  mental.  Reality  has  these  two  aspects,  and 
these  two  aspects  are  parallel  manifestations  of  the 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  REALITY  157 

same  underlying  substance.  Representatives  of  the 
identity  theory  are  Spinoza  (1632-1637),  Schelling 
(1775-1854),  Avenarius  (1843-1896),  Spencer 
(1820-1903),  Mach  (1838-1916),  James  (1842-1910) 
and  some  of  the  new  Realists  of  today.  These  views 
are  all  designated  qualitative  monisms  inasmuch  as 
they  maintain  that  there  is  only  one  kind  of  being. 
The  second  question  referred  to  above  is  that 
as  to  the  relation  of  the  parts  to  the  whole.  What 
is  the  relation  of  the  unity  of  the  universe  to  the 
parts  that  are  in  it?  We  find  here  two  main  types 
of  theory,  viz.,  Monism  or  Singularism  and  Plural- 
ism. Here  the  question  is  not,  how  many  kinds  of 
being  there  are,  but  how  many  beings  are  there. 
Spinoza  is  a  monist  of  both  kinds.  There  is  for 
him  only  one  being  and  only  one  kind  of  being.  In 
many  respects  this  Spinozistic  view  is  the  doctrine 
of  Hegel,  Royce,  Bradley,  and  Bosanquet.  For 
all  of  these  there  is  only  one,  ultimately  real, 
absolute,  all  inclusive  being.  The  other  theory 
is  that  finite  beings,  especially  human  personalities, 
have  a  distinct  and  separate  existence  and  that  they 
are  not  parts  of  God.  They  are  private  and  unique 
beings,  but  not,  however,  without  relations  to  one 
another.  It  was  this  problem  that  was  central  with 
the  Stoics  and  it  was  at  this  problem  that  they  per- 
sistently hammered.  It  is  from  this  point  of  view 
that  we  see  the  metaphysical  significance  of  the 
different  types  of  philosophy  of  the  State.  The 
State  for  the  singularist  view  is  the  alUinclusive 
unity,  an  all-inclusive  world-State.  The  democratic 
or  pluralistic  conception,  however,  is  that  the  State 


158  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

is  a  human  device  set  up  to  enable  us  to  get  along. 
The  State  is  an  instrument,  a  tool.  We  are  not  its 
tools,  it  is  our  tool 

Among  the  great  Pluralists  are  Locke,  Berkeley, 
Leibnitz,  William  James,  Bergson,  and  James  Ward. 

Note.  Bergson  sets  out  from  dualism,  and  the  oppo- 
sition between  matter  or  extension  and  the  life-force  or 
duration  is  the  prevalent  note  of  his  system.  But,  in  places, 
e.  g.,  at  the  conclusion  of  Matter  and  Memory,  he  reduces 
this  opposition  to  a  difference  in  degree  of  tension  in  the 
universal  movement  or  mobility  which  is  the  real 

The  neutral  monism  or  identity  theory  of  James  only 
found  utterance,  in  his  concept  of  pure  experience,  in  some 
of  his  later  essays.  (See  his  Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism). 
James  here  takes  the  original  neutral  stuff  of  reality  to  be 
an  undifferentiated  experience  on  a  vast  scale  and  free  from 
the  impurities  introduced  by  the  contrasts  we  set  up  between 
the  physical  and  the  mental,  the  unconscious  matter  and  the 
conscious  life,  of  common  sense  thinking.  In  this  pure  ex- 
perience my  pencil  would  be  neither  physical  nor  mental, 
but  when  I  place  it  in  space-relations  I  make  it  physical  and 
where  I  call  it  a  percept  I  make  it  mental.  It  is  really  the 
same  pencil  all  the  while,  just  a  bit  of  pure  experience.  He 
neither  explains  where  we  are  to  find  experience  in  its 
purity,  nor  why  it  should  ever  become  bifocalized.  I  find 
myself  unable  to  abolish  the  distinction  between  my  con- 
sciousness of  an  object  and  the  object. 


CHAPTER  XVII 
DUALISM 

This  theory  assumes  that  there  are  two  dis- 
tinct substances.  In  the  human  individual  they 
interact.  This  is  the  common  sense  view.  It  is 
based  on  what  appears  to  be  glaring  distinctions. 
When  we  will  a  mental  process,  we  determine  a 
bodily  movement.  In  tight  places  we  frequently 
discover  that  we  can  do  things  with  our  bodies  that 
we  never  thought  we  could  do,  e.  g.,  in  situations  of 
fright  and  in  athletic  contests,  et  cetera.  Con- 
versely, bodily  conditions  influence  mental  pro- 
cesses. 

When,  however,  we  consider  the  respective 
properties  of  mind  and  body,  we  find  that  they  are 
sharply  contrasted.  While  body  is  a  divisible  mass, 
extended  in  space,  mind  is  an  indivisible  unity, 
having  no  mass  or  exten^ity.  Again,  body  seems  at 
all  times  to  be  determined  from  without,  while  mind 
is  a  self-determining,  self-directing  principle.  Mind 
has  interests  and  seeks  to  realize  values.  It  is  pur- 
posive and  develops  new  interests  and  values,  and 
continually  devises  new  means  to  realize  its  values. 
The  dualistic  theory  thus  seems  to  be  based  on  obvi- 
ous facts  and  contrasts  in  respect  to  the  relation 
of  mind  and  body.  The  Cartesian  dualist  says  that 
the  body  apart  from  mind  is  mechanical,  a  system 
of  juxtaposed  points  moving  in  space.    In  this  way 

(159) 


160  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

he  assumes  that  the  body  is  a  mere  machine.  Such 
was  Descartes'  view.  He  held  that  animals  had  no 
minds  and,  therefore,  were  automata. 

What  are  some  of  the  objections  to  this  theory? 
First  of  all,  it  is  inconceivable  and  inexplicable  how 
an  unextended  principle  can  act  upon  an  extended 
principle ;  because  of  this  it  is  said  that  the  relation 
cannot  be  explained.  To  this  objection,  however, 
the  dualist  may  reply  that  many  inconceivable 
things  are  facts,  and  he  will  urge  that  it  is  our 
province  to  be  guided  by  facts  rather  than  by  con- 
siderations of  inconceivability.  The  second  objec- 
tion to  dualism  is  this :  That  if  mind  acts  on  body, 
then  the  principle  of  the  "conservation  of  energy" 
is  violated.  This  principle  is  the  statement  that  in 
all  changes  or  transformations  of  energy  in  the 
physical  series,  there  is  a  mathematical  equivalence. 
So  much  energy  of  one  kind  produces  so  much 
energy  of  another  kind.  Throughout  the  series 
there  is  a  constancy,  there  is  a  strict  quantitative 
equivalence,  thus  precluding  either  the  creation  or 
destruction  of  energy.  Now  in  the  interaction  of 
the  dualist,  there  is  energy  injected  into  the  physical 
series  by  the  action  of  the  mind  on  the  body,  and 
this  injection  means  the  destruction  of  the  principle 
of  the  conservation  of  energy. 

To  this  objection  the  dualist  may  reply:  The 
amount  of  energy  injected  into  the  physical  series 
by  mind  is  too  small  to  be  detected  by  our  most 
refined  instruments.  The  objector  would  object 
again  to  this  reply  by  saying,  that,  though  such  a 
position  is  plausible,  it  does  violate  the  principle 


DUALISM  161 

of  the  conservation  of  energy.  A  still  further 
dualistic  reply  might  be  something  like  that  which 
Lotze  indicated,  viz.,  the  passage  from  the  one  series 
to  the  other  is  on  the  whole  balanced,  and  there  is 
thus  no  loss  or  gain.  This  also  is  very  plausible, 
but  it  entangles  the  dualist  in  a  further  difficulty 
and  one  of  such  a  character  that  if  the  dualist 
adheres  to  it,  he  ceases  to  be  a  dualist.  If  energy 
can  thus  be  interchanged,  then  energy  is  the  com- 
mon denominator  of  both  series,  and  mind  and  mat- 
ter are  only  forms  of  a  common  principle.  The 
dualist  has  still  a  third  answer  which  is  to  the  effect 
that  the  mind  directs  the  body  but  uses  no  energy 
in  so  doing.  The  advocate  of  this  view  might  point, 
for  example,  to  an  engineer  directing  a  great  en- 
gine by  a  small  lever,  or,  to  such  an  incident  as 
President  Wilson  pressing  a  button  at  Washington, 
thus  setting  in  motion  all  the  machinery  in  a  large 
exhibit  on  the  Pacific  coast.  But  the  President  did 
use  energy — he  pressed  the  button — so  this  answer 
also  is  invalid.  Still  a  fourth  reply  might  be  given 
by  the  dualist.  He  may  argue  that  the  principle  of 
the  conservation  of  energy  is  a  working  hypothesis 
for  the  physicist  when  dealing  with  strains  and 
tensions,  and  with  mass  particles.  He  finds  that 
the  principle  works,  but  his  point  of  view,  says  the 
dualist,  is  abstract,  and  from  a  total  point  of  view 
there  is  no  reason  for  assuming  that  the  physical 
series  is  a  closed  one.  When  we  take  the  whole  of 
experience  into  account,  it  is  seen  to  be  too  complex 
for  one  to  be  justified  in  saying  that  the  principle 
of  the  conservation  of  energy  is  absolutely  valid. 

11 


162  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

This  principle  when  considered  in  connection 
with  the  second  law  of  thermodynamics  (the  entropy 
of  a  physical  system  tends  to  increase)  breaks  down 
as  an  ultimate  principle  for  interpreting  experi- 
ence. In  actual  physical  changes,  work  and  motion 
are  effected  only  through  the  loss  of  available  heat 
energy.  In  the  doing  of  work,  energy  is  passing 
from  available  to  unavailable  forms,  from  unequal 
to  equal  temperatures.  Energy  generated  by  a 
waterfall  may  be  harnessed  and  made  to  drive 
wheels  or  other  types  of  machines.  But  a  large  pro- 
portion of  the  energy  of  the  waterfall  is  dissipated 
in  the  form  of  heat.  If  the  sum-total  of  energy  in 
the  universe  is  constant,  and  if  the  doing  of  work 
always  involves  passage  from  available  to  unavail- 
able forms,  then  either  the  universe  is  finite  in  dura- 
tion, or  there  is  a  creative  source  of  energy  which 
compensates  for  the  passage  of  available  into  un- 
available forms.  If  we  do  not  assume  this,  then  we 
must  assume  that  the  universe  is  running  down,  i. 
e.,  is  tending  to  equilibrium,  and  that  the  time  is 
coming  when  there  will  be  nothing  doing.  If  the 
universe  has  existed  through  infinite  time,  then  it 
must  have  run  down  long  ago.  Infinite  energy,  in 
amount,  is  not  a  sum-total ;  it  is  not  a  so-much.  A 
universe  which  had  no  beginning  is  not  finite  and  it 
has  no  ending.  Thus  we  are  led  to  the  view  that  the 
universe  cannot  be  a  perpetual  motion  machine  con- 
taining a  definite  quantum  of  energy.  The  second 
law  of  thermodynamics,  when  thought  out,  requires 
us  to  assume,  if  the  universe  is  endless  in  duration, 
a  Creative  Source  of  Energy. 


DUALISM  163 

The  discussion  of  the  above  point  brings  us 
directly  to  another  problem,  namely,  what  do  we 
mean  by  matter?  Common  sense  dualism  holds  the 
view  that  matter  is  what  we  perceive.  When  the 
dualist  believes  in  interaction,  he  means  to  say  that 
an  unextended  entity  is  seated  somewhere  in  the 
brain  and  directs  it.  The  scientific  conception  of 
matter  is  not  identical  with  this  common  sense 
view,  and  this  difference  is  seen  in  the  fact  that 
the  man  of  the  street  is  a  naive  realist  as  regards 
the  problem  of  our  knowledge  of  reality.  He  be- 
lieves that  the  real,  external  world  is  just  what  we 
perceive  and  exists,  just  as  we  perceive  it,  inde- 
pendently of  our  perceptions.  The  idealist  points 
out  that  what  we  perceive  does  not  exist  independ- 
ently of  our  perceiving  it.  The  world  of  experience 
is,  he  shows,  a  world  of  sense  qualities.  It  is  a  con- 
geries of  sense  qualities  having  temporal  and  spatial 
relations.  Now  sense  qualities  are  just  things 
perceived  by  minds.  The  idealist  asks  this  ques- 
tion of  the  naive  realist:  If  sense  qualities,  which 
are  all  that  you  perceive,  are  independent  of  the 
mind,  how  do  they  exist  when  no  mind  perceives 
them?  Is  there  color  when  no  one  is  looking?  Is 
there  sound  when  no  one  is  listening?  Sometime 
ago  I  read  a  book  entitled,  "Light,  Visible  and  In- 
visible." Such  a  title  is  really  tantamount  to  the 
expression,  untasteable  taste,  unbearable  sound,  or 
unseeable  light.  This  is  nonsense.  If  the  naive 
realist  says  that  he  thinks  qualities  are  independent 
of  mind,  what  is  the  nature  of  these  qualities  when 
not  perceived  ?    If  I  were  to  bring  before  this  class 


164  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

a  band  of  colors,  dollars  to  doughnuts,  the  girls 
would  recognize  the  differences  between  them  bet- 
ter than  the  boys.  Were  there  a  number  of  musical 
instruments  played  here  now,  many  of  you  would 
recognize  distinctions  which  others  would  not  hear 
at  all.  We  do  not  all  agree  either  as  to  the  number 
or  the  relations  of  space,  time  and  intensity  in  sense 
qualities.  Sense  qualities  are  variable  functions 
depending  on  senses,  mental  and  physical  habits, 
interests,  et  cetera.  That  which  exists  apart  from 
our  perceiving  is  nothing  but  the  abstract  possi- 
bility of  further  perceiving.  Then  what  exists  in 
the  moment  of  perception  is  not  matter,  but  experi- 
ence. The  physical  world  is  just  this  possibility 
of  experience  for  all.  It  is  social  possibility.  What 
we  mean  by  the  physical  world,  the  idealist  argues, 
is  something  that  can  be  perceived,  if  there  be  some- 
one to  perceive  it,  and  can  be  perceived  by  all  per- 
cipients. Now  we  do  not  all  agree  as  to  its  qualities 
and  relations,  but  we  attempt  to  overcome  this  sub- 
jective perceptive  standpoint  by  means  of  quantita- 
tive ratios  which  serve  as  tests  of  commonness  or 
social  perceptibility,  and  it  is  this  that  is  the  basis 
of  our  belief  in  the  external  world.  The  latter  is 
the  realm  of  common  or  social  percepts  and  per- 
ceivables. 

Now  the  question  arises  what  is  matter  in 
itself  as  it  is  apart  from  perception  and  experience  ? 
The  scientific  dualist,  who  believes  in  an  inde- 
pendent matter,  says  to  the  idealist,  you  must  admit 
that  something  independently  real  is  the  cause  of 
what  we  perceive.    To  perceive  there  must  be  an 


DUALISM  165 

objective  cause  or  ground  of  our  perception.  We 
do  distinguish,  says  the  dualist,  between  perceptions 
and  images,  between  realities  and  illusions. 

Were  I  to  say  to  this  class,  look  at  that  striped 
tiger  in  the  back  of  this  room,  you  would  imme- 
diately think  I  am  experiencing  illusions.  The  vic- 
tim of  delirium  tremens  sees  snakes  crawling  about 
him,  but  we  can  neither  see  them  nor  touch 
them.  We  do  not  have  the  same  images  and  per- 
ceptions that  he  has.  His  visual  images  are  inco- 
herent with  tactual  percepts  and  with  all  our  per- 
cepts. Thus  we  say  he  is  in  an  abnormal  condition, 
whereas  we  are  normal.  Illusion  is  thus  a  test  of 
the  distinction  between  appearance  and  reality.  We 
say  that  that  which  resists  our  wills,  our  purposes 
and  intents,  is  reality,  but  objects  which  do  not 
resist  or  modify  our  wills,  we  say  are  illusions.  We 
say  that  the  thing  which  we  cannot  resist  is  real. 
The  meaning  of  this  is  that  we  call  that  real  wherein 
the  qualities  of  our  sense  organs  are  confirmed  by 
the  experiences  of  the  other  senses  and,  more  espe- 
cially, by  the  experiences  of  other  selves.  An  in- 
dividual who  had  been  on  a  protracted  spree,  just 
as  he  was  beginning  to  recover  his  rationality  and 
was  thus  in  the  borderland  of  the  experience  of 
the  carousal  and  that  of  his  rational  self,  saw  a 
monkey  sitting  on  the  foot  of  his  bed.  He  was 
startled  and  reached  under  his  pillow  for  his  re- 
volver. Lifting  himself  up,  and  while  doing  this 
and  taking  aim,  he  remarked  to  the  monkey,  "if 
you  are  a  real  monkey  you  are  in  a  hell  of  a  fix, 
and  if  you  are  not  a  real  monkey  then  I  am  in  a 


166  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

hell  of  a  fix."  This  individual  was  giving  expres- 
sion to  the  fundamental  criticism  of  the  real.  He 
was  not  sure  that  his  visual  perception  would  be 
confirmed  by  his  tactual,  and  there  were  no  other 
persons  present  to  make  appeal  to. 

The  scientific  dualist  who  differs  radically  from 
the  scientific  materialist  says,  that  what  really 
exists  independent  of  percipient  minds  is  a  world 
of  mass  particles  having  no  secondary  qualities.  He 
conceives  a  world  of  no  color,  no  taste,  no  smell,  no 
temperature,  no  sound.  It  is  this  world  that  really 
and  independently  exists.  It  is  a  world  of  mass 
particles  moving  in  space  and  time. 

REFERENCES 

Descartes,  Meditations. 

Locke,  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding.  Es- 
pecially Books  II  and  IV. 

B.  Russell,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Chapter  II. 
McDougall,  W.,  Body  and  Mind. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE   SCIENTIFIC  NOTION  OF   MATERIAL 
SUBSTANCE 

The  scientific  dualist,  naive  dualist,  materialist, 
and  idealist,  all  agree  with  the  man  of  the  street  in 
that  they  unanimously  admit  the  existence  of  the 
external  world.  When  we  perceive,  they  assert, 
there  is  something  outside  our  own  minds.  A  dis- 
agreement emerges,  however,  as  to  what  this  some- 
thing really  is  and  consequently  as  to  how  that  ex- 
ternal something  is  known,  how  it  acts  upon  and 
is  acted  upon  by  the  human  mind. 

The  lecture  desk  before  me  is  as  I  perceive  it, 
urges  the  man  in  the  street.  Its  existence  is  inde- 
pendent of  me.  We  know,  however,  that  the  desk 
as  I  perceive  it  is  in  some  fashion  a  function  of 
many  variables,  to-wit:  sense  organs,  nerve  cur- 
rents, my  position,  my  interests,  my  attention,  my 
previous  experience  and  ideas.  An  African  savage 
could  not  perceive  this  desk  before  me  just  as  I 
perceive  it.  It  would  not  mean  "desk"  to  him.  What 
we  perceive  is  largely  determined  by  our  already 
achieved  mental  structure  and  outlook.  In  view  of 
this,  what  is  the  factor  that  is  independent  of  my 
perceiving?  Many  say  that  this  object  before  me 
is  a  mere  Schein,  appearance,  and  that  the  real  sub- 
stance is  something  different  in  genere  from  its  ap- 
pearances.     The    scientific    dualist   maintains,    as 

(167) 


168  THE   FIELD   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

against  the  materialist,  that  there  are  two  kinds  of 
being.  The  materialist  says  that  there  is  only  one 
kind  of  being,  and  that  is  matter.  The  attitude  of 
the  materialist  is  indicated  by  the  old  adage :  What 
is  mind?  Answer:  It  is  no  matter.  What  is 
matter?     Answer:    Never  mind. 

The  advocate  of  material  substance  admits  that 
the  qualities  which  we  perceive  in  the  external 
world  are  in  part  dependent  on  our  organism.  He 
admits  that  colors  and  other  secondary  qualities  are 
phenomena.  They  are  the  joint  resultants  of  ex- 
ternal substance  and  of  our  percipient  organism. 
What  then  is  the  nature  of  this  independent  sub- 
stance or  matter?  In  many  of  the  older  forms  of 
the  substance  theory,  it  consists  of  mass  particles  in 
motion.  It  is  an  aggregate  of  minute  bodies  having 
mass,  density,  and  varying  in  size  and  perhaps  in 
shape.  In  terms  of  the  distinction  between  primary 
and  secondary  qualities,  the  secondary  qualities  are 
subjective,  they  exist  only  where  there  is  a  per- 
cipient organism  for  which  they  exist.  Body  in  it- 
self consists  of  these  minute  particles  in  motion.  In 
perceiving  primary  qualities,  we  have  a  copy  of  be- 
ing as  it  is.  Molecules  in  motion  is  thus  the  make-up 
of  matter.  Recently  this  Lockian  notion  has  been 
greatly  modified  and  we  now  have  the  more  dynamic 
conception.  In  place  of  mass  particles  in  motion, 
we  now  have  the  view  that  mass  particles  are  but 
nodal  points  of  energy.  Matter  therefore  is  the 
result  of  the  action  on  our  organs  of  centers  of  elec- 
trical charges.  In  the  highly  elastic,  frictionless, 
imponderable  ether  are  centers  of  strain,  and  these 


SCIENTIFIC  NOTION  OF  MATERIAL  SUBSTANCE   169 

strain  centers  are  the  electrons.  This  newer  theory 
makes  matter  to  consist  of  non-matter  in  motion. 
There  are,  however,  many  difficulties  involved  in 
this  notion  of  the  enormously  strong  ether,  as  well 
as  in  the  assumption  of  an  independent  substance 
different  in  kind  from  what  we  perceive  and  yet  as- 
sume to  be  the  cause  of  what  we  perceive. 

My  criticisms  of  this  theory  are  in  part  ident- 
ical with  Berkeley's.  The  first  difficulty  is  as  to 
how  the  advocate  of  an  independent  material  sub- 
stance is  justified  in  his  conception  that,  while  sec- 
ondary qualities  have  no  correlates  in  matter  itself, 
the  primary  qualities  do  represent  properties  that 
are  inherent  in  matter.  Locke  and  Descartes  are  in 
agreement  on  this  point.  The  secondary  qualities, 
they  both  say,  are  produced  in  us  by  the  action  of 
particles  that  actually  possess  the  primary  qualities. 
This  is  an  assumption,  and  is  for  many  purposes 
highly  convenient.  But  this  assumption  is  not 
thoroughly  logical.  Why  not?  No  one  ever  per- 
ceived primary  qualities  without  secondary  qualities, 
neither  did  any  one  ever  perceive  secondary  qual- 
ities unaccompanied  by  primary  qualities.  There 
is  no  such  thing  as  one  set  of  these  qualities  without 
the  other.  The  disjunction  seems  forced  upon  us 
that  either  all  the  qualities  are  in  the  percipient 
organism  or  all  are  in  the  object. 

The  advocate  of  material  substance  says  that 
primary  qualities  are  in  the  object,  for  the  reason 
that  they  do  not  vary  as  do  the  secondary  qualities. 
The  secondary  qualities  do  vary  and  therefore  are 
in  me.    But  primary  qualities  are  perceived  by  us 


170  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

just  as  we  do  the  secondary  and  the  primary- 
qualities  do  vary,  although  less  markedly  than  the 
secondary.  Either  none  of  these  qualities  testify  to 
independent  substance  or  all  of  them  do.  The 
Lockian  distinction  is  illogical.  The  advocate  of 
material  substance  is  not  yet  silenced.  He  will  yet 
say,  **I  admit  that,  but  there  must  be  something 
external  which  exists,  some  cause  independent  of 
our  wills  and  imagination.  What  is  it?"  This  ad- 
vocate of  an  independent  substance  insists  that 
there  is  something  independent  of  the  mind.^ 

Let  us  look  at  the  most  serious  difficulty  in- 
volved in  this  assumption  of  a  material  substance. 
Naively,  we  all  assume  and  believe  in  an  inde- 
pendent substance.  We  believe  in  it  until  we  reflect 
a  moment  on  the  difficulties  that  are  involved.  But 
most  of  us  after  reflecting,  forthwith  go  back  on 
our  reflection  and  still  believe  in  an  independent 
material  substance.  We  are  like  the  man  spoken 
of  by  St.  James  in  the  Bible:  "He  is  like  unto  a 
man  beholding  his  natural  face  in  a  glass:  for  he 
beholdeth  himself,  and  goeth  his  way,  and  straight- 
way forgetteth  what  manner  of  man  he  was."  We 


^  Practical  and  social  motives  are  responsible  for  the 
distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities.  The 
so-called  primary  qualities  of  bodies  —  space-occupancy, 
mass,  inertia,  motion  —  are  the  perceptual  qualities  which, 
being  relatively  least  variable,  human  beings  can  agree  upon 
as  being,  for  practical  and  social  purposes,  constant.  More- 
over, since  vision  and  touch  are  the  two  senses  through 
which  our  active  intercourse  with  the  world  is  chiefly  guided, 
the  visual  and  tactual  qualities  which  have  most  constancy 
are  convenient  substrates  for  all  the  other  qualities. 


SCIENTIFIC  NOTION  OF  MATERIAL  SUBSTANCE   171 

assume  that  the  world  as  we  perceive  it  is  a  part 
of  reality.  But  the  variability  of  our  perceptions 
ceaselessly  operates  against  this.  Two  men  in  the 
same  field  do  not  see  identically  the  same  field.  Two 
men  before  a  great  mountain  do  not  perceive  ident- 
ically the  same  mountain. 

We  are  told  that  what  really  exists  is  a  mate- 
rial substance,  but  on  analysis  this  material  sub- 
stance is  not  the  common  world  of  our  experience; 
it  is  a  substitute  for  it.  It  is  something  which  by 
hypothesis  can  never  be  directly  experienced.  What 
then  is  the  relation  of  this  world  of  supposed  sub- 
stance to  our  common  world?  Here  we  get  no 
cogent  answer.  John  Locke  says  that  our  knowl- 
edge is  a  sort  of  copy  of  the  external  world.  The 
huge  assumption  made  here  Locke  never  was  con- 
scious of.  How  do  I  know  that  my  knowledge  is  a 
copy?  A  copy  is  a  copy  of  an  original.  How  do 
we  know  that  our  knowledge  is  a  copy?  If  by 
hypothesis  we  never  could  know  the  independent 
material  substance,  then  how  could  we  ever  tell  that 
our  knowledge  is  a  copy  of  the  material  substance? 
This  is  the  greatest  difficulty  with  this  standpoint. 
By  what  transcendental  sense  could  these  men  per- 
ceive the  original? 

The  Matter  about  which  physicists  theorize  is 
a  hypothetical  something,  a  construction,  a  theory. 
Descartes  saw  clearly  this  difficulty,  but  he  never 
succeeded  in  making  much  out  of  it.  He  was  doubt- 
ful as  to  whether  there  is  any  external  world  at  all. 
He  says  that  it  is  possible  that  all  of  our  perceptions 
are  illusions.    To  guarantee  the  validity  of  our  per- 


172  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ceptions,  he  called  in  the  veracity  of  God.  If  God 
exists,  He  is  veracious — He  won't  deceive  us  and 
therefore  there  is  the  external  world.  Sad  indeed 
is  the  situation  of  a  philosopher  who  introduces  the 
God  idea  as  an  epistemological  device  to  guarantee 
our  perceptions! 

REFERENCES 

Nichols,  E.  F.,  Physics    (Lectures  on   Science,   Philos- 
ophy and  Art),  Columbia  Univ.  Press. 

Soddy,  F.,  Matter  and  Energy. 

Ames,  J.  S.,  The  Constitution  of  Matter. 
v^Ward,  J.,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  Vol.  I,  Pt.  I, 
especially  Lect's  V  and  VI. 

Pearson,  Grammar  of  Science,  3d  ed.,  chapters  VII-X. 

More,  L.  T.,  The  Limitations  of  Science. 

Lodge,     Electrons;     Fournier    d'Albe,     The    Electron 
Theory. 

Poincare,  H.,  Science  and  Hypothesis. 

Poincare,  L.,  The  Evolution  of  Modern  Physics. 

Russell,   B.,   Our   Knowledge  of  the   External   World, 
Lectures  III  and  IV. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

MATERIALISM 

The  scientific  dualist,  who  assumes  the  exist- 
ence of  a  matter  different  from  the  experienced 
world,  has  thus  far  not  given  us  a  clear  and  con- 
sistent conception  as  to  what  this  matter  is,  nor 
can  he  give  a  plausible  explanation  of  how  its  acts 
on  mind  and  is  acted  on  by  mind.  In  actual  experi- 
ence we  have  sense  qualities  and  mind  interde- 
pendent. Materialism  holds  that  matter  only  really 
exists  and  that  mind  is  but  an  epiphenomenon,  a 
by-product  of  matter.  Like  a  tramp  "bumming" 
his  way  on  a  train,  it  is  not  a  real  factor  in  the 
process  of  experience.  The  materialist  argues  that 
matter  is  the  only  reality.  There  is  only  movement 
of  mass  particles  in  space.  This  view  is  expressed 
by  the  saying  that  brain  secretes  thought  as  liver 
does  bile  and  the  expression  "der  Mensch  ist  was 
er  isst". 

The  arguments  given  by  the  materialist  are 
these : 

a)  He  adduces  obvious  evidences  of  the  de- 
pendence of  consciousness  on  physical  conditions 
such  as :  If  the  supply  of  blood  to  the  brain  stops, 
unconsciousness  ensues;  when  in  great  fatigue,  it 
is  difficult  to  think ;  a  blow  on  the  head  will  produce 
unconsciousness;  drugs  and  diseases  have  various 
effects  in  the  way  of  heightening  and  lowering  con- 
sciousness. 

(173) 


174  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

b)  The  materialist  re-enforces  his  first  argu- 
ment by  pointing  to  the  development  of  conscious- 
ness in  the  biological  series.  He  regards  conscious- 
ness as  an  agency  which  is  dependent  on  the  degree 
of  development  of  the  nervous  system.  There  seems 
to  be  a  one-one  correspondence  or  co-relation  be- 
tween the  vividness  and  apparent  efficiency  of 
consciousness  and  the  organization  or  complexity 
of  the  nervous  system.  Man  has  the  most  com- 
plicated brain  of  all  animals.  The  more  organized 
the  nervous  system,  the  more  organization  of  brain 
structure,  the  higher  the  degree  of  consciousness 
and  intelligence.  Mind,  therefore,  is  simply  a  func- 
tion of  the  nervous  system,  says  the  materialist. 
Consciousness  is  not  an  entity  or  an  agent,  it  is 
only  an  attribute  of  the  nervous  system. 

Let  us  examine  these  arguments.  Both  imply 
that  consciousness  is  the  effect  of  purely  physical 
causes.  What  do  we  mean  by  saying  that  one  set 
of  conditions  is  cause  of  another  set?  In  the 
sciences,  by  cause  is  meant  an  invariable  and  uncon- 
ditional sequence ;  what  always  follows  is  the  effect 
and  what  always  precedes  is  cause.  This  is  the 
scientific  notion  of  cause,  save  where  the  more  rigid 
notion  of  quantitative  equivalence  is  used.  In  so 
far  as  cause  is  identified  with  the  idea  of  quantita- 
tive equivalence,  the  causal  idea  loses  its  significance 
in  application  to  the  relation  of  brain  and  conscious- 
ness. From  the  viewpoint  that  cause  is  invariable 
sequence,  the  materialist's  argument  is  one-sided.  It 
is  true  we  do  observe  mind  changes  following  upon 
bodily  processes,  but  the  converse  is  equally  true. 


MATERIALISM  175 

and  it  is  on  this  converse  that  the  strength  of 
dualism  reposes.  In  his  first  argument  the  mate- 
rialist ignores  one  side  altogether.  His  second 
argument  is  much  more  important.  There  is  a  cor- 
relation between  the  degree  of  the  organization  of 
the  nervous  system  and  the  degree  of  consciousness 
and  intelligence.  We  cannot  with  our  present 
technique  carry  this  out  in  a  detailed  way,  but  we 
must  admit  that  the  functioning  of  mind  in  this 
two-sided  world  of  ours  is  dependent  on  a  nervous 
system.  Minds  do  not  work  without  nervous  sys- 
tems, but  we  must  not  forget  that,  though  the 
nervous  system  may  be  a  causal  condition,  it  need 
not  be  the  total  explanation  of  the  operation  of 
mind.  The  functioning  of  the  nervous  system  may 
be  an  invariable  condition  of  the  functioning  of 
consciousness,  but  we  cannot  explain  mind  entirely 
in  terms  of  this  one  causal  condition. 

On  the  materialist's  hypothesis,  mind  is  useless, 
it  doesn't  do  anjrthing,  it  is  an  otiose  by-product, 
it  is  wholly  passive.  In  the  organism,  bile  does 
something  physiologically,  and  we  can  analyze  it. 
But  thought  escapes  all  analysis  by  physical  means. 
The  analogy  between  thought  and  glandular  secre- 
tions is  worthless  and  misleading. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  animals  with  the  greatest 
degree  of  consciousness  are  those  which  dominate 
creation.  "Beware  when  a  thinker  is  let  loose  on 
this  planet",  said  Emerson.  Pictures,  poems,  tools, 
states,  religion, — these  are  the  products  of  thought. 
It  is  not  in  accordance  with  plain  facts  to  say  that 
conscious  intelligence  does  not  do  anything,  i    Con- 


176  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

sciousness  is  efficacious  both  for  good  and  for  evil. 
In  the  present  world  war,  we  see  clearly  this  bi-f  ocal 
type  of  mental  efficacy. 

The  scientific  minded  materialist  appeals  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy  as  his  last 
resort,  and  he  assumes  that  this  supports  his  theory. 
As  we  have  stated  above,  this  is  only  a  working 
hypothesis  and  we  do  not  take  this  as  our  sole 
guiding  principle.  But  even  if  we  do  take  the  mate- 
rialistic viewpoint,  we  yet  have  something  outside 
the  range  of  measurement.  If  we  take  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  conservation  of  energy  as  the  absolute 
truth,  we  can  see  no  reason  why  there  should  be 
such  a  thing  as  mind  appearing  in  the  series  of 
organic  forms.  Either  mind  is  an  efficient  agent 
and  in  that  case  the  conservation  of  energy  is  not 
an  absolute  principle,  or  mind  is  without  any  efficacy 
and  in  that  case  the  mass  particles  moving  in  space 
do  not  seem  to  behave  in  accordance  with  nature's 
principle  of  parsimony,  since  they  generate  a  super- 
fluous and  useless  illusion,  i.  e.,  conscious  intel- 
ligence. 

Finally,  it  will  be  clear  that  the  materialist  is 
unable  to  explain  how  mind  can  be  a  product  of 
matter.  Furthermore,  it  will  be  evident  that  the 
scientific  conception  of  matter  is  itself  a  product 
of  mind.  The  matter  the  scientist  deals  with  is  a 
conceptual  construction  and  not  anything  that  any 
one  can  ever  experience.  But  how  remote  is  this 
conception  from  that  of  the  ordinary  man?  The 
ordinary  man  means  by  matter  the  organized  qual- 
ities that  we  perceive.    These,  we  have  seen,  in  part 


MATERIALISM  177 

depend  upon  our  perceiving.  What  we  experience 
are  grouped  sense  qualities.  Our  world  of  experi- 
ence is,  therefore,  a  realm  in  which  the  percipient 
organism  and  the  object  mutually  imply  one  an- 
other, and  the  world  beyond  what  we  perceive  is 
only  the  real  possibility  of  further  experience. 

REFERENCES 

Paulsen,  F.,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  60-86. 
^,,CIalkins,  M.  W.,  The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy, 
Chapter  III. 

Seth,  James,  English  Philosophers,  Chapter  II. 

Robertson,  G.  Croom,  Hobbes. 

Taylor,  A.  E.,  Hobbes. 

Selections   from   Hobbes,   by   Calkins,   in    Open    Court 
Series. 

Lange,  History  of  Materialism. 

Biichner,  L.,  Force  and  Matter. 

Haeckel,  E.,  The  Riddle  of  the  Universe. 


12 


CHAPTER  XX 

SPIRITUALISM  OR  IDEALISM 

The  basic  thesis  of  this  standpoint  is  that  only- 
minds  and  their  contents  exist.  To  my  mind  there 
are  three  chief  forms  of  Idealism,  viz. : 

1.  Berkeleyan 

2.  Leibnitzian 

3.  Hegelian 

1.      BERKELEYAN  IDEALISM 

The  essence  of  the  first  is  this:  Berkeley 
argues  that  our  knowledge  consists  of  notione  and 
ideas  or  perceptions.  By  notion  he  seems  to  mean 
immediate  awareness  or  intuition.  I  know  myself 
directly  as  an  active  being,  thinking,  perceiving, 
and  willing.  In  addition  to  this  immediate  aware- 
ness of  activity,  I  also  have  ideas.  I  have  content 
with  respect  to  ideas.  I  am  passive  or  receptive  in 
having  ideas.  These  two  exhaust  the  whole  field 
of  knowledge.  When  I  perceive  any  object  such  as 
desk,  tree,  snow,  I  have  a  congeries  of  sense 
quales  and  these  congeries  I  call  things.  By  things 
Berkeley  means  just  w^hat  I  perceive. 

The  field  of  knowledge  involves  notions  and 
ideas.  Notion  is  a  knowledge  of  the  spirit  as  an 
acting  subject.  In  perception  we  know  that  we 
are  relatively  passive.  Our  perceptions  are  received 
by  us;  they  must,  therefore,  have  a  cause  which  is 
independent  of  ourselves.    We  are  continually  dis- 

(178) 


SPIRITUALISM  OR  IDEALISM  179 

tinguishing  between  those  images  that  are,  and  those 
that  are  not,  under  our  control.  We  know  that  we 
do  not  cause  our  perceptions.  I  cannot  help  see- 
ing, feeling,  hearing,  the  content  of  my  present  field 
of  perception.  There  is  involved  in  perception  a 
degree  of  constancy  and  a  type  of  order  which  at- 
tests the  independent  character  of  the  cause  of  our 
perceptions. 

What  causes  our  perceptions?  We  have  seen 
that  the  materialist  argues  that  the  cause  is  matter, 
a  principle  which  is  entirely  different  from  our  per- 
ceptions. The  materialist  argues  that  matter  has 
the  primary  qualities  but  is  eviscerated  of  all  sec- 
ondary qualities.  This  distinction,  says  Berkeley, 
is  illogical.  If  primary  qualities  are  objective,  so 
also  are  the  secondary.  Berkeley  convincingly  and 
irrefutably  shows  that  all  qualities  are  on  the  same 
footing.  The  ordinary  assumption  of  the  mate- 
rialist is  that  ideas  are  copies  in  our  mind  of  the 
independent  matter.  Now  Berkeley  asks,  if  we  can- 
not perceive  matter,  how  can  we  experience  matter? 
And  if  we  can  perceive  matter,  then  matter  is  the 
content  of  the  act  of  perception.  We  cannot  know 
the  relation  between  ideas  and  matter  if  we  do  not 
perceive  matter.  Berkeley  says  that  the  material 
is  only  perception.  Must  there  be  an  objective 
cause?  We  have  no  knowledge  of  matter  as  a  cause. 
We  do  know,  however,  that  we  are  causes.  We 
are  conscious  of  producing  changes  in  the  world, 
therefore  the  cause  of  our  perceptions  must  be  a 
spirit.  As  our  perceptions  show  order,  regularity, 
and  an  intelligible  structure,  so  the  cause  of  our 


180  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

perceptions  must  be  the  incessant  operation  of  a 
spirit  which  has  such  an  intelligible  character. 

Mind  I  know  intuitively  —  by  a  notion  —  as  a 
thinking,  acting  principle.  I  thus  know  mind  as  the 
spiritual  support  of  ideas.  There  is,  therefore, 
no  independent  material  substance  for  Berkeley. 
Nature  is  literally  the  living  garment  of  the  Deity. 
The  world  of  nature,  "the  whole  choir  of  heaven 
and  furniture  of  earth",  is  a  divine,  visual  language. 
Jusft  as  I  infer  from  your  looks  that  you  are  intel- 
ligent, so  I  infer  that  an  infinite,  omnipresent,  in- 
telligent principle  is  speaking  to  me  through  nature. 
Nature  is  not  a  garment  that  hides  the  Deity,  nor 
is  nature  a  body  of  thought  forms  which  hide  reality 
from  the  percipient  individual.  Nature  is  the  direct 
revelation  of  God's  intelligent  and  benevolent  will. 

I  do  not  perceive  my  fellowman's  spirit  directly, 
but  I  do  infer  from  his  actions  that  there  is  a  spirit. 
So  I  infer  from  the  order,  utility  and  beauty  of 
nature  that  there  is  a  Supreme  Spirit.  There  is 
also  this  important  difference  between  our  percep- 
tions of  nature  and  those  of  individuals.  Nature 
we  have  constantly  before  us  as  a  manifestation  of 
the  power  and  intelligence  of  the  Supreme  Spirit, 
whereas  human  individuals  do  not  bear  this  constant 
relation  to  us.  Since  nature  therefore  is  a  language 
to  man,  all  he  has  to  do  is  to  study  it  and  it  speaks. 
Berkeley  would  say  that  the  whole  technique,  both 
mathematical  and  experimental,  of  modern  science 
are  but  elements  in  the  process  of  learning  nature's 
tongue.  Do  we  eat  and  drink  ideas  when  we  eat 
and  drink  sense  objects?    Yes.    But  it  is,  however, 


SPIRITUALISM  OR  IDEALISM  181 

only  a  question  of  names  at  this  point.  Berkeley 
insists  that  his  view  is  the  common  man's  view. 
The  materialist  says  that  what  you  perceive  is  not 
matter.  Back  of  what  you  perceive,  says  Berkeley, 
the  materialist  postulates  some  thoughtless,  stupid 
thing.  It  is  the  futility  of  this  postulate  that 
Berkeley  is  seeking  to  show.  He  has  seen  that  such 
a  postulate  will  not  explain  the  facts  of  perception. 
When  Dr.  Johnson  kicked  the  stone  and  it  hurt,  he 
did  not  refute  Berkeley.  It  is  the  materialist  who 
deprives  our  sense  impressions  of  their  reality. 
"Esse  est  percipi",  this  famous  expression,  which 
has  often  been  taken  to  be  the  whole  of  Berkeley's 
system,  is  in  reality  only  its  beginning.  The  divine 
mind  is  the  cause  of  our  perceptions  and  it  is  the 
cause  of  the  continued  existence  of  things  when  I 
do  not  perceive  them.  Mind  is  the  only  conceivable 
cause  of  our  ideas  and  perceptions.  God  is  the  uni- 
versal intelligence  which  we  conceive  on  the  analogy 
of  our  own  existence  as  thinking,  willing  selves. 

There  are  certain  fundamental  difficulties  in 
Berkeley.  Nature  for  him  is  simply  the  effect  in 
human  minds  of  the  continuous  activity  of  the 
divine  mind.  From  this  standpoint,  what  becomes 
of  the  past  history  of  nature,  of  the  genesis  of  the 
solar  system;  in  short,  what  becomes  of  the  whole 
world  before  man  appeared?  Nature  is  simply  a 
continuous  manifestation  of  the  divine  mind  to 
finite  minds,  on  Berkeley's  premises.  This  continu- 
ous manifestation  of  the  divine  is  all  there  is  to 
nature.  At  this  point  we  see,  therefore,  that 
Berkeley  deprives  nature  of  any  existence  on  its 


182  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

own  account.  This  is  one  of  the  two  chief  difficul- 
ties in  his  system.  His  doctrine  is  also  unsatis- 
factory in  the  solution  it  offers  of  the  relations  of 
one  finite  mind  to  another  and  to  God.  Your  body 
from  your  point  of  view  is  the  effect  of  the  divine 
will  acting  upon  your  mind.  But  your  body  as  I 
perceive  it  is  the  effect  of  the  action  of  the  divine 
will  on  my  mind.  Here  arises  a  serious  difficulty. 
How  can  I  distinguish  between  my  body  as  I  per- 
ceive it  and  my  body  as  you  perceive  it?  This  ques- 
tion is  not  satisfactorily  answered  in  Berkeleyan 
idealism.  As  James  has  shown,  my  appreciation 
of  my  own  body  has  a  peculiar  ivarmth  and  in^ 
timacy  which  I  never  experience  in  connection  with 
my  perceptions  of  your  body.  Never  do  I  perceive 
your  toothache  quite  as  I  do  my  own.  Never  do  I 
perceive  your  difficulties  as  I  do  my  own.  Why 
feel  in  such  an  intimate  way  the  action  of  the  divine 
mind  which  I  call  my  body,  if  the  whole  world  is 
perceptual  content?  Why  is  there  not  the  same 
emotional  tang  to  all  my  experiences?  If  body  is 
what  I  perceive  and  only  that,  then  Berkeley's 
theory  fails  to  account  for  this  patent  fact. 

In  conclusion  we  may  say  that  Berkeley's 
theory  does  not  give  us  a  satisfactory  doctrine  of 
nature,  nor  does  it  account  for  the  uniqueness  and 
the  discreteness  of  selves. 

2.      LEIBNITZ'S  MONADOLOGY 

Leibnitz's  doctrine  avoids  one  of  Berkeley's 
difficulties.  Leibnitz  starts  from  the  idea  of  sub- 
stance. He  is  thus  in  agreement  with  the  other  chief 


SPIRITUALISM  OR  IDEALISM  183 

thinkers  of  the  time  in  making  substance  the  cen- 
tral explanatory  principle.  He  sets  up  a  plurality 
of  monads.  Now  a  monad  is  a  center  of  force  or 
of  desire  and  activity.  We  may  almost  say  that  a 
monad  is  an  animated  point.  In  this  respect  Leib- 
nitz shows  profoundly  the  influence  of  the  mathe- 
matics of  his  day.  Galileo,  in  describing  the  path 
of  moving  bodies,  called  the  differential  a  point  of 
tendency  and  at  no  time  in  the  physical  series  does 
Galileo  resort  to  rest,  as  did  Archimedes,  as  the 
final  point  of  explanation.  So  here  Leibnitz  comes 
not  to  a  position  of  equilibrium  or  rest,  but  to  force. 
The  whole  universe  consists  of  an  infinite  number 
of  centers  of  desire  or  striving.  There  are  three 
kinds  of  monads,  Viz. :  — 

1.  Body  monad  (animated  molecule) 

2.  Soul   monad    (monad  having  memory  or 
conscious  continuity) 

3.  Spirit  monad  (a  center  that  sets  up  ends). 

All  physical  bodies  are  made  up  of  monads.  These 
centers  of  force  and  feeling  exhaust  the  whole  con- 
tent of  the  world. 

The  monad  develops  from  within.  The  history 
of  the  monad  is  a  consequence  of  inner  impulsion 
and  not  of  external  impact.  Here  also  we  find  em- 
ployed the  conception  that  Galileo,  Huyghens  and 
other  physicists  of  the  time  worked  out,  of  the 
nature  of  a  point  of  any  function  as  expressed  by 
the  diiferential. 

Every  monad  is  in  some  degree  a  soul  or  self. 
Even  the  body  monads  are  rudimentary  selves,  that 


H 


)^ 


184  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

is,  they  are  low  grade  centers  of  feeling  or  desire. 
Each  monad  mirrors  or  reflects  the  universe,  and 
its  development  is  entirely  from  its  own  internal 
impulse.  It  is  self-active.  The  monad  produces  no 
change  in  any  other  one.  Each  develops  solely  by 
the  law  of  its  own  being.  In  this  aspect,  Leibnitz 
expresses  the  central  core  of  the  mathematics  of 
his  day.  The  monad,  in  addition  to  being  a  point 
expressing  the  law  of  an  entire  series,  is  also  a  com- 
plex unity.  It  is  the  true  type  of  that  which  is 
both  one  and  many,  both  unity  and  complexity. 
The  best  analogy  of  such  a  function  Leibnitz  finds 
in  the  self  or  soul.  A  human  individual  is  complex ; 
it  includes  a  variety  of  impulses  in  a  unity  of  feel- 
ing and  purposive  activity. 

In  the  body  monad  there  are  only  dazed  flashes 
of  consciousness  and  from  the  lowest  body  monad 
there  begins  an  inflnite  gradation  of  organization. 
There  are  no  breaks  in  nature;  and  so  we  have  an 
infinite  series  from  the  very  lowest  up  to  the  most 
rational  and  self-conscious  monad.  This  may  be 
pictured  as  an  ascending  scale  which  leads  up  to  the 
perfect  monad,  namely,  God.  God  is  the  one  per- 
fectly organized  monad.  He  is  the  governing 
monad,  and  is  also  the  cause  of  the  existence  of  all 
the  others. 

In  conceiving  of  the  relation  of  body  and  soul, 
Leibnitz  does  not  think  that  one  term  of  the  dualism 
sends  over  any  influence  into  the  other  term.  Both 
members  of  the  dualism  work  together  in  harmony. 
There  is  in  Leibnitz's  view  no  dead  matter  which 
serves  in  Lockian  fashion  as  the  unknown  cause  of 


SPIRITUALISM  OR  IDEALISM  185 

our  perceptions.  On  this  point  Leibnitz  is  in  funda- 
mental agreement  with  Aristotle.  Soul  is  the  en- 
telechy  of  the  body. 

Leibnitz  has  propounded  an  original  conception 
in  psychology,  to-wit,  the  conception  of  grades  of 
consciousness.  There  are  all  sorts  of  modes  rang- 
ing from  the  most  transient  and  evanescent  feelings 
up  to  clear  self-consciousness.  The  inner  life  of  the 
monad  is  made  up  of  "perceptions  petites".  In  the 
very  lowest  type  of  monads  there  are  but  few  of 
these  minute  perceptions  and  the  unifying  principle 
is  least  operative.  Since  Leibnitz  conceives  all  force 
as  being  in  the  final  analysis  psychical,  the  physical 
spatial  order  is  but  the  phenomenal  expression  of 
an  infinite  number  of  interrelated  monads.  Force 
is  of  the  nature  of  a  self-acting  and  desiring  type. 
I  am  a  body  governed  by  soul.  I  perceive  most 
clearly  those  monads  which  are  nearest  to  me  in 
kind,  and  I  also  perceive  their  interrelationships 
under  the  form  of  space.  The  world  is  a  har- 
monious system  of  such  monads,  and  these  monads 
are  not  in  space,  but  space  is  in  them.  The  same 
relation  is  also  true  of  time.  The  laws  of  mechanics 
are  true,  but  they  are  not  the  ultimate  truth.  The 
Newtonian  principles  express  the  order  and  con- 
tinuity between  spatial  phenomena.  From  the 
spatial  point  of  view,  the  world  is  through  and 
through  mechanical,  but  this  mechanical  system  is 
the  expression  of  an  inner  purposive,  teleological 
nature.  The  monads  constitute  a  kingdom  of  spirits, 
a  cosmical  harmony  of  souls.  In  this  way  Leibnitz 
has  incorporated  into  a  single  principle  the  teleology 


186  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  the  mechanics  of  New- 
ton, Kepler,  Galileo,  Huyghens,  et  al. 

Spiritualism  or  idealism  in  Leibnitz  thus  as- 
sumes a  form  which  does  not  deprive  nature  of 
reality — nature  is  real.  Nature  is  really  alive,  is 
psychical,  and  in  this  respect  the  Leibnitzian  con- 
ception of  nature  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  the 
nature-romanticism  of  Wordsworth,  Byron,  Shelley, 
and  others.  In  nature  there  is  an  all-pervasive 
spirit  akin  to  ours.  Leibnitz  is  also  in  harmony 
with  the  most  recent  deliverances  of  physical 
science;  for  both  nature  is  dynamical,  is  process, 
activity. 

This  view  of  Leibnitz  is  the  most  original  meta- 
physical conception  of  modem  times. 

This  type  of  spiritualism  does  not  really  ac- 
count for  the  fact  that  the  world  of  our  experience 
has  two  aspects.  This  view  may  be  true,  but  it  fails 
to  convince  us  that  the  whole  of  nature  is  alive  and 
psychical.  It  does  not  tell  why  there  should  be  this 
double  aspect  to  experience  and  why,  if  physical 
nature  really  consists  of  souls,  we  commonly  fail  to 
be  conscious  of  their  presence  and  are  usually  in- 
capable of  communing  with  them.  Royce,  our  late 
notable  American  idealist  and  also  Liebmann,* 
have  tried  to  rectify  this  one  defect.  Royce  says 
that  the  reason  why  we  do  not  apprehend  the 
psychical  life  of  nature  is  because  the  souls  dis- 
tributed throughout  nature  have  different  time 
spans.    Our  own  consciousness  has  a  certain  beat, 


*  In  Zur  Analysis  der  Wirklichkeit. 


SPIRITUALISM  OR  IDEALISM  187 

SO  to  speak ;  attention  wavers  and  wanes  at  a  fairly 
constant  rate.  Our  consciousness  has  a  certain 
rhythm.  If  we  had  a  more  rapid  rhythm  of  con- 
sciousness, we  might  live  in  a  minute  as  much  as 
we  now  live  in  a  hundred  years.  As  compared  with 
the  elephant  and  lower  forms  of  animal  organism, 
and  still  more  so  with  inorganic  nature,  our  con- 
sciousness has  a  much  more  rapid  rhythm.  Now  if 
we  had  different  rhythms  of  consciousness,  we 
could  perhaps  hold  communion  with  stars,  moun- 
tains, trees,  yes,  even  with  stones.  Our  failure  to 
apprehend  the  all-pervading  psychical  life  in  nature 
is  thus,  according  to  Royce,  due  to  the  differences 
in  time-  span  between  their  lives  and  ours. 

This  seems  unlikely  to  me.  If  all  parts  of 
nature  have  an  indwelling  consciousness,  then  our 
scientific  formulae  for  the  regular  behavior  of  ob- 
jects should  be  reducible  to  a  common  type,  and  all 
the  different  sciences  could  be  shown  to  be  only 
parts  of  one  science,  namely,  psychology.  Not  only 
logic  and  ethics  but  physics  and  chemistry  would 
be  merged  into  psychology.  As  science  develops, 
we  discover  that  the  rules  of  the  behavior  of  stones, 
rivers  and  clouds  are  not  the  same  as  the  rules  of 
the  behavior  of  psychical  beings.  And,  among 
psychical  beings,  those  with  the  most  highly  or- 
ganized individuality  have  the  most  unique  and 
significant  ways  of  behaving.  Moreover,  we  also 
discover  that  the  difference  is  not  reducible  to  varia- 
tions in  the  time-span.  It  is  a  difference  in  kind. 
There  is  a  constancy,  a  regularity  that  differs  in 
kind  in  these  different  levels — namely,  the  physical. 


188  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  animal  and  the  rational — and  I  fancy  that  the 
time  is  not  even  relatively  at  hand  when  the  only 
technique  of  the  social  engineer  v^rill  be  a  book  of 
log  tables  and  other  mathematical  formulae.  I  see 
no  promise  of  the  reduction  of  the  psychical  and  the 
physical  to  a  common  basis. 

3.      HEGELIAN  IDEALISM 

The  great  names  here  are  Fichte,  Hegel,  T.  H. 
Green,  E.  Caird,  Bradley,  Bosanquet,  and  Royce. 
This  type  of  idealism  is  called  objective.  Berkeley's 
is  designated  subjective.  For  both  Berkeley  and 
Leibnitz,  there  are  only  subjects.  Leibnitz  differs 
from  Berkeley  in  that  he  includes  the  whole  of 
nature,  which  he  conceives  to  be  constituted  by  a 
plurality  of  subjects.  We  saw  above  that  for  Leib- 
nitz nature  is  not,  as  it  is  to  Berkeley,  the  mere  ex- 
pression of  God  to  human  mind. 

Hegelianism  makes  no  attempt  to  reduce  nature 
to  an  assemblage  of  finite  souls.  It  admits  un- 
equivocally that  nature  is  unconscious  and  has  ways 
of  behaving  that  are  qualitatively  different  from  our 
human  modes.  But  Hegel  further  holds  that  nature 
is  not  independent  of  experience.  Indeed  reality  is 
experience,  and  being  experience  it  is  therefore 
process.  But  it  is  not  a  simple,  homogeneous 
texture  of  experience.  It  is  process  containing  op- 
positions and  conflicts.  From  this  standpoint  the 
physical  stands  in  opposition  to  the  mental.  It  is 
the  Other,  it  is  the  opposite  of  mind.  Fichte's  view 
is  that  nature  exists  only  as  an  Anstoss,  as  a 
stimulus  for  the  creation   of  free  moral  agents. 


SPIRITUALISM  OR  IDEALISM  189 

Nature  is  that  apparent  other-than-mind  in  inter- 
action with  which  mind  becomes  conscious.  It  is 
only  in  conflict  with,  and  in  the  overcoming  of,  the 
physical,  that  we  achieve  our  full  nature  as  con- 
scious and  rational  spirits.  The  idealist  of  this  type 
conceives  the  whole  universe  as  a  purposive  system 
and  shows  the  development  of  the  conscious  realiza- 
tion of  purposes  to  be  the  process  of  organization 
of  fuller  spiritual  individuality.  This  realization 
takes  place  through  the  overcoming  (aufheben)  of 
opposition.  There  is  an  insistence  here  that  nature 
is  an  organic  totality  in  which  mind  comes  to  full 
realization.  The  meaning  of  nature  is  spiritual.  If 
we  wish  to  get  the  best  key  to  the  meaning  of  the 
whole,  we  should  look  at  the  highest  development 
of  the  spirit  (Geist).  This  view  aims  to  justly 
regard  all  the  aspects  of  experience,  and  it  does  this 
by  showing  that  the  stages  of  inorganic  nature  are 
epochs  preliminary  to  the  development  of  minds 
into  higher  forms  of  spiritual  totality  and  harmony. 
Let  us  never  forget  the  inorganic  and  the  animal 
rock  from  which  we  are  hewn,  and  let  us  also  guard 
against  the  assumption  that  we  are  caused  by  this. 
The  Hegelian  standpoint  is  that  the  principle  of 
totality,  of  the  organization  of  the  whole,  is  spirit, 
which  helps  itself  by  subduing  matter,  its  op- 
posite or  other.  Moreover,  Hegel  insists  that,  as 
we  reflect  upon  this  infinite  organization,  we  must 
be  just  to  all  its  aspects.  Reality  is  the  concrete 
and  all-inclusive  spiritual  world-process  which  in- 
cludes and  assimilates  into  itself,  as  subordinate 


190  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

moments   contributory  to   the   spirituality   of  the 
whole,  the  inorganic  and  organic  orders. 

REFERENCES 

Berkeley,  Three  Dialogues  Between  Hylas  and  Philo- 
nous,  and  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge  (Open  Court  Se- 
ries or  Fraser's  Selections). 

James  Seth,  English  Philosophers,  Part  II,  Chapter  I. 

A.  C.  Fraser,  Berkeley. 

Thilly  or  Rogers'  History  of  Philosophy,  Chapters  on 
Leibnitz,  Fichte  and  Hegel. 

Latta,  Leibnitz,  The  Monadology,  etc. 
Leibnitz,  Monadology  (In  Open  Court  Series). 
G.  M.  Duncan,  Philosophical  Works  of  Leibnitz. 

B.  Russell,  The  Philosophy  of  Leibnitz. 
R.  Adamson,  Fichte. 

Wm.  Smith,  The  Popular  Works  of  Fichte. 
Fichte,  Vocation  of  Man  (Open  Court  Series). 
E.  Caird,  Hegel. 

B.  Croce,  What  Is  Living  and  What  Is  Dead  in  Hegel's 
Philosophy? 

J.  A.  Leighton,  Typical  Modern  Conceptions  of  God. 
Hegel,  Philosophy  of  Mind,  and  Logic,  trans.  Wallace. 
T.  H.  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics. 

E.  Caird,  The  Evolution  of  Religion. 

F.  H.  Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  Second  Edition. 
B.  Bosanquet,  The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value. 
J.  Royce,  The  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy,  Part  II, 

and  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  I,  Lectures  VII  and 
VIII,  and  Volume  II,  Lectures  II,  IV  and  V. 


CHAPTER  XXI 
THE  IDENTITY  OR  DOUBLE  ASPECT  THEORY 

The  identity  or  double  aspect  theory  of  the  rela- 
tion of  soul  or  mind  and  body  in  man  and  in  the 
universe  was  first  formulated  by  Spinoza.  It  has 
since  been  advanced,  with  various  modifications,  by 
Schelling,  Fechner,  Paulsen,  Herbert  Spencer,  Hey- 
mans  and  others.  Fechner,  Paulsen,  Strong  and 
others  give  it  a  spiritualistic  twist  and  Haeckel  gives 
it  a  materialistic  twist.  It  has  found  favor  with 
many  psychologists.  Reality  consists  of  two  irre- 
ducible aspects.  They  do  not  interact;  they  are  the 
two  aspects  of  one  principle  or  substance.  "Ordo 
idearum  idem  est  ordo  rerum".  The  order  of  ideas 
is  the  same  as  the  order  of  things,  i.  e.,  Spinoza 
means  to  say  that  the  mental  and  physiological 
processes  are  parallel.  This  psycho-physical  paral- 
lelism rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  degree  of 
mental  organization  and  perfection  corresponds  to 
the  degree  of  bodily  organization  and  perfection, 
but  the  one  does  not  cause  the  other.  This  stand- 
point, starting  as  a  metaphysical  interpretation  of 
the  relation  of  soul  and  body  in  man,  is  generalized 
into  a  theory  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  matter 
in  the  universe  at  large.  It  thus  passes  from  a 
psychological  doctrine  into  a  cosmology.  Reality  is 
two-faced.  This  view,  if  taken  literally,  would  lead 
us  back  to  the  pan-psychism  of  Leibnitz  and  to  the 

(191) 


192  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

extravagances  of  Fechner  and  others  like  him  who 
have  busied  themselves  with  a  suppositious  region 
of  plant  psychology.  One  who  thinks  clearly,  and 
follows  it  through,  cannot  stay  in  this  double 
aspect  view.  There  is  an  inevitable  tendency  to  em- 
phasize the  one  or  the  other  term  of  the  parallelism, 
to  shade  off  from  a  monism  with  two  forces  into 
either  spiritualism  or  materialism.  Nevertheless, 
as  regards  the  relation  of  body  and  soul  there  is  an 
element  of  truth  in  this  view.  Mental  and  neural 
processes  do  exhibit  a  considerable  degree  of  paral- 
lelism and  can  be  thus  fruitfully  regarded.  But  the 
mental  self  is  not  literally  parallel  with  the  nervous 
system,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  it  operates 
in  the  closest  connection  with  the  nervous  system. 

SUMMARY 

Reality  is  experience  (actual  and  possible).  It 
is  an  organized  whole  having  many  degrees  of  in- 
dividuality. So  far  I  go  with  Leibnitz.  The  whole 
world  is  a  dynamic  process,  but  the  physical  world 
is  not  psychical  in  itself.  Selves  are  true  parts  of 
the  world.  The  physical  order  is  the  sub-structure 
of  the  social  order.  There  is  therefore  nothing  real 
which  is  not  subject  or  object  of  either  actual  or 
possible  experience.  Furthermore,  experience  is 
social.  What  we  mean  by  the  physical  is  that  which 
is  accessible  to  all  selves.  Of  the  individual  self  we 
can  have  no  adequate  conception  apart  from  society. 
The  individual  lives  and  develops  only  as  a  member 
of  a  social  order.  Now  the  physical  is  the  real,  com- 
mon ground  of  our  social  activities.    But  the  social 


r- 


/ 


THE  IDENTITY  OR  DOUBLE  ASPECT  THEORY      193 

and  spiritual  is  also  a  true  part  of  the  real.  The 
physical  is  intelligible  and  is  to  some  extent  subject 
to  human  control.  And  because  of  this  we  may  say 
it  is  a  part  of  a  teleological  system,  but  it  is  not  a 
figment  of  the  Ego's  imagination,  as  Fichte  came 
perilously  near  saying.  Nor  is  nature  the  mere  sub- 
servient tool  of  purpose  interpreted  in  a  narrowly 
humanisitic  or  supernaturalistic  fashion,  as  was 
done  by  older  naive  and  pre-evolutionary  teleologists 
in  their  watchmaker  theories  of  design.  (Of  this 
matter  more  anon.) 

In  the  real  world  of  actual  and  really  possible 
experience,  which  is  the  only  world  that  has  con- 
crete meaning  for  human  beings,  selves-in-societal- 
relations  and  physical  nature  are  in  organic  or  func- 
tional interdependence.  They  are  co-ordinates  and 
therefore  functions  one  of  another.  Reality  con- 
tains non-mental  individuated  centres  of  force  or 
dynamic  relationship,  vitally  organized  and  psych- 
ical individuals  of  various  grades  of  wealth  of  con- 
tent, degree  of  organization  and  harmony.  All  these 
various  types  of  individual  or  monads  live  and  func- 
tion in  what,  for  want  of  a  better  term,  I  call 
"organic  or  functional"  interrelation  and  interexist- 
ence.  The  highest  type  of  individuum  that  we  know 
is  a  rational  human  individual  or  personality.  In 
human  individuality  the  functioning  of  mind  is  con- 
ditional upon  the  functioning  of  a  central  nervous 
system,  but,  as  I  have  already  argued,  we  are  not 
compelled,  since  we  have  not  sufficient  grounds  for 
the  assumption,  to  say  that  mind  and  nervoug 
system  are  absolutely  identical.    An  individual  mind 

18 


194  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

is  a  conscious,  active  and  selective  centre  of  mean- 
ings and  values  expressing  itself  through,  and  there- 
fore conditioned  by,  a  physiological  organization. 
The  mind  is  the  dynamic  meaning  and  purpose  of 
the  body.  The  relation  between  them  is  not  prop- 
erly described  as  "causal".  It  is  the  functional  in- 
terdependence of  two  systems  which,  together,  con- 
stitute a  teleological  whole  and  in  which  body  is  the 
teleological  instrument  of  mind. 

Such,  with  reference  to  the  soul^body  and  mind- 
matter  problems,  is  the  standpoint  which  may 
be  called  "organic  experientialism'*  or  "teleological 
idealism". 

REFERENCES 

Spinoza,  Ethics,  Especially  Book  I. 

Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  Book  I,  Chapter  I, 
74-111. 

C.  A.  Strong,  Why  the  Mind  Has  a  Body. 

James,    Essays    in    Radical    Empiricism,    especially, 
Does  Consciousness  Exist? 

Mach,  Analysis  of  the  Sensations. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

SINGULARISM  AND  PLURALISM* 
(The  One  and  the  Many) 

1.      PROM   NAIVE  PLURALISM  TO  SINGULARISM 

When  we  say  cosmos,  universe,  or  world,  we 
imply  that  all  things  which  exist  and  all  events 
which  occur  are  interconnected.  There  is  a  unity 
of  some  sort  and  perhaps  there  are  unities  of  many 
sorts.  Yet  this  s.tatement  involves  the  recognition, 
not  alone  of  the  interconnection  of  things  and 
events,  but  also  of  their  manyness.  There  are 
many  beings;  there  is  a  constant  procession  of 
events.  What  then  is  the  relation  of  the  manyness 
of  things  and  the  unity  of  the  whole?  What  con- 
stitutes the  togetherness  of  things?  What  kind  or 
kinds  of  unity  are  there  to  be  found?  Does  the  uni- 
verse in  the  last  analysis  consist  of  an  aggregate  or 
collection  of  discrete  or  discontinuous  beings?  Or, 
is  the  universe  fundamentally  a  sort  of  block  uni- 
verse, all  of  a  piece? 

The  Pluralist  argues  that  the  universe  consists 
of  a  number  of  discrete  beings,  i.  e.,  that  the  uni- 
verse is  made  up  of  beings  which,  with  respect  to 
their   existence,   are   discrete   and   separate.    The 


*  Singularism  is  frequently  called  "numerical  monism" ; 
inasmuch  as  "monism"  has  another  widely  employed  mean- 
ing I  prefer  the  terms  singularism  or  unitarism. 

(195) 


196  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Singularist  holds  that  there  is  only  one  real  being. 
This  one  is  the  all-inclusive  unity.  "The  one  re- 
mains ;  the  many  change  and  pass.  Life,  like  a  dome 
of  many  colored  glass,  stains  the  white  radiance  of 
eternity.^'     (Shelley.) 

This  seems  to  be  a  very  abstruse  problem,  and 
so  it  is.  It  seems,  to  the  beginner  in  philosophy, 
very  abstract  and  remote  from  life,  but  such  is  not 
the  case.  This  problem  bobs  up  everywhere  when 
we  come  to  think  out  the  fundamental  problems  of 
science  and  social  organization.  Let  me  illustrate. 
The  common  conception  of  physical  science  is  that 
matter  is  made  up  of  indivisible  units.  The  nature 
of  these  units  is  now  regarded  as  made  up  of  elec- 
trons, this  being  an  improvement  upon  the  old 
atomic  conception.  Now,  whether  it  be  the  old 
atoms  or  the  new  electrons,  in  either  case  the  as- 
sumption of  the  physicist  is  that  the  world  is  built 
up  out  of  unchangeable  elements.  In  biology  also 
we  find  the  same  shifting  from  one  unit  to  another 
as  ultimate,  but  we  also  find  here  the  assumption 
of  something  that  is  an  irreducible  element.  When 
you  have  your  unit,  the  question  arises  as  to  how 
these  units  are  to  be  related.  The  physicist  sees  that 
a  lot  of  entirely  separate  units  will  not  constitute 
a  cosmos,  universe,  or  world.  There  must  be  some- 
thing further  which  will  account  for  the  unity  or 
interconnection  of  things,  and  it  is  to  satisfy  this 
fundamental  motive  that  the  physicist  postulates 
the  ether  as  the  continuum.  The  elements  must 
have  something  to  connect  them.  There  must  be 
some  sort  of  ground  for  interaction.     This  same 


SINGULARISM   AND  PLURALISM  ld7 

situation  is  evidenced  in  the  life  of  the  state.  Does 
the  state  consist  of  entirely  separate  individuals? 
This  was  the  old  "Laissez  faire"  doctrine,  and  even 
to  us  this  assumption  sounds  good  until  there 
emerges  a  conflict  between  the  individual's  aim  and 
that  of  the  general  good.  We  have  here  the  same 
duality  of  unity  and  manyness.  At  the  present  time 
many  a  pacifist  says:  "I  have  no  interests  in  the 
quarrels  of  Europe.  I  would  rather  be  a  live  pacifist 
than  a  dead  hero."  What  do  we  do  with  such  a 
man  as  this?  We  either  put  him  on  the  firing  line, 
or  in  some  way  force  him  to  acknowledge  the  bind- 
ing nature  of  the  general  good  incorporated  in  the 
institutions  and  aims  of  the  state.  Extreme  in- 
dividualism leads  to  the  total  disintegration  of 
society.  Such  individualism  will  not  work.  We 
have  to  learn  that  the  state  does  not  exist  merely 
to  feed  us,  to  clothe  us,  and  educate  us,  and  in  turn 
to  ask  nothing  from  us.  The  working  theory  of  the 
Germans  is  that  the  state  is  divine,  and  that  the  in- 
dividual should  be  completely  absorbed  in  the  state. 
In  this  Germanic  theory  we  have  an  extreme  ap- 
plication of  the  singularistic  view  of  the  state. 
Pluralism,  on  the  other  hand,  in  its  emphasis  on 
the  value  of  the  nature  of  the  individual,  when  it 
becomes  extreme,  develops  into  anarchism.  It  does 
not  seem  to  have  the  element  of  togetherness  which 
is  indispensable  to  the  formation  and  maintenance 
of  the  state  as  the  necessary  basis  of  social  order. 
How  can  we  conceive  rightly  the  relation  of 
the  particular  constituents  and  the  unity?  This 
problem,  as  I  am  discussing  it  under  the  general 


198  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

title  of  the  One  and  the  Many,  is  but  a  generaliza- 
tion of  the  same  problem  in  chemistry,  physics, 
ethics,  philosophy  of  the  state,  and  in  all  the  other 
sciences.  In  religion  our  question  is,  what  is  the 
relation  between  God  and  man?  Is  God  the  all-in- 
clusive being  in  whom  literally  we  all  live,  move 
and  have  our  being?  And  do  we  exist  only  as  parts 
of  God?  To  this  question  Pantheism  replies  in  the 
affirmative.  All  finite  selves  are  only  parts  of  the 
single  being.  Pantheism  denies  that  we  have 
separate  or  semi-independent  existence.  The  only 
being  that  has  reality  is  natura  naturans.  This  be- 
ing the  case,  all  reality  is  denied  to  natura  naturata, 
or  ens  causatum.  The  question  emerges,  are  we 
separate,  free,  responsible  beings?  The  answer  of 
Spinoza  and  of  all  the  thoroughgoing  singularists  or 
monists  is  "no !"  Thus,  the  same  problem  appears 
in  connection  with  the  human  will.  Have  we  the 
power  of  self-determination?  Can  we  in  any  way 
determine  the  courses  of  our  actions  and  volitions  ? 

Moral  freedom  need  not  mean  caprice.  It 
means,  however,  that  to  some  degree  I  determine 
my  own  destiny,  that  in  some  small  way,  I  am  the 
captain  of  my  own  ship.  However,  if  I  am  to  make 
a  good  voyage,  there  are  certain  conditions  which 
I  must  acknowledge  and  obey.  But  moral  freedom 
means  that  these  given  conditions  are  not  the 
whole  of  the  moral  life.  I  am  my  own  steersman. 
Necessitarianism  says  that  man  is  like  a  pawn  on 
a  chessboard,  or  like  a  mote  in  the  sunbeam;  that 
his  life  is  completely  and  inevitably  determined  by 
forces  of  which  he  is  only  the  geometrical  meeting 


SINGULARISM   AND  PLURALISM  199 

point.  Here  again  appears  that  fundamental  con- 
trast between  the  view  of  the  Singularist  and  that 
of  the  Pluralist.  But  freedom  seems  to  be  incon- 
sistent with  Singularism. 

Let  us  consider  briefly  the  motives  which  lead 
from  Pluralism  to  Singularism.  The  naive  stand- 
point is  pluralistic.  This  standpoint  is  natural  to 
man.  To  us  all  the  world  appears  as  an  aggregate 
or  collection  of  many  distinct  beings.  The  primitive 
world  view,  as  we  have  already  seen,  is  through  and 
through  pluralistic.  But  the  development  of  thought 
and  the  organization  of  society  involve  an  increas- 
ing recognition  of  order  and  law  in  both  natural 
and  social  phenomena.  The  growth  of  organization 
or  order  in  social  life  tends  always  to  be  reflected 
in  our  interpretation  of  physical  nature.  The  great 
French  movement  in  social  psychology  of  the  last 
generation,  carried  on  by  such  men  as  Le'vy  Briihl, 
Ribot  and  others,  has  made  its  contribution  at  this 
very  point.  At  first  natural  phenomena  appeared  to 
be  capricious  and  wholly  independent  of  any  prin- 
ciple of  organization.  But  as  social  and  technical 
control  increased,  man  found  a  conception  of  law 
and  order  in  nature.  It  is  at  such  a  point,  where 
man  has  become  conscious  of  the  existence  of  some 
unifying  principle  in  nature,  that  we  find  the  early 
Greek  philosophers.  These  men  are  singularists. 
Thales  and  the  others  felt  that  all  finite  forms  of 
existence  were  modifications  of  the  one  all-inclusive 
substance.  The  wonderful  suggestiveness  of  the 
Greek  movement  resides  in  the  great  diversity  of 


200  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

types  of  unity  which  they  suggested.  They  all  agree 
in  the  assertion  of  the  existence  of  unity. 

Religion  has  also  moved  from  Pluralism  to 
Singularism.  In  its  earliest  stages  it  is  generally 
a  chaotic  polytheism,  and  moves  on  until  it  becomes 
monotheistic.  The  highest  form  of  monotheism  is 
given  us  in  such  prophets  as  Isaiah.  Such  expres- 
sions as  the  following  evidence  this :  "I  am  Jehovah ; 
I  form  the  light  and  make  darkness ;  I  make  peace 
and  create  evil;  there  is  none  other  beside  me". 
Isaiah  is  in  agreement  with  the  early  Greek  phil- 
osophers.   There  is  only  one  ultimate  being. 

Let  us  consider  certain  aspects  in  which  the 
universe  is  one.  Take,  for  instance,  the  perceptual 
order.  In  this  order  space  is  an  absolute  continuum. 
It  is  impossible  for  us  to  imagine  that  there  is  no 
space  between  any  two  solar  systems.  We  cannot 
think  that  space  is  bounded.  There  are  no  utmost 
bounds  to  space.  Neither  can  we  conceive  space  to 
be  so  divided  that  there  is  no  space  between  the 
parts.  Mathematics  has  at  last  succeeded  in  de- 
fining linear  and  other  continua  in  such  a  way  as 
to  make  perfectly  clear  the  meaning  of  our  inability 
so  to  conceive  space.  And,  in  the  modem  mathe- 
matical conception  of  the  nature  of  the  infinite,  we 
have  traveled  a  long  way  from  the  notions  which 
regarded  the  infinite  as  the  merely  unlimited  and 
also  have  traveled  far  from  the  Hamiltonian  con- 
ception of  the  infinite  as  the  mere  negation  of  the 
finite.  Space  is  not  the  only  continuum.  Time  also 
appears  to  be  a  continuum.  We  cannot  think  of 
two  successive  events  between  which  there  is  not 


SINGULARISM  AND  PLURALISM  201 

time.  It  is  quite  true  that  experiential  time  comes 
for  us,  as  James  puts  it,  in  drops,  but  the  reason 
for  this  is  the  rhythmic  character  of  our  attention. 
Time  does  not  so  appear  to  us  when  we  think  time. 
We  can  only  think  time  as  continuous.  In  addition 
to  space  and  time,  we  find  a  causal  principle  of 
unity.  The  causal  postulate  means  that  if  the  same 
antecedents  occur,  the  same  kinds  of  consequents  or 
effects  will  follow.  Causation  appears  to  be  a  form 
of  unity  or  order  which  is  as  fundamental  as  either 
space  or  time.  We  hold  that  there  is  a  connection 
between  the  moving  of  the  string  on  yonder  win- 
dow curtain  and  the  planet  Mars.  We  are  told  by 
the  physicist  that  the  fall  of  the  minutest  particle 
causes  a  tremor  throughout  the  solar  system. 
Tennyson  has  this  form  of  unity  in  mind  when 
he  says : 

"Flower  in  the  crannied  wall, 
I  pluck  you  out  of  the  crannies. 
Hold  you  here,  root  and  all,  in  my  hand. 
Little  flower  —  but  if  I  could  understand 
What  you  are,  root  and  all,  and  all  in  all, 
I  should  know  what  God  and  man  is." 

So  the  motives  making  for  singularism  are 
strong  in  all  directions — in  science,  art,  politics,  and 
religion.  The  Singularist  position  has  appealed  to 
the  speculative  poets.  Indeed,  this  attitude  is  an 
expression  of  the  deepest  motives  of  philosophical 
reflection.  Philosophy  is  just  this  deep  passion  for 
the  vision  of  the  whole.  The  philosopher  is  con- 
vinced that  this  world  of  ours  is  not  a  junk-shop 


202  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

world  or  a  rummage-sale  universe.  In  some  way 
or  other  this  universe  is  really  one  orderly  whole. 
Tennyson  expresses  this  unity  of  the  universe  in  his 
poem,  "The  Higher  Pantheism" ; 

"The  Sun,  the  Moon,  the  Stars,  the  Sea,  the  Hills  and  the 

Plains  — 
Are  not  these,  O  Soul,  the  vision  of  Him  who  reigns? 
Is  not  the  vision  He?  Tho'  He  be  not  that  which  He  seems? 
Dreams   are  true  while  they  last,  and   do  we  not   live  in 

dreams? 
Earth,  these  solid  stars,  this  weight  of  body  and  limb, 
Are  they  not  sign  and  symbol  of  thy  division  from  him? 

Glory  about  thee,  without  thee;  and  thou  fulfillest  thy  doom, 
Making   Him   broken    gleams,    and    a    stifled    splendor   and 

gloom. 
Speak  to  Him  thou  for  He  hears,  and   Spirit  with  Spirit 

can  meet  — 
Closer  is  He  than  breathing,  and  nearer  than  hands  and 

feet." 

Wordsworth  in  his  "Lines  composed  a  few  miles 
above  Tintern  Abbey"  thus  voices  his  sense  of  a  Uni- 
versal Presence: 

"And  I  have  felt 
A  presence  that  disturbs  me  with  the  joy 
Of  elevated  thoughts:  a  sense  sublime 
Of  something  far  more  deeply  interfused. 
Whose  dwelling  is  the  light  of  setting  suns 
And  the  round  ocean  and  the  living  air. 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man, 
A  motion  and  a  spirit,  that  impels 
All  thinking  things,  all  objects  of  all  thoughts. 
And  rolls  through  all  things." 


SINGULARISM   AND  PLURALISM  203 

The  doctrine  of  the  Universal  Soul  or  Self, 
which  includes  and  sustains  all  things  finite  and 
mortal  as  the  being  of  their  beings  and  life  of  their 
lives;  the  Absolute  and  Eternal  Spirit  who  is  the 
undying  and  unchanging  reality  behind  the  illusory 
appearances  of  the  many  finite  selves,  is  the  most 
characteristic  teaching  of  the  Ancient  Hindu  religio- 
philosophical  literature  —  the  Upanishads.  This 
doctrine,  one  of  the  classical  forms  of  absolute 
singularism  or  numerical  monism,  is  beautifully  ex- 
pressed in  Emerson's  little  poem,  "Brahma" : 

"If  the  red  slayer  think  he  slays, 
Or  if  the  slain  think  he  is  slain. 
They  know  not  well  the  subtle  ways 
I  keep,  and  pass,  and  turn  again. 

"Far  or  forgot  to  me  is  near; 
Shadow  and  sunlight  are  the  same; 
The  vanish'd  gods  to  me  appear; 
And  one  to  me  are  shame  and  fame. 

"They  reckon  ill  who  leave  me  out; 
When  me  they  fly,  I  am  the  wings; 
I  am  the  doubter  and  the  doubt. 
And  I  the  hymn  the  Brahmin  sings." 

The  reader  who  will  ponder  well  this  little  gem 
will  find  that  it  contains  the  gist  of  many  pages 
of  philosophical  argumentation  and  explication. 
Spinoza's  Ethics  is  an  elaboration  of  the  same 
motif;  Hegel's  whole  system  is  a  subtle  and  labored 
endeavor  to  apply  and  deepen  the  meaning  of  the 
same  fundamental  intuition  which  consists  in  "see- 
ing all  things  in  God"  (the  latter  expression  is  from 


204  THE   FIELD   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

Malebranche,  a  disciple  of  Descartes)  ;  Bradley  and 
Royce  essay,  with  somewhat  different  emphasis,  the 
task  of  establishing  the  truth  of  the  same  insight 
in  the  light  of  modern  logic  and  psychology. 

What  chiefly  distinguishes  our  modern  Euro- 
pean philosopher-pantheists  from  their  congeners 
of  ancient  India  is  the  constant  endeavor  of  the 
Europeans  to  find  place  and  significance  and  value 
in  the  Eternal  One  for  the  various  degrees  of 
psychical  and  spiritual  individuality  and  for  the 
labors,  sufferings  and  achievements  of  the  historical 
life  of  humanity.  Among  them  Hegel  has  made  the 
bravest  attempt  of  all;  and  Royce,  with  his  re- 
iterated emphasis  on  the  volitional  and  purposive 
character  of  reality  and  his  stressing  of  the  sig- 
nificance, in  and  for  the  Eternal  Individual,  of  the 
strivings,  deeds  and  emotions  of  the  human  self  and 
the  social  order,  finally  developed,  in  his  doctrine 
of  God  as  the  Spirit  of  the  Beloved  Community,  a 
standpoint  which  is  fundamentally  inconsistent  with 
eternalistic  singularism.  The  course  of  modem 
speculation  on  this  theme  suggests  the  question 
whether  the  eternalistic  singularists  have  not  at- 
tempted an  impossible  task.  Does  not  the  initial 
assumption,  that  the  temporal  order,  the  entire 
realm  of  change,  evolution,  culture-history  and  in- 
dividual development,  is  mere  appearance  of  a  time- 
less order,  condemn  philosophy  and  the  reflective 
life  to  a  denial  of  the  meaningful  reality  of  experi- 
ence and  human  life  and  send  philosophy  on  a  flight 
into  the  inane  from  which,  logically,  it  has  no  way 


SINGULARISM   AND  PLURALISM  206 

of  return  and  no  means  of  finding  a  positive  valua- 
tion for  human  life  and  experience? 

There  are  two  types  of  philosophical  Singu- 
larism.  First,  is  the  Singularism  of  substance: 
Spinoza's  doctrine.  This  is  the  view  that  there  is 
one  all-inclusive  being,  the  Absolute  or  one  Sub- 
stance. True  human  freedom  depends  on  our  recog- 
nizing the  illusory  nature  of  our  ordinary  beliefs  as 
to  the  separate  or  independent  existence  of  finite 
being.  True  ins-ight  consists  in  understanding  that 
we  are  nothing  apart  from  God.  Our  true  being 
consists  in  our  membership  in  him.  We  are  in  the 
One.  Substance  is  that  which  exists  in  itself  and  by 
itself,  and  the  philosopher  is  the  one  who  sees  all 
things  under  the  form  of  eternity;  And  in  so  far  as 
we  achieve  genuine  freedom,  we  live  under  the  vision 
of  things,  sub  specie  aeternitatis.  Bondage  and 
error  is  the  lot  of  all  who  are  outside  of  this  vision. 
We  are  all  parts  of  the  one  substance,  but  these 
parts  are  not,  however,  of  the  same  glory.  There 
are  degrees  of  reality  in  finite  beings.  The  second 
or  Hegelian  doctrine  is  that  the  absolute  is  the  one 
all-inclusive  Spirit  or  Individual. 

2.      THE  SPINOZISTIC  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  ABSOLUTE 

The  true  or  adequate  view  of  reality,  for 
Spinoza,  consists  in  seeing  things  sub  quadam  specie 
aetematitis,  that  is,  in  seeing  all  that  is  finite  and 
temporal  as  the  necessary  expression  of  the  infinite 
and  eternal.  This  view  Spinoza  calls  intuitive 
knowledge.  The  essence  of  every  finite  being  is  the 
striving  to  express  its  own  being,  but  the  true  being 


206  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  man  consists  in  seeing  himself  as  part  of  the  One. 
In  this  way  all  evil  and  good  vanishes.  Evil  and 
good  are  functions  of  our  failure  to  consider  things 
sub  specie  aetemitatis.  Immortality  is  not  a  dura- 
tion of  our  lives  through  endless  time;  the  living  in 
it  is  this  vision  of  all  things  as  seen  in  the  light  of 
eternal  truth  —  of  the  Absolute.  Passions  and 
emotions  belong  to  us  as  finite,  but  the  idea  of  God 
enables  us  to  detect  and  distinguish  the  higher  from 
the  lower  elements  in  them.  By  this  vision  the 
negative  elements  of  our  experience  are  eliminated 
and  this  elimination  is  necessary  for  the  bringing 
about  of  true  and  adequate  ideas.  True  freedom 
consists  intellectually  in  seeing  ourselves  and  all 
things  as  necessary  elements  in  the  perfection  of 
God.  True  freedom  consists  emotionally  in  what 
Spinoza  calls  amor  intellectualis  dei.  This  intel- 
lectual love  of  God  is  the  very  love  wherewith  God 
loves  himself,  not  in  so  far  as  he  is  infinite,  but  in 
so  far  as  he  can  be  expressed  by  the  essence  of  the 
human  mind  considered  under  the  form  of  eternity, 
i.  e.,  the  mind's  intellectual  love  of  God  is  part  of 
the  infinite  love  wherewith  God  loves  himself. 
(Ethics  V,  36.)  The  finite,  human  self,  with  all  its 
positive  individuality  disappears  in  an  abstraction, 
and  in  this  way  Spinoza  reproduces  the  principle 
of  asceticism  while  rejecting  it.  So  far  as  our  life 
is  penetrated  and  controlled  by  this  insight  of  see- 
ing all  things  in  God,  we  have  actually  become  God. 
It  is  only  by  means  of  this  insight  that  man  can 
actually  partake  in  God's  liberty.  In  so  far  as  man 
is  finite,  he  cannot  achieve  the  liberty  of  God.    In 


SINGULARISM   AND  PLURALISM  207 

SO  far  as  man  is  finite,  he  is  wholly  determined  by 
antecedents,  and  in  so  far  as  man  is  raised  to  the 
infinite,  his  individuality  seems  to  vanish.  All  finite 
things  as  finite,  are  modes  or  modifications  of  this 
one  infinite  substance.  Finite  being  is  like  a  ripple 
on  the  surface  of  the  ocean  of  being.  This  analogy, 
however,  is  defective  for  the  reason  that  the  finite 
self  can  become  a  conscious  part  of  God. 

How  does  Spinoza  reach  this  conception  of  the 
One,  the  absolute  Substance,  God?  He  starts  out 
as  a  rationalistic  mystic  in  a  way  that  reminds  us 
of  the  Stoic  and  of  the  Neo-Platonist.  He  really 
sets  out  from  an  intuition.  A  pantheist  is  one  who 
identifies  God  and  the  world.  Now  there  are  two 
types  of  pantheists.  Spinoza  is  not  a  crude  pan- 
theist, i.  e.,  he  does  not  regard  God  as  the  soul  of 
the  world.  God  is  for  Spinoza,  not  the  soul  of  the 
world,  but  the  only  being  that  really  is.  God  is 
the  all-in-all,  the  all-one.  Everything  depends  upon 
him  and  is  determined  necessarily  so  to  follow  from 
the  divine  nature.  Things  as  such  have  no  exist- 
ence. The  world  of  finite  selves  and  other  beings, 
for  Spinoza,  has  no  existence  on  its  own  account.  It 
is  only  a  manifestation  of  God  seen  from  a  finite 
point  of  view.  God  is  the  only  reality.  God  is  the 
one  substance.  Spinoza  may  well  be  called  an 
acosmist  or  an  acosmic  pantheist,  in  that  he  denies 
to  the  world  any  independent  reality  except  as  a 
manifestation  of  God  to  the  finite.  It  is  no  wonder 
that  Novalis  referred  to  him  as  the  God-intoxicated 
man. 


208  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

In  his  method  Spinoza  is  deductive  and  geo- 
metrical. He  starts  out,  not  with  concrete  fact,  but 
with  his  a  priori  definition  of  substance.  The  defini- 
tion which  he  gives  of  substance  is  somewhat  as 
follows :  "That  which  exists  in  se  and  is  conceived 
per  se;  i.  e.,  which,  in  order  to  be  conceived,  does 
not  need  a  prior  conception  of  anything  else".  In 
other  words  substance  for  Spinoza  is  ens  in  se.  Sub- 
stance is  both  self-conceived  and  self-existent.  Its 
very  essence  involves  its  existence.  Substance  is 
the  self-existent  being,  and  in  this  way  the  universe 
is  truly  one.  There  is  nothing  outside  of  God  to 
either  hinder  or  influence  him.  The  human  mind 
is  a  mode  of  the  mind  of  God  and  the  human  body 
is  a  modification  of  his  attribute  of  extension.  All 
things  exist  in,  and  all  events  follow  from,  the 
divine  nature  by  a  necessity  which  is  the  same  as 
the  necessity  which  gives  rise  to  the  theorems  of 
geometry.  God  is  the  universal,  mathematical 
ground  of  all  things.  Nothing  exists  without  him. 
All  depends  on  and  follows  from  his  nature.  Man 
is  not  free,  save  as  he  rises  to  this  insight  that  he 
is  a  true  part  of  the  infinite  substance.  God  is  the 
necessary  or  absolute  all-inclusive  timeless  cause 
and  there  is  no  cause  aside  from  his  perfect  nature. 
God  is  the  real  being  of  nature — natura  naturans 
— ^he  is  the  active  creative  nature.  God  is  the  cease- 
lessly active  ground  of  all  events  in  the  world.  He 
is  the  immanent  ground  of  the  world;  he  is  not  a 
cosmical  soul  in  the  world — ^the  world  is  in  him.  He 
alone  is  the  eternal  cause  of  the  whole  procession 
of  nature. 


SINGULARISM  AND  PLURALISM  209 

God  expresses  himself  to  us  in  two  parallel 
ways,  to-wit,  thought  and  extension.  Of  thought 
we  say  that  it  is  both  intellect  and  will,  but  we  must 
not  attribute  these  to  God  as  we  do  to  ourselves. 
Our  intellect  is  dependent  on  sensory  stimuli  for 
the  materials  of  thought ;  our  intellect  works  episod- 
ically and  inaccurately,  but  God  grasps  all  things 
in  one  timeless  pulse  of  thought. 

One  conception  made  famous  by  Spinoza's  ex- 
treme formulation  of  it  is  the  meaning  of  definition. 
Omnis  determinatio  est  negatio,  i.  e.,  all  definition 
is  limitation  or  negation.  To  define  anything  is  to 
deny  the  contradictory  of  the  qualities  involved  in 
the  definition  and  thus  to  limit  the  object  defined. 
God  is  above  all  definition,  and  in  this  Spinoza 
agrees  with  the  Neo-Platonists  and  with  the  specu- 
lative mystics  of  the  type  of  Bruno  and  Meister 
Eckhart. 

Spinoza  really  has  two  inconsistent  views  of 
the  nature  of  substance.  In  the  first  place,  sub- 
stance is  conceived  as  an  indeterminate  absolute 
without  any  definite  nature,  and  secondly,  he  means 
by  the  absolute  the  totality  of  things  regarded  as  a 
unity.  Spinoza  does  not  attempt  to  prove  that  there 
is  only  one  substance.  This  is  for  him  a  rational 
intuition,  the  self-existent  totality  of  being.  All 
that  is,  is.  But  has  he  the  right  to  further  assume 
that  all  that  is,  is  a  single  being  or  unity?  ^ 


^  I  am  indebted  to  E.  Caird's  article  on  Cartesianism 
in  the  Britannica,  11th  ed. 


14 


210  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

3.      THE  HEGELIAN  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  ABSOLUTE. 

In  recent  years  there  has  been  a  marked  revival 
of  the  doctrine  of  Hegel.  The  leading  exponents  of 
this  view  are  Bradley,  Bosanquet,  and  Royce. 

Hegel  wrote  many  works  and  these  are  all  dif- 
ficult to  read.  In  language  which  is  often  obscure 
and  is  made  doubly  so  by  his  tiresome  iteration, 
he  argued  and  reargued  his  views.  At  bottom  his 
point  of  view  is  that  the  absolute  is  the  all-inclusive 
unity  of  the  Cosmical  Spirit  or  Mind,  and  it  is  this 
point  of  view  which  he  has  so  elaborately  worked 
out  as  to  make  him  the  father  of  a  distinctive  school. 
His  position  is  called  absolute  idealism.  This  view 
is  to  be  sharply  distinguished  from  the  Berkeleyan 
and  Leibnitzian  idealism  which  we  have  already 
considered,  since  the  latter  recognizes  the  distinc- 
tive reality  of  finite  selves  and  is,  hence,  pluralistic. 
For  Hegel  the  Absolute  or  the  all-inclusive  unity  is 
Mind,  Spirit,  Geist.  For  Bradley,  the  Absolute  is 
Experience.  For  Royce,  it  is  an  Absolute  Self  or 
Individual,  the  Eternal  Knower  and  Fulfiller  of  all 
finite  purposes  and  meanings. 

Hegel  starts  from  the  position  that  nothing  can 
be  real  apart  from  consciousness  or  experience.  We 
know  nothing  about  anything  apart  from  experi- 
ence. Reality  is  that  which  is  present  in  experience. 
At  this  point  Hegel  shows,  by  his  famous  dialectic 
or  argumentation,  that  all  finite  being  is  related  or 
dependent.  We  cannot  say  anything  about  any- 
thing except  by  reference  to  something  other  than 


SINGULARISM   AND   PLURALISM  211 

what  we  talk  of.  Thought  is  a  process  of  Othering.^ 
Likeness,  for  instance,  has  no  meaning  apart  from 
difference.  The  floor  implies  the  walls,  the  sky  im- 
plies the  earth,  *I  speak'  implies  that  there  are  ears 
that  hear.  Even  a  single  object  such  as  an  orange 
is  a  relational  whole  of  different  or  opposed  qualities 
— for  round  is  not  sweet,  yellow  is  not  round,  and 
juicy  is  not  yellow  and  so  on.  Cause  and  effect  have 
no  meaning  apart  from  one  another.  Change  and 
permanence,  essence  and  accident,  substance  and 
attribute,  force  and  its  expression,  imply  one  an- 
other. So  too  in  the  vital  and  human  world.  Life 
and  death  go  together,  humility  and  pride,  the  in- 
dividual and  the  family,  the  family  and  the  larger 
community  of  city  and  state,  go  together.  The  in- 
dividual lives  in  and  through  the  species,  the  species 
lives  in  and  through  the  whole  of  living  existence. 
Lifg  and  its  physical  environment  imply  another. 
Inorganic  and  organic,  mind  and  body,  self  and 
society,  finite  and  infinite,  God  and  the  world,  are  in- 
terrelated in  the  whole,  which  is  an  organic  system. 
Everything  finite  is  related  to  something  other  than 
itself,  and  it  is  the  unity  of  its  opposite  qualities. 
Anything  can  be  the  "same'*,  i.  e.,  be  itself  only  by 
reference  to  an  "other",  i.  e.,  a  not-itself.  We  can 
think  of  nothing  that  does  not  imply  relations. 

Kant  had  tried  to  solve  this  problem  by  saying 
that  we  know  only  appearances  or  phenomena.  In 
our  knowledge  there  are  two  factors — forms  and 


*  Bradley,  Royce  and  the  Pragmatists  share  this  view 
of  thought. 


212  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

sensations.  Forms  are  the  organizing  or  relating 
activities  of  the  mind;  sensations  are  the  unor- 
ganized content  which  come  to  us  from  we  know 
not  where,  and  it  is  because  of  this  dualism  be- 
tween the  forms  of  thought  and  sensation  that 
knowledge  for  Kant  is  transcendentally  ideal,  while 
it  is  valid  only  empirically.  We  can  have  no  knowl- 
edge of  things-in-themselves. 

HegePs  view  is  that  a  thing  is  what  it  appears 
to  be.  He  holds  that  the  Kantian  distinction  of 
phenomena  and  noumena  is  illogical.  For  Hegel 
everything  is  related.  Reality  for  him  is  the  sys- 
tematic whole  of  interrelated  qualities.  It  is  not 
something  remote  or  beyond  our  world.  God  is  not 
something  behind  the  stars.  He  is  what  he  appears 
as  being.  Of  Herbert  Spencer's  conception  of  God 
as  Infinite  and  Eternal  Energy,  Hegel  would  doubt- 
less say,  he  does  not  go  far  enough.  God  is  all  that 
Spencer  says,  but  he  is  also  much  more."  God  is 
thought  and  will  organizing  a  spiritual  world,  as 
well  as  energy  and  life.  Reality  is  to  be  interpreted 
in  terms  of  experience.  The  completest  manifesta- 
tion of  God  is  to  be  had  in  human  life.  This  unity 
must  also  exist  for  itself  "fur  sich",  i.  e.,  it  must 
be  conscious,  or  it  must  be  spirit.  Things  are 
related.  They  constitute  a  unity,  and  they  exist 
only  for  a  self.  Our  experience  is  only  a  fragment. 
Our  selfhood  is  finite.  God  is  the  Absolute  Mind  for 
whom  the  whole  organized  system  of  things  exists. 

The  process  of  the  world  is  the  ever  increasing 
manifestation  of  absolute  mind.  The  significance 
of  the  life  of  Christ  is  that  in  him  God  came  to  the 


SINGULARISM  AND  PLURALISM  218 

fullest  self-consciousness  attained  in  a  human  in- 
dividual. In  no  finite  mind  does  the  thought  of 
unity  constitute  the  unity  of  the  world,  since  the 
unity  of  the  world  is  present  to  no  finite  mind. 
Therefore  God  is  the  absolute  thought  or  mind,  the 
absolute  individual,  and  the  measure  of  reality  is 
individuality.  The  more  any  being  is  an  organized 
totality,  a  coherent  system  of  internal  relations,  the 
more  individuality  and  reality  it  has.  God  is  the 
absolute  totality  of  relations. 

The  real  is  a  living  process,  purposive  and 
rational,  an  organized  rational  unity  or  spiritual 
system  which  is  the  Absolute  Mind — God — in  nature 
and  in  humanity,  but  realizing  himself  most  fully 
in  the  spiritual  life  of  the  highest  civilized  humanity 
through  the  forms  of  social  organization,  art,  re- 
ligion and  philosophy,  in  which  God  comes  to  the 
fullest  consciousness  of  himself  that  is  possible 
through  finite  beings.  Thus  reality  is  a  spiritual 
process  that  ceaselessly  realizes  itself  in  the  suc- 
cessive steps  from  unconscious  nature  to  the  most 
fully  organized  rational  mind,  and  this  fully  or- 
ganized rational  mind  is  achieved  in  civilized 
society — in  the  civic  community,  the  state,  the  work 
of  art,  the  church,  and  at  the  very  summit  in 
philosophy's  understanding  of  the  whole  process  as 
the  self-revelation  and  self-fulfillment  of  Absolute 
Mind.  The  Absolute  is  a  spiritual  system,  a  whole 
of  interrelated,  living,  thinking,  willing  beings 
which  exist  as  a  whole  in  and  for  God — ^the  unitary 
spirit  of  the  whole.  God  is  a  spirit  living  in  his 
own  concrete  differences,  men  and  things.     Mind 


214  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

is  the  true  whole,  but  not  any  finite  individual  mind 
or  system  of  minds,  since  these  never  constitute  a 
perfect  self-sustaining,  self-existing  unity.  The 
Absolute  Mind — God — of  which  all  finite  minds  and 
societies  are  parts,  is  the  ultimate  and  true  reality. 
All  stages  and  forms  of  organization  and  all  the 
works  of  culture — all  organized  social  life,  all  art 
forms,  all  religion  and  all  science,  are  stages  in  the 
increasing  apprehension  and  comprehension  by  the 
finite  mind  of  the  Absolute  Mind,  in  and  through 
which  progressive  apprehensions  and  comprehen- 
sions the  Absolute  Individual  or  Cosmic  Mind  comes 
to  fuller  self-expression  in  the  temporal  order.  Of 
the  whole  unceasing  process  by  which  "the  thoughts 
of  men  are  widened  with  the  process  of  the  suns", 
God  is  the  Eternal  Ground. 

The  following  are  the  chief  points  of  contrast 
between  the  various  leading  forms  of  recent  singu- 
laristic  idealism  or  spiritualism.  Whereas  Spinoza's 
absolute  substance  is  statically  conceived  and  only 
by  a  pretty  thoroughgoing  inconsistency  can  be  ad- 
mitted to  include  individuality  and  purposiveness, 
Hegel's  Absolute  is  conceived  to  be  a  dynamic  and 
purporsive  totality  of  process,  in  which  the  various 
degrees  of  finite  organization  or  systematic  and 
rational  wholeness  embody  the  Absolute  precisely 
in  the  respective  degrees  to  which  they  are  or- 
ganized wholes.  Inorganic  and  organic  nature,  the 
minds  of  individuals,  the  objective  mind  embodied 
in  the  organized  social  institutions  of  family,  civil 
society  and  the  political  state,  and  absolute  mind, 


SINGULARISM  AND  PLURALISM  216 

which  comes  to  more  adequate  conscious  self-realiza- 
tion in  the  products  of  human  art  and  in  religious 
ideas  and  acts  and  which  finally  attains  full  con- 
sciousness of  itself  in  philosophy — all  these  factors 
of  the  actual  world  are,  in  the  order  given,  stages 
of  increasing  meaning  and  content  in  the  ceaseless 
self-realization  and  self-incarnation  of  the  Absolute 
Spirit  or  Individual.  Hegel  nowhere  definitely  calls 
his  absolute  a  self  or  personality.  Therefore  his 
disciples  have  disputed  as  to  whether  the  philosophy 
of  the  master  has  place  for  the  personal  God  of 
theism  and  for  a  belief  in  human  immortality.  My 
own  opinion  is  that  Hegel's  Absolute  can  only  be 
an  impersonal  spirit  and  that  human  immortality 
has  no  importance  in  his  system. 

Bradley  explicitly  denies  that  the  Absolute  can 
be  a  self.  It  is  an  utterly  harmonious  experience 
and,  therefore,  it  must  be  beyond  the  distinctions 
of  self  and  other.  It  can  have  no  objects  beyond 
itself  to  know,  no  objectives  for  its  will  and  hence 
no  will  or  purpose.  It  includes  truth,  goodness  and 
beauty,  but,  in  its  ineffable  perfection  and  harmony, 
it  is  beyond  our  human  notions  of  goodness  and 
truth,  since  for  us  these  terms  have  meaning  only 
through  contrast  with  their  opposites.  What  an 
experience  can  mean  which  no  self  owns  or  enjoys 
Bradley  fails  to  explain. 

Royce  explicitly  holds  the  Absolute  to  be  the 
Self  of  selves  and  the  eternal  fulfillment  of  all  pur- 
poses and  meanings. 


216  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

4.      FURTHER   IMPLICATIONS   OF   SINGULARISM 

The  singularist  argues  that  there  is  an  analogy 
between  the  relation  of  the  various  sub-systems  of 
ideas  in  a  human  mind  and  that  mind  as  a  whole, 
and  the  relation  of  all  finite  minds  as  constituting 
the  system  of  the  Absolute  Mind  to  the  Absolute; 
i.  e.,  the  human  mind  is  the  organization  of  a  given 
body  of  sub-systems  of  ideas,  while  the  Absolute 
Mind  is  the  organization  of  all  the  minds  as  such. 
From  one  point  of  view  reality  may  be  conceived  as 
a  society  of  selves.  From  another  point  of  view, 
reality  may  be  conceived  of  as  only  the  one  all-in- 
clusive mind.  The  world  is  a  rational  unity  in  which 
all  meanings  are  fulfilled,  all  purposes  realized,  all 
problems  solved.  The  world  is  an  Absolute  in  which 
there  are  already  the  cures  for  every  disease  and  the 
solutions  of  all  problems. 

Spinoza  at  times  appears  to  regard  the  notion 
of  reality  as  this  static  unity,  but  yet  he  has  to  find 
a  place  for  change  and  all  the  mutations  of  the  tem- 
poral in  his  Absolute.  This  problem  is  a  difficult 
one  for  any  person  who  takes  such  a  point  of  view, 
and  it  is  interesting  to  see  how  Spinoza  meets  the 
problem.  In  the  first  twenty-seven  propositions  of 
his  Ethics,  he  discusses  this  bare  abstract  unity  and 
he  then  makes  the  suggestion  that  we  now  talk  as 
the  common  man  does  and  thus  he  begins  to  talk  of 
finite  things.  This  is  the  arbitrary  way  in  which 
he,  and  not  he  alone,  makes  the  transition  from  the 
infinite  to  the  finite,  from  the  eternal  to  the  tem- 
poral. It  is  very  difficult  for  one  both  to  eat  his 
cake  and  keep  it.    So  it  is  difficult  to  keep  this  ab- 


SINGULARISM  AND  PLURALISM  217 

stract  unity  and  also  to  conserve  change.  To  recog- 
nize that  there  is  any  meaning  or  any  significance 
in  this  world  of  time  and  change,  is  to  put  a  severe 
strain  upon  the  timeless  unity.  Our  lives  and  that 
of  others  are  involved  in  time.  Life  is  a  process  of 
getting  up,  getting  dressed,  getting  to  work,  getting 
to  eat,  getting  to  sleep — in  short,  it  is  one  thing 
after  another.  But  the  Absolute  is  an  all-inclusive, 
unchanging  principle.  But  what  is  the  relation  of 
these  two  to  each  other?  For  Hegel  the  eternal  ful- 
fills itself  or  himself,  change  takes  place  in  it;  it 
does  not  change.  All  the  biographies  of  all  indi- 
viduals and  all  worlds  coalesce  in  the  Absolute, 
which  is  an  eternal,  timeless  whole. 

Royce  is  far  more  emphatic  in  his  insistence 
on  the  significance  of  the  temporal.  He  calls  his 
position  absolute  pragmatism.  God  is  the  complete 
fulfillment  of  all  the  meanings  of  our  ideas.  Ideas 
are  plans  of  action.  They  are  not  reports  of  the 
structure  of  things.  Ideas  are  not  cognitive  func- 
tions so  much  as  practical  guides.  Idea  has  an 
aim,  it  is  purposive,  it  is  something  which  requires 
its  own  fulfillment.  The  Absolute  is  the  final  ful- 
fillment of  all  our  ideas.  The  Absolute  is  the  inclu- 
sive will  or  purpose.  For  the  Hegelian  or  the  Abso- 
lute Monistic  Idealist,  our  temporal  experiences  are 
elements  in  an  unchanging  whole,  and  our  errors, 
sins  and  failures,  are  transmuted  into  the  perfection 
of  the  Absolute.  All  of  our  sufferings  and  imper- 
fections contribute  to  the  harmoniousness  of  the 
whole.    The  whole  is  a  perfectly  harmonious  and 


218  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

blissful  unity.     In  the  whole  the  good  is  eternally- 
achieved. 

Let  us  say  a  few  words  of  the  moral  and  re- 
ligious implications  of  this  theory.  These  implica- 
tions are  optimistic,  deterministic,  quietistic  and 
mystical.  Singularism  is  essentially  deterministic. 
The  only  freedom  for  the  individual  consists  simply 
in  a  clear-sighted  recognition  by  the  individual  of 
the  fact  that  he,  like  all  else,  is  a  necessary  element 
in  this  perfect  whole  and  that  his  whole  function  is 
submission  to  this  Absolute.  Job  expressed  this 
attitude  when  he  said:  ^Though  he  slay  me,  yet 
will  I  trust  in  him".  Every  deed,  every  fate  of  each 
finite  being,  is  as  it  should  be  and  it  could  not  be 
otherwise.  The  lout,  the  imbecile,  the  fool,  the  de- 
bauchee, the  saint,  yes  and  even  the  wise  man, — 
all  have  their  lives  as  determined  elements  in  the 
Absolute  Whole.  The  only  freedom  is  the  willing 
recognition  of  the  dependence  of  all  things  as  parts 
of  the  Absolute.  The  second  attitude  or  rather,  im- 
plication, of  this  viewpoint  is  that  all  is  well  with 
the  world,  God  is  on  his  throne,  let  no  man  worry. 
This  is  the  optimistic  implication  of  Singularism. 
Of  this  attitude  the  poets  have  frequently  sung,  the 
orators  have  often  spoken,  and  the  philosophers 
have  repeatedly  written.  In  connection  with  this 
implication  we  have  the  fact  that  the  goal  of  abso- 
lutism is,  from  the  religious  point  of  view,  quietistic 
in  much  the  same  way  as  is  that  of  Neo-Platonism. 
With  Singularism  of  all  forms  there  goes  a  certain 
type  of  mysticism.  There  is  the  unio  mystica,  an 
experience  in  which  we  feel  the  consummation  of 


SINGULARISM  AND  PLURALISM  219 

our  being  and  this  consummation  expresses  itself 
emotionally  in  what  Spinoza  called  the  amor  inteU 
Uctualis  del.  The  ultimate  good  to  the  wise  is  the 
insight  that  all  finite  beings  have  their  measure  of 
being  in  the  Infinite.  This  quietistic  attitude  re- 
ceived its  classical  formulation  in  the  Leibnitzian 
hypothesis — in  the  statement  that  this  world  is  the 
best  of  all  possible  worlds.  For  the  most  adequate 
caricature  of  this  position  read  Voltaire's  Candide. 

5.      CRITICISM  OF  SINGULARISM 

1.  Singularists,  at  least  some  of  them,  namely 
Calkins  and  Royce,  speak  of  the  Absolute  as  a  Self, 
as  a  Person.  The  Singularist  talks  about  the  mean- 
ing of  reality  and  about  the  will  of  the  Absolute. 
Our  conception  of  a  self  is  always  of  a  being  who 
is  a  self  in  relation  to  other  selves.  Genetic  psychol- 
ogy affords  us  abundant  ground  for  this.  The  mate- 
rials out  of  which  the  notion  of  selfhood  is  formed 
are  in  a  way  given  us,  yet  selfhood  develops  in 
social  relations.  If  there  is  no  other  being  distinct 
from  the  Absolute,  then  how  can  the  Absolute  be  a 
self?  Fichte  expresses  this  social  dialectic  in  these 
words :  kein  Mensch  ohne  Menschen.  Bradley  says 
that  the  Absolute  is  an  Absolute  Experience.  Hegel 
called  it  Geist,  and  in  this  way  I  believe  they  were 
more  consistent  than  Royce.  We  have  no  justifica- 
tion for  calling  the  Absolute  a  Self,  unless  there  is 
this  general  social  interaction.  In  Royce's  later  view 
the  Absolute  is  the  Spirit  of  the  perfected  Society 
— ^the  Beloved  Community, 


220  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

As  to  the  Bradleyan  conception,  I  can  here  only 
say  that  I  know  nothing  of  experience  unless  it  be 
the  experience  of  a  self.  Experience,  i.  e.,  Abso- 
lute Experience  in  the  Bradleyan  sense,  is  a  mere 
psychological  abstraction.  These  men  also  say  that 
the  Absolute  is  timelessly  perfect,  and  that  as  a 
unity  it  is  beyond  both  time  and  change.  How  can 
there  be  purpose  in  such  a  unity?  Purpose  is  an 
aim,  a  goal,  that  is  postulated,  and  if  there  is  no 
change  and  no  time,  then  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
cosmical  purpose.  Bradley  agrees  with  this  and 
says  that,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  timeless  Abso- 
lute, there  is  no  place  for  development,  no  progress 
or  evolution  in  the  sum  of  things;  these  are  mere 
illusions.  For  the  Absolute  there  is  no  change.  The 
Absolute  may  contain  histories  without  number,  but 
it  can  have  no  history.  Therefore  all  the  changes 
and  histories  which  are  included  in  the  Absolute 
must,  in  sum,  cancel  one  another  as  factors  in  the 
harmonious  equipoise  of  the  timelessly  perfect  ex- 
perience. 

2.  I  think  that  I  exist  as  a  fragment,  as  a 
unique  being,  and  I  think  of  you  as  existing  like- 
wise. You  feel  things  and  no  one  else  feels  your 
feelings  as  you  feel  them.  Each  believes  himself 
to  be  an  individual  self.  What  kind  of  existence 
can  you  and  I  have  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
Absolute?  Our  existence  is  illusory,  erroneous, 
from  the  Absolute's  point  of  view.  How  does  the 
Absolute  know  me  as  a  minute  constituent  in  its 
constitution?  This  is  surely  a  very  different  type 
of  experience  from  the  way  in  which  I  know  my- 


SINGULARISM  AND  PLURALISM  221 

self.  If  the  Absolute  is  really  the  absolute  knower, 
I  must  exist  only  as  the  Absolute  knows  me  and  I 
do  not  exist  as  I  know  myself.  This  is  one  way  of 
showing  the  inadequacy  of  finite  knowledge. 

3.  We  have  already  seen  that  there  is  no  free- 
dom on  the  part  of  the  human  self,  save  as  an  abso- 
lutely determined  part  of  the  whole.  Practically, 
this  is  a  useless  conception.  It  cannot  be  made  ap- 
plicable in  courts  or  in  any  of  our  social  institutions. 
Indeed  social  practice  would  be  impossible  if  this 
assumption  were  true.  As  a  working  point  of  view, 
we  must  assume  responsibility  and  we  have  already 
found  that  in  the  long  run  the  demand  is  honored 
by  the  race.  Singularism,  therefore,  does  not  agree 
with  our  practical  consciousness  of  freedom  and  re- 
sponsibility. 

4.  All  sin,  vice,  suffering  and  other  evils,  are 
viewed  by  Singularism  as  being  contributory  to  the 
universe  as  a  whole.  Sin  is  sin  only  from  the  finite 
point  of  view,  but  if  viewed  sub  specie  aetemitatis, 
it  is  seen  to  be  contributory  to  the  perfection  of  the 
whole.  All  is  right  in  this  world,  all  is  for  the  best, 
let  us  therefore  experience  nothing  but  blissful  con- 
templation of  the  Absolute.  This  Absolute,  which 
is  nothing  but  an  everlasting  stare,  an  unendliches 
Blick,  is  the  touchstone  of  reality  for  Singularism. 

6.      PLURALISM 

This  is  the  view  that  there  are  many  beings, 
that  the  universe  consists  in  some  way  of  a  society 
of  individuals.  McTaggart's  pluralism  is  the  view 
that  the  universe  is  made  up  of  eternal  selves,  that 


222  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

there  is  no  coming  into  being  or  passing  out  of 
being.  This  view  does  not  conform  to  experience. 
Finite  selves  are  developmental. 

Leibnitz's  view  is  a  pluralism  with  a  monistic 
basis  and  it  is  a  form  of  pluralism  that  is  most  pro- 
foundly original.  The  significant  thing  for  us  here 
is  that  the  world  is  regarded  as  a  society  of  selves, 
and  these  members  constitute  the  society  because  of 
a  pre-established  harmony  or  unity.  The  members 
of  the  society  have  originated  from  God.  God  brings 
self-determining  individuals  into  existence  and  these 
develop  into  a  fuller  selfhood.  The  universe  is 
therefore  a  developing  one  and  all  individuals, 
within  limits  set  by  the  supreme  monad,  are  self- 
determining.  Leibnitz  thus  has  a  creative  ground 
of  the  existence  of  the  selves.  This  view  has  cer- 
tain defects.  First,  the  Leibnitzian  conception  of 
evolution  is  not  that  of  today.  Evolution  for  Leib- 
nitz is  the  mere  unfolding  of  what  is  already  im- 
plicit in  the  germ.  Our  conception  today  is  epi- 
genetic.  Leibnitz's  conception  is  the  old  Chinese  box 
theory  of  evolution.  The  biologist  of  today  argues, 
on  the  basis  of  experimental  findings,  that  the 
organisms  and  selves  are  not  completely  self -in- 
closed; they  interact  and  thus  they  are  modified. 

The  second  point  of  weakness  in  the  Leibnitz- 
ian conception  is  his  failure  to  make  an  organic  con- 
nection between  the  unity  of  experience  and  its 
manyness.  With  these  two  aspects  corrected,  we 
can  today,  without  reservation,  accept  this  theory 
of  Leibnitz. 


SINGULARISM  AND  PLURALISM  223 

7.      MY  OWN  STANDPOINT 

I  regard  the  world  of  selves  as  generated  in 
time  by  the  creative  activity  of  the  world  ground, 
and  I  further  regard  this  process  of  generation  as 
being  without  either  beginning  or  end.  The  de- 
velopment of  individuals  in  this  process  consists  in 
their  education  into  fuller  self-determination.  The 
goal  of  the  process  is  the  attainment  of  rational 
freedom  as  unique  individuals.  There  are  specific 
conditions  in  the  environment  for  the  development 
of  individuals.  There  are  two  types  of  environ- 
ment, viz.,  physical  and  social. 

Reality,  I  conceive  to  be  a  process  and  evolu- 
tion in  time,  and  the  goal  of  this  process  is  the 
realization  of  selfhood  in  society.  Inasmuch  as 
there  must  be  a  source  for  the  energy  and  the  in- 
dividuality of  individuals,  and  inasmuch  as  evolu- 
tion takes  specific  direction,  i.  e.,  moves  towards 
certain  values,  I  regard  God  as  at  once  the  ground 
or  sustainer  of  the  process  and  the  conserver  of 
values.  The  world  is  a  dependent  reality  and  in  it 
selves  have  a  relatively  higher  degree  of  independ- 
ence than  do  lower  beings.  There  are  thus  stages 
and  degrees  of  individuality,  freedom  and  independ- 
ence, evolved  in  the  process  of  evolution.  The 
human  self  is  free  and  responsible  within  limits  and 
the  human  self  is  clearly  the  product  of  the  whole 
process. 

The  motives  and  facts  that  are  involved  in 
Singularism  and  Pluralism  might  be  reconciled  in 
the  following  way.  Let  me  say  here,  however,  as 
an  indirect  mode  of  stating  the  reconciling  position, 


224  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

that  there  are  two  objections  to  most  forms  of 
Singularism.  It  is  evident  that  either  one  or  both 
of  these  objections  apply  to  the  variant  forms  of 
Singularism,  i.  e.,  to  the  Substance  Singularism  of 
Spinoza  and  to  the  Idealistic  Singularism  of  Hegel, 
Bradley,  and  Royce.  These  objections  are  (1)  that 
Singularism  does  not  succeed  in  finding  a  perdur- 
able basis  for  the  human  self.  The  invariable 
tendency  of  Singularism  is  to  deprive  human  indi- 
viduality of  its  place  and  worth  in  reality.  It  in- 
variably derealizes  the  human  self  and  it  effects 
this  derealization  by  reducing  the  human  self  to  a 
mere  appearance  of  an  ineffable  Absolute,  and  this 
treatment,  while  it  confers  a  certain  honorific  qual- 
ity on  the  individual,  ends  by  surreptitiously  ex- 
punging or  extinguishing  the  individual.  So  that  I 
think  it  is  not  unjust  to  say,  if  absolute  Singularism 
is  true,  then  our  individuality,  our  freedom,  our 
responsibility,  our  meaning  and  our  worth,  are  only 
egotistical  illusions.  This  may  be  true.  Perhaps 
we  are  not  any  more  significant  than 

"The  flies  of  latter  spring, 
That  lay  their  eggs,  and  sting  and  sing, 
And  weave  their  petty  cells  and  die." 

It  is  strange,  however,  that  our  life  should  have 
such  a  sharp  tang,  if  this  be  all  there  is  to  life.  It 
is  equally  strange  that  life  should  appear  to  exist 
in  the  only  way  in  which  it  immediately  appears  to 
exist,  i.  e.,  as  the  life  of  distinct  and  separate  indi- 
viduals. What  we  actually  experience  is  indi- 
vidualized   striving,   suffering,   hoping,    dreaming, 


SINGULARISM  AND  PLURALISM  225 

achieving,  and  even  hoping  when  achievement  falls 
short.  Before  we  abandon  our  common  sense  con- 
viction as  to  the  reality  of  our  individuality,  we 
shall  claim  the  right  to  be  shown  why  we  should 
give  up  this  conviction.  (2)  The  second  objection 
is  that  absolute  Singularism  regards  the  absolute  as 
timeless  and  all-inclusive.  Hegel  insists  that  reality 
is  a  process.  Royce  also  repeatedly  lays  great  em- 
phasis upon  the  purposive  and  volitional  character 
of  selfhood.  But  the  process,  as  ultimately  regarded 
by  these  men,  turns  out  to  be  more  a  function  of 
implication  than  of  actual  causal  sequences.  Royce 
goes  so  far  in  his  latest  work  as  to  conceive  God 
as  the  spirit  of  the  beloved  community,  and  here 
he  really  abandons  Singularism.  Kant  said  that 
time  is  a  form  of  our  intuition  or  perception. 
Things-in-themselves  may  not  be,  indeed  are  not 
in  space  and  time.  What  conception  can  we  form 
of  a  reality  in  which  there  is  no  temporal  move- 
ment? Evolution  as  a  natural  process  antecedent 
to  human  history;  history  which  is  but  the  story 
of  the  evolution  of  human  culture  as  this  has  veered 
in  its  ups  and  downs  and  the  whole  innumerable 
series  of  developing  individuals, — ^these  are  all  tem- 
poral processes  and  they  cannot  be  reduced  to  some- 
thing which  is  not  temporal.  With  what  special 
acuteness  does  the  average  student  realize  a  few 
days  before  the  finals  what  a  relentless  master  time 
is?  It  is  only  when  care  free  that  we  forget  time. 
"Dem  Glucklichen  schlagt  keine  Stunden." 

Our  world  is  a  temporal  world,  and,  for  my 
part,  I  can  accept  no  philosophy  which  begins  with 

16 


226  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

a  mystical  flight  from  the  temporal  world.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  numerical  Monist  or  Singularist 
urges  against  the  Pluralist  that  the  universe  is  one, 
that  there  is  a  unity  of  structure,  or,  as  Royce  ex- 
presses it,  there  is  a  unity  in  the  types  of  order  in 
the  world.  No  doubt  all  things  are  related  in  some 
fashion.  Co-existence  in  space  is  one  form  of  rela- 
tion, but  this  is  not  necessarily  a  very  significant 
or  relevant  type  of  relation.  Culture  relations,  such 
as  are  ours  by  virtue  of  our  life  in  the  university, 
are  more  significant  than  our  mere  spatial  relations 
on  the  campus.  All  events  are  temporally  related; 
this  also  may  or  may  not  be  a  very  significant  type 
of  relation.  Singularism  is  right  in  insisting  upon 
the  existence  of  some  sort  of  relation,  but  it  errs  in 
assuming  that  all  forms  of  relations  may  be  ulti- 
mately reduced  to  the  whole-part  type.  I  agree  with 
the  Singularists  that  there  is  some  sort  of  unity  or 
continuity  in  the  world,  but  I  do  not  agree  that  the 
discreteness  of  the  different  types  of  empirical 
existents  overthrows  the  validity  of  the  systems  of 
continuity.  There  is  a  unity,  viz.,  of  the  solar  sys- 
tem; there  is  a  unity  of  a  fine  machine,  e.  g.,  a 
watch;  there  is  a  unity  of  a  living  organism;  and 
finally,  there  is  a  unity  of  a  society  of  like  minded 
beings.  The  differences  between  these  unities  are 
much  more  significant  than  the  likenesses,  and  I  see 
no  way  of  discovering  some  common  denominator 
which  will  effect  a  reduction  of  these  unities  to  one. 
The  tendency  of  the  Singularist  has  been  to  reduce 
all  forms  of  unity  to  that  of  the  unity  of  the  uni- 
verse, and  then,  subsequent  to  this  reduction,  he 


SINGULARISM  AND  PLURALISM  227 

emotionally  glosses  over  this  type  of  unity  with  re- 
ligious predicates.  He  baptizes  this  abstract  unity 
with  the  most  acute  form  of  emotional  experience. 

Is  it  not  more  reasonable  to  suppose  something 
of  the  following  order,  viz.,  rather  than  reduce  all 
kinds  of  unities  to  one  type,  let  us  conceive  a  world- 
ground  which  is  not  identical  with  these  unities? 
Such  an  assumption  would  enable  us  to  take  full 
cognizance  of  all  the  facts  of  Singularism  and 
Pluralism.  God  is  the  source  of  whatever  degree,  or 
of  whatever  kind,  of  unity  there  is  in  any  of  these 
various  systems.  God  in  his  own  interior  being  is 
richer  than  the  sum  of  the  unities  that  we  find  in 
the  universe.  There  is  a  world  of  partly  inde- 
pendent, responsible  individuals.  This  world  is  not 
eternally  complete,  and  in  this  world  God  shares  in 
its  growth.  God  is  not  an  aristocratic  Deity  apart 
from  the  grime  of  this  universe.  He  is  the  energiz- 
ing Good,  and  at  this  point  this  view  is  at  one  with 
Plato's.  God  is  not  a  One  in  which  all  individuals 
are  swallowed  up  and  disappear. 

This  problem  of  the  one  and  the  many  involves 
the  place  and  the  status  of  individuality  in  the 
world.  The  Singularist  is  the  extreme  realist.  For 
him  the  particular  is  absorbed  in  the  unity.  The 
extreme  Pluralist  dissolves  all  unity  and  thus  he  is 
seen  to  be  a  revised  edition  of  the  extreme  nominalist 
of  former  days.  For  him  there  are  no  universals 
and  no  general  types  of  relations.  The  mediating 
position  is  that  we  make  the  relations  by  reflecting 
on  the  data  of  experience  and  generalize  upon  the 


228  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

basis  of  the  results  of  reflection,  and  this  generaliza- 
tion rests  upon  the  order  that  is  in  the  world. 

Before  bringing  to  a  close  this  grand  tour  in 
which  we  have  touched  only  the  high  spots  and  have 
seen  only  a  few  of  the  most  important  sights,  let 
me  give  a  few  words  as  to  the  moral  and  religious 
implications  of  pluralism.  The  standpoint  of  Plural- 
ism is  melioristic.  The  world  may  become  better. 
It  is  not  absolute  optimism,  the  viewpoint  that  all 
is  well  with  the  world,  nor  is  it  absolute  pessimism, 
the  view  that  the  world  is  irretrievably  bad.  From 
our  standpoint  also  we  must  admit  that  there  are 
evil,  sin  and  suffering  here.  These  really  take  place, 
but  they  can  be  regarded  as  the  conditions  for  the 
development  of  free  personalities.  They  are  a  part 
of  the  process  of  education.  But  the  superlative 
character  of  the  good  renders  all  this  suffering  ex- 
cusable. One  very  interesting  question  emerges  at 
this  point.  Does  the  very  ubiquity  of  evil,  sin  and 
suffering,  suggest  the  question  as  to  whether  there 
is  not  some  obtrusive  element  which  forces  us  to 
admit  a  dualistic  strain  in  the  structure  of  the  uni- 
verse? Bergson's  suggestion  at  this  point  is  that 
such  is  the  case.  The  Life  force  ever  strives  up- 
ward, matter  ever  pulls  downward.  (Plato  recog- 
nizes a  similar  situation.) 

REFERENCES 

Calkins,  M.  W.,  The  Persistent  Problems  of  Phil- 
osophy, Chapters  IV,  VIII,  X,  XI. 

Spinoza,  Ethics,  translated  by  White,  or  Elwes,  espe- 
cially Books  I  and  V. 


SINGULARISM   AND  PLURALISM  229 

Joachim,  H.  H.,  The  Ethics  of  Spinoza. 

James,  Wm.,  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  and  Some  Prob- 
lems of  Philosophy. 

Hegel,  Logic,  and  Philosophy  of  Mind,  trans,  by  Wal- 
lace. 

Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  especially  Chapters 
XIV,  XV,  XVI. 

Bosanquet,  B.,  The  Principle  of  Individuality  and 
Value,  especially  Lectures  VI,  VII,  IX,  and  X. 

Taylor,  A.  E.,  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  Bk.  II,  Chap- 
ter III. 

Royce,  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  I,  Lectures 
VIII,  IX,  and  X,  Vol.  II,  from  Lecture  VI. 

For  Royce's  later  view,  The  Problem  of  Christianity, 

Schiller,  F.  C.  S.,  Riddles  of  the  Sphinx,  Chapter  X. 

Ward,  James,  The  Realm  of  Ends. 

Howison,  G.  H.,  The  Limits  of  Evolution. 

Varisco,  B.,  The  Great  Problems. 

McTaggart,  J.  M.  E.,  Studies  in  Hegelian  Cosmology, 
and  Some  Dogmas  of  Religion. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY. 

1.      THE  RISE  OF  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  EVOLUTION 

The  theory  of  evolution  is  as  old  as  Greek 
philosophy,  but  it  was  not  until  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury that  the  doctrine  of  biological  evolution  became 
the  most  deeply  influential  and  far-reaching  of  all 
scientific  conceptions.  During  the  sixteenth,  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries,  the  concepts  of 
mathematics  and  mechanics  were  dominant;  but 
since  1850  these  have  gradually  been  made  subordi- 
nate to  the  notion  of  evolution.  This  change  is  the 
result  of  the  work  of  Lamarck,  Darwin,  Wallace, 
Huxley  and  others.  The  labors  of  these  investi- 
gators carried  the  concept  of  evolution  over  from 
the  status  of  a  speculation  to  its  present  status  as 
a  well  established  scientific  theory.  These  men  ad- 
duced a  great  mass  of  evidence  which  sustained 
both  the  fact  and  the  methods  of  evolution.  Up  to 
the  time  of  these  men  the  prevailing  view  was  that 
species  were  fixed.  This  view  had  prevailed  from 
the  days  of  Plato  who,  in  his  epistemological  lan- 
guage in  the  doctrine  of  Ideas,  had  hardened  species 
into  fixed  and  permanent  types. 

"All  things  flow,"  said  Heraditus.  Today  the 
evolutionist  again  throws  all  things  into  the  flux. 
Not  even  the  truths  of  logic  and  mathematics  are 
exempt  from  the  influence  of  change,  according  to 

(230) 


PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY       281 

the  thoroughgoing  evolutionist.  Evolution  means 
change,  but  not  blind  and  chartless  change.  It  is 
change  in  describable  and  definable  directions.  The 
evolution  of  organic  life  means  the  descent  of  the 
more  complex  from  the  simple  by  the  operation  of 
causes  which  are  similar  to  those  observed  in  opera- 
tion today.  This  type  of  describable  or  lawful 
change  means  increasing  diversity  in  the  parts  and 
increasing  interdependence  of  the  parts. 

Herbert  Spencer  describes  the  process  of  evolu- 
tion in  words  that  are  quite  ponderous  but,  not- 
withstanding this  feature,  they  neatly  express  the 
state  of  the  matter — "Evolution  is  progress  from 
an  indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  definite, 
coherent  heterogeneity  and  involving  concomitant 
processes  of  differentiation  and  integration".  In 
these  few  words  are  summed  up  for  us  a  descrip- 
tion of  a  process  that  has  been  going  on  for  eons 
upon  eons. 

The  evolutionist  begins  with  the  simpler  phase 
of  the  evolving  object.  He  makes  no  claim  to  be 
competent  to  deal  with  absolute  beginnings.  The 
substance  in  which  life  embodies  itself  invariably 
involves  the  colloids.  The  biological  evolutionist 
starts  out  with  protoplasmic  colloids.  The  colloidal 
substances  differ  progressively  in  complexity  both 
of  structure  and  function.  This  diversification  is 
at  a  minimum,  not  even  apparent  through  the  micro- 
scope, in  some  of  the  lowest  forms.  Socrates,  in 
the  Phaedo  and  other  of  the  Platonic  dialogues,  has 
given  us  a  caricature  of  the  notion  of  evolution,  and 
in  this  caricature  is  the  view  that  the  parts  have 


232  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

been  developed  wholly  independently  of  one  another 
and  later,  by  some  deus  ex  machina,  the  aggregate 
of  parts  have  been  assembled  in  much  the  same  way 
that  a  modern  machine  is  assembled.  From  the 
modern  evolutionary  standpoint  the  organism  de- 
velops, as  a  whole,  into  increasing  diversity  and 
interdependence  of  structure  and  function  in  its 
distinguishable  but  not  separable  organs.  The 
higher,  that  is  the  more  complex,  the  organism  the 
greater  the  degree  of  interdependence  in  the  parts. 
There  is  increasing  interdependence  of  the  parts  of 
the  living  organism  as  life  ascends  the  scale.  We 
may  cut  a  worm  in  two  and,  partly  because  of  its  an- 
nular structure,  it  develops  into  two  worms.  We 
may  do  the  same  thing  to  a  magnetized  bar  of 
steel.  Cut  the  bar  at  the  indifference  point  and  we 
find  that  we  have  two  bars  with  their  positives  and 
their  negatives  and  their  indifference  points.  This 
is  not  true  of  man  or,  indeed,  of  any  complex  organ- 
ism. We  cannot  cut  man  in  two  and  have  him 
develop  as  the  worm  and  the  magnetized  bar. 

The  conception  of  evolution  has  been  extended 
beyond  the  organic  sphere,  both  below  and  above. 
Geologists  hold  the  evidence  to  be  indisputable  that 
the  earth  is  the  result  of  evolution.  No  other 
hypothesis  is  adequate  to  explain  all  the  observed 
facts.  The  glacial  striations,  order  of  the  rock 
series,  fossil  remains  and  other  phenomena  are  best 
explained  by  the  hypothesis  that  the  earth  has  gone 
through  vast  evolutionary  changes.  Paleontology 
and  biology  re-enforce  one  another.  The  remains 
of  fossilized  life  in  the  geological  strata  correspond, 


PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY       233 

roughly,  with  the  biological  scheme  of  evolution. 
To  the  astronomers  also  the  most  plausible  hypoth- 
esis to  account  for  facts  revealed  by  the  telescope, 
applied  mathematics,  spectrum  analysis,and  sidereal 
photography  is  the  view  that  the  solar  system  is  the 
result  of  evolution.  The  nebular  hypothesis  with  its 
vortex  movements  in  the  cooling  nebulae  has  been 
supplanted  by  the  planetesimal  hypothesis.  This 
hypothesis  is  only  a  more  explicit  recognition  of 
the  gathering  of  stellar  dust  around  certain  nuclei 
and  their  development  into  our  present  system. 

Above  the  development  of  the  organic  life,  the 
hypothesis  of  evolution  is  applied.  Consciousness 
itself  is  said  to  have  evolved  from  simpler  to  more 
complex  forms.  Psychology  explicitly  builds  on  the 
conception  that  consciousness  has  evolved.  Man's 
own  history  is  also  an  evolution.  Humanity's  whole 
cultural  history,  morals,  language,  social  organiza- 
tion, science,  art,  religion,  and  philosophy  itself,  are 
the  products  of  growth.  It  is  a  very  interesting 
fact  that,  before  the  hypothesis  of  biological  evolu- 
tion was  developed.  Herder  and  Hegel  had  con- 
ceived, and  at  great  length  had  attempted  to  carry 
out  the  notion  of  an  evolution  of  human  culture, 
thought,  social  institutions,  morals,  which  the 
philosophers  and  the  scientists  of  the  17th  and  18th 
centuries  had  been  saying,  with  Hobbes,  Locke, 
Rousseau  and  others,  were  the  result  of  invention, 
but  are  now  agreed  to  be  matters  of  growth.  The 
old  concepts  of  sudden  causation,  of  divine  creation 
and  revelation  of  language,  culture  and  society,  and 
of  the  origin  of  political  society  by  deliberate  human 


234  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

contract,  were  supplanted  by  Herder  and  Hegel,  and 
the  Growth  Thought  was  introduced  in  their  stead. 
Like  Topsy  in  Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  there  is  a  recog- 
nition that  things  have  grown  to  be  what  they  are. 
Philosophy  elaborated  this  point  of  view  and  suc- 
cessfully applied  it  to  man's  whole  cultural  history 
before  the  biologists  applied  it  to  organic  life. 

EVIDENCES  FOR  ORGANIC  EVOLUTION 

(a)  The  fundamental  similarities  in  the  struc- 
tures of  skeletons  and  cells  of  all  vertebrates  is  a 
witness  to  a  certain  type  or  degree  of  continuity 
of  all  vertebrates.  " 

(b)  Embryology  has  indisputably  established 
the  fact  that  the  embryo  gives  us  a  telescopic  or 
epitomized  recapitulation  of  the  whole  evolutionary 
process.  The  embryo  of  all  vertebrates  recapit- 
ulates in  its  ontogenetic  history  all  the  stages  of  the 
phylogenetic  series. 

(c)  The  existence  of  vestigial  organs  shows 
that  they  must  have  been  at  one  time  useful  to  the 
organic  form.  The  most  notorious  instance  of  such 
an  organ  is  the  vermiform  appendix,  for  which  the 
biologists  have  struggled  in  vain  to  find  a  use. 

(d)  The  facts  of  geological  distribution  of 
flora  and  fauna  can  be  accounted  for  by  evolution. 
The  kinship  of  the  flora  and  the  fauna  of  Australia 
and  Papua  is  taken  to  mean  that  they  were  once 
parts  of  one  continent  and  that  it  was  only  after- 
wards that  they  were  isolated. 

(e)  The  facts  of  paleontology  are  also  a  basis 
for  this  view.    Huxley,  for  example,  has  given  us  a 


PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY   286 

sketch  of  the  stages  through  which  the  equine  form 
has  passed  from  eohippus  to  the  present  horse. 
Huxley  has  reconstructed  this  series. 

2.      THE  METHOD  OF  EVOLUTION 

The  doctrine  of  evolution  remained  a  phil- 
osophical speculation  until  the  nineteenth  century. 
Lamarck  and  Darwin,  both  of  whom  had  a  number 
of  forerunners,  were  the  most  original  in  formulat- 
ing theories  of  the  method  of  evolution.  The  advo- 
cates of  the  fixed  species  view  had  challenged  the 
biologists  by  asking  them  to  say  how  evolution  can 
take  place. 

Lamarck  pointed  to  the  facts  of  adaptation  to 
environment,  and  to  the  effects  of  use,  and  argued 
that,  just  as  organisms  now  develop  new  functions 
and  thus  modify  their  organs  in  response  to  the 
needs  of  the  organism,  so  the  process  of  striving  and 
consequent  modification  of  organs  has  been  going 
on  in  all  domains  of  life  and  the  results  of  this 
process  have  been  inherited.  There  has  been  a 
transmission  of  acquired  characteristics.  The 
giraffe  got  his  long  neck  by  reaching  high  for  the 
succulent  leaves  of  the  trees  and  the  tortoise  got  his 
homy  back  by  striving  to  protect  himself.  The  fish 
got  his  light  ventral  side  as  an  adaptation  to  the 
upper  air  and  his  dark,  mud-colored  back  as  an 
adaptation  to  the  bed  of  the  stream.  This  double 
adaptation  enables  the  fish  to  escape  his  enemy,  for 
if  he  is  nearer  the  surface  of  the  water,  by  mount- 
ing upward  he  escapes  his  enemy  because  he  has 
the  color  of  the  upper  air,  and  if  he  chances  to  be 


236  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

nearer  the  bottom  of  the  water,  he  escapes  the 
enemy  by  dropping  to  the  ground  and  is  indistin- 
guishable from  the  bed  of  the  stream.  Responsive- 
ness to  the  wants  or  needs  of  the  organism  and  in- 
heritance of  the  results  of  successful  response  are 
thus,  for  Lamarck,  the  chief  factors  in  evolution. 
There  is,  says  Lamarck,  an  inherent  tendency  in 
living  forms  to  expand  and  to  enlarge  their  parts, 
up  to  a  limit  set  by  the  living  body. 

Darwin  and  his  fellow  workers  made  an  epoch 
making  contribution  to  the  subject.  Darwin  dis- 
covered, and  supported  by  evidence,  a  reasonable 
method  by  which  evolution  takes  place.  Darwin 
took  note  of  the  fact  that  breeders  selected  the  qual- 
ities which  they  wanted  and  they  interbred  those 
individuals  that  had  these  qualities  and  thus  de- 
veloped new  species.  They  bred  from  those  species 
that  had  the  characteristics  which  they  wished  to 
perpetuate.  The  breeder  pre-supposes  the  varia- 
tions. What  in  nature  takes  the  place  of  the 
breeder?  This  is  Darwin's  question.  His  answer 
is — natural  selection  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 
Because  of  the  great  fecundity  of  life,  of  the  fre- 
quent variations  that  living  forms  undergo,  and  be- 
cause of  the  fact  that  living  forms  must  struggle 
to  survive,  those  types  which  develop  characters 
that  enable  them  to  fit  the  environment,  i.  e.,  to 
endure  heat  and  cold,  to  conquer  or  escape  their 
enemies,  to  get  food  and  digest  it,  survive. 

Mental  and  moral  evolution  are  to  be  explained 
from  the  same  general  standpoint.  There  are  fortu- 
nate variations  in  the  way  of  quantitatively  vary- 


PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY       237 

ing  mental  power,  memory,  power  of  inference,  and 
greater  perceptual  discrimination;  all  these  are 
powerful  instruments  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 
Man's  moral  ideals  and  his  religious  practices  are 
types  of  technique  that  are  evolutionary  in  char- 
acter. The  group  that  hangs  together  the  best  wins 
the  conflict.  And  moral  and  religious  beliefs  and 
practices  are  cohesive  forces. 

The  Darwinian  doctrine  seems  powerfully  to 
support  the  view  that  all  the  changes  that  take  place 
in  this  universe  are  really  the  consequences  of  me- 
chanical motions.  The  mechanistic  or  materialistic 
metaphysics  involves  the  denial  of  any  directing 
principles  in  the  world  process.  The  defenders  of 
teleology  argued  that  the  observed  adaptation  of 
organs  to  one  another  and  of  organisms  as  a  whole 
to  the  environment  could  be  explained  only  upon  the 
assumption  of  a  world-designer.  Naturalistic  selec- 
tion explains  these  adaptations  on  mechanistic  as- 
sumptions. Given  original  variations,  all  the  rest 
follows.  This  is  the  point  of  view  of  natural  selec- 
tion. Given  reproducing  organisms,  varying  as  they 
do  because  of  the  unstable  character  of  the  com- 
pounds of  C,  H,  0,  N,  P  and  S,  the  environment  will 
do  the  rest.  This  selection  hypothesis  affords  a  very 
plausible  explanation  of  the  wastes,  the  failures  and 
the  monstrosities  of  organic  nature.  The  great 
optician  Helmholtz  once  declared  that  if  his  labora- 
tory mechanic  should  bring  him  an  instrument  so 
imperfectly  constructed  as  the  human  eye,  he  would 
discharge  him.  Instances  of  lack  of  good  adjust- 
ment, the  cruel  and  wasteful  processes  of  nature, 


2S8  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  sufferings,  the  injustices  and  the  stupidities  of 
life,  in  which  not  even  the  righteous  man  seems  to 
triumph,  are  explicable  on  this  hypothesis.  Yes, 
Bismarck,  if  this  hypothesis  is  true,  God  is  on  the 
side  of  the  strongest  battalions  and  ultimately  might 
makes  right,  and  the  good  which  Plato  placed  at 
the  apex  of  the  universe  has  been  made  to  give 
place  to  ruthless  might!  God  is,  then,  but  a  mis- 
leading name  for  the  blind  pushes  and  pulls  of 
physical  forces. 

The  advocate  of  teleology  replies  to  these  argu- 
ments as  follows :  — 

The  mechanical  theory  does  not  account  for  the 
original  organization  of  the  universe,  for  the  origin 
of  life  or  the  origin  of  consciousness  and  reason. 
The  theory  of  evolution  itself  involves  a  kind  of 
teleology  which  is  more  than  the  rubrics  of  mechan- 
ism take  note  of.  We  are  here,  and  we  are  pur- 
posive beings  with  our  capacity  for  the  recreation 
of  the  natural  environment.  We  are  parts  of 
nature — we  are  the  products  of  nature.  Thus  the 
evolutionary  process  has  produced  beings  that  in 
part  can  control  it.  The  human  mind  creates  new 
conditions  of  existence.  All  our  cultural-  ideals  and 
all  the  institutions  of  society  have  been  postulated, 
espoused  and  made  real  by  human  teleogical  activity. 
These  transcend  the  considerations  of  a  merely 
biological  struggle  for  existence. 

Humanity  has  established  a  whole  spiritual 
complex  or  set  of  conditions  in  the  creation,  out 
of  the  materials  of  nature,  of  civilization  and  cul- 
ture. In  civilization  "nurture"  or  education  remakes 


PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY       239 

"nature"  or  biological  inheritance.  This  is  the 
creation  of  a  new  environment.  How  different  is 
this  conception  from  the  postulation  of  Herbert 
Spencer,  for  whom  the  moral  complex  is  a  matter 
of  increasing  the  mere  length  and  breadth  of  life? 
How  different  also  is  this  concept  from  that  of 
Nietzsche,  for  whom  the  highest  type  of  life  is  that 
wherein  man  everlastingly  says  Ja  to  all  his  in- 
stincts? Not  the  prolongation  of  life  only,  not  the 
mere  uncontrolled  outgo  of  our  prime  instincts,  but 
the  creation  of  a  new  Jerusalem  in  the  way  of  cul- 
tural ideals  seems  to  be  the  highest  characteristics 
of  a  civilized  human  life. 

The  teleologist  insists  that  the  mechanist  is  in- 
competent to  account  for  the  origin  of  life,  of  con- 
sciousness and  of  the  spiritual  set  of  conditions  that 
the  race  has  elaborated. 


8.      THE    MECHANICAL   AND   THE    TELEOLOGICAL 
ASPECTS  OF  EVOLUTION 

Our  survey  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution  has  con- 
vinced us  that  the  old  "watchmaker"  theory  of 
creation  is  dead  and  buried,  so  far  as  contemporary 
science  is  concerned.  The  question  that  now  con- 
fronts us  is  this,  is  there  any  place,  in  the  light  of 
evolutionary  theory,  for  a  finalistic,  purposive,  or 
teleological  interpretation  of  the  world-process?  If 
this  question  must  be  answered  in  the  negative,  then 
materialism  is  the  only  rational  philosophy  and  the 
critical  and  constructive  arguments  of  the  last  two 
chapters  have  been  in  vain.  There  are  three 
logically  possible  positions  on  the  problem:      (1) 


240  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

materialism  or  mechanism  satisfactorily  interprets 
the  whole  nature  of  the  world-process;  (2)  mechan- 
ism satisfactorily  accounts  for  much,  perhaps  the 
greater  part  of  the  phenomena  of  nature,  but  at 
certain  specific  points  it  fails  and  we  must  have 
recourse  to  a  purposive  principle;  (3)  from  the 
standpoint  of  philosophy,  which  is  that  of  totality, 
that  is  of  an  integral  and  alUinclusive  view  of 
things,  mechanism  is  a  valid  scientific  programme 
to  be  applied  as  far  as  possible  in  every  field,  but  a 
mechanistic  world  view  is  quite  inadequate  to  an 
all-sided  interpretation  of  the  world-process. 

Before  we  consider  this  problem  it  is  necessary 
that  we  be  as  clear  as  possible  as  to  what  the 
mechanistic  standpoint  means.  There  is  much  con- 
fusion in  present  day  discussions  on  this  topic.  Here, 
then,  are  several  different  points  of  view,  (a)  A 
mechanistic  metaphysics  is  identical  with  material- 
ism. Everything  which  exists  and  every  change 
which  takes  place  is  the  purely  mechanical  resultant 
of  the  movements  of  mass  particles  in  space,  (b) 
In  scientific  investigation,  including  biology,  the 
mechanistic  view  is  a  canon  or  method  of  inquiry,  a 
working  hypothesis.  As  such  it  means  (1)  that  the 
purpose  of  science  is  to  determine  the  particular 
"go"  or  "how"  of  every  thing  or  occurrence  which 
it  investigates;  (2)  all  science  is  deterministic, 
therefore  science  cannot  admit  indeterminism  in 
vital  phenomena,  since  to  do  so  would  mean  to  admit 
that  causes  or  conditions  identical  in  character  could 
have  effects  varying  and  hence  unpredictable  in 
character,  which  admission  would  bring  scientific 


PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY   241 

enquiry  to  a  dead  stop;  (3)  the  aim  of  science  is 
measurement  or  quantitative  statement  of  its  de- 
scriptive generalizations;  to  admit  an  indetermin- 
able factor  is  to  admit  a  non-quantitative  factor. 

Most  biologists  seem  to  take  the  mechanistic 
standpoint,  and  assuredly  they  are  justified  in  using 
it  as  a  working  method  as  far  as  it  will  go.  Pushed 
to  the  limit  it  means  that  there  is  a  determinable 
and  therefore  unvarying  one-to-one  correspondence 
between  every  specific  physico-chemical  complex  or 
configuration  of  molecules  which  is  an  organism  and 
the  sum  of  the  manifestations  of  vitality  by  that 
organism.  On  the  other  hand,  the  vitalists  (and 
their  number  includes  some  distinguished  names  in 
present  biology,  such  as  Prof.  Hans  Driesch,  Prof. 
J.  A.  Thomson,  J.  S.  Haldane,  Pawlow)  maintain 
that  the  experimental  facts  cannot  be  accounted  for, 
unles  we  suppose  a  non-mechanical  agent,  a  vital 
principle,  an  organic  individuality  functioning  in 
the  organism ;  that  the  regulation  of  the  life  of  the 
organism,  repair  of  injured  parts,  reproduction  and 
other  vital  phenomena,  all  presuppose  a  directive, 
non-mechanical  agency.  We  have  no  concern  with 
this  quarrel  among  biologists  except  in  so  far  as 
it  bears  on  our  more  general  problem.  Mechanical 
explanation  should  be  pushed  as  far  as  possible,  for 
the  aim  of  science  is  to  determine,  with  the  greatest 
possible  degree  of  precision,  the  specific  conditions 
under  which  things  take  place  in  nature.  This  is 
just  what  causal  determination  means,  and  even 
though  it  should  turn  out  to  be  true  that  there  is  a 
one-to-one  correspondence  between  physico-chemical 

16 


242  THE  FIELD  OP  PHILOSOPHY 

and  vital  phenomena,  including  conscious  ideas  and 
purposes,  this  would  not  involve  materialism,  unless 
it  could  be  shown  that  the  physico-chemical  series 
is  the  solely  real  series  and  the  vital  and  conscious 
series  merely  epiphenomenal.  Such  a  possibility  is 
very  remote. 

We  might  attempt  to  disprove  the  assumption 
of  mechanistic  metaphysics,  as  Prof.  Hans  Driesch^ 
has  done,  by  arguing  that  specific  vital  phenomena 
cannot  be  explained  without  recourse  to  a  vital  prin- 
ciple (which  he  calls  an  entelechy  or  psychoid)  ;  or 
we  might  proceed,  in  what  seems  to  me  a  more  effec- 
tive fashion,  to  do  as  Bergson  does  when  he  adduces 
the  parallel  development  of  the  eye  of  the  Pecten 
and  of  the  vertebrates,  an  identical  organ  fashioned 
by  different  means  along  divergent  lines  of  evolu- 
tion. ^  We  might,  with  Bergson,  point  to  the  com- 
plicated and  manifold  correlation  between  organs 
and  parts,  to  the  fact  that  minute  variations  must 
persist  and  increase  before  they  are  useful  in  the 
struggle  for  existence,  that  adaptation  of  organisms 
to  the  condition  of  existence  takes  place  and  in- 
creases along  certain  definite  lines  (orthogenesis), 
that  there  are  useless  variations  (ornamentation 
and  the  aesthetic  sense  which  are  correlated) ,  that 
instincts  seem  to  be  remarkable  cases  of  unconscious 
purposiveness,  and  that,  finally,  it  is  only  through 
supposing  that  organisms  by  integral  effort,  that 


*  The  Science  and  Philosophy  of  the  Organism,  Vols. 
I  and  II.  See  also  his  Vitalismus  als  Geschichte  und  als 
Lehre. 

'H.  Bergson,  Creative  Evolution,  Chapter  I. 


PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY       243 

is,  by  effort  involving  the  organism  as  a  whole,  de- 
velop greater  organization  with  more  successful 
adaptation.^    These  are  all  important  considerations. 

As  students  of  philosophy  we  should,  however, 
look  at  the  matter  in  a  larger  light.  The  subject 
we  are  considering  is,  like  all  basic  philosophical 
problems,  one  of  great  difficulty  and  immense  sweep. 
I  prefer,  therefore,  in  view  of  the  introductory  and 
fundamental  character  of  this  course  of  lectures,  to 
call  your  attention  summarily  to  the  general  prin- 
ciples involved,  so  that  you  may  have  points  of  view 
for  further  enquiry. 

A  mechanistic  metaphysics  of  evolution  falls 
short  for  the  following  reasons.  (1)  The  theory 
of  evolution  is  a  general  description  of  a  universal 
historical  process  or  temporal  sequence  which  in- 
cludes a  multitude  of  diverse  features.  It  assumes 
that  the  same  kinds  of  forces  that  are  now  observed 
to  operate  have  always  operated  in  the  world.  Now 
purposive  activities  do  operate  and  achieve  things 
in  our  world.  Humanly,  a  purpose  means  the  con- 
scious striving  for  an  end  or  value  and  the  effectua- 
tion of  a  purpose  signifies  putting  in  train  the 
means  or  mechanism  that  will  achieve  the  end. 
Human  finalistic  or  teleological  activity  is  activity 
directed  either  towards  the  attainment  of  new 
values  (satisfaction  of  appetites,  wealth,  power, 
knowledge,  justice,  beauty)  or  the  maintenance  of 
values  already  attained.    Thus  in  human  life  there 


'  Bergson's  Creative  Evolution  seems  to  me  decidedly 
the  most  important  recent  work  on  the  philosophy  of  evolu- 
tion. 


244  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

need  be  no  antagonism  between  mechanism  and  end 
—  a  mechanism  devised  for  one  end  may  indeed  de- 
feat other  ends,  as  when  an  industrial  process  is 
run  so  exclusively  for  the  owner's  profit  as  to  de- 
stroy the  lives  of  the  workers  or  injure  the  con- 
sumers of  the  product. 

In  the  life  activities  of  organisms  many  tele- 
ological  functions  are  performed  without  conscious 
pre- vision;  for  example,  instinctive  activities  such 
as  flight,  repulsion,  gregariousness,  and  sex,  begin 
by  being  only  vaguely  conscious  and  after  having 
been  satisfied  become  more  fully  conscious.  Ex- 
amples of  adaptive  activities  that  may  continue  to 
be  unconscious  are  respiration,  circulation,  diges- 
tion, and  even  swallowing;  while,  then,  a  purposive 
activity  in  its  higher  form  has  its  inception  in 
prevision  and  the  whole  process  of  fulfillment  may 
be  accompanied  by  consciousness,  it  cannot  be  gain- 
said that  a  great  many  adaptive,  end-realizing, 
value-producing  activities  are  unaccompanied  by 
consciousness.  It  is  a  fact,  which  no  theorizing  can 
explain  away,  that  purposive,  value-producing  and 
value-sustaining  activities  are  now  effective  on  a 
large  scale  in  nature  and  still  more  in  human  so- 
ciety. This  being  the  case,  no  theory  which  explains 
the  present  state  of  nature  and  human  life  as  the 
product  of  blind  and  insensate  mechanical  move- 
ments, the  product  of  brute  accident,  has  any  prob- 
ability in  its  favor.  A  world  in  which  purposive 
functioning  is  so  large  a  factor  cannot  be  a  world 
which  is  the  miraculous  creation  of  blind  chance. 
If  one  were  invited  to  suppose  that  the  differences 


PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY       245 

between  the  products  of  a  Shakespeare  and  those  of 
a  navvy  were  fully  accounted  for  in  terms  merely  of 
undirected  physico-chemical  processes,  if  he  were 
not  already  a  blindly  prejudiced  adherent  of  mate- 
rialism, such  an  one  would  smile  incredulously.  To 
ask  one  to  accept  the  above  mechanistic  position  is, 
however,  to  ask  him  to  accept  only  an  infinitesimal 
fraction  of  what  he  is  asked  to  swallow  by  the  mate- 
rialist. 

(2)  The  universe  of  experience,  as  we  know 
it,  displays  frequent  creativeness,  new  discoveries 
and  inventions,  new  creations  in  art,  letters  and  in- 
dustry, new  forms  of  social  organization,  original 
human  individualities,  even  new  forms  of  plant  and 
animal  life  due  either  to  the  co-operation  of  the 
breeder  with  nature  or  to  nature's  unconscious 
fecundity.  This  present  world  of  novelty  and 
creativity  in  beings  and  values  is,  from  the  evolu- 
tionary standpoint,  the  descendent  of  a  past  extend- 
ing through  illimitable  ages.  The  evolutionary 
story,  in  whatsoever  chapter  we  may  read,  whether 
the  evolution  of  solar  systems,  of  the  earth,  of  ani- 
mal life,  of  consciousness  or  of  human  history,  is 
the  story  of  descent  with  modification;  in  other 
words,  of  qualitative  novelties,  different  beings,  the 
evolution  towards  and  of  richer  individualities  and 
values,  the  appearance  of  man  and  civilization,  the 
growth  of  society,  language,  art,  industry,  religion, 
science  and  personality.  The  struggle  and  the  push 
forward  of  the  vital  impetus  (Bergson's  U  Elan 
vital)  never  ceases  to  throb.  Evolution  is  a  creative 
process,  a  cumulative  movement.    So  far  as  we  can 


246  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

see,  its  issue  has  been  the  fashioning  of  souls,  of 
rational  self-determining  creative  selves  who  con- 
tinue the  process  by  giving  it  a  new  turn,  that  of 
conscious  co-operative  activity  in  the  realization 
and  conservation  of  psychical  values.  Such  is, 
broadly  speaking,  the  continuity  of  direction  and 
purpose  which  makes  the  evolutionary  history  of 
the  world  not  an  endless,  chartless  drifting  in  the 
cosmic  weather,  but  an  evolution. 

If  mechanistic  metaphysics  were  true,  this 
whole  process  would  be  inexplicable.  For  a  purely 
mechanical  process  means  only  the  external  inter- 
action of  parts  juxtaposed  in  space,  a  system  of 
interchangeable  parts,  whereas  the  evolutionary 
conception  of  the  world  implies  an  organized  and 
organizing  unity  of  process  by  which  the  different 
phases  and  stages  of  the  world-history  constitute 
a  living  whole.  In  a  purely  mechanical  process 
there  is  no  place  for  qualitative  novelty,  for  dis- 
crete change,  that  is,  change  with  a  difference.  The 
continuous  process  of  evolution  involves  novelty, 
change  which  brings  forth  differences;  it  involves 
individuality  or  organization  of  various  qualities 
into  a  unity  and  the  production  of  new  types  of 
individuality.  A  purely  mechanical  process  would 
be  reversible,  a  cyclical  process.  The  process  of 
evolution  is  irreversible.  Even  the  history  of  the 
solar  system  or  the  earth's  geological  history  is  the 
description  of  an  irreversible  series  of  events ;  much 
more  emphatically  so,  the  history  of  organisms  and 
the  history  of  man.  The  maxim,  "history  repeats 
itself*,  is  but  the  superficial  fraction  of  a  truth.  We 


PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY       247 

are  justified  in  contending  that  the  whole  evolu- 
tionary process,  when  viewed  as  a  totality  and  in- 
terpreted in  the  light  of  its  results  in  individuality, 
in  organization,  in  the  creation  and  enhancement 
of  vital  and  psychic  values,  is  teleological,  end- 
realizing,  value-producing.  Indeed  the  notion  of  a 
purposive  and  organizing  system,  such  as  we  find 
at  the  highest  level  in  a  mind,  or  better,  in  a  social 
life  constituted  by  the  interrelation  of  like-minded 
but  different  individuals,  gives  us  the  only  adequate 
clue  to  the  character  of  a  continuous  whole  which 
develops  or  evolves  in  time. 

From  this  standpoint  the  mechanistic  way  of 
thinking  is  valid  as  an  analytic  post-mortem  de- 
scription of  the  conditions  and  general  features 
of  particular  phases  of  the  evolutionary  order. 
Mechanism  uncovers  the  skeleton,  but  the  living  and 
evolving  universe  can  only  be  fully  understood  and 
interpreted  from  the  inner  and  appreciative  stand- 
point of  purposive  selfhood.  Mechanism  lays  bare 
the  means  by  which  new  results  have  been  achieved, 
but  the  forward  movement  of  life  and  the  universe, 
by  which  novel  results  are  being  produced,  mechan- 
ism is  inadequate  to  see  and  interpret.  Reality  is 
life  and  it  lives  forward,  carrying  with  it  whatever 
part  of  its  past  is  really  useful  for  its  future 
creation.  The  mechanistic  and  teleological  views 
of  reality  are  both  true,  but  teleology  is  the  higher, 
more  inclusive  truth. 

If  reality  in  evolution  be  purposive  what  are 
we  to  make  of  all  the  wastes,  failures,  sufferings 
and  cruelties  which  we  find  in  nature  and  human 


248  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

history?  Well,  we  can  see  that  much  of  the  pain 
and  discomfort,  the  dangers  and  obstacles  in  the 
natural  order  are  stimuli  which  incite  organisms, 
and  especially  man,  to  a  greater  activity.  A  high 
civilization  has  never  developed  either  in  a  tropical 
paradise  or  near  the  poles.  The  imminence  of  pain, 
want  and  suffering,  incite  man  to  effort  that,  under 
proper  social  conditions,  is  joyful  and  successful. 
He  makes  discoveries  and  applications,  organizes 
society,  develops  science,  education,  and  for  the  en- 
joyment of  his  leisure,  arts  and  letters.  Yet  there 
is  much  undeserved  and  useless  suffering.  Because 
of  the  social  solidarity  of  human  beings,  the  in- 
nocent suffer  for  the  guilty,  the  wise  man  for  the 
fool,  the  saint  for  the  sinner.  Social  redemption 
or  improvement  is  a  social  process.  Society  is  lifted 
up  by  its  best  and  wisest  who  strive  and  often  seem 
to  suffer  most.  There  is  social  progress  through 
the  enrichment  of  man*s  cultural  heritage.  So  far 
as  concerns  the  individual  or  the  group,  however, 
ethical  justice  would  demand  some  sort  of  com- 
pensation for  suffering  and  loss.  Admitting  that 
the  imperfection  of  adjustment  and  the  large-scale 
character  of  the  process  account  for  much  of  the 
failure,  suffering,  and  apparent  waste,  as  necessary 
incidents  in  a  purposive,  living  and  growing  uni- 
verse, it  remains  true  that  we  cannot,  in  the  light 
of  our  present  knowledge,  see  the  rationality  or 
justice  of  all  the  defects  of  nature,  taints  of  blood, 
of  all  the  natural  catastrophes  and  diseases  and 
sufferings  which  nature  visits  on  man  and  its  other 
children.    We  are  touching  here  on  a  large  and  dif- 


PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY       249 

ficult  problem,  one  whose  full  discussion  belongs  to 
systematic  metaphysics  and  the  philosophy  of  re- 
ligion, and  I  can  but  hint  at  the  issues  and  prin- 
ciples involved. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  that  man,  in  his 
present  stage,  is  the  goal  of  evolution.  Human  life 
here  can  hardly  be  other  than  a  transitional  phase 
(though  of  value  in  itself)  in  the  development  of 
the  supreme  purpose  and  meaning  of  things.  It  is 
not  necessary  for  us  to  be  able  to  conceive  the  final 
goal  in  order  to  have  the  right  to  believe  that  the 
highest  ends  and  values  that  we  can  conceive  and 
follow  are  essential  elements  in  the  fulfillment  of 
the  universal  meaning. 

The  wastes,  sufferings,  failures,  and  evils  of 
the  world  process  have  suggested  to  philosophers, 
from  Plato  down  to  Bergson,  that  there  is  in  the 
universe  as  a  whole  an  obstacle  not  of  its  own 
creation  or  choosing,  against  which  the  Supreme 
Purpose  or  Universal  Will  to  life  and  good  must 
struggle.  In  Plato,  Aristotle  and  Bergson,  this 
obstacle  is  a  blind,  unintelligent  matter.  In  various 
religious  systems  it  is  the  cosmical  devil  or  prin- 
ciple of  evil.  In  Hebrew  and  Christian  theism, 
while  the  problem  is  not  solved,  the  view  held  is  that 
part  of  the  evil  in  the  world  is  due  to  man's  capacity 
to  sin,  which  capacity  is  involved  in  his  freedom 
to  develop  into  a  self-determining  being.  The  pos- 
sibility of  moral  evil  is  thus  inherent  in  man's 
vocation  to  moral  and  spiritual  self-education.  The 
evils  of  nature  are  regarded  as  part  of  God's  prov- 
idential order,  which  incite  man  to  activity  and 


250  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

which,  moreover,  have  no  power  to  injure  man's 
immortal  spirit.  The  further  discussion  of  these 
theories  belongs  to  the  philosophy  of  religion  and 
systematic  metaphysics  and  cannot  be  undertaken 
here. 

REFERENCES 

Ency.  Britannica  and  International  Ency.,  Articles 
on  Evolution. 

Ency.  of  Religion  and  Ethics,  Articles  on  Evolution, 
and  Life  and  Death  (Biological). 

Thomson  and  Geddes,  Evolution  (Home  University 
Library) . 

Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  Chapter  II,  pp. 
150-232. 

Moore,  B.,  The  Origin  and  Nature  of  Life  (Home 
University  Library). 

Bergson,  Henri,  Creative  Evolution. 

De  Lage  and  Goldsmith,  The  Theories  of  Evolution. 

Driesch,  Hans,  Science  and  Philosophy  of  the  Or- 
ganism. 

Jennings,  H.  S.,  Doctrines  Held  as  Vitalism,  American 
Naturalist,  1913;   Heredity  and  Personality,   Science,   1911. 

Lovejoy,  A.  O.,  The  Meaning  of  Vitalism,  Science, 
1911;   The  Import  of  Vitalism,   Science,   1911. 

Morgan,  L.,  The  Interpretation  of  Nature. 

Schafer,  Inaugural  Address,  Nature,  1912. 

Ward,  James,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  Vol.  I, 
Lectures  7-10. 

Seward,  A.  C,   (Editor)   Darwin  and  Modern  Science. 

Weismann,  A.,  The  Evolution  Theory  and  Essays  upon 
Heredity. 

Loeb,  J.,  The  Mechanistic   Conception  of  life. 

Haldane,  J.,  Mechanism,  Life  and  Personality. 

Hobhouse,  L.  T.,  Development  and  Purpose. 

Le  Dantec,  F.,  The  Nature  and  Origin  of  Life. 

Darwin,  Origin  of  Species. 


PROBLEM  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  TELEOLOGY       251 

Huxley,  T.  H.,  Collected  Essays. 

Dewey,  John,  The  Influence  of  Darwin  upon  Phil- 
osophy, Chapter  I. 

Romanes,  G.  J.,  Darwin  and  After  Darwin,  Vol.  I. 

Merz,  J.  T.,  History  of  European  Thought  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century  Vol.  II,  Chapter  IX. 

Osborn,  H.  t\,  From  the  Greeks  to  Darwin. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 
THE   SELF* 

The  problem  of  the  nature  and  place  of  the  Self 
is  of  quite  central  importance  in  modem  philosophy. 
In  this  respect  there  is  a  decided  contrast  between 
ancient  and  modern  philosophy.  It  is  true  that  the 
doctrine  of  the  soul  plays  a  very  important  part  in 
the  philosophy  of  Plato,  and  that  Aristotle's  concep- 
tion of  the  real  as  entelechy  or  individual  is  derived 
from  the  notion  of  the  soul.  But  we  miss  the  acute 
sense  of  the  subjectivity,  the  privacy  and  uniqueness 
of  the  Self,  the  feeling  of  the  poignancy  of  experi- 
ence as  personal  and,  consequently,  that  conscious- 
ness of  the  existence  and  difficulty  of  such  problems 
as  how  the  Self  knows  the  external  world  or  how 
one  self  knows  another.  The  note  of  subjectivity, 
the  feeling  of  and  for  personality,  pervades  the 
greater  part  of  modem  philosophy  and  literature, 
and  is  chiefly  the  result  of  the  Christian  emphasis 
on  the  seriousness  and  worth  of  the  soul,  or  the  in- 
wardness of  the  true  life,  reacting  upon  peoples 
whose  whole  civilization,  as  perhaps  their  original 
native  bent,  has  tended  to  foster  a  keen  sense  of  in- 
dividuality. Thus  at  the  very  outset  of  modem 
philosophy    we    find    Descartes,    amidst   universal 


*My  forthcoming  work,  "Personality  and  the  World," 
is  devoted  chiefly  to  a  thorough  discussion  of  the  problem 
of  the  Self  in  all  its  aspects. 

(262) 


THE  SELF  253 

doubt,  clearly  conscious  of  his  existence  as  a  think- 
ing being.  Locke  believes  in  a  soul-substance,  al- 
though he  admits  it  is  only  an  hypothesis.  But  he 
is  certain  that  we  have  empirical  consciousness  of 
our  own  personal  identity.  Berkeley  is  equally  cer- 
tain that  we  can  have  a  notion  or  intuitive  con- 
sciousness of  the  Self  as  the  unitary  spirit  which 
thinks,  perceives  and  wills.  Kant  makes  the  syn- 
thetic or  organizing  activity  of  the  Self  (or  Ego) 
the  agency  by  which  the  disjointed  sequences  of  our 
sensations  are  formed  into  knowledge  of  nature  as 
a  rational  whole  or  ordered  world.  According  to 
Kant,  we  do  not  perceive  the  true  Self,  but  the  "I 
think"  accompanies  all  knowledge  and  we  may  be- 
come conscious  of  it  when  we  will.  The  Self,  as  the 
organizing  principle  of  knowledge  in  Kant's  system 
is  universal — ^the  same  in  all  men,  since  it  is  simply 
the  power  of  intellectual  synthesis.  But  the  self  is 
individualized  in  the  fulfillment  of  one's  moral  voca- 
tion. The  Self  as  purely  moral  will,  subjecting  it- 
self to  the  commands  of  duty,  is  the  real  individual. 
Kant's  disciple,  Fichte,  builds  his  whole  meta- 
physical system  of  ethical  or  spiritual  idealism  on 
the  intuition  of  free  self-activity  in  the  individual's 
moral  will.  The  existence  of  other  selves  and  a 
world  of  nature  are  deduced  as  necessary  to  the  ful- 
fillment of  one's  moral  vocation.  Hegel  makes  self- 
hood or  spirit  the  key  to  the  structure  and  meaning 
of  the  world,  although  it  is  doubtful  whether  he 
regarded  the  Absolute  as  a  self-conscious  individual. 
More  recent  idealists  such  as  Bradley  and  Royce 
make  the  Self  or  individual  center  of  experience  the 


254  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

clue  to  the  nature  of  reality.  Royce  especially  em- 
phasizes the  volitional  character  of  the  self. 

One  great  iconoclast,  David  Hume,  challenged 
the  grounds  of  belief  in  a  single  or  unitary  and  per- 
manent Self  in  a  classical  passage  in  which  he  as- 
serted that  he  could  find  no  Self  when  he  looked 
within  himself,  only  particular  impressions,  ideas 
and  feelings  in  perpetual  flux  and  movement.^  The 
modern  phenomenalistic  idealists,  such  as  Mach  and 
Pearson,  take  the  same  position.  As  for  psychology, 
William  James  argued  that  the  only  Self  which 
psychology  knows  or  needs  is  the  momentary  "unity 
of  the  passing  thought". ^  Nearly  all  psychologists 
would  agree  with  him.  Some,  such  as  M.  W. 
Calkins,  contend  that  we  have  an  immediate  feeling 
of  selfhood,  and  therefore  the  Self  is  the  most  real 
thing  we  know. 

But  the  self  which  I  feel  immediately  is  not 
identical  with  the  Self  which  is  held,  by  the  man  in 
the  street  and  by  many  philosophers,  to  exist  as  a 
substantial  reality.  For  (1)  in  the  first  place,  when 
I  am  self-conscious,  that  aspect  of  myself  which  is 
conscious  cannot  be  identical  with  that  aspect  of  my 
supposed  self  concerning  which  I  am  conscious.  The 
contents  or  data  of  self-consciousness  are  ever  fluc- 
tuating, though  not  so  much  as  the  data  of  our  con- 
sciousness of  a  world.  (2)  At  any  moment  I  may, 
it  is  true,  be  conscious  of  the  unity  of  my  thought, 
but  what  I  mean,  when  I  say  that  I  believe  in  the 


*  Hume,  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  bk.  1,  part  4,  fH 
5-6. 

"James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  Chapter  10. 


THE  SELF  255 

Self  as  a  single  and  enduring  reality,  is  that  there 
is  a  permanent,  intelligent  and  purposive  principle 
of  action  which  is  my  real  self.  (3)  What  I  regard 
as  the  center  or  core  of  my  selfhood  varies  from 
time  to  time  and  is  largely  dependent  on  the  in- 
fluence of  my  social,  and  even  my  physical,  environ- 
ment. I  am  a  quite  different  person  cold  or  warm, 
hungry  or  satiated,  happy  or  miserable,  successful 
or  failing,  popular  or  disliked,  wealthy  or  poor,  play- 
ing or  working.  As  my  bodily  condition  alters  so  my 
conscious  and  active  selfhood  alters  and  my  bodily 
condition  depends  in  large  part  on  the  physical 
environment.  As  my  social  atmosphere  alters  my 
self  suffers  alteration  too.  If  the  self  be  not  wholly 
a  product  of  physical  and  social  influences,  it  is,  at 
least,  notoriously  subject  to  alterations  at  the  hand 
of  these  factors.  (4)  The  actual  self  is  clearly  a 
changing  complex  of  experiences — of  perceptions, 
wants,  feelings  (emotions  and  sentiments),  striv- 
ings, purposes,  ideas,  satisfactions  and  dissatisfac- 
tions. The  complexity  and  instability  of  the  actual 
self  is  signally  evidenced  by  the  many  striking  cases, 
which  have  been  written  up  in  recent  years,  of 
multiple  personalities.  Two  or  more  different  "per- 
sons'* or  characters  may  control  the  same  living 
body  in  successive  periods,  longer  or  shorter,  or  in 
alternating  periods.  Even  different  characters  or 
complexes  of  feelings  and  strivings  may  struggle 
simultaneously  for  the  control  of  the  body.  A  "per- 
sonality" may  disintegrate.  An  individual  may 
suffer  loss  of  his  normal  or  average  selfhood  and 
become  quite  different;  he  may  permanently  re- 


256  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

cover  his  former  selfhood  or  he  may  oscillate  back 
and  forth  between  the  old  and  the  new.  Logically, 
we  should  not  even  speak  of  "he"  or  "she''  in  such 
cases,  for  "he"  cannot  recover  himself  from  a  state 
that  was  not  "him"  at  all.  (5)  We  are  discussing 
the  consciousness  or  experience  of  selfhood ;  but  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  at  any  moment,  by  far  the  greater 
part  of  one's  personality  as  it  is  believed  to  exist, 
by  oneself,  one's  friends  and  associates,  is  not  in 
consciousness  at  all.  At  the  present  passing  mo- 
ment, all  that  is  in  my  consciousness  clearly  is  what 
I  am  writing  and,  more  dimly,  the  skill  and  tools 
with  which  I  am  doing  the  writing.  All  my  other 
accomplishments  and  defects  are  out  of  conscious- 
ness. Where  are  these?  Is  my  selfhood  chiefly  an 
unconscious  substance  or  enduring  complex  of 
psychical  powers  or  dispositions,  or  is  it  a  mass  of 
brain  paths  or  engramms  in  the  central  nervous 
system? 

The  Self  then  is  not  simple  or  unchanging. 
Plato's  doctrine  of  the  soul  will  not  hold  in  the  face 
of  the  facts.  The  Self,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  cer- 
tainly largely  the  product  of  its  surroundings,  un- 
stable and  dependent.  And  yet  we  do  inexpugnably 
feel  in  our  best  moments  the  reality  of  our  indi- 
vidualities. We  feel  ourselves  to  be  responsible 
agents,  and  society  treats  us  as  such,  in  education, 
social  and  business  intercourse  and  law.  We  feel 
ourselves  to  have  enduring  natures  which  are  ex- 
pressed in  the  purposes  which  we  pursue  and  cling 
to,  even  amidst  seeming  shipwreck  of  all  our  hopes 
and  plans.    The  stronger  among  us  persist  in  being 


THE  SELF  257 

true  -to  ourselves,  in  pursuing  our  chosen  aims  and 
ambitions,  in  serving  our  elected  ideals  of  life.  And 
society,  almost  by  instinct,  recognizes  and  respects, 
yes  even  worships,  the  strong  and  self-reliant  indi- 
vidual. It  turns  to  him  in  its  days  of  perplexity 
and  distress.  The  history  of  human  progress  is 
chiefly  the  story  of  the  creative  beginnings  made 
by  great  individuals  in  all  directions.  Knowledge, 
discovery,  invention,  industry,  politics,  education, 
art  and  even  religion  are  modified,  reconstructed, 
added  to,  propelled  by  the  creative,  exploring  and 
organizing  individuals. 

Must  we  conclude  that  selfhood  is  complex  and 
yet  a  unity,  ever  changing  and  yet  permanent,  pas- 
sively moulded  and  yet  truly  self-creative  and 
creative  of  other  existences  and  values,  a  partially 
unorganized  mass  of  cravings  and  experiences  and 
yet  an  active  organizing  principle,  the  creature  of  its 
environment  and  yet  the  recreator  of  environments, 
the  product  of  the  universe  and  yet  the  best  clue  to 
the  meaning  and  purpose  of  the  universal  order? 
Yes,  I  think  we  must  answer  these  paradoxical 
queries  in  the  affirmative.^ 

The  Self  is  subject  and  object.  It  feels  itself 
to  be  "I",  and  yet  the  "I"  is  vastly  more  than  the 
self  at  any  instant  feels  itself  to  be.  "I"  and  "thou" 
have  meaning  only  because  there  is  a  feeling  of  self- 
hood, but  this  immediate  sense  of  selfhood  is  but 
the  starting  point  upon  which  is  built  the  notion 


^  I  have  discussed  this  problem  at  length  in  my  forth- 
coming book,  "Personality  and  the  World." 

17 


258  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  selfhood  or  individuality.  The  latter  is  a  con- 
struction of  thought,  but  we  have  the  best  right  in 
the  world  to  believe  that  it  is  a  valid  construction. 
For  (1)  the  critic  who  sets  out  to  refute  the 
legitimacy  of  a  belief  in  individuality  contradicts 
himself  both  in  setting  out  at  all  and  in  every  step 
he  takes.  He  assumes  the  existence  of  other  selves 
and  himself  and  then  proceeds,  in  terms  of  "I"  and 
"you"  and  "they",  to  refute  the  reality  of  the  Self. 
(2)  The  Self  is  indeed  complex  and  growing.  For 
selfhood  or  individuality  is  the  progressive  or- 
ganization of  the  native  capacities  of  a  conscious 
organism  into  a  more  harmonious  and  richer  unity 
of  experience  and  deed.  The  actual  self  is  a  self- 
organizing  principle.  The  materials  of  individuality 
are  the  congenital  impulses  of  the  organism.  The 
patterns  for  the  work  to  be  done  are  the  social  types 
of  conduct,  thought,  sentiment,  character  and 
trained  capacity,  which  have  been  worked  out  by 
other  socially  creative  selves  in  the  history  of  human 
culture.  The  ultimate  agent  in  the  process  of  self- 
development  or  creation  is  the  attentively  selective, 
valuing,  purposing,  organizing  mind  of  the  indi- 
vidual. The  more  truly  the  natural  self  becomes  a 
spiritual  individual  or  personality,  the  more  social- 
ized and  rational,  the  more  self-dependent  and 
creative  it  becomes.  Thus  the  individual  grows 
more  and  more  into  a  self-determining,  self-initiat- 
ing unity.  He  ceases  to  be  the  mere  creature  of 
his  environment  and  becomes  in  some  part  the 
transformer,  the  renewer  and  recreator  of  the 
physical  and  social  environments.    Instinctive  crav- 


THE  SELF  259 

ings  and  imperious  desires  become  transformed  into 
dynamic  factors  in  the  organized  and  harmonious 
life  of  the  whole  self.  The  nature  of  the  self  is  thus 
revealed  as  it  is  "realized"  or  "actualized"  in  the 
fundamental  and  increasingly  systematic  develop- 
ment of  its  active  attitudes,  its  valuations,  choices, 
persistent  purposes  and  deeds.  The  self  is  thus  not 
a  mere  "phenomenal"  flux  or  stream  of  passively 
determined  feelings  and  ideas.  It  is  not,  on  the 
other  hand,  an  unchanging  "substance"  or  entity 
unaffected  by  its  aims,  history  and  environment. 
Selfhood  or  individuality  has  many  degrees.  .It  is 
a  complex,  dynamic  process  always  having  some  de- 
gree of  unity  in  thought,  feeling  and  purpose;  and 
is  capable  of  developing  more  unity  and  harmony 
under  appropriate  conditions. 

(3)  The  Self  is  the  product  of  the  universe  and 
the  best  clue  to  the  nature  of  the  whole.  For  the 
notions  of  substance  or  permanence  through  change, 
of  unity  in  multiplicity,  of  organization  or  sys- 
tematic relation  in  a  whole,  of  uniformity,  intel- 
ligibility, coherence,  of  a  purposive  order  and  of 
individuality — in  short,  all  the  fundamental  notions, 
which  man  employs  in  the  work  of  understanding 
and  controlling  nature,  and  so  harmonizing  himself 
with  nature,  by  intelligent  apprehension  and  ra- 
tional mastery,  are  derived  from  the  life  of  human 
society.  Selfhood  has  as  its  original  datum,  its 
core,  the  inborn  capacities  and  the  dynamic  prin- 
ciple of  mental  organization.  But  the  full  selfhood 
of  the  rational  individual  arises  only  in  a  highly 
developed  social  order.    Every  principle  and  instru- 


260  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ment  of  thought  which  man  employs  in  interpreting 
the  world  is  a  product  of  social  experience. 
Uniformity,  law,  order,  finality  —  these  are  social 
categories.  This  does  not  mean  that  nature 
as  an  intelligible  order  is  a  creation  out  of  nothing 
by  human  society.  It  does  carry  the  implication 
that,  since  the  intellectual  tools  by  which  man  suc- 
ceeds in  understanding  and  controlling  nature  are 
of  social  origin,  there  must  be  a  fundamental  cor- 
respondence or  harmony  or  organic  interdependence 
of  structure  between  nature  and  human  nature. 
Kant  said  "the  understanding  makes  nature".  I 
would  say  "the  social  understanding  and  will  make 
nature,  because  society  is  the  highest  product  and 
value  achieved  in  nature". 

(4)  The  pathological  disintegration  of  actual 
selves  does  not  mean  the  absolute  disintegration  of 
the  Self.  In  all  these  cases  there  is  still  a  unity 
of  selfhood.  It  is  obscured  and  thwarted  by  nervous 
disintegration.  The  various  selves  or  "persons"  in 
such  cases  are  not  true  selves  or  persons.  They  are 
relatively  isolated  clusters  of  impulses  and  ideas  in 
an  individual  who  has  not  achieved  the  integration 
of  a  full  selfhood.  Actual  selfhood  has  all  manner 
of  degrees  of  organization  of  the  congenital  im- 
pulses to  action. 

(5)  A  considerable  part  of  the  life  of  self- 
hood is  at  any  moment  unconscious.  Individuality 
includes  much  more  than  is  in  consciousness.  It  is 
an  organized  whole  of  many  capacities.  The  ques- 
tions involved  in  the  relation  of  the  conscious,  the 
subconscious  and  the  unconscious  in  mental  life  are 


THE  SELF  261 

too  complex  to  be  discussed  here.  I  must  leave  this 
matter  with  the  warning  that  the  admission  of  an 
unconscious  psychical  life  by  no  means  commits  one 
to  the  recognition  of  a  distinct  subconscious  self. 
The  latter  is  a  bit  of  mythology.^ 

Since  we  have  already  found  grounds  for  re- 
jecting materialism,  we  hold  that  the  Self  is  not 
identical  with  the  nervous  system.  The  mental  self 
is,  we  have  seen,  intimately  bound  up  with  the  cen- 
tral nervous  system.  The  latter  is  the  instrument 
by  means  of  which  the  Self  affects  and  is  affected 
by  the  world.  The  mind  is  a  power  or  system  of 
powers,  of  memory,  inhibition,  selection,  generaliza- 
tion, valuation  and  choice,  by  which  the  nervous  re- 
sponses are  organized  and  made  subservient  to  the 
enrichment,  intensification,  harmonization  and  con- 
servation of  the  conscious  life  of  the  organism. 

Dualism,  as  we  have  seen,  leaves  us  with  a 
mystery  on  our  hands;  psychological  parallelism  is 
a  partial  truth.  The  relation  between  mind  and 
body  is  perhaps  best  stated  as  a  duality  of  aspects 
with  a  unity  of  functioning. 

In  regard  to  the  mental  self,  there  is  another 
matter  of  controversy  to  be  considered.  Which  is 
more  fundamental  in  the  soul  or  mind,  intellect  or 
will,  thought  or  feeling  and  conation?  The  inteU 
lectualists  make  intellect  fundamental  and  the 
voluntarists  make  conation  of  prime  importance. 
Descartes,  Spinoza  and  Hegel  would  be  classed  as 


^I  have  discussed  this  problem  at  length  in  my  forth- 
coming book,  "Personality  and  the  World." 


262  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

intellectualists ;  Kant,  Fichte  and  Schopenhauer,  as 
voluntarists.  Voluntarism  has  been  much  in  fashion 
lately  largely  due  to  the  influence  of  Wundt.  The 
whole  controversy  is  a  mistaken  one.  In  man  feel- 
ing, striving  and  thinking  are  equally  congenital 
and  fundamental.  One  can  understand  why  an  irra- 
tionalistic  pessimist  like  Schopenhauer  should  tie  up 
to  an  extreme  voluntarism  because  it  supported  his 
ethical  twist,  but  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why 
one  who  without  prejudice  studies  carefully  the 
facts  of  human  nature  should  not  see  that  while 
man's  impulses  and  instincts  are  indeed  ineradicable 
and  often  imperious  in  their  clamancy,  they  are  the 
impulses,  the  conations  of  a  being  who  is  conscious 
of  his  surroundings  and  who  frames  images  and 
concepts  of  his  world  and  acts  by  their  guidance. 
Intellect  is  itself  a  kind  of  conation;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  distinctively  human  volition  is  volun- 
tary action  incited  and  guided  by,  and  culminating 
in,  knowledge. 

Probably  the  one-sided  voluntarism  of  the  pres- 
ent time  is  the  consequence  of  the  undue  emphasis 
on  man's  biological  inheritance  and  the  resulting 
failure  to  distinguish  between  the  character  of  in- 
stinct, impulse,  emotion,  the  will-to-live  and  the 
will-to-power  in  man  and  in  the  animal  world.  Even 
the  will-to-live  and  the  will-to-power  in  their  most 
ruthless,  dangerous  and  ethically  inhuman  forms  in 
human  society  are  incited  by  ideas  and  guided  to 
their  accomplishment  by  thought. 

I  close  with  a  few  words  on  the  relation  be- 
tween the  concept  of  selfhood  and  freedom.    Free- 


THE  SELF  268 

dom  of  the  will  properly  means  freedom  of  the  self, 
and  this,  in  turn,  means  self-determination.  The 
freedom  that  is  implied  in  our  conception  of  indi- 
viduality is  not  that  of  unmotived  or  capricious  and 
irrational  choice.  Such  a  freedom,  if  possible,  would 
have  no  moral  worth  for  man.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  nature  of  the  Self,  as  a  being  that  grows  in 
rational  and  moral  self-determination,  implies  that 
the  self  is  not  absolutely  predetermined  by  its 
antecedent  history.  If  the  self  be  not  the  purely 
passive  product  of  circumstances,  it  must  have  the 
capacity  to  free  itself  from  the  clutch  of  circum- 
stance to  the  extent  to  which  such  freedom  is  in- 
volved in  the  fulfillment  of  its  own  rational  nature. 
What  the  self  wills  at  any  moment  is  determinate, 
for  it  is  the  joint  resultant  of  circumstances  and  that 
degree  and  manner  of  self-expression  of  indi- 
viduality of  which  the  self  is,  at  that  particular 
moment,  capable. 

But  it  does  not  follow  that,  in  similar  cir- 
cumstances, in  a  future  crisis,  the  self  must  choose 
as  it  did  before.  New  and  deeper  or  more  rational 
aspects  of  the  Self's  individuality  may  come  into 
play.  The  truth  is,  it  appears  to  me,  that  in  the 
moral  life  of  man  exactly  the  same  situation  does 
never  twice  occur.  For  at  least  the  Self  is  not  the 
same  as  it  was  and,  in  the  infinite  complexity  of 
human  life,  the  conditions  subject  to  which  choices 
and  volitions  are  made  must  also  be  consequently 
varying  in  some  degree. 

The  chief  arguments  advanced  for  determinism, 
by  which  I  understand  the  view  that  human  voli- 


264  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

tions  are,  like  all  the  processes  in  the  universe,  the 
unequivocal  resultants  of  antecedent  conditions,  are 
as  follows: 

(1)  The  universality  of  causation.  Human 
action,  it  is  said,  cannot  be  an  exception  to  the 
rule  that  every  event  is  the  perfectly  determinate 
result  of  equally  determinate  antecedents.  To  this 
argument  the  advocate  of  rational  freedom  replies 
that  the  final  determining  factor  in  voluntary  or 
chosen  action  is  just  the  conscious  Self  itself,  which 
weighs,  evaluates  and  chooses  between  possible 
actions  in  the  light  of  an  ideal  standard. 

(2)  The  actual  continuity  of  character  and 
conduct.  The  determinist  points  out  that  the  bet- 
ter we  know  a  person  the  more  certainly  can  we 
predict  how  that  person  will  act  in  given  conditions. 
The  individuality  of  a  person  is  a  determinate  quan- 
tum. Moreover,  he  insists  that  our  whole  work  of 
moral  and  intellectual  education  aims  at  building 
up  a  definite  character,  the  type  of  character  de- 
manded by  the  structure  and  aims  of  the  social 
order.  He  insists  that  the  very  notion  of  responsi- 
bility implies  that  the  rational  human  individual  is 
a  being  that  can  be  counted  on  to  act  in  specific 
ways  corresponding  to  specific  situations.  He  ex- 
plains the  functions  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
praise  and  blame,  to  be  to  produce  the  type  of  char- 
acter that  the  educator,  the  parent,  the  judge,  as 
the  agents  of  the  social  group,  or  the  group  itself 
through  its  approvals  and  disapprovals,  demands. 

To  these  arguments  the  advocate  of  freedom 
replies  as  follows :    He  does  not  contest  the  fact  of 


THE  SELF  265 

continuity  in  character  and  conduct ;  but  holds  that 
the  highest  degree  of  continuity  exists  just  where 
the  self  is  most  truly  a  rational  self-determining 
individual,  who  has  an  ideal  which  he  follows  and 
who  judges  his  own  conduct  in  the  light  of  that 
ideal.  He  argues  that  the  aim  of  all  social  approval 
and  disapproval,  of  all  rewards  and  punishments, 
of  all  social  inhibitions  and  incitements  to  the  self, 
should  be  educative.  But  he  holds  that  true  educa- 
tion is  education  into  responsible  self-determination, 
that  the  highest  aim  of  society  should  be  to  give  op- 
portunity for  human  beings  to  become  more  rational 
individuals,  responsible  to  their  own  ideals.  He 
holds  that  the  highest  type  of  society  is  that  one 
which  contains  the  largest  proportion  of  persons 
who  do  not  passively  accept  the  current  fashions 
in  conduct  and  thought  but  who,  actively  and  in  the 
light  of  reflection,  determine  for  themselves  the 
right  course  of  conduct.  He  insists  that,  in  the  case 
of  punishment  through  the  law,  the  offender  should 
be  treated  as  a  responsible  being  who  accepts  the 
guilt  as  his  own  and  who  thus  can  actively  par- 
ticipate in  his  own  moral  renovation.  He  argues 
that  the  individual  is  not  to  be  treated  by  society 
as  an  animal  capable  of  being  trained  to  do  its 
tricks.  He  argues  that  the  highest  type  of  human 
being  is  precisely  one  who  feels  keenly  his  own  re- 
sponsibilities as  a  self-determining  agent.  He 
argues  further  that  the  possibility  of  self-initiated 
change  is  a  necessary  postulate  of  the  moral  life. 
It  is  evident  that  the  real  question  at  issue  is 
this — ^has  the  normal  self  to  any  degree  the  power 


266  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

of  rational  self-determination  or  is  it  the  plastic 
creature  of  circumstances?  If  the  self  be  the  sort 
of  reality  whose  characteristics  I  have  sketched, 
this  question  may  be  answered  in  the  affirmative. 
The  meaning  of  this  view  may,  perhaps,  be 
illustrated  by  considering  the  place  of  the  conscious 
self  in  relation  to  the  neural  activities.  The  cerebral 
cortex  is  a  very  intricate  system  of  nerve  cells 
and  connecting  paths  (neurones  and  dendrites). 
Because  of  its  original  plasticity  new  connections 
are  constantly  being  made  in  it  in  the  process  of 
the  education  of  the  individual.  The  sensory  and 
the  motor  segments  of  the  nervoiis  system  consti- 
tute, respectively y  specific  sets  of  native  ways  of  per- 
ceiving and  responding  to  stimuli.  Thus,  the  organ- 
ism has  native  ways  of  reacting,  both  directly  to 
stimuli  that  originate  in  the  external  environment, 
and  indirectly,  through  the  responses  motivated  by 
the  inborn  and  persistent  needs  of  the  organism. 
The  former  are  the  direct  reactions  through  the 
sensory  system,  through  sight,  hearing,  touch,  smell, 
et  cetera ;  the  latter  are  the  congenital  instincts  and 
impulses.  Without  the  intervention  of  reflective  con- 
sciousness, without  deliberation  and  choice,  the 
human  organism  would  respond  in  specific  and  com- 
plex ways,  determined  in  part  by  the  character  of 
the  external  stimuli  and  in  part  by  the  character  of 
its  own  native  bodily  organization  and  needs.  The 
native  ways  of  reacting  to  external  stimuli  and  or- 
ganic cravings  with  sensory  experiences  and  move- 
ments are  complex  and  modifiable.  They  may  be 
tied  up  together  in  a  variety  of  ways.  The  tieing 
up  is  done  in  the  brain. 


THE  SELF  267 

What  new  factors  do  conscious  experience,  de- 
liberation, valuation  and  choice  introduce  into  the 
organism's  reactions;  in  other  words,  what  is  the 
function  of  the  conscious  self?  It  delays  responses. 
It  builds  up,  in  its  system  of  ideas  and  purposes,  a 
selective  mechanism  which  shifts  the  emphasis,  by 
attention  and  choice,  on  what  shall  be  perceived  and 
done.  It  generalizes  from  the  perceptual  and 
memory  materials.  It  weighs  and  evaluates  the  re- 
sults of  possible  actions.  It  forms,  in  short,  a  mov- 
ing system  of  selective  interests  or  aims,  which 
originate  in  its  own  affectively  colored  judgments 
of  value,  as  to  what  is  most  worth  noting,  remem- 
bering, seeking  to  avoid,  to  attain  and  to  retain  in 
its  experiences.  Delayed  response  is  the  condition 
of  deliberation  and  choice.  But  the  latter  involves, 
further,  a  "throwing  of  the  switches"  in  the  cortex, 
a  "loading  of  the  dice,"  motivated  by  the  organizor 
tion  of  interests,  the  systematization  of  values  in 
perception  and  action,  which  is  performed  by  coiv- 
sdovs  selfhood;  which  indeed  constitutes  the  very 
essence  of  selfhood.  For,  at  its  highest  level,  con- 
scious individuality  is  an  organization  of  attitudes 
or  dispositions  to  act,  to  know  and  to  feel,  guided 
by  reflection  upon  the  values  yielded  by  the  various 
types  of  sensory  and  motor  reactions  which  it  has 
had  in  the  past  and  may  have  in  the  present  and 
future  physical  and  social  environments. 

Rational  freedom  is  nothing  more  than  the 
actualization  of  the  capacity  to  interpret,  evaluate, 
and  thus  organize  into  an  ideal  or  coherent  system 
of  purposes  or  values,  the  experiences  which  the 


268  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

organism  has  and  takes  note  of.  But  we  must  not 
forget  that,  at  the  center  of  these  volitional  experi- 
ences, are  the  individual's  own  experience  of  its 
ideal  strivings  and  valuations,  its  demands  for  the 
fruition  of  its  yearnings  for  inner  harmony  and 
inner  growth,  for  social  harmony  and  social  prog- 
ress, for  comradeship  and  justice,  for  the  progress 
of  great  human  causes ;  in  short,  for  "more  life  and 
fuller"  of  the  sort  that  one  means  when  one  thinks 
of  the  fellowship  of  noble  minds,  endowed  with 
sympathy  for  human  kind  and  enkindled  with  the 
passion  for  the  increase  and  spread  of  truth,  beauty, 
justice  and  comradeship,  participation  in  and  serv- 
ice of  which  lift  society  and  the  individual  out  of 
the  mire  of  sensualism,  of  selfishness,  of  a  hardened 
and  exclusive  egoism,  out  of  that  static  egohood 
which  is  the  death  of  the  soul. 

It  is  the  mission  of  philosophy  to  judge  the 
possibilities  of  man  in  the  light  of  the  highest  that 
man  has  lived  and  striven  for.  The  philosopher 
who  does  not  think  nobly  of  the  soul  is  no  genuine 
philosopher.  For,  in  a  complex  and  changing 
world,  an  interpretation  of  its  central  factor  which 
would  read  the  meaning  and  destiny  of  the  whole 
life  of  the  spirit  in  man  in  the  light  of  an  arith- 
metical average  is  untrue  to  the  meaning  of  the 
whole.  Not  the  so-called  "divine  average"  but  the 
highest  and  rarest  and  most  excellent  that  has  been 
lived  by  men  is  the  key  to  the  meaning  of  spiritual 
individuality,  of  selfhood  or  personality  in  man. 


THE  SELF  269 


REFERENCES 

Calkins,  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Chapter 
XI,  B.  II  Personal  Idealism,  also  Calkins,  A  First  Book  in 
Psychology. 

Rashdall,  Hastings,  Personality,  Human  and  Divine; 
in  Personal  Idealism. 

James,  Wm.,  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  passim,  end  Will 
to  Believe  (The  Dilemma  of  Determinism). 

McTaggart,  J.  M.  E.,  Art.,  Personality  in  Encylopaedia 
of  Religion  and  Ethics,  and  Studies  in  Hegelian  Cosmology. 

Howison,  George  H.,  The  Limits  of  Evolution. 

Royce,  J.,  see  index  under  Individuality  in  the  World 
and  the  Individual,  and  The  Problem  of  Christianity. 

Bradley,  F.  H.,  Appearance  and  Reality,  Chapters 
IX,  X. 

Bosanquet,  B.,  The  Principle  of  Individuality  and 
Value,  pp.  68-77  and  the  Whole  of  Lecture  IX. 

Ward,  J.,  The  Realm  of  Ends  under  the  Individual  in 
Index,  also  Art.,  Psychology  in  the  Britannica,  11th  ed. 

Bergson,  H.,  Matter  and  Memory,  and  Time  and  Free 
Will. 

Palmer,  G.  H.,  The  Problem  of  Freedom. 

McDougall,  Body  and  Mind. 

Prince,  Morton,  The  Dissociation  of  a  Personality. 

Hume,  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  1,  pt.  4. 


CHAPTER  XXV 
THE  FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OF  METAPHYSICS 

In  this  chapter  I  shall  aim  to  gather  up  the 
threads  which  have  been  running  through  our  study 
of  the  problems  and  theories  of  philosophy,  in  order 
that  the  reader  may  see  that  philosophy  is  ever  en- 
gaged in  weaving  a  logical  tissue  of  symbols  to  in- 
terpret reality  as  an  ordered  whole  or  significant 
system.  This  is  precisely  the  work  of  metaphysics, 
the  heart  of  philosophy.  In  a  more  technical  and 
fuller  treatment,  it  would  be  one's  duty  to  examine 
more  critically  this  logical  tissue  of  concepts.  In 
this  introductory  study  I  shall  be  content  with 
pointing  out  its  general  character. 

The  technical  name  used  frequently  to  desig- 
nate a  fundamental  concept  of  metaphysics  is 
category.  A  category  is  a  highly  general  and  basic 
type  of  judgment,  an  affirmation  or  predication  of 
a  universal  meaning  or  relation  of  reality.  The 
categories  are  the  principal  or  universal  ways  in 
which  thought  classifies  and  organizes  the  data  of 
knowledge.  Thus  likeness  and  unlikeness,  identity 
and  difference,  qitantity,  quality,  thinghood,  sub- 
stance, causality,  finality,  individuality,  totality  and 
order  are  categories  or  forms  for  the  relating  of  ex- 
periences and  the  organizing  of  our  conceptions  of 
reality.  Aristotle  was  the  first  to  give  a  table  of 
categories.     He   enumerated   Substance,   Quantity, 

(270) 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OF  METAPHYSICS     271 

Quality,  Relation,  Place,  Time,  Position,  Possession, 
Action  and  Passion.  Under  the  name  of  "relations" 
Locke  and  Hume  discussed  the  subject  and  Kant 
gave  what  he  regarded  as  a  logically  complete 
enumeration  of  categories  —  twelve  in  number  as 
follows:^ — 

1.     Qimntity  2.     Quality 

Unity  Reality 

Plurality  Negation 

Totality  Limitation 

3.    Relation  4.    Modality 

Inherence  and  Subsist-  Possibility  —  Impossi- 

ence  bility 
Causality  and  Depend-  Existence  —  Non-exist- 
ence ence 
Community  Necessity — Contingency 

Hegel's  Logic  is  a  very  elaborate  attempt  to 
organize  the  categories  into  a  system.  Among  other 
interesting  tables  of  categories  are  those  by  E.  Von 
Hartmann  and  Charles  Renouvier. 

The  full  discussion  of  the  categories  could,  of 
course,  be  undertaken  only  in  an  advanced  treatise 
on  metaphysics.  Here  I  shall  single  out  for  com- 
ment only  those  categories  which  I  regard  as  most 
fundamental. 


*  See  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Transcendental 
Analytic,  Book  I,  Chap.  I,  Sect.  Ill  and  Chap.  II  and  ff. 
Also  the  whole  of  Book  II. 


272  THE  FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 


1.      SUBSTANCE 

Both  historically  and  logically  the  first  concept 
of  philosophy  is  substance.  The  concept  of  sub- 
stance means  in  philosophy  chiefly  two  things :  — 
(1)  Substance  is  the  permanent  principle  or  ground 
of  changing  things;  water  for  Thales,  aether  for 
Anaximenes,  atoms  for  Democritus,  ideas  for  Plato, 
forms  for  Aristotle,  are  the  permanent  or  enduring 
realities;  so  too  the  spirits  or  selves  of  Berkeley, 
the  monads  of  Leibnitz,  the  Absolute  of  Spinoza  and 
Hegel;  (2)  the  substantial  is  the  self -existent,  it  is 
being  which  is  not  dependent  on  other  being.  Des- 
cartes seems  an  exception  with  his  two  substances, 
but  he  recognizes  that  these  are  not  substances  in 
the  full  sense  of  the  term.  They  are  not  self- 
existent;  neither  are  the  finite  monads  of  Leibnitz. 
The  point  at  issue  between  Singularism  and  Plural- 
ism is  whether  Substance  is  one  or  many  independ- 
ent beings.  Spiritualists  and  materialists  alike 
aflfirm  that  Substance  is  of  one  kind — spirit  or  mat- 
ter ;  dualists  affirm  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  Sub- 
stance. Thus  one  may  be  a  pluralistic  or  a  singular- 
istic  monist  (either  spiritualistic  or  materialistic) 
or  a  dualist  Or  one  may  take  the  position  that  the 
two  empirical  realities  —  spirit  and  matter — are 
du^l  aspects  of  one  kind  of  being,  Experience,  This 
latter  view  then  means  that  reality  is  psycho- 
physical. One  may  hold  this  view  of  empirical 
reality  and  still  hold  that  the  empirical  world,  with 
its  duality  of  aspects,  is  dependent  on  an  ultimate 
Being  which  is  best  described  as  creative  spirit. 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OF  METAPHYSICS    273 

It  is  clear  from  the  course  of  our  critical  ex- 
position that  reality  cannot  consist  of  an  unknow- 
able substance  that  exists  apart  from  or  behind 
phenomenal  existence.  Since  the  only  reality  we 
know  consists  of  what  we  experience  plus  what  we 
logically  infer  from  the  nature  of  experience,  sub- 
stantial reality  can  be  only  the  systematic  totality 
of  all  that  is  manifested  and  involved  in  experience. 
The  notion  of  Substance  in  its  highest  form  is  that 
of  a  sustaining  and  active  principle  of  order  or 
systematic  meaning,  manifested  in  the  diversity  of 
aspects  and  degrees  of  individuality  and  meaning 
which  the  world  of  experience  shows. 

I  shall  argue  that  the  notion  of  an  active  and 
sustaining  principle  of  order  is  implied  in  all  the 
other  concepts  or  categories  of  metaphysics.  I  mean 
by  the  active  principle  of  order  that  the  ground  of 
the  whole  structure  and  course  of  reality  is  con- 
stituted by  a  principle  which  displays  its  character 
in  the  systematic  or  organized  character  of  reality. 
Empirical  reality  does  not  consist  either  of  one  ab- 
stract being  or  of  many  atomistic  beings.  It  con- 
sists of  several  kinds  of  individuals  possessing  many 
degrees  of  individuality  and  all  forming  an  ordered 
whole  or  system. 

2.      CAUSALITY 

In  primitive  thought  no  distinction  is  made  be- 
tween mechanical  and  finalistic  or  purposive  causa- 
tion. The  distinction  emerges  in  Greek  atomism 
and  in  Plato,  and  is  very  clearly  made  by  Aristotle. 
Modem  philosophy  largely  revolves  about  the  prob- 

18 


274  THE  FIELD  OP  PHILOSOPHY 

lem  of  the  relations  of  mechanism  and  finality,  as 
one  of  its  main  issues. 

In  common  sense  thinking  a  "cause"  means  a 
specific  force  or  power  which  produces  a  specific  re- 
sult and  it  is  assumed,  in  practical  work  and  science, 
that  the  same  force  working  under  the  same  cir- 
cumstances will  always  produce  the  same  kind  of 
an  effect.  This  is  the  postulate  of  the  uniformity 
of  nature.  Hume,  in  his  famous  critique  of  Causal- 
ity, attacked  the  grounds  on  which  this  belief  rests. ^ 
He  argues  that  we  cannot  know  anything  of  a  nec- 
essary or  absolutely  uniform  connection  between 
specific  causes  and  specific  effects.  A  priori  any- 
thing may  produce  anything,  he  says.  All  our  rea- 
sonings concerning  causes  and  effects  have  no  other 
basis  than  this,  that  having  observed  a  number  of 
times  that  similar  events  Ci,  C2,  C3 — Cn  are  imme- 
diately followed  by  similar  events  Ei,  Eg,  Eg — En, 
we  jump  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  an  invariable 
or  necessary  connection  between  C  and  E.  Our  be- 
lief in  causation  is  thus  "a  determination  of  the 
mind".  As  a  matter  of  fact,  says  Hume,  all  we  have 
to  base  this  belief  on  is  the  repetition  of  a  number 
of  similar  cases  which,  by  virtue  of  the  psychological 
laws  of  association,  by  resemblance  and  contiguity 
and  succession,  generate  the  belief  in  a  necessary 
connection.  We  have  no  rational  grounds  for  deny- 
ing that  the  next  C  may  be  followed  by  X.  More- 
over, he  argues,  we  can  form  no  picture  or  concep- 


^  Hume,  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Book  I,  Part  III, 
Sections  1,  2,  3,  10,  14,  etc.     Also  his  Enquiry,  Section  IV. 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OF  METAPHYSICS    275 

tion  of  how  the  cause  produces  the  effect.  We  simply 
see  that  the  movement  of  one  billiard  ball  is  followed 
by  that  of  another  ball.  We  simply  feel  that  a  voli- 
tion is  followed  by  a  muscular  movement.  We 
know  nothing  about  the  inner  "go"  of  the  process 
in  either  case.  All  our  beliefs  in  causal  connections 
are  the  results  of  mental  habits  or  cttstoms  due  to 
association  of  ideas, 

Kant  answered  Hume  with  the  argument  that 
we  do  distinguish  between  causal  or  irreversible 
sequences,  which  imply  necessary  connection,  and 
non-causal  sequences,  which  are  accidental.  We  say 
that  heat  is  the  cause  of  motion  but  we  do  not  say 
that  night  is  the  cause  of  day.  To  which  Hume 
might  reply  that  the  reason  is  that  night  and  day 
alternate.  Kant  admits  that,  in  particular  cases, 
our  belief  in  causal  connection  is  based  on  the  ob- 
servation of  repeated  empirical  sequences  of  similar 
events,  but  he  insists  that  the  distinction  which  is 
made  between  causal  and  non-causal  sequences  im- 
plies that  there  is  in  the  mind  a  native  rule  or  prin- 
ciple of  causal  relationship  not  derived  from,  but 
read  into,  the  sequence  of  sense-impressions.  The 
causal  relation  is  a  necessary  way  in  which  the  mind 
connects  certain  sequences  in  experience. 

Since  Kant  the  causal  principle  has  been  sub- 
jected to  acute  criticism  on  the  ground  that  change 
is  a  continuous  process,  whereas  our  separation  of 
events  into  causes  and  effects  is  arbitrary  and  due 
simply  to  our  practical  interests.  In  a  temporally 
continuous  series  we  cannot  say  when  the  cause 
ceases  and  the  effect  begins.     For,  if  any  empty 


276  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

time  elapses  between  the  two,  causation  is  an  un- 
meaning miracle.  Since  no  time  elapses  and  the 
full  presence  of  causal  conditions  is  simultaneously 
the  effect,  the  temporal  distinction  between  cause 
and  effect  is  arbitrary.  Moreover,  what  we  single 
out  as  causes  and  effects  in  any  given  process 
of  change  are  only  particular  features  in  an  in- 
finitely complex  network  of  relationships.  There- 
fore, it  is  said,  causal  explanation  is  only  a  useful 
fiction  in  science;  and,  from  the  standpoint  of 
philosophy,  it  disappears  in  the  idea  that  all  se- 
quences of  events  are  but  appearances  of  one  com- 
plete, timeless  reality.  Strictly  speaking  the  cause 
of  any  event  is  the  total  state  of  the  world  at  that 
very  moment. 

Let  us  take  up  the  latter  point  first.  Admitting 
that,  in  our  causal  explanations,  we  arbitrarily 
isolate  and  give  prominence  to  certain  aspects  of 
the  order  of  change  which  may  interest  us  as 
physicists,  biologists,  lawyers,  doctors  or  educators, 
and  neglect  many  other  features  of  the  process 
which  are  not  relevant  to  our  special  purposes,  it 
does  not  follow  that  real  causal  changes  do  not  take 
place  in  the  world.  Such  an  assumption  deprives  our 
whole  experience,  which  is  temporal,  of  meaning 
and  reality.  I  do  not  see  what  would  then  be  left 
to  philosophize  about.  We  may  admit  that  reality 
consists  of  a  vast  complex  of  interrelated  and  in- 
teracting centers  of  force  whose  entire  network  of 
causal  relationships  we  shall  never  fully  uncover. 
But  things  are  really  done  and  suffered  in  our  world. 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OP  METAPHYSICS     277 

and  we  have  a  right  to  hold  that  our  temporal  world 
is  real  until  we  are  given  a  better  one. 

It  is  true  also  that  in  many  cases  we  cannot 
picture  or  conceive  how  changes  are  produced.  But 
scientific  analysis  and  the  constructive  imagination, 
working  upon  the  results  of  this  analysis,  do  suc- 
ceed in  giving  us  good  working  models  of  how  many 
things  go.  The  molecular  theory  of  gases,  the  elec- 
tro-magnetic theory  of  light,  the  atomic  theory  of 
matter,  bio-chemical  theories  and  many  other  scien- 
tific theories  that  might  be  cited,  aim  at  giving  us 
pictures  of  how  changes  go  on  beyond  the  range  of 
our  crude  perceptions.  Any  one  of  these  theories, 
as  it  now  is,  may  tomorrow  be  thrown  away  for  a 
more  plausible  one,  but  the  fact  remains  that  we 
make  better  models  as  time  goes  on,  and  learn  more 
about  the  "how"  of  causal  changes.  If  it  be  said  that 
science  knows  nothing  of  efficient  causes  or  forces, 
I  would  point,  in  reply,  to  the  constant  use  of 
theories  of  force  and  energy  in  science.  Since  we 
are  conscious  of  activity,  feel  effort  when  we  move 
things  and  change  things  in  the  world,  we  cannot 
help  believing  that  every  change  in  nature  results 
from  the  interaction  of  force-centers.  Any  science 
or  philosophy  which  denies  or  ignores  this  basic 
fact  of  experience  is  thus  far  untrue  to  our  com- 
mon experience. 

As  to  the  necessity  of  causal  relations,  it  is 
true  that  in  many  cases  the  observed  repetition  of 
resembling  instances  is  the  only  basis  we  have  for 
a  belief  in  uniformity.  There  may  be  no  exact  re- 
petitions in  the  course  of  the  universe.    But  Hume 


278  THE  FIELD  OP  PHILOSOPHY 

ignored  the  fact  that  a  few  instances  or  even  one 
case,  experimentally  tested,  may  be  sufficient  to  es- 
tablish a  causal  connection,  especially  if  the  rela- 
tion can  be  reduced  to  mathematical  determination. 
The  quest  for  causal  connections  is  a  native 
principle  of  the  human  intellect.  It  is  a  higher  form 
of  the  same  demand  for  order  or  interrelatedness 
and  system,  for  a  conceptual  or  intelligible  relevancy 
of  one  thing  to  another  in  the  changes  that  take 
place  in  the  experienced  world,  which  we  have  met 
in  doctrines  of  Substance.  The  human  mind  is  so 
constituted  that  it  must  seek  grounds  for  every 
change  in  the  orderly  relations  or  systematic  relev- 
ancies of  the  single  changes  and  the  single  thing 
which  changes  to  other  events  and  things.  The 
principle  of  causality,  when  thought  out,  is  thus 
seen  to  be  a  form  of  the  mind's  postulation  of  the 
world-process  as  a  whole  of  interacting  and  inter- 
patient  elements,  in  other  words  as  a  connected 
totality,  a  system  of  interrelated  elements,  a 
rational  system  or  order. 

3.  FINALITY  AND  INDIVIDUALITY 
The  concept  of  finality  or  teleological  activity 
cannot  be  discussed  apart  from  that  of  individuality. 
End  or  purpose  implies  individuals  hy  whom  ends 
are  sought  and  in  whom  they  are  achieved.  In  its 
fuller  form,  it  implies  individuals  for  whom  these 
ends  are  present  as  values.  Hence  the  belief  in  the 
purposiveness  of  any  part  of  reality  implies  that  in- 
dividuals  are  there  effective  agents.  The  belief  in 
the  purposiveness  of  the  whole  of  reality  implies 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OF  METAPHYSICS    279 

that  there  is  either  one  supreme  individual  or  a 
society  of  individuals  whose  ends  prevail,  whose 
values  endure,  in  the  order  of  reality. 

By  individuality  in  this  connection  we  mean 
more  than  the  individuality  of  a  single  self.  For 
a  society,  such  as  a  college,  a  church,  a  nation,  even 
an  epoch  of  human  civilization,  has  its  common  or 
supreme  purpose  which  controls  the  purposes  of  the 
individual  selves  who  are  its  constituent  elements. 
These  common  purposes  are  more  fully,  clearly  and 
unqualifiedly  represented  by  some  individual  mem- 
bers of  the  group  than  by  others.  But  they  in- 
fluence all  the  members.  At  the  present  time,  for 
instance,  England,  France,  Italy,  and  the  United 
States  each  have  aims  and  purposes  in  the  great 
war  which  are  being  organized  into  a  supemational 
unity  of  purpose  which,  if  achieved,  will  probably 
determine,  to  a  large  extent,  the  future  course  of 
civilization. 

Individuality  may  be  defined  as  an  organized 
and  effective  unity  of  interests  and  purposes.  A 
lesser  or  poorer  individuality  may  be,  indeed  must 
be,  an  element,  more  or  less  harmonious  or  obstruc- 
tive, in  the  unity  of  a  richer  and  more  compre- 
hensive individuality  or  spiritual  totality. 

The  relationships  of  common  feeling  and 
thought,  of  common  purpose,  value  and  volition,  by 
which  persons  or  elementary  moral  individualities 
are  organized  into  societies,  are  of  a  higher  order 
than  those  which  obtain  in  the  causal  interaction 
of  a  physical  system.  Hence  the  notion  of  order, 
that  is,  of  coherent  relationship  among  members  of 


280  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

a  whole  or  system,  is  more  richly  and  more  ade- 
quately embodied  in  a  society  of  selves  than  in  a 
physical  system.  A  society  of  persons  is  at  once  a 
richer,  more  comprehensive  whole  and  one  with 
more  capacity  for  development  than  a  mechanical 
system.    It  is  a  spiritual  system. 

In  a  more  technical  and  fuller  treatment  of 
these  theories,  it  would  be  in  place  to  show  in  de- 
tail what  I  only  suggest  here,  that  the  best  analogy 
from  which  to  interpret  the  unity  and  order  of  the 
universe  is  that  of  a  society  of  rational  selves. 

4.      ORDER,  LAW,  RELATION  AND  INDIVIDUALITY 

Thought  is  concerned  with  the  natures  of  con- 
crete beings  and  their  relations.  Whether  it  be  in 
practical  life,  or  in  a  special  science,  or  in  philos- 
ophy, there  are  always  two  aspects  to  the  work  of 
reflective  knowing:  (a)  What  are  the  character- 
istics of  the  individual  beings,  the  "thises",  which 
are  the  elementary  data  of  the  problem,  and  what 
are  the  significant  relations  between  these  indi- 
vidual beings?  Philosophy  generalizes  this  twofold 
problem,  in  order  to  determine  what  are  the  dis- 
tinctive types  and  ranks  of  individualities  in  the 
world  and  what  are  the  correspondingly  distinctive 
types  and  ranks  of  relationships  between  them.  Are 
all  individuals  and  all  relations  reducible  to  a  com- 
mon type,  and  is  this  common  type  the  lowest  or 
simplest  type  that  is  found?  My  answer  to  both 
these  questions,  dogmatically  stated,  is  that  all  in- 
dividuals and  relationships  are  not  reducible  to  a 
lowest  common  type  and  that  the  higher  types  are 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OF  METAPHYSICS     281 

not  explained  by  the  lower,  but  that  the  higher 
types  of  individuals  and  relations  more  nearly 
furnish  an  adequate  principle  of  interpretation  for 
the  whole  than  do  the  lower. 

Let  us  designate  the  individual  or  elementary 
datum  (the  haecceitas  of  Duns  Scotus)  by  the  gen- 
eral names  of  individuum  or  monad.  Then  in  any 
science  the  single  member  is  the  monad.  In  chem- 
istry it  is  the  molecule,  in  physics  the  atom  or  elec- 
tron, in  biology  the  cell  and  in  the  social  sciences 
the  self.  The  principles  or  laws  of  these  sciences 
are  economic  generalizations  of  the  types  of  rela- 
tionship which  obtain  between  the  individua  or 
monads  whose  characteristics  and  relationships  are 
studied  by  the  various  types  of  science.  The  end- 
less series  of  whole  numbers,  for  example,  has  its 
perfectly  definite  laws  of  operation.  The  mole- 
cular monads  of  chemistry  have  their  laws  of 
valency  and  atomic  weight.  The  physical  monads 
have  their  mathematically  statable  laws.  The  rela- 
tions of  human  selves  in  society  have  their  economic, 
physical,  psychological,  moral  and  spiritual  laws  of 
relationships. 

But  we  say,  rightly,  that  laws  are  abstract  and, 
especially  in  the  case  of  the  more  complex  monads, 
such  as  living  cells  and  still  more  emphatically  in 
the  case  of  selves,  laws  are  only  approximately  cor- 
rect statements  of  the  relationships  of  the  individua. 
For  example,  the  statistical  averages  in  regard  to 
murders,  suicides  or  marriages  in  any  given  popu- 
lation, tell  us  very  little  in  regard  to  what  any  given 
human  individual  may  do.    "By  lawfulness  we  mean 


282  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

a  character  which  is  generally  viewed  as  belonging, 
not  to  individuals  or  to  collections  of  individuals, 
but  to  the  general  modes  of  behavior,  the  general 
qualities,  characters  or  relations  which  nature  fol- 
lows, which  we  regard  as  belonging  to  the  real 
world,  —  or  our  world  of  thought  or  of  conduct."^ 
In  short,  laws,  whether  natural,  civil  or  ethical, 
leave  out  of  account  many  of  the  concrete  char- 
acteristics of  actual  individua  or  monads.  A  law 
of  nature  is  an  abstract,  universal  statement  of  how 
certain  types  of  individua,  who  exist  in  the  natural 
order,  do  actually  behave.  A  civil  law  or  an  ethical 
rule  is  an  abstract,  universal  statement  of  how 
members  of  the  social  order  must  or  should  behave. 

"There  is  a  natural  order  and  there  is  a 
spiritual  order,"  says  St.  Paul,  and  we  may  add  to 
this  saying  the  remark  that,  within  both  the  natural 
and  the  spiritual  orders,  there  are  various  subor- 
dinate types  and  ranks  of  order.  There  is  a  logical 
order,  a  physical  order  and  a  vital  order.  There 
are  various  types  and  ranks  of  social  order;  the 
order  of  public  law,  orders  of  economic  relation- 
ships, the  orders  of  family  affection,  friendship, 
neighborliness,  patriotism,  and  general  human 
sympathy. 

It  is  thus  impossible  to  discuss  individuality, 
relationship,  cause,  purpose,  or  law,  without  making 
use  of  the  notion  of  order.  Therefore  this  notion 
of  order  is  fundamental  to  all  science  and  philos- 


*  Royce's  article  on  Order  in  Encyclopedia  of  Religion 
and  Ethics. 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OF  METAPHYSICS    283 

ophy.  Indeed  the  correlative  notions  of  order  and 
individuality  are  the  two  most  fundamental  notions 
of  human  thought  and  of  the  whole  realm  of  reality. 
Each  in  his  own  order,  the  individual  or  monad 
is  the  datum,  and  the  law  is  but  the  abstract  state- 
ment of  the  orderly  relations  of  individuals  in  a 
system  or  society.  There  are  as  many  types  of 
order  in  reality  as  there  are  types  of  individual  and 
these  types  of  ordered  individuals  may,  in  turn,  be 
constituents  in  the  universal  type  of  order  which, 
we  may  suppose,  is  ever  being  realized. 

One  cannot  conceive  an  individual  except  as  a 
member  of  one  or  more  orders,  and  the  more  orders 
he  has  membership  in,  the  richer  his  individuality, 
provided  he  does  not  dissipate  his  selfhood  in  a 
multitude  of  relationships  too  numerous  and  varied 
for  him  actively  to  participate  in.  The  "joiner"  of 
clubs  and  associations  may  indeed  join  too  many. 
The  human  self  is  a  member  of  the  physical,  the 
vital  and  various  social  and  ethical  orders  or  sys- 
tems of  relationships.  For  an  order  means  a  sys- 
tematic relationship  that  obtains  or  should  obtain 
between  individuals.  As  Royce  says,  order  belongs 
to  sets  of  individuals,  to  collections,  to  arrays  of 
things,  persons,  deeds  or  events. 

The  orders  of  the  poorest  types  of  individua, 
such  as  numbers,  points,  lines,  atoms  and  electrons, 
are  simple  and  definable  in  very  precise  or  mathe- 
matical terms.  The  orders  of  vital  individua  or 
organisms  are  more  complex  and  not  definable  in 
such  abstract  and  simple  terms.     The  orders  in 


284  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

which  human  selves  live,  behave  and  feel  are  very 
much  more  complex  and  richer. 

It  is  very  significant  that  Cosmos,  the  Greek 
word  for  world,  means  order,  and  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal meanings  of  our  English  word  world  is  the 
totality  of  an  ordered  or  harmonious  system.  Any 
order  or  system  means  a  totality  of  elements  or 
individua  that  are  interrelated  organically,  that  are 
functionally  interdependent  members  of  the  whole. 
This  does  not  imply  that  the  mere  order  or  system 
of  relations  completely  determines  the  nature  or 
character  of  the  individual  members.  The  members 
of  a  system  or  order  are  such  in  the  orderly  rela- 
tions which  constitute  the  system.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  character  of  the  relations  are  determined 
by  the  natures  of  the  members.  In  short,  the 
natures  of  the  members  and  the  relations  of  order 
which  constitute  them  members  of  the  system  are 
reciprocal  or  interdependent.  It  is  a  case  of  com- 
pletely organic  or  better  still,  with  reference  to 
social  orders,  organized  totality.  Coherence,  har- 
mony and  order  are  various  names  for  this  or- 
ganizational or  functional  interdependence  of  in- 
dividua. 

For  example,  the  members  of  a  numerical 
series,  such  as  the  ordinal  series  of  whole  numbers, 
are  defined  by  their  positions  in  the  series  and,  in 
turn,  the  serial  character  of  the  order  grows  out 
of  the  nature  of  the  whole  numbers.  The  cell  mem- 
bers of  an  organism  constitute  a  more  complex  type 
of  order  or  system,  that  is,  one  whose  individual 
members  have  more  complication  of  nature  and 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OF  METAPHYSICS     285 

consequently  one  whose  order  is  not  so  simple.  The 
members  of  a  social  group  such  as  a  family,  a  col- 
lege, a  nation  or  a  church,  are  still  richer  in  their 
individual  natures  and,  consequently,  the  social 
order  is  more  complex  and  significant  than  any 
lower  order. 

Metaphysics  has  the  task  of  classifying  the 
various  types  of  order  and  ordering  them  into  an 
order  of  orders,  a  totality  in  which  each  subordinate 
order  is  given  its  due  place,  a  living  system  into 
which  all  partial  systems  are  integrated.  The 
postulate  common  to  the  practical  ordering  activ- 
ities of  man  in  society  and  to  science  and  to  meta- 
physics, is  that  there  is  one  all-unifying  type  of 
order,  an  ultimate  principle  of  order  into  which  all 
other  orders  may  be  fitted.  Not  that  the  world  is 
subject  to  law,  but  that  it  is  an  orderly  whole  is  the 
fundamental  assumption  of  intelligence. 

From  this  standpoint  we  can  see,  as  Bergson 
so  well  points  out,  that  what  is  called  disorder  exists 
only  from  some  partial  or  practical  point  of  view 
and  that,  in  the  last  analysis,  a  disorder  can  only 
mean  a  different  or  strange  (to  us) ,  type  of  order. 
For  example,  I  leave  my  study  in  order.  My  small 
boy  comes  in  and  I  return  to  find  it  in  what  I  call 
disorder,  but  from  his  standpoint  it  is  a  higher 
order. 

Inasmuch  as  individuals  and  groups  of  indi- 
viduals have  conflicting  interests  and  purposes,  the 
types  of  social  order  to  which  they  adhere  come 
into  conflict.  The  problem  as  to  whether  all  finite 
types  of  order  can  be  regarded  as  subordinate  to 


286  ^      THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

one  universal  principle  of  order  is  another  form  of 
the  problem  as  to  whether  there  can  be  said  to  be  a 
Universal  Purpose  or  Meaning,  to  which  all  lesser 
purposes  are  tributary  or  in  which  they  are  taken 
up  as  elements.  The  problem  is  obviously  that  of 
Singularism  and  Pluralism  stated  in  different  terms. 
I  suggest  that  the  notion  of  a  universal  society  or 
order  of  selves  which  has,  as  its  Principle  and  Ideal, 
a  Representative  or  Supreme  Self,  in  which  the 
meaning  or  order  of  the  whole  society  is  typified, 
will  probably  prove  to  be  the  conception  which  will 
most  fully  satisfy  all  the  interests  at  stake  in  this 
matter. 

It  is  very  significant,  in  this  connection,  to  note 
that  the  study  of  the  evolution  of  human  thought 
in  regard  to  the  Cosmos  and  in  regard  to  the  or- 
ganization of  the  human  social  order  shows  that 
the  former  reflects  the  latter.  Hegel  pointed  out, 
in  his  Philosophy  of  History  and  Philosophy  of  Re- 
ligion, that  the  religious  beliefs  of  a  people  and 
their  philosophies  reflect  the  character  of  their 
social  organization.  In  a  despotic  empire,  God  is  a 
despotic  monarch.  In  the  Greek  states  the  Olympian 
gods  are  a  society  of  free  individuals,  each  with 
his  special  province  or  domain  and  constituting  a 
social  order.  In  Israel  Jahweh  was  the  accepted 
ruler  of  the  social  order.  In  Christian  England, 
God  is  a  constitutional  monarch.  In  John  Calvin's 
autocratic  republic  of  Geneva,  God  was  an  austere 
sovereign.  In  a  democracy  God  would  be  the  per- 
manent President  administering  the  moral  order  of 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OF  METAPHYSICS    287 

society.  M.  Durkheim  has  shown  very  clearly,^ 
what  many  works  on  ethnology  testify  to,  that  in 
primitive  types  of  society  the  conception  of  the 
Cosmos  reflects  more  naively  the  organization  of 
the  trible.  For  instance,  the  Pueblos  have  seven 
constituent  clans  and  there  are  seven  cardinal  points 
in  the  Cosmos.  Certain  Australian  tribes  have  four 
social  groups  and  there  are  four  cardinal  points  in 
their  Cosmos. 

On  the  other  hand,  novel  conceptions  of  the 
universal  order  modify  social  organization.  The 
Christian  doctrine  of  a  new  social  order  of  which 
God  is  the  pattern  and  type,  the  ideal  and  guardian, 
has  been  one  of  the  chief  sources  of  the  modem 
movement  towards  democracy. 

5.      SPACE  AND  TIME 

Space  and  Time  are  such  universal  features 
of  experience  that  they  cannot  be  passed  over  in 
this  connection,  although  an  adequate  discussion  of 
the  metaphysical  problems  involved  is  not  in  place 
here. 

All  physical  objects  of  experience  are  placed 
in  Space  and  have  spatial  relations.  Indeed,  the 
minimal  definition  of  a  body  is  that  it  occupies 
space  and  resists  the  occupation  of  the  same  space 
by  any  other  body.  The  physical  concepts  of  in- 
ertia and  mass  are  derived  from  this  basic  fact.  In- 
asmuch as  inertia  and  mass  vary  greatly,  the 
physicist  is  rightly  led  to  the  view  that  space-occu- 


*  See  his  EUmentary  Formt  of  th^  R^UgiouM  Life, 


288  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

pancy  means  that  centers  of  force  are  distributed 
in  nature  in  very  varied  degrees  of  "thickness"  or 
nearness  and  remoteness  from  one  another.  The 
molecules  of  a  solid  are  closely  packed  together, 
those  of  a  liquid  are  farther  apart  and  those  of  a 
gas  still  farther  apart.  What  then  is  the  space  in 
which  these  various  relative  positions  obtain?  It 
cannot  well  be  a  vessel  which  contains  them,  and 
which  would  be  the  same  empty  as  full  of  molecules. 
And  yet  space  seems  to  have  a  constancy  of  dimen- 
sions, whether  molecules  are  thinly  scattered  or 
thickly  packed  in  it.  The  physicist  is  apt  to  invoke 
a  space-filling  ether,  in  which  molecules  are  regarded 
as  deformations  and  by  means  of  which  they  act 
on  one  another.  But  this  ether  is  only  another 
name  for  the  fact  that  physical  objects  interact.  I 
suggest  that  real  space  means  the  three-ply  order 
of  simultaneous  existence  or  co-existence  and  inter- 
action of  force-centers  as  perceived  by  human  be- 
ings. From  this  standpoint  space  is  not  something 
in  itself.  It  is  our  perception  of  the  order  in  which 
things  interact  and,  if  the  physical  world  is  made 
up  of  a  vast  system  of  interacting  force-centers, 
then  space  is  the  way  in  which  we  perceive  en  masse 
parts  of  this  system.  Space  thus  would  be,  not  a 
substance,  but  an  attribute  or  quality  of  the  real 
physical  world.  It  means  a  type  of  order  that  be- 
longs to  all  the  parts  of  the  physical  world  as  the 
latter  is  perceived. 

Interesting  questions  arise  as  to  the  relation 
between  the  space  of  experience  or  perceptual  space 
and  mathematical  space,  including  the  various  con- 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OF  METAPHYSICS     289 

ceptions  of  non-Euclidian  space.  Into  these  ques- 
tions we  cannot  enter  here.  It  may  be  in  place  to 
point  out  that  the  rather  prevalent  notion  that  to 
make  a  distinction  between  perceptual  and  con- 
ceptual space  will  enable  us  to  solve  all  the  problems 
of  space  is  a  mistake.  For  all  conceptual  spaces, 
those  of  mechanics,  Euclidian  geometry  and  non- 
Euclidian  geometries,  are  derived  by  abstraction 
and  intellectual  construction  from  perceptual  space. 
These  conceptual  spaces  are  not  real  apart  from 
the  mind  which  constructs  them.  The  space  that 
is  physically  real  must  be  an  extension  or  modifica- 
tion of  perceptual  space. 

All  human  experience  and  all  volition  is  tem- 
poral. Every  event  is  related  to  every  other  event 
either  as  contemporaneous,  before  or  after.  Event 
B  may  be  wholly  or  partly  contemporaneous  with 
event  X,  partly  or  wholly  after  A,  partly  or  wholly 
before  C.  Time  then  is  the  complex  relation  or 
order  of  succession  between  events.  Time  would 
not  be  recognized  unless  some  things  changed  in 
our  experiences  while  some  things  remained  perma- 
nent. This  does  not  imply  that  anything  is  neces- 
sarily absolutely  permanent,  except  the  orderly  stcc- 
cession  of  events.  The  temporal  order  is  an  irre- 
versible series  of  events.  But  it  would  not  be  a 
series  and  there  would  be  no  time-consciousness, 
unless  there  were  an  orderly  sequence  or  succession. 
The  notion  of  time  arises  from  our  conscious  noting 
of  succession  or  orderly  change,  but  we  apply  this 
notion,  by  means  of  recurring  or  rhythmic  motions 
in  space,  an  hour  glass,  a  pendulum,  the  earth's 

19 


290  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

rotation  and  its  movement  around  the  sun,  to  ar- 
range and  date  events  in  an  objective  temporal  or 
historical  order.  Inasmuch  as  we  can  correlate 
changes  in  our  own  experiences  as  individuals  and 
social  groups  with  the  physical  changes  and  rhythms 
in  the  external  world,  we  are  led,  rightly,  to  be- 
lieve in  an  objective  time  order,  in  which  the  tem- 
poral order  of  individuals,  the  histories  of  societies 
and  living  species  and  even  the  histories  of  stellar 
systems,  are  elements. 

We  cannot  think  of  the  whole  spatial  order  as 
having  bounds,  since  it  could  not  be  bounded  except 
by  another  and  larger  space-whole  which  contained 
it.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  universe  is  in  bound- 
less space,  it  is  not  a  complete  totality.  Similarly, 
we  cannot  think  time  as  having  either  an  absolute 
beginning  or  an  absolute  ending,  for  beginnings 
and  endings  are  relative  to  the  events  before  and 
after  them.  And  yet  there  seem  to  be  new  begin- 
nings, new  beings,  new  acts  in  the  time  order.  If 
it  were  not  so  the  universe  would  have  no  history; 
for,  without  changes  or  novelties,  there  would  arise 
no  thought  of  history,  no  idea  of  continuity  or  per- 
manence.   How  can  we  solve  these  paradoxes  ? 

Kant  proposed  a  very  simple  solution.  He  as- 
sumed that  space  and  time  were  forms  of  human 
perception.  Constituted  as  it  is,  the  race  of  man 
cannot  help  perceiving  things  in  space  and  time. 
But  things-in-themselves,  that  is,  the  ultimate 
reality,  may  not  be  in  space  or  time.  God  and  the 
soul  may  really  be  spaceless  and  timeless.  In  fact 
Kant  finally  concludes  that  they  must  be. 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  OF  METAPHYSICS     291 

Kant's  solution  is  too  simple.  Since  we  human 
beings  live  and  work  with  fair  success  in  a  world 
which  has  spatial  and  temporal  order,  it  seems  im- 
pK)ssible  to  conceive,  in  an  intelligible  fashion,  the 
nature  of  a  so-called  "real"  wo^rld  that  had  no 
spatial  or  temporal  qualities. 

Perhaps  the  solution  of  the  difficulties  here  may 
be  found  in  the  following  direction.  The  spatial 
order  is  real,  but  relative  to  our  positions  and  rela- 
tions as  finite  beings.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
the  absolute  totality  or  unity  of  the  real,  this  order 
would  appear  only  as  the  order  of  relations  among 
the  several  finite  members  of  the  whole  system  of 
reality.  The  temporal  order  is  real,  since  it  is  an 
order  which  involves  permanence;  in  other  words, 
since  we  cannot  think  succession  as  an  order,  or 
indeed  at  all,  without  reference  to  the  notion  of  a 
permanence,  at  least  of  order  or  law  or  meaning 
holding  through  change,  there  may  be  an  absolutely 
permanent  reality,  one  that  is  trans-temporal  in  the 
sense  of  enduring  through  all  time. 

Since  a  complete  whole  or  totality  of  being  im- 
plies a  permanent  order,  the  notion  of  perduration 
in  time  is  more  fundamental  than  that  of  spatial 
order.  And  since  the  notion  of  a  permanent  order 
involves  time,  and  time  means  an  order-in-experi- 
ence,  the  only  satisfactory  conception  that  I  can 
frame  of  an  order  that  endures  through  time  is 
that  of  the  conscious  life  of  a  universal  society 
which  has  its  ground  in  a  permanent  selfhood,  an 
enduring  spirit  for  whom  all  temporal  orders  exist, 
in  whose  total  and  self-active  experience  all  finite 


292  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

"nows"  or  "presents"  are  sustained  and  unified.  If 
the  universe  be  a  universe  it  must  be  a  systematic 
or  ordered  whole  of  structure  and  meaning  or  pur- 
pose. The  ground  of  such  an  order  of  meaning  and 
purpose  must  be  a  Universal  Life,  an  active  experi- 
encing centre  or  unity. 

The  above  remarks  are  intended  simply  as 
hints  to  the  student  as  to  the  importance  and  dif- 
ficulty of  these  problems  and  the  directions  in  which 
we  might  work  for  their  clarification. 

REFERENCES 

Mackenzie,  article  Metaphysics  and  Royce  article  Or- 
der in  Encyclopaedia  of  Religion  and  Ethics. 

Taylor,  Elements  of  Metaphysics. 

Marvin,  First  Book  in  Metaphysics  (useful  for  an 
outline  of  dilfferent  standpoints  and  for  bibliography). 

Royce,  The  World  and  the  Individual. 

Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality. 

Ward,  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  especially  Parts 
IV  and  V,  and  The  Realm  of  Ends. 

Bosanquet,  The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value. 

Varisco,  The  Great  Problems,  and  Know  Thyself, 


CHAPTER  XXVI 
EPISTEMOLOGY 

All  the  principal  theories  of  knowledge  have 
been  already  discussed.  It  is  indeed  impossible  to 
discuss  systematically  theories  of  reality  or  the 
theories  of  the  great  philosophers  without  going 
into  epistemological  questions.  In  the  historical  in- 
troduction it  was  pointed  out  that  the  problem  of 
knowledge  was  definitely  raised  and  discussed  by 
Plato  and,  indeed,  we  find  more  or  less  fragmentary 
theories  of  knowledge  before  Plato.  At  this  point 
we  wish  to  get  a  summary  view  of  the  principal 
problems  of  knowledge  and  of  the  principal  answers 
to  these  problems.  It  will  be  my  aim  systematically 
to  gather  together  the  discussions  and  the  points  of 
view  as  to  the  nature,  structure  and  function  of 
knowledge  that  have  been  scattered  through  our 
previous  discussions. 

In  modem  epistemology  there  are  three  chief 
problems.  These  of  course  cannot  be  absolutely 
separated.  No  principal  problem  of  knowledge  can 
be  thus  separated  from  the  other  chief  problems. 
In  philosophy  our  quest  is  for  a  unified  conception 
of  reality.  One's  standpoint  on  any  one  of  these 
problems  of  knowledge  will  determine  largely,  if 
not  entirely,  his  standpoint  on  the  other  problems. 
For  emphasis,  however,  it  is  possible  to  distinguish 
between  these  problems.  The  three  problems  are 
the  following :  — 

(293) 


294  THE   FIELD   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

(1)  What  are  the  sources  of  knowledge  — 
whence  is  our  knowledge  derived? 

(2)  What  is  the  place  of  knowledge  in  the 
world  of  being — what  is  the  relation  of 
cognition  to  reality? 

(3)  What  are  the  norms,  the  criteria,  the 
standards  of  knowledge? 

1.      PROBLEM   OF  THE  SOURCES  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

From  the  beginning  of  modern  philosophy 
down  to  the  present  time,  one  finds  two  antithetical 
views  as  to  the  sources  of  knowledge,  namely,  em- 
piricism  and  rationalisTn. 

Empiricism  is  predominantly  a  British  tradi- 
tion in  philosophy.  We  find  its  beginnings  in  some 
of  the  nominalists  of  the  Middle  Ages  and  it  then 
moves  forward,  with  ever  increasing  momentum, 
through  Francis  Bacon,  Hobbes,  Locke,  Hume,  J.  S. 
Mill,  and  others.  The  central  thesis  of  this  move- 
ment is  that  all  knowledge  is  derived  from  sense 
experience,  Locke,  for  example,  while  not  an  out 
and  out  empiricist,  in  that  he  admits  that  there  are 
certain  kinds  of  knowledge  arrived  at  by  reflection, 
says  that  there  are  two  chief  sources  of  knowledge, 
viz.,  ideas  of  sense  and  ideas  of  reflection.  Hume, 
who  is  a  thoroughgoing  empiricist,  has  a  different 
terminology  from  Locke.  Hume  calls  Locke's 
"ideas  of  sense"  "impressions,"  and  uses  the  term 
"ideas"  to  designate  copies  or  traces  of  sense  im- 
pressions in  the  mind.  All  ideas  are  derived  from 
sense  impressions  for  Hume.  These  men,  save  to 
the  extent  that  Locke  is  a  rationalist,  regard  the 


EPISTEMOLOGY  295 

mind  as  a  sort  of  wax  tablet  or  sheet  of  paper  on 
which  impressions  are  made.  The  mind  is  but  a 
name  for  the  records  made  by  the  sequences  of  im- 
pressions. Impressions  are  made  on  the  mind  and 
thus  the  mind  is  modified.  We  must  be  careful  to 
note,  however,  that  there  is  no  substance-mind  for 
Hume.  For  him,  at  least,  mind  is  only  the  tied-up 
succession  of  impressions.  Mind  is  only  the  proces- 
sions of  ideas  and  impressions.^ 

Where  do  these  impressions  come  from? 
Hume's  answer  virtually  is,  "I  don't  know".  "I 
feel",  he  says  in  effect,  "only  a  constant'  succession 
of  impressions  and  ideas".  Nowhere  can  Hume  find 
a  substantial  mind.  As  to  the  modes  whereby  these 
successions  get  tied  together,  Hume  says  that  this 
is  accomplished  by  means  of  such  psychological  laws 
as  association  by  contiguity,  resemblance  and  suc- 
cession. It  is  by  means  of  these  laws  that  ideas 
get  married.  The  fact  that  you  have  had  two  im- 
pressions contiguous  and  immediately  succeeding 
one  another  leads  an  impression  or  idea  similar  to 
one  to  call  up  the  other.  Hume  says  that  all  our 
knowledge  is  built  up  in  these  ways  from  impres- 
sions which  are  connected  up  by  means  of  these 
laws  of  association.  We  had  better  not  say  we 
have  impressions  and  copies  since  there  is  no  self; 
it  would  be  truer  to  say  there  are  impressions  and 
these  mysteriously  engender  copies  which  get  asso- 
ciated in  a  variety  of  ways. 


^  William  James  has  a  better  way  of  stating  how  ideas 
are  connected.  He  calls  the  connection  "the  unity  of  the 
passing  thought." 


296  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

The  idea  of  causation,  which  was  the  central 
difficulty  for  Hume,  and  which  Kant  later  gen- 
eralized in  such  a  way  as  to  show  that  it  is  but  one 
of  the  many  types  of  synthetic  a  priori  connections, 
is  derived,  says  Hume,  from  the  repeated  succes- 
sion of  our  impressions.  If  it  is  noticed  that  A  is 
always  followed  by  B,  there  is  soon  formed  the 
habit  of  expecting,  of  looking  for  B  whenever  we 
see  A.  All  we  mean  by  causation  is  that  there  have 
been  in  a  number  of  cases  similar  sequences  of  im- 
pressions. If,  for  example,  A  is  followed  by  B 
and  A2  by  Bg,  and  so  on,  then  if  we  ever  perceive  A^^ 
we  shall  of  course  expect,  through  the  force  of  this 
habit,  that  Bn  will  follow.  Causation  is  the  name 
of  a  habit  engendered  by  such  a  repetition  of  re- 
sembling sequences  of  impressions.  For  the  pure 
empiricist,  the  mind  is  either  wholly  passive  or  it 
is  nothing  at  all.  Knowledge  consists  of  the  re- 
peated association,  in  various  ways,  of  sense  impres- 
sions and  copies  of  sense  impressions.  We  can,  ac- 
cording to  empiricism,  account  for  images  and  con- 
cepts and  for  their  modes  of  association,  but  we 
remain  absolutely  mute  when  we  try  to  give  an 
account  of  the  source  of  the  original  perceptual 
knowledge. 

The  rationalist  maintains  that  true  knowledge 
is  derived  from  thought  itself,  from  the  activity  of 
reason.  He  believes  that  the  characteristic  of 
knowledge  which  is  called  truth  is  a  function  of 
its  power  to  constitute  a  totality.  The  highest  kind 
of  knowledge  consists  in  universally  valid  proposi- 
tions that  are  consistent  with  one  another.     Sense 


EPISTEMOLOGY  297 

experience  does  not  give  us  propositions  which  are 
universally  valid  or  mutually  consistent.  By  the 
great  philosophers  of  Greece  and  such  modem 
philosophers  as  Descartes,  Spinoza,  Leibnitz,  Kant, 
Hegel  and  all  the  later  idealists  after  Hegel,  this 
claim  of  the  inability  of  sense  experience  to  give  us 
universally  valid  thought  connections  is  reiterated. 
From  sense  perception,  say  the  rationalists,  we  can 
get  only  a  number  of  particular  cases.  The  cases 
may,  to  be  sure,  be  similar  to  one  another  but  we 
never  get  universally  valid  linkages  of  thought. 
Now,  our  sense  experience  is  full  of  inconsistencies 
and  discrepancies,  and  the  rationalist  maintains 
that,  when  we  examine  these  inconsistencies  and 
discrepancies  in  sense  perception,  we  find  them  to 
be  due  to  the  imperfect  activity  of  thought.  Knowl- 
edge for  the  rationalist  is  more  than  a  connection 
of  experiences  by  passive  repetition  and  association 
and  by  emotionally  engendered  beliefs.  Reasoning 
is  a  process  of  actively  relating  and  classifying  our 
experiences,  but  this  may  be  done  so  hastily  that 
sufficient  scrutiny  is  not  exercised  to  avoid  error. 
We  may  correct  error  under  the  guidance  of  cer- 
tain innate  or  a  priori,  fundamental  laws  of  thought. 
In  this  way  the  very  principles  that  we  employ  in 
organizing  our  experiences  have  a  different  source 
from  our  sense  impressions.  I  cannot  rest  satis- 
fied in  a  contradiction.  My  intellectual  structure 
is  such  that  I  cannot  rest  at  such  a  point.  My 
rational  nature  demands  consistency.  Two  contra- 
dictory propositions  cannot  be  true  simultaneously 
and  if  one  denies  this  he  virtually  denies  the  possi- 


298  THE   FIELD   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

bility  of  science.  He  negates  the  very  nature  of 
reason. 

Our  ordinary  sense  experience,  as  interpreted 
under  the  influence  of  tradition  and  feeling,  gives 
us  many  contradictory  propositions.  Of  these  we 
say  that  there  must  be  something  wrong,  that  the 
experiences  can  not  have  been  taken  in  their  right 
relations.  In  order  to  think  scientifically  we  are 
obliged  to  accept  the  validity  and  authority  of  the 
laws  of  thought.  The  first  of  these  laws  is  called 
the  Principle  of  Identity.  It  means  that  in  any  dis- 
cussion that  is  to  get  anywhere  we  must  stick  to 
our  definitions.  Its  objects  must  have  certain  in- 
variant characteristics  if  thought  is  to  continue. 
Another  of  these  fundamental  principles  is  called 
the  Law  of  Contradiction  —  two  contradictory 
propositions  cannot  both  be  true  simultaneously. 
These  principles,  together  with  others  which  Logic 
formulates,  are  the  presuppositionless  or  ultimate 
bases  of  all  valid  thinking.  In  regard  to  all  the 
other  sciences,  we  find  that  they  rest  upon  certain 
logical  presuppositions.  There  is  always  some  atlas 
upon  which  the  group  of  order  series  which  con- 
stitutes any  particular  science  rests.  But  at  this 
point  in  the  discussion  of  the  theory  of  knowledge 
we  come  upon  a  unique  situation.  The  presupposi- 
tions of  knowledge  are  the  logical  principles  which 
guide  and  control  the  mind  in  its  entire  quest  for 
knowledge. 

Another  of  these  ultimate  logical  principles  is 
that  of  the  Causal  Category  or  Principle  of  Sufficient 
Ground.  Why  does  one  always  look  for  causal  rela- 


EPISTEMOLOGY  299 

tions?  We  say  that  nothing  can  happen  without  a 
sufficient  cause  or  ground.  This  attitude  seems  to  be 
native  to  the  mind.  We  are  not  satisfied  with  saying 
that  things  just  happen.  We  look  diligently  for 
causes.  Many  of  us  are  uneasy  until  we  find  out  the 
how  and  the  why  of  happenings.  We  distinguish 
between  causal  sequences  and  those  that  are  not 
causal.  Of  the  latter,  the  sequence  of  day  and  night 
may  be  taken  as  an  illustration.  The  causal  series 
differs  from  the  non-causal  in  that  the  former  is  an 
irreversible  series.  We  may  agree  with  the  em- 
piricist that  the  specific  aspects  of  any  given  causal 
sequence  are  in  all  particular  cases  dependent  upon 
empirical  data.  But  the  empiricist  fails  to  account 
for  the  native  propensity  of  the  mind  insistently  to 
demand  the  causal  grounds  of  every  event.  Thics 
the  mind  seems  to  have  certain  specific  native  ways 
of  operation,  and  in  Logic  we  study  these  ways.  The 
whole  subject  matter  of  Logic  is  the  study  of  the 
structure  of  human  reason.  The  empiricist  is  evi- 
dently right  in  saying  that  the  data  of  knowl-  T>^ 
edge  are  found  in  experience,  and  no  reasonable  ^vX^ 
rationalist  will  deny  that  postulate,  but  he  insists  ^ 
that  the  data  do  not  fashion  the  tools  by  which 
knowledge  is  made.  Indeed,  Kant  emphatically  as- 
serted that  there  could  be  no  knowledge  without 
empirical  data  and  became  agnostic  only  at  the 
points  where  such  empirical  data  are  not  present. 
Empiricism  has  a  tendency  to  confine  experience  to 
what  we  perceive  through  the  outer  senses,  but  in 
doing  so  it  overlooks  the  fact  that  we  have  a  large 
framework  of  affectional,  moral,  social  and  logical 


300  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

context.  It  is  this  that  empiricism  seems  peren- 
nially to  overlook. 

The  position  that  I  take  is  called  teleological 
idealism.  Such  a  point  of  view  makes  an  organic 
synthesis  of  the  valid  claims  of  both  rationalism 
and  empiricism.  From  this  standpoint  we  explicity 
hold  that  the  materials  of  knowledge  come  to  us  in 
experience,  but  the  materials  thus  given  are  or- 
ganized by  the  activity  of  reason  into  the  texture 
of  our  sciences.  This  native  capacity  of  the  reason 
is  not  to  be  interpreted,  as  many  interpret  Plato 
and  other  historic  rationalists,  as  being  a  body  of 
categories  which  have  come  into  existence  independ- 
ently of  the  creative  or  synthetic  processes  of  ex- 
perience. The  universal  principles  of  knowledge 
are  the  mind's  fundamental  ways  of  working  as 
these  develop  in  and  through  the  organization  of 
experience. 

Thoroughgoing  empiricism  is  nominalistic. 
Concepts  and  universals,  which  are  the  chief  tools 
of  science,  are  from  this  standpoint  nothing  but 
signs  or  symbols,  and  it  is  impossible  to  determine 
with  any  degree  of  accuracy  what  the  relation  is 
that  subsists  between  the  symbols  and  the  thing 
symbolized.  The  thing  signified  or  symbolized  is 
not  a  matter  of  experience,  consequently  our  con- 
cepts and  universals  are  subjective  formations;  they 
are  names  for  relations  which  arise  in  the  mind  be- 
tween ideas.  Hume,  who  is  one  of  the  most  instruc- 
tive figures  in  the  history  of  philosophy  because  he 
worked  out  the  logical  consequences  of  empiricism, 
argued  that  the  only  kind  of  knowledge  that  has 


EPISTEMOLOGY  801 

any  certainty  is  mathematics.  Now  this  certainty 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  mathematics  deals  only  with 
relations  between  ideas.  Such  relations  as  these  of 
identity,  difference,  magnitude  and  degree  have  to 
do  only  with  the  comparison  of  ideas  with  one  an- 
other. Yet  Hume  is  constrained  to  say  that  even 
in  mathematics  the  oftener  we  run  over  a  proof  the 
more  certain  of  it  do  we  become.  Repetition  of 
similar  experiences  is  the  test  of  truth.  Thus  em- 
piricism is  not  just  to  the  character  of  mathematics. 
Mathematics  does  not  deal  with  existence  theorems. 
It  is  not  concerned  with  the  existence  of  points, 
lines,  circles,  et  cetera,  in  nature.  Indeed  it  abstracts 
even  from  the  relation  of  mathematical  space  to 
the  space  of  perception.  Pure  mathematics  deals 
with  ideal  constructions.  Thus  far  Hume  is  cor- 
rect, but  the  validity  of  a  mathematical  theorem 
is  in  no  wise  dependent  on  the  frequency  of  our 
running  over  the  proof.  In  the  last  generation  the 
science  of  mathematics  has  been  very  largely  recon- 
structed by  the  discovery  and  the  elaboration  of 
more  rigorous  methods  of  proof.  Keen,  critical 
minds  equipped  with  a  passion  for  certitude  have 
discovered  flaws  even  in  Euclid.  Minds,  in  the 
highest  degree  equipped  with  the  rational  structure 
of  which  I  spoke  above,  have  criticised  and  dis- 
covered flaws  in  certain  mathematical  demonstra- 
tions which  had  been  supposed  to  be  irrefutable.  But 
these  more  rigorous  methods  of  proof  have  not  in- 
creased in  rigor  merely  by  being  repeated  many 
times  by  many  persons. 


302  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

There  is  another  difficulty  with  the  empirical 
attitude.  Granted  that  mathematics  deals,  not  with 
existence,  but  with  relations  of  ideas  connected  by- 
reason,  we  are  justified  in  saying  that  mathematics 
is  an  invention.  We  must  say  that  it  is  a  product 
not  of  the  senses  but  of  the  reason.  But  mathe- 
matics applies  to  the  world  in  which  we  live.  The 
triumph  of  the  modern  mechanical  theory  of  nature 
is  due  to  the  faith  its  authors  had  that  nature  is 
a  kind  of  crystallized  mathematics.  It  is  small 
wonder  that  Galileo  and  others  called  mathematics 
divine  —  "What  we  can  measure  we  can  know." 
Mathematics  works.  It  works  in  its  application  to 
past  experience,  to  present  experience  and  further, 
to  possible  experience.  The  predictive  power  of 
mathematical  science  is  great.  Take  this  illustra- 
tion. In  1843  two  astronomers  made  a  calcula- 
tion, based  upon  the  deviation  of  the  observed  path 
of  the  planet  Uranus  from  the  path  it  should  de- 
scribe in  view  of  the  relations,  the  relative  points 
and  motions  of  the  planets  known  by  observation 
to  exist.  The  path  of  Uranus  as  calculated  from 
the  observed  relations  of  the  recorded  planets  should 
have  been  of  a  certain  character.  The  observed 
path,  however,  was  aberrant.  In  view  of  this,  what 
did  the  mathematical  astronomers  do?  The  astron- 
omer said,  "there  must  be  an  hitherto  unobserved 
planet"  and  he  calculated  the  locus  of  this  planet. 
At  Berlin  the  royal  astronomer  heeded  the  order 
of  the  astronomers  in  question  and  looked  as  he  was 
told  for  the  planet  and  lo,  it  was  there.  This  is 
only  one  of  the  evident  cases  of  prediction.     The 


EPISTEMOLOGY  303 

more  science  develops  by  so  much  the  more  do  we 
have  cases  of  this  kind.  Let  me  note  as  a  curious 
fact  that  Hume,  who  says  that  the  whole  idea  of 
causation  is  a  mere  result  of  habit,  presupposes 
the  very  idea  he  seeks  to  explain,  inasmuch  as  he 
is  already  seeking  a  cause  for  the  origin  of  our 
belief  in  causation. 

Rationalism  is  realistic.  It  is  realistic  in  that 
it  regards  universals  and  other  relations  as  facts 
that  the  mind  discovers  by  the  use  of  its  funda- 
mental ways  of  working.  Reality  has  rational 
order,  texture,  coherence ;  it  is  not  chaotic,  and  it  is 
because  of  this  doctrine  as  to  the  texture  of  reality 
that  rationalistic  realism  finds  a  place  for  science, 
whereas  for  nominalism  science  is  but  a  set  of  sub- 
jective symbols  of  an  unknown  reality.  Science  is 
objective  in  its  application. 

Rant,  though  he  answered  Hume,  never  freed 
himself  completely  from  the  influence  of  empiricism. 
He  said  that  the  materials  of  knowledge  come  into 
the  mind  as  a  chaotic  manifold  and  that  mind, 
through  its  synthetic  organizing  power,  arranges 
this  chaotic  mass  into  the  ordered  whole  which  we 
call  the  world.  The  mind  puts  the  relations  into 
nature.  This  view  is  an  inconsistent  one,  for,  if 
mind  puts  the  relations  into  nature,  then  the  world 
is  the  fabrication  of  our  own  powers  and  we  are 
not  delivered  from  subjectivity. 

Later  idealists  start  from  Kant's  view  that 
mind  is  an  organizing  principle,  and  they  hold  that 
the  successful  working  of  the  mind  in  the  world 
shows    that   the   environment   has   an    intelligible 


304  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

texture.  This  is  what  objective  idealism  teaches. 
It  is  not  that  we  know  only  ideas  as  Berkeley 
argued,  but  it  is  the  fact  that  we  are  analyzing  the 
nature  of  mind  and  finding  that  it  has  this  structure, 
which  also  has  its  correlate  in  nature,  that  gives 
efficacy  to  mind.  Mind  is  an  effective  part  of  the 
world.    In  short,  mind  is  at  home  in  the  world. 

Wm.  James,  who  partially  misunderstood 
rationalism,  and  was  at  the  same  time  rightly  dis- 
satisfied with  empiricism,  called  his  view  radical 
empiricism.  It  is  pure  mythology,  he  says,  to  argue 
that  all  that  comes  to  the  mind  is  mere  disjecta 
membra.  We  cannot  put  our  finger  on  any  dis- 
connected item  of  experience.  Every  item  is  re- 
lated. The  minimum  of  experience  at  least  involves 
the  relating  implied  in  the  answer  to  such  a  question 
as,  "what  is  that?"  The  mind  starts  out  with  its 
classificatory  tentacles,  its  incipient  universals.  We 
are  everlastingly  propounding  the  question  "what 
does  this  fact  mean?";  and  thus  we  start  on  the  end- 
less process  of  relating  data.  There  is  no  such 
thing  as  an  unrelated  datum  of  sense.  Psychologists 
are  now  agreed  that  there  are  no  such  things  as 
pure  sensations.  James  misunderstood  rationalism 
in  so  far  as  he  thought  that  it  is  one  of  the  cardinal 
doctrines  of  this  view  to  suppose  that  mind  comes 
down  from  above,  as  it  were,  and  puts  relations 
into  the  data  in  an  external  fashion.  James,  in  his 
doctrine  of  a  "pure  experience"  free  from  the  dis- 
tinctions and  relations  which  thought  makes,  over- 
looked the  fact  that  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  have 
mere  sensations,  although,  in  other  passages,  he 


EPISTEMOLOGY  805 

recognizes  that  there  are  no  pure  sensations.  He 
seems  to  have  held  that  this  so-called  pure  experience 
is  the  reality  which  thought  distorts  and  disfigures. 
The  truth  is  the  mind  is  always  active  and  all  that 
comes  to  mind  is  related.  The  meaning  of  this  is 
that  our  world  has  an  intelligible,  rational,  texture 
or  structure. 

2.      KNOWLEDGE  AND  REALITY 

We  have  already  discussed  incidentally  the 
place  of  knowing  in  reality.  It  now  remains  to 
gather  up  briefly  these  suggestions  into  a  systematic 
view. 

The  simplest  answer  to  the  query,  what  is  the 
relation  of  cognition  to  reality?  is  called  naive  or 
presentational  realism.  This  is  the  view  of  the  com- 
mon man  (that  horrible  example) ,  the  person  who 
has  not  thought  of  this  problem.  He  is  naive;  for 
him  there  is  no  distinction  between  mind  and  the 
object  of  mind.  For  him  mind  is  at  one  with  its 
object.  The  object  known  and  the  knowing  process 
are  numerically  and  qualitatively  identical. 

This  position  is  untenable.  No  two  of  us  in 
this  classroom  see  this  table  before  me  in  the  same 
way.  Your  perception  is  a  function  of  your  posi- 
tion, of  light,  shade,  of  movements  and  of  infinite 
other  variations.  In  fact  your  perception  is  a 
function  of  your  sense  organs,  of  your  perceptors 
as  these  are  determined  by  your  mental  habits  and 
interests.  From  Zeno  down  the  skeptics  have  been 
pointing  out  arguments  that  show  the  duality  of 
the  knowing  mind  and  the  known  objects. 


306  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

One  remove  from  naive  is  representationcd 
realism.  The  stock  example  of  this  point  of  view 
is  John  Locke.  This  views  admits  the  validity  of 
the  criticism  just  made  of  naive  realism,  and  so  this 
view  starts  from  the  existence  of  images  and  mental 
conceptions  and  says  that  we  know  only  our  ideas. 
Our  ideas  are  representations,  copies,  symbols,  of 
the  real  things. 

It  is  quite  true  that  representation  does  play 
a  considerable  part  in  our  knowledge.  In  response 
to  my  request,  you  describe  the  State  House.  In 
doing  so  you  call  up  images  of  the  State  House. 
Your  idea  is  a  kind  of  representation,  replica  or 
copy ;  but  how  do  we  settle  whether  the  description 
you  give  is  a  copy?  We  appeal  to  the  fact.  The 
fact  confirms  or  rejects  the  copy.  If  we  take,  how- 
ever, the  copy  view  on  all  fours,  we  never  get  any- 
thing but  ideas.  Then  how  can  we  settle,  how  can 
we  ever  agree?  Representational  realism  is  only  a 
half-way  mansion ;  we  cannot  stay  at  this  place.  Any 
man  that  thinks  must  pack  up  his  tent  and  move 
on  to  some  more  substantial  city.  One  more  remove 
is  the  position  known  as  phenomenalistic  realism 
or  idealism,^  Ernst  Mach,  Karl  Pearson  and  in  part 
Immanuel  Kant  are  representatives  of  this  position. 
These  men  assert  that  we  do  not  know  reality.  We 
cannot  tell  to  what  extent,  if  indeed  to  any  at  all, 
our  ideas  truly  represent  reality.  The  really  real 
things  forever  retreat  up  the  spiral  stairway  of 


^  Improperly  so-called.    It  should  be  called  phenomenal- 
istic psychologism  or  ideaism.    This  is  Hume's  position. 


EPISTEMOLOGY  307 

reality.  We  reach  out  our  conceptual  tentacles  to 
make  a  seizure  into  reality,  but  we  remain  in  the 
veil.  Between  us  and  reality  there  is  a  wall  of 
partition  which  not  even  the  Allies  can  demolish. 
We  do  not  know  reality. 

Herbert  Spencer  too  has  contributed  to  the 
teaching  of  phenomenalism.  He  calls  his  position 
transfigured  realism.  In  our  knowing  reality,  he 
says,  we  transfigure  it ;  it  becomes  in  the  knowledge 
context  something  quite  different  from  what  it  is 
outside  the  knowledge  relation.  The  knowledge 
relation  does  not  bring  us  into  touch  with  reality 
as  it  is.  Yet  Herbert  Spencer  is  convinced  that 
there  is  a  reality,  and  that  this  reality  is  an  infinite 
and  eternal  energy  from  which  all  things  proceed. 

Let  me  briefly  indicate  two  diflficulties  in  this 
view:  (a)  Knowledge  works  in  the  world.  In  the 
only  world  with  which  we  have  anything  to  do,  we 
find  that  knowledge  does  function  effectively,  and 
we  further  find  that  the  increasing  success  of 
knowledge  is  due  to  the  fact  that  we  have  analyzed 
and  systematized  our  experiences.  Errors  are  half 
truths.  Illusions  are  experiences  wrongly  inter- 
preted, set  in  the  wrong  relations,  in  the  wrong 
context,  and  the  distinction  between  the  knowledge 
of  phenomena  and  the  knowledge  of  reality  is  only 
a  distinction  of  degree,  (b)  Phenomenalistic  ideal- 
ism is  inconsistent  in  the  very  distinction  which 
serves  as  its  starting  point.  How  do  we  know  that 
we  know  only  phenomena,  if  we  do  not  know  the 
real?  The  lapidarist  says  of  a  certain  specimen 
handed  to  him,  "this  is  a  sham  diamond."     Such 


308  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

pronouncement  is  impossible  unless  there  be  a 
knowledge  of  the  real  diamond.  Phenomenalism 
assumes  that  there  is  a  veil  between  us  and  reality. 
How  do  we  know  it  is  a  veil  if  we  have  never  been 
through  the  veil  and  looked  upon  the  holy  of  holies  ? 
Our  world  of  experience  is  the  only  world  with 
which  we  have  to  deal.  The  phenomenalist  makes 
a  distinction  which  involves  him  in  a  contradiction. 
By  what  sources  does  he  know  that  we  do  not  know 
real  things  ?  There  is  no  meaning  in  the  distinction 
between  the  sham  and  the  real,  unless  we  know 
enough  about  the  real  to  be  able  to  compare  it  with 
the  sham. 

3.      CRITICAL  REALISM  OR  TELEOLOGICAL  IDEALISM. 

We  know  reality  in  part  and  are  capable  of 
knowing  it  more  fully.  This  is  the  basic  thesis  of 
our  position.  It  is  also  our  contention  that  the 
progress  of  knowledge  shows  an  increasing  corre- 
spondence between  mind  or  the  knower  and  the 
world.  There  is  a  growth  in  the  agreement  be- 
tween thought  and  things,  and  this  evolution  is 
manifested  in  the  progress  of  pure  science  and  in 
its  successful  applications.  Many  of  our  ideas  do 
seem  to  consist  of  mental  representations  of  actual 
past  or  possible  future  experiences.  Considered 
as  ideas,  these  representations  vary  in  concreteness 
and  pictorialness  from  images  to  the  symbolic 
formulas  of  mathematics  and  logic.  But  these 
representative  ideas  contain  truth,  because  the 
representative  experiences  that  human  beings  have 


EPISTEMOLOGY  309 

had,  stand  for  further  experiences  which  may  be 
had  under  definite  and  assignable  conditions. 

The  standpoint  of  teleological  idealism  is  that 
mind  is  a  live  focus  of  reality,  that  there  is  an 
active  correspondence  of  mind  and  reality,  in  short, 
it  is  that  mind  is  a  true  part  of  reality.  Minds  are 
centers  in  which  the  nature  of  reality  becomes  con- 
scious of  itself,  and  in  this  way  mind  is  seen  to  be 
something  very  different  from  the  old  soul  prin- 
ciple which  was  shut  off  by  unscalable  walls  from 
the  world.  Reality  is  not  something  impenetrably 
hidden  behind  a  veil.  Reality  is  what  is  or  may  be 
experienced,  and  what  may  be  inferred  from  ex- 
perience. The  other  side  of  the  moon,  the  center 
of  the  earth  and  the  polar  ice-cap  of  the  Antarctic 
region  are  items  of  rational  belief  which  we  infer 
from  our  experiences. 

By  saying  that  there  is  ether  or  that  there  are 
electrons,  what  does  one  mean?  I  take  it  that  we 
can  only  mean  that  these  are  logical  constructions 
inferred  from  experiences.  These  constructions 
however,  are  based  on  experience,  and  if  there  are 
electrons,  then  under  certain  assignable  conditions 
they  should  be  perceptible.  Otherwise  the  electron 
theory  is  a  useless  hypothesis.  Reality  is  experience 
as  actual  or  possible  or  both.  Our  minds  and  sense 
organs  are  genuine  functioning  parts  of  the  real 
world.  There  is  this  active  and  effective  corre- 
spondence between  thought  and  reality  and,  since 
we  make  our  concepts,  our  formulas  and  sjnnbols 
of  things  by  thinking  about  sense  data  and  since, 
furthermore,  these  formulas  work  in  experience,  it 


310  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

follows  that  reality  has  an  orderly  or  structural 
character.  In  short,  we  agree  with  Hegel  in  saying 
that  reality  is  rational. 

What  then  shall  we  say  of  illusions  and  the 
so-called  errors  of  the  senses?  In  reality  they  are 
errors  of  judgment  and  not  of  the  senses.  The  error 
is  a  function  of  the  judgment  which  I  make.  The 
man  in  delirium  tremens  has  a  real  experience,  so 
also  the  one  who  sees  ghosts,  but  it  is  only  in  his 
interpretation  of  his  experience  that  he  errs.  He 
does  not  set  his  sensory  data  in  their  right  relations. 
In  epistemology  one  of  the  most  hackneyed  illustra- 
tions is  the  case  of  the  straight  stick  that  is  bent 
in  the  water.  In  the  water  it  looks  bent,  but  we 
say  it  is  really  straight.  The  bentness  of  the  stick 
is  due  to  the  different  refractive  power  of  air  and 
water.  The  visual  stick  is  really  bent,  but  the 
tactual  stick  is  not  bent  and  further,  the  visual 
stick  out  of  the  water  is  not  bent.  Which  is  the 
real  stick? 

We  live  most  of  our  time  on  land,  and  we  have 
learned  that  the  properties  or  qualities  which  are 
practically  important  for  us  are  those  an  object 
has  when  close  to  us.  So  we  agree  to  make  cer- 
tain sets  of  conditions  define  the  standard  for  us 
and  we  all  agree  to  that.  The  "real"  stick  is  the 
result  of  the  tacit  agreement  among  us  socially  as 
to  what  aspects  of  the  whole  series  of  sensory 
qualities  called  "stick"  are  most  important.  Our 
standards  of  measurement  are  all  of  them  postulates 
of  the  social  will.  They  are  a  matter  of  social  con- 
vention.    So  then,  to  return  to  the  stick  in  the 


EPISTEMOLOGY  311 

water,  suppose  that  we  were  like  seals,  living  in  the 
water  and  were  without  hands,  the  type  of  im- 
portant qualities  would  doubtless  vary  greatly  from 
what  it  now  is.  Or  suppose  that  we  lived  on  the 
surface  of  a  sphere  and  were  unable  to  lift  our- 
selves up.  Here  also  we  would  have  a  very  dif- 
ferent set  of  standardized  qualities  and  relations. 
It  may  be  objected  to  this  view  that  what  we  mean 
by  a  real  thing  is  the  thing  as  it  exists  independently 
of  our  perceptions.  To  this  I  reply,  yes  and  no! 
Independent  of  my  perceiving  it,  yes !  But  no  mean- 
ing can  be  attached  to  the  idea  of  an  object  existing 
independently  of  anybody's  perceiving  it.  The  inde- 
pendent reality  of  an  object  is  the  reality  of  some- 
thing that  can  be  perceived  under  definite  assignable 
conditions  by  any  percipient  organism  like  our  own. 
Who  cares  about  a  real  object  which  is  apart  from 
and  indifferent  to  any  percipient  organism  ? 

The  real  world  is  the  world  of  social  per- 
ceivahles.  It  is  the  world  of  things  which  under 
definite  conditions  can,  by  anyone  equipped  with 
the  proper  mental  and  sensory  equipment,  be  ex- 
perienced. Some  say  that  the  real  object  is  what 
God  or  the  Absolute  perceives — I  don't  know  what 
he  perceives. 

When  we  take  into  account  the  specific  char- 
acteristics of  the  percipient,  his  place,  his  relations 
to  objects,  his  history  and  interests,  we  can  recog- 
nize that  what  he  perceives  is  relative  to  him  and  yet 
real.  Teleological  Idealism  or,  as  it  might  be  called. 
Critical  Realism,  is  the  view  that  we  know  reality, 
not  uncritically,  however.     It  is  a  fact  that  we  do 


312  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

perceive,  and  it  is  further  a  fact  that  we  can  im- 
prove our  perceptions  by  means  of  the  organizing 
activity  of  thought.  This  circumstance  indicates, 
it  seems  to  me,  that  the  world  is  in  agreement  with 
mind. 

Many  critics  of  objective  or  teleological  ideal- 
ism shoot  wide  of  the  mark,  because  they  insist  on 
identifying  all  idealistic  standpoints  with  either 
phenomenalistic  "ideaism"  or  Berkeleyan  idealism. 
Modem  or  teleological  idealism  from  Hegel  down  to 
the  present  is  realistic  in  its  epistemology,  as  in- 
deed so  were  Plato  and  Aristotle.  It  insists  that 
the  human  mind  knows  reality,  through  experience, 
as  the  resultant  of  the  active  intercourse  of  the 
knower  with  his  world.  Knowing  may  be  described, 
on  the  one  hand,  as  the  process  by  which  the  real 
world  becomes  conscious  of  itself  in  human  minds ; 
or,  on  the  other  hand,  as  the  process  by  which  minds 
transcend  their  merely  "given*'  or  biological  indi- 
viduality by  becoming  aware  of  the  qualities- 
in-organic-relation  which  constitute  the  world.  In 
short,  the  organization  of  experience  is  the  or- 
ganization of  selfhood,  through  the  increasing  dis- 
covery of  the  nature  of  reality.  The  knower,  in  his 
perceptual  reactions,  apprehends  in  some  degree 
and  manner  the  actual  qualities  of  the  real.  The 
knower  in  thinking,  and  thus  organizing  perceptual 
experience,  is  discovering  the  systematic  and  intel- 
ligible character  of  reality  as  an  ordered  whole  of 
things-in-relation.  The  very  realistic  character  and 
practical  success  of  human  knowledge  indicates  that 
reality  is  a  purposive  and  intelligible  order.     To 


EPISTEMOLOGY  818 

hold  this  is  the  essence  of  teleological  idealism  which 
is  thus,  a  metaphysical  theory  of  reality.  Reality 
as  a  whole  has  a  significant  structure.  But  such  a 
view  is  built  on  an  essentially  realistic  conception 
of  the  function  of  knowing.  We  know  reality  in 
perception  and  thought,  and  we  know  reality  thus 
because  it  is  responsive  to  the  aims  and  activities 
of  minds  and,  therefore,  is  the  expression  of  intel- 
ligence or  reason. 

REFERENCES 

Russell,  B.,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  especially 
Chapters  7  and  8,  Philosophical  Essays,  and  Our  Knowledge 
of  the  External  World. 

Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  Book  II,  Chap- 
ter II. 

Des  Cartes,  Meditations;  Locke,  Essay  Concerning  Hu- 
man Understanding;  Berkeley,  Three  Dialogues,  and  Prin- 
ciples of  Human  Knowledge;  Hume,  Enquiry  Concerning 
Human  Understanding,  Sects.  II  to  VII,  and  Treatise,  Of 
the  Understanding,  Parts  I  and  III. 

Kant,  Prolegomena,  and  Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 

Hegel,  Logic,  and  Phenomenology  of  Mind. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  Logic,  Book  II,  Chapters  III  and  IV. 

Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  Chapters  XV  and 
XXIX. 

Joachim,  H.  H.,  The  Nature  of  Truth. 

James,  Essays  on  Radical  Empiricism,  II,  III  and  IV, 
and  Some  Problems  of  Philosophy,  III  and  IV. 

The  New  Realism,  Essays  by  Perry  and  others. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 
THE  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH 

The  problem  of  this  chapter  is  the  fundamental 
problem  of  Logic.  Inasmuch  as  philosophy  is  the 
application  of  logic  to  the  systematic  interpretation 
of  the  most  general  features  of  experience,  we  have 
been  compelled  to  use  the  logical  criteria  of  truth 
all  along  the  line  in  this  course.  It  now  remains  to 
state  systematically  what  these  criteria  are  and  to 
examine  them  critically.  There  are  three  chief  doc- 
trines on  this  matter — (1)  the  Copy  Theory,  (2) 
the  Pragmatic  Theory  and  (3)  the  Rationalistic 
Theory. 

1.      THE  COPY  THEORY  OF  TRUTH 

According  to  this  theory  ideas  (including  in 
the  term  "idea,"  images,  concepts  and  propositions) 
are  true  if  they  are  good  copies  of  reality.  Ideas 
are  mental  representations  of  realities.  Some  of 
theriTTtEat'ts,  imagesT  are  pictures  of  realities. 
Some  of  them,  abstract  concepts  and  propositions, 
and  in  general  the  conventionalized  formulas  of 
mathematics  and  science  are  linguistic  symbols  of 
realities. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  spend  much  time  now  ex- 
amining this  theory.  A  great  many  of  our_ideas, 
namely  all  those  which  refer  to  objects  not  present 
to  sense,  are  either_j::ejireafintatives  or  syinl)oIs~of 

(314) 


THE  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH  315 

realities.  But  the  test  of  the  validity  or  truth  of 
these  ideas  is  whether  theycorresjioiid  with,  and 
will  lead  us,  under  the  appropriate  conditions,  to  an 
adequate  experimental  acquaintance  with,  the 
things  which  they  represent  or  symbolize.  The  test 
of  their  truthfulness  is  their  agreement  with  ex- 
perience. The  knowledge  about  things  which  they 
appear  to  bear  is  true  knowledge  only  in  so  far  as 
they  can  be  cashed  in  in  direct  experience  bv  per- 
ceiving, handling,  working  with  the  things  repre- 
sented by  them.  If  I  have  an  idea  of  a  certain 
office  building  and  the  distance  to  it,  my  idea  is 
true  if  it  will  guide  me  there.  If  I  have  a  scientific 
formula,  it  is  true  if  it  will  enable  me  to  solve  a 
chemicalor  an  engmeermg  problem.  tJut  when  it 
is  maintained  that  all  ideas  are  copies  of  realities, 
we  answer  that  if  there  are  two  worlds,  the  mental 
world  of  ideas  and  the  real  world  outside,  which 
are  shut  out  from  direct  contact  with  one  another, 
then  we  are  landed  in  phenomenalism;  and  finally, 
when  we  think  this  doctrine  through  to  the  end,  in 
an  inconsistent  subjectivism  and  skepticism.  For, 
unless  we  have  direct  acquaJTifanpp  af  anTvio  pninfo 
with  realitv.  we  can  never  know  whether  wp  know 
anything  truly  atiH  wp  r^n  j\c\i.  Avplaiii  ^j^y  ^yo 
shnnlH  ^yiakp  any  HistinpfinTi  af  all  bptween  ideas 
and  reality,  between  phenomena  and  thingsjn  them- 
selves. 

2.      PRAGMATISM 

Pragmatism  is  the  name  that  has  been  made 
fashionable  by  William  James   and   others  for  a 


316  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

theory  of  truth  which  is  offered  as  a  correction  of 
the  copy  theory. 

I  think  the  novelty  and  importance  of  the  prag- 
matic theory  of  truth  has  been  over-emphasized, 
probably  because  its  progenitors,  who  were  psychol- 
ogists, were  overjoyed  at  finding  a  way  out  of  the 
subjective  world  of  the  copy-theory  into  which  the 
undue  subjectivism  of  Locke,  Descartes,  Hume  and 
even  Kant  had  kept  them  imprisoned  so  long.  If 
they  had  kept  company  more  faithfully  with  Plato, 
Aristotle  and  Hegel,  they  would  not  have  been  im- 
mured in  the  prison  house  of  subjectivism. 

The  pragmatist  insists,  with  justice,  on  the 
purposive  or  instrumental  character  of  ideas.  Ideas, 
he  insists,  are  not  eternal  copies  of  external 
realities,  but  working  plans  of  action,  devised  and 
invented  by  man  to  remove  pains  and  discomforts, 
escape  dangers,  promote  his  affectional  and  prac- 
tical interests,  maintain  and  enhance  his  own  well 
being.  The  pragmatist  is  an  evolutionist.  He  looks 
upon  mind  and  all  its  products  as  biological  instru- 
ments— like  sharp  fangs  and  strong  jaws  and  swift 
feet,  only  much  more  powerful  and  supple  weapons 
in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Indeed,  he  admits 
that  mind  has  the  strange  power  of  creating  a  cul- 
tural environment  by  which  human  life  is  lifted  far 
above  that  of  the  brutes.  Still  he  insists  that  re- 
flective thinking  would,  in  all  probability,  never 
have  arisen,  and  certainly  would  never  have  thriven, 
if  the  affectional  life  of  the  genu^  homo  had  always 
been  serene  and  blissful  without  alloy,  if  his  desires 
had  always  been  satisfied  the  instant  they  made 


THE  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH  317 

themselves  felt  and  if  the  satisfactions  had  never 
left  him  with  a  bad  taste  in  the  mouth,  if  promise 
had  always  led  straight  to  fulfillment. 

Because  of  discordances,  discomforts,  pains, 
because  of  discrepancies  between  belief  and  experi- 
ence, expectation  and  fulfillment,  thought  arises  and 
continues  to  work  until  the  jarring  discords  are 
removed. 

"Thought  is  the  means  by  which  the  consciously 
effected  evolution  of  reality  goes  forward"  (Dewey). 
The  only  part  of  reality  which  we  know  and  are 
concerned  with  is  in  evolution.  "Reality  is  still 
in  the  making  and  awaits  a  part  of  itg'^mplexion 
froirrthe  future"  (William  James).  In  fact,  for 
the'pfagmatist,  reality  is  jicst  the  process  of  experi- 
ence itself  and  experience  is  the  result  of  the  con- 
tinuous and  active  commerce  of  man  with  his 
natural  and  social  environment,  in  which  commerce, 
in  saecula  saeculorum,  he  remakes  both  environ- 
ments and  remakes  them  again  and  again,  even 
though  only  in  small  degree.  Thics  reality  is  the 
joint  product  of  man's  intelligent  will  and  the  en- 
vironing nature.  There  is  no  eternal  nature  of 
things  which  the  mind  has  to  copy  or  gaze  at;  or  if 
there  is,  it  is  ultra  vires,  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court  of  human  intellect.  The  world  that 
thought  lives  and  works  in  is  a  humanistically 
colored  world,  a  world  that  has  engendered  minds 
just  as  it  has  engendered  stomachs  and  hands.  But, 
of  course,  the  pragmatist  would  not  assert  that  the 
intellect  has  no  larger  or  more  varied  uses  than  the 
stomach,  although  he  would  doubtless  say  that  with- 


318  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

out  a  stomach  the  mind  could  not  do  much  in  this 
world. 

But  the  pragmatist  is  not  a  materialist.  In 
fact  he  is  a  kind  of  teleological  idealist.  For  he 
holds  that  the  mind  is  a  very  important  kind  of 
organic  behavior.  It  is  active  and  experimental. 
It  not  only  reacts  to  stimuli  in  its  own  ways,  but 
is  a  selective  and  successfully  purposive  agent. 
Ideas  are  not  inherently  true.  They  are  not  eternal 
verities.  They  are  made  true,  become  true  by  lead- 
ing to  all  sorts  of  satisfactory  results.  An  idea  of 
the  way  to  a  certain  place  to  which  you  want  to  go 
becomes  true  by  leading  you  there.  An  idea  of  a 
certain  ethical  or  chemical  process  becomes  true  by 
leading  to  the  promised  land  of  results.  An  idea  in 
education  or  social  reconstruction  is  made  true  by 
being  put  to  work  and  "delivering  the  goods."  "The 
true,  to  put  it  very  briefly,  is  only  the  expedient  in 
the  way  of  our  thinking,  just  as  the  right  is  only 
the  expedient  in  the  way  of  our  behaving."^  If 
you  can  cash  in  on  the  amount  indicated  by  the  idea, 
in  the  currency  that  the  idea  promises,  the  idea  is 
made  true.  Ideas  are  checks  drawn  on  the  bank  of 
experience.  If  they  are  returned  marked  "no 
funds,"  they  are  false.  If  the  money  is  counted  out 
to  you  in  the  shape  of  concrete  satisfactions,  they 
are  true.  The  satisfactions  may  be  paid  in  terms 
of  worldly  success,  honor,  fame,  wealth,  power;  in 
terms  of  the  gratification  of  personal  affections,  love, 
friendship,  comradeship ;  in  terms  of  social  welfare, 


*  James,  Pragmatism,  p.  222. 


THE  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH  819 

in  terms  of  aesthetic  gratification,  in  terms  of  the 
mind's  craving  for  intellectual  satisfaction ;  even  in 
terms  of  the  soul's  craving  for  a  God  to  lean  on  and 
commune  with. 

The  pragmatic  method  means  "the  attitvde  of 
looking  away  from  first  things,  principles,  'cate- 
gories', supposed  necessities,  and  of  looking  towards 
last  things,  fruits,  consequences,  facts,*'^  "The  true 
is  the  name  of  whatever  proves  itself  to  be  good  in 
the  way  of  belief,  and  good,  too,  for  definite  assign- 
able reasons/'^  "True  ideas  are  those  that  we  can  as- 
similate, validate,  corroborate  and  verify.  False 
ideals  are  those  that  we  can  not,"^  "Truth  is  made 
just  as  health,  wealth  and  strength  are  made,  in  the 
course  of  experience."*  For  thought  to  be  true  it 
must  "agree"  or  correspond  with  reality.  "To  agree 
in  the  widest  sense  with  a  reality  can  only  mean  to 
be  guided  either  straight  up  to  it  or  into  its  sur- 
roundings, or  to  be  put  into  such  working  touch 
with  it  as  to  handle  either  it  or  something  con- 
nected with  it  better  than  if  we  disagreed."^  "The 
essential  thing  is  the  process  of  being  guided.  Any 
idea  that  helps  us  to  deal,  whether  practically  or 
intellectually,  with  either  the  reality  or  its  belong- 
ings, *  *  *  that  fits,  in  fact,  and  adapts  our  life 
to  the  reality's  whole  setting^  will  agree  sufficiently 


^  James,  Pragmatism,  pp.  54-55. 

'Ibid.,  p.  76. 

"Ibid.,  p.  201. 

*Ibid.,  p.  218. 

■^  James'  Pragmatism,  pp.  212-213. 


320  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

to  meet  the  requirements.    It  will  hold  true  of  that 
reality."  ^ 

"This  function  of  agreeable  leading  is  what  we 
mean  by  an  idea's  verification."  ^ 

Truth  is  made  largely  out  of  previous  truths. 
"Men's  beliefs  at  any  time  are  so  much  experience 
funded.  But  the  beliefs  are  themselves  parts  of 
the  sum  total  of  the  world's  experience,  and  become 
matter,  therefore,  for  the  next  day's  funding  opera- 
tions. So  far  as  reality  means  experienceable 
reality,  both  it  and  the  truths  men  gain  about  it  are 
everlastingly  in  process  of  mutation  —  mutation 
towards  a  definite  goal,  it  may  be — but  still  muta- 
tion." ^     In  short,  reality  is  mutable  and  so  is  truth. 

These  quotations  require  no  comment  on  my 
part.  They  are  so  clear  as  to  be  wholly  self-ex- 
planatory. Any  idea  that  is  useful  in  enriching 
and  harmonizing  experience,  in  satisfying  the  in- 
terests of  the  individual  or  society,  by  performing 
that  function  as  a  good  instrument,  becomes  thus 
far  true.  An  idea  that  cannot  be  put  to  work  is 
meaningless.  An  idea  that  will  not  yield  satisfac- 
tion when  put  to  work  is  false.  The  pragmatist 
can  even  find  some  uses  for  the  Absolute  All-inclu- 
sive Knower  or  Experiencer  of  a  Hegel,  a  Bradley 
or  a  Royce,  although  James  did  not  think  that  the 
moral  and  religious  uses  of  the  Absolute  counter- 


Mbid.,  p.  213. 

'  James'  Pragmatism,  p.  202. 

'  Ibid.,  pp.  224-225. 


THE  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH  321 

balanced  its  practical,  moral  and  scientific  useless- 
ness  and  so  rejected  it.^ 

Pragmatism  is  right  in  insisting  on  the  instru- 
mental value  of  ideas,  on  their  purposive  character, 
and  in  demanding  that  ideas  should  be  put  to  work 
in  the  life  of  concrete  experience.  It  is  right  in 
insisting  that  the  fact  that  an  idea  works  in  experi- 
ence and  conduct  is  a  test  of  its  truth.  Pragmatism 
accounts  for  the  origin,  utility  and  truth-value  of 
many  of  our  ideas.  A  good  deal,  perhaps  the  greater 
part,  of  knowledge  arises  and  is  validated  precisely 
in  the  ways  which  the  pragmatist  describes.  He 
propounds  a  sound  although  not  novel  method  of 
testing  the  truth  of  ideas — ^the  scientific  method  of 
taking  ideas  as  hypotheses,  deducing  conclusions 
from  them  and  testing  these  deductions  by  putting 
them  to  work  and  finding  whether  they  lead  to  the 
promised  concrete  results  in  experience.  If  a  con- 
cept, a  judgment,  a  belief  works  well  in  practice, 
there  must  be  something  true  in  it. 

James*  own  statement  of  pragmatism  was  too 
individualistic.  Ideas  may  work  well  for  individuals 
in  terms  of  satisfaction,  but  their  so  working  may 
be  harmful  to  society  in  the  long  run.  A  conscience- 
less profiteer  may  make  millions  from  the  nation's 
patriotism  in  time  of  war  and  die  rich,  working 
untold  injury  to  society.  John  Dewey  emphasizes 
the  social  test  of  working  and  thus  corrects  James* 
view.    And,  of  course,  the  social  and  long-run  satis- 


^  James,   Pragmatism,   pp.   291   ff.,   and   A   Pluralistic 
Universe,  Lecture  VIII. 

21 


322  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

factions  as  tests  are  logically  compatible  with  the 
pragmatist  position.  But  even  the  later  pragmatists 
have  not  made  it  clear  as  to  how,  pragmatically, 
the  conflicts  between  individuals,  or  between  an  in- 
dividual and  a  social  group,  as  to  the  respective 
claims  for  satisfaction  of  their  interests  are  to  be 
adjudicated. 

Pragmatism  talks  much  about  good  fruits  and 
good  consequences,  but  it  has  failed  hitherto  to 
formulate  any  comprehensive  theory  of  how  rela- 
tive goodnesses  in  fruits  or  consequences  are  to  be 
judged.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  pragmatist  must 
admit  that  the  ability  of  the  stronger  or  of  the 
majority  to  dragoon  the  recalcitrant  individual  or 
minority  is  the  final  social  test.  If  expediency  is 
to  rule  both  in  practice  and  in  theory,  I  can  see  no 
other  argument.  Expediency  thus  becomes  an 
euphonious  name  for  brute  power,  analogous  to  the 
"survival  of  the  fittest  in  the  struggle  for  existence." 
Perhaps  this  is  the  ultimate  test,  but  the  choicest 
spirits  of  the  race  have  not  hitherto  thought  so  and 
I  for  one  cannot  think  so.  I  am  unable  to  admit  that 
the  Right  is  always  on  the  side  of  the  biggest  bat- 
talions. Belgium  may  be  blotted  from  the  map  but 
the  wrong  remains  eternally  a  wrong.  Hence  I 
agreevdthRo^e^  that  there  are^  absolute  truths  in 
Idjic,  ma^ematics,  ethifis^  history  and  experience; 
§in^  the  truthsj}f  logiCr  m^fh^jn^fic*^  a,yid  ethifi3  im- 
ply that  there  is  an  absolute  creative,  rational  will 


^  "The  Problem  of  Truth  in  the  Light  of  Recent  Dis- 
cussion" in  William  James  and  other  Essays. 


THE  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH  323 

which  is  their  ground  and  source.  "Absolute''  prag- 
matism is  the  only  fom  of_tViP.  Hnp±riTiP  that,  is  in 
harmony  ^^th  the  nature  of  logical  and  ethical 
truth,  as  at  once  volitional  or  purposive  and  draw- 
ing its  character  and  meaning  and  its  inherent  au- 
thority from  the  determinate  structure  of  the  abso- 
lute, rational  and  ethical  will  or  purpose  involved 
in  the  teleological  or  worthful  and  meaningful  order 
of  reality. 

Pragmatism  takes  too  narrow,  too  provincial 
a  view  of  the  criteria  of  truth.  In  the  long  run 
ideas  work  and  yield  good  results  because  they  are 
in  harmony  with  the  actual  structure  of  reality. 
And  there  is  useless — ^that  is,  useless  from  any  pres- 
ent view  of  individual  or  social  utilities — ^knowledge. 
The  story  is  told  of  -  a  great  mathematician  that, 
having  worked  out  a  new  theorem,  he  said  "thank 
God,  there  is  a  truth  that  no  one  can  make  any 
use  of."  In  higher  mathematics,  in  history,  arch- 
aeology and  science,  yes  even  in  perceptual  experi- 
ence, there  are  many  things  recognized  as  true  that 
men  have  not  found  any  use  for  beyond  the  satis- 
faction of  knowing  them,  which  means  the  satisfac- 
tion the  mind  has  in  being  in  conscious  and  loyal 
harmony  with  the  intelligible  order  of  reality.  How 
are  these  propositions  known  to  be  true?  Either 
because  men  cannot  help  perceiving  them,  as  I  can- 
not help  perceiving  the  hideous  and  useless  things 
that  deface  the  landscape  in  my  town,  or  because 
they  express  the  intuitively  recognized  objective 
structure  of  the  rational  will  in  man,  or  because 
their  truth  follows  by  the  laws  of  logical^oi^isitency 


324  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

from  some  other  proposition,  definition  or  axiom 
Which  expresses  some  fact  of  the  objective  rational 
order.  It  may  be  that  use  will  be  found  for  every 
truth  ultimately.  Let  us  hope  so.  If  the  world  is 
rational  and  just,  it  must  be  so. 

There  are  disagreeable  truths  which  we  must 
face^. — When  my  lbaincef~informs  me  that  my  ac- 
count  is  already  overdrawn  and  I  have  no  money  to 
put  in,  or  if  I  am  wholly  bankrupt,  I  have  yet  to 
find  the  person  to  whom  the  knowledge  of  that 
truth  is  agreeable.  At  the  present  juncture,  we 
must  face  as  a  nation  discomforts,  sacrifice  and 
death  of  many  of  our  choicest  sons  in  loyalty  to  a 
cause.  The  pragmatist  says  that^what  provessatis£ 
fa^^ory,  when  the  returns  are  all  in.  will  be  true. 
BuCSjthe  matter  of  moral  principles,  ofttimes  the 
returns  are  never  all  in,  in  this  world.  How  do  I 
know  that  more  satisfaction  will  ensue  to  anybody  if 
I  go  to  the  war  and  sacrifice  myself  for  my  country 
or  if  I  send  my  son?  How  do  I  know  that  my 
family  or  even  the  third  generation  to  come  will  be 
happier?  I  do  not.  I  only  know  that  if  it  is  clearly 
my  duty — I  ought  to  go,  I  ought  to  send  my  son. 
How  do  I  know  that  by  conscripting  the  youth  of 
this  land  to  fight  in  Europe  the  world  will  be  made 
safe  for  democracy  and  this  will  be  a  better  world? 
I  do  not  know.  I  only  hope  so.  But  in  loyalty  to 
the  cause,  I  know  that  we  must  not  shirk  the  issue. 
I  only  know  that,  since  we  are  convinced  of  the 
justice  of  our  cause,  and  that  if  a  brutal  militaristic 
autocracy  triumphs  the  world  will  not  be  a  fit  place 
for  our  children  and  our  children's  children  to  live 


THE  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH  325 

in,  therefore,  we  ought  to  do  whatever  is  necessary 
to  defend  that  cause. 

3.      THE  RATIONALISTIC  THEORY  OF  TRUTH^ 

Knowledge  comes  from  several  sources.  What 
one  perceives  or  feels,  one  perceives  or  feels  just  as 
brute  fact.  We  may  recognize,  examine  and  analyze 
experience  very  rigorously  but,  finally,  we  get  down 
to  data  that  are  not  further  analyzable.  I  see  the 
light  and  feel  the  heat  and  cold,  whether  these  be 
agreeable  or  disagreeable.  I  apprehend  impacts  and 
motions  as  brute  facts.  Any  idea  in  regard  to  ex- 
perimental  facts  is  true  only  it  it  is  m  agreement 
with  the  determinate  experience  or  experienceable 
facts.  The  facts  may  be  unsatisfactory  to  you  or 
me,  but  there  they  are. 

I  also  intuitively  recng-rnVp,  hy  vny  rpagnTi^  Pf^r. 

tain  truths  of  logic  and  ethics.  JThe  elementary 
propositions  and  axioms  or  postulates  of  mathe- 
matics and  logic,  on  careful  reflection,  appear  to 
me  true  whether  you  or  I  care  for  them  or  not. 
They  express  the  intellect's  native  ways  of  working. 
They  reflect  the  rational  stmrti^^^  ^^  ^^alj^'y  The 
statement  that  two  contradictory  propositions  can- 
-rmfr-hfi  t.nTp"'Rvfnn1f.flr>pons1y  atiH  ij]  the  same  situa- 
tion appears  to  me  self-evident.  I  cannot  conceive 
a  world  in  which  it  should  be  false.  In  such  a  world 
"true"  and  "false"  would  have  no  meaning,  and  it 
would  not  even  be  a  world. 


^  Perhaps  a  better  name  for  this  theory  would  be  either 
'rationalistic  experientialism",  or  "rationalistic  realism". 


326  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

Thus  there  are  ideas  that  are  true  because  they 
are  in  agreement  with  the  given  nr  finite  farfs,  ^nd 
there  are  ideas  that  are  trueHbecause  they  express 
the  meanings  of  the  mind's  own  reflective  intuitions, 
of  its  own  rational  procedure  in  thinking  about  its 
world.  Sojfar  as  these  truths  go  they  are  absolute. 
Further  than  this,_some  minds  have  a  passionate 
hunger  for  puttinjTtruths  togetheTlnto  a  coliHrtrnlr 
\^^ole,  for^organizing  ideas  into  a  system.  This 
ideaiof  truth-seeking  is  the  philosophical  ideal.  It 
is  the  harmonious  organization  of  all  separate 
truths  into  a  coherent  whole.  James  really  ad- 
mitted these  criticisms  when  he  said  that  we  are 
CQerce(Lby-jthe-4ete^^nmate^order  of  fact  and  of  in- 
tuitively  recognized  truths  of  abstract  relationships, 
and  when  he^said-that  intellectuaL-Consistency  is_ 
:^.e-most  imperlnus  claimant  of  all  for  satisf action. 
The  fact  is  that  our  purposes  and  our  interests  do 
not  always  get  or  deserve  satisfaction.  Sometimes 
they  are  shattered  into  fragments  and  remade  by 
the  logic  of  events,  into  larger  purposes  and  mean- 
ings. Reality  is  in  mutation,  but  there  is  a  logic 
of  events,  a  determinate  order  of  mutation.  The 
process  of  reality  has  a  specific  structure,  and  part 
of  our  truth  consists  in  apprehending  and  sym- 
bolizing that  structure  as  it  is.  Mind  in  us  has  a 
logical  and  ethical  structure.  Our  images,  concepts, 
theories  and  assumptions  change,  to  fit  enlarged  and 
finer  apprehensions  of  the  factual  order  and  to  meet 
the  mutations  in  that  order.  But  through  all  the 
changes  and  chances  in  the  mental  life  of  ideas, 
through  all  the  scrapping  of  old  ones  and  the  making 


THE  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH  327 

of  new  ones  to  fit  the  facts,  there  run  certain  funda- 
mental ways  of  thinking  and  acting ;  the  elementary- 
principles  and  postulates  of  knowledge  and  conduct. 
It  would  belong  to  a  treatise  on  logic  and  epis- 
temology  to  discuss  these  theoretical  principles 
fully,  but  we  may  state  the  principal  ones  briefly 
— the  logical  identity  of  objects  of  thought  with 
themselves  or  the  invariant  character  of  these  ob- 
jects, the  impossibility  of  admitting  the  truth  of 
two  contradictory  propositions,  the  self-evidencing 
qvMity  of  the  elementary  propositions  of  logic  and 
mathematics,  the  rationally  evident  character  of  our 
most  universal  and  fundamental  moral  judgments, 
the  demand  of  the  mind  for  the  organization  of 
knowledge  into  a  coherent  whole  which  gives  us  the 
logically  self -consistent  systems  of  mathematics  and 
which,  in  the  form  of  the  principle  of  sufficient  rea- 
son or  ground,  appears  in  our  insistent  need  in 
science  to  discover  the  relevancy  of  facts  to  one  an- 
other, to  classify  facts  and  connect  them  in  a  system 
of  causally  related  or  reciprocally  interdependent 
elements.  One  could  sum  up  this  matter  as  follows 
— the  absolute  postulates  of  knowledge  are  the 
loqicajridentity  of  every  object  of  t/iougtit  with  it- 
self,  and  the  harmonious  organization  or  reievancii 
of  oil  tru^'JuxTgrnents  to  one  avnther  j'n-  n  sysfp/ryinfir. 
whole.  And  there  are  ethical  principles  which  are 
valid  whether  you  and  I  obey  them  or  not,  whether 
we  find  that  they  satisfy  our  concrete  interests  or 
not.  We  may  as  individuals  or  social  groups  be 
loyal  or  disloyal  to  honesty,  justice,  love,  fellow- 
ship, loyalty  itself,  but  our  actions  do  not  make  these 


328  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

qualities  right  if  expedient,  and  wrong  if  inex- 
pedient. If  expediency  be  the  highest  good,  there 
is  no  highest  good.  Plato  was  right  in  holding  that 
there  are  values  and  relationships,  principles  of 
moral  and  rational  order,  that  give  meaning  and 
status  to,  and  that  endure  through,  the  temporal  flux 
of  human  experience. 

This  generation  has  been  permeated  and  cap- 
tivated in  its  thinking  by  the  thought  of  evolution, 
ceaseless  flux  and  relativity  in  all  things.  Let  me 
remind  you  that  there  is  no  meaning  in  evolution, 
or  even  in  flux  and  relativity,  unless  there  be  an 
enduring  teleological  order  of  meanings,  by  refer- 
ence to  which  we  measure  and  judge  the  dates  and 
relations  and  meanings  and  values  of  the  tides  and 
times  of  human  circumstance  and  deed  and  of 
physical  circumstance  as  well. 

The  fullest  criteria  of  truth  are  the  coherence 
Qf  ideas^ith  exneriences  andjgie  coherence  of  ideas , 
as  interpretations  of  experiences,  with  one  another. 
The  ideal  of  knowledge  is  the  harmonious  organiza- 
tion of  thinking  and  experience,  in  which  thinking 
appears  as  the  instrument  for  the  organization  or 
interpretation  of  experience,  by  which  experience 
becomes  conscious  of  its  own  meanings  and  by 
which  its  own  enrichment  and  more  harmonious  ful- 
fillment are  furthered.  This  ideal,  although  never 
fully  realized,  is  the  animating  motive  of  the  thinker 
at  his  best. 

^^plify  ifl  a.  tp1po|ogieal_and  self-organizing__sys- 
tem,  and  thinking  is  the  chief  est  instimmeg^-  -f^r  fhp 


THE  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH  329 

i 

function  of  thought  is  both  to  discover  the  existing 
relations  or  relevancies  of  things  to  one  another  and 
to  promote  the  increase  of  these  relationships. 
Thinking  is  the  chief  instrument  of  organization  in 
a  purposively  ordered  world,  a  world  controlled  by 
a  rational  and  ethical  order,  as  I  believe. 


REFERENCES 

Carr,  H.  W.,  The  Problem  of  Truth.  (An  excellent, 
brief  discussion.) 

James,  William,  Pragmatism  (especially  Lectures  II, 
III,  V,  and  VI)  and  The  Meaning  of  Truth. 

Royce,  Josiah,  The  Problem  of  Truth  in  William  James 
and  other  Essays. 

Dewey,  John,  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  and  the 
articles  Beliefs  and  Realities  and  The  Experimental  Theory 
of  Knowledge  in  The  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy. 

Russell,  Bertrand,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  Chap- 
ters 10,  11,  12  and  13. 

Hegel,  Logic  trans.  Wallace. 

Joachim,  H.  H.,  The  Nature  of  Truth. 

Bradley,  F.  H.,  Appearance  and  Reality. 

Marvin,  W.  T.,  A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics. 

Schiller,  F.  C.  S.,  Humanism  and  Studies  in  Humanism. 

Santayana,  G.,  Reason  in  Science. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

THE  SPECIAL  PHILOSOPHICAL 

DISCIPLINES — THE  SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  central  and  fundamental  philosophical  dis- 
cipline, metaphysics,  is  the  theory  of  the  nature  or 
structure  and  meaning  of  reality  as  a  whole.  While 
writers  may  show  philosophical  insights  in  various 
special  fields  and,  to  the  extent  of  these  insights, 
deserve  the  name  philosophers,  a  system  of  thought 
can  be  properly  called  a  philosophy  only  when  its 
various  aspects  are  built  upon  and  articulated  with 
a  metaphysics  or  doctrine  of  reality.  Metaphysics 
includes,  as  special  divisions : — cosmology  or  philos- 
ophy of  nature,  whose  chief  problems  are  the  nature 
or  meaning  of  space,  time,  matter,  motion  and 
evolution;  meta^psychology  or  philosophy  of  selves 
and  society;  epistemology  or  philosophy  of  knowl- 
edge; and  axiology  or  philosophy  of  values.  These 
special  divisions  of  metaphysics  cannot,  however,  be 
pursued  successfully  in  isolation  from  one  another. 
The  subject  matter  of  the  present  work  has  con- 
sisted:—  (1)  in  tracing  the  emergence  and  develop- 
ment of  the  fundamental  problems  and  theories  of 
metaphysics;  and  (2)  in  discussing  the  present 
status  of  these  problems  and  theories.  It  now  re- 
mains for  us  to  consider  briefly  the  respective  fields, 
and  relations  to  general  philosophy  or  metaphysics, 

(330) 


DISCIPLINES — THE  SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY     331 

of  the  special  philosophical  disciplines.  These  are: 
Logic,  Ethics  and  Social  and  Political  Philosophy, 
Aesthetics,  Philosophy  of  Religion  and  Philosophy 
of  History.  Before  proceeding  with  this  matter,  it 
is  desirable  that  an  indication  be  given  as  to  the 
relation  between  philosophy  and  psychology. 

1.      PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

There  is  no  unanimity  of  opinion  among  the 
psychologists  as  to  the  proper  fields  and  methods 
of  psychology.  The  point  on  which  there  is  nearest 
approach  to  agreement  is  that  psychology  is  not  the 
science  of  the  soul,  that  it  has  no  concern  with  the 
question  whether  man  is  a  soul  or  permanently 
unified  self.  It  is  also  pretty  generally  agreed  that 
psychology  is  as  much  an  independent  science  as, 
say,  chemistry,  and  therefore,  like  any  other  special 
science,  is  independent  of  philosophy.  Still  there 
must  be  some  good  reason,  other  than  the  slow  de- 
velopment of  the  science  itself,  why  psychology  has 
remained  so  long  in  closer  association  with  philos- 
ophy than  the  other  sciences.  Before  we  can  dis- 
cover this  reason,  we  must  essay  a  statement  as  to 
the  province  of  psychology. 

It  used  to  be  said  that  the  business  of 
psychology  is  to  analyze,  describe  and  correlate  the 
elementary  constituents  and  processes  of  conscious- 
ness, or  to  determine  in  detail  the  structure  of  coiv- 
sciou^ness  in  all  its  forms  and  stages.  This,  the 
standpoint  of  strv/^turalism,  was  the  classical  stand- 
point until  after  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, when  evolutionary  biology  began  more  and 


332  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

more  to  hold  sway  over  men's  thinking  about  human 
nature.  Of  course  it  had  been  already  recognized 
that  psychology  is  concerned,  too,  with  the  relation 
between  consciousness  and  the  nervous  system,  or, 
in  general  terms,  between  mind  and  body. 

The  rapid  development  of  the  evolution  hypo- 
thesis led  to  a  change  of  emphasis  in  psychology. 
Mental  processes  began  to  be  viewed  as  instru- 
ments of  adaptation  to  the  environment,  as  tools  for 
the  more  successful  adjustment  of  the  relationships 
between  man  and  nature,  and  the  individual  man 
and  society.  This  is  the  standpoint  of  functionalism, 
which  does  not  deny  all  value  to  structural  analysis 
of  mind  but  makes  such  analysis  subservient  to  the 
determination  of  the  biological  or  life-serving  func- 
tions of  the  mind.  The  mind  in  all  its  phases, 
whether  clearly  conscious,  subconscious  and  per- 
haps unconscious,  consists  of  special  types  of  func- 
tional adjustments  of  the  organism.  William  James' 
great  work,  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  was  the 
first  and  most  influential  in  making  this  change 
of  emphasis.  Herbert  Spencer's  Principles  of 
Psychology  is  written  chiefly  from  the  same  stand- 
point. Lately  a  third  standpoint  has  arisen  —  be- 
haviorism. The  ultra-radical  behaviorist  denies 
that  consciousness  is  a  fruitful  or  even  legitimate 
subject  of  study.  He  proposes  to  consider  only  the 
objective  or  physical  side  of  behavior.  The  mod- 
erate behaviorist  admits  that  the  most  important 
data  for  psychology  are  those  obtained  from  the 
study  of  conscious  thinking  organisms,  but  he  in- 
sists that  psychology  is  primarily  the  science  of 


DISCIPLINES — THE  SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY     333 

human  behavior.  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the 
psychologist  cannot  afford  to  neglect  permanently 
any  one  of  these  standpoints.  Psychology,  as  I 
understand  it,  has  for  its  central  domain  the  sys- 
tematic investigation  of  the  conscious  and  intel- 
ligent behavior  of  human  individuals.  To  success- 
fully carry  on  this  work  it  cannot  afford  to  leave 
out  of  account,  either  the  purposive  adaptation- 
functions  which  the  mind  of  the  individual  per- 
forms, or  the  structural  analysis  of  mental  com- 
plexes, such  as  perceptions,  memories,  images,  judg- 
ments, conceptions,  instincts,  emotions  and  senti- 
ments, into  their  elementary  features. 

What,  then,  is  the  right  relation  between 
psychology  and  philosophy  ?  Psychology  is  a  special 
science,  inasmuch  as  it  studies  the  behavior  of  the 
conscious  individual  in  relation  to  the  physical  order 
and  the  social  order,  without  raising  the  metaphys- 
ical questions  as  to  how  one  is  to  conceive,  ulti- 
mately, the  nature  of  the  self  in  relation  to  the  body 
and  the  relation  of  the  psycho-physical  individual 
or  group  of  individuals  to  the  world  as  a  whole;  in 
so  far  as  it  describes  the  process  of  thinking,  with- 
out attempting  to  determine  what  are  the  final 
norms  or  critera  of  knowledge;  in  so  far  as  it  de- 
scribes the  processes  of  volition,  without  attempting 
to  determine  the  valid  norms  or  standards  of  con- 
duct; and  in  so  far  as  it  describes  the  processes  of 
aesthetic  feeling,  without  raising  the  question  as  to 
the  place  of  beauty  in  reality.  But  when  psychology 
does  attempt  to  deal  with  the  ultimate  problems  of 
the  relation  of  mind  and  body,  of  self  and  world, 


334  THE   FIELD   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  criteria  of  truth  and  goodness  and  beauty  in 
the  universe,  then  it  passes  into  philosophy;  it 
passes  into  metaphysics,  ethics,  logic,  epistemology 
and  aesthetics.  Moreover,  it  is  not  easy  for  the 
psychologist  to  avoid  raising  the  philosophical 
issues.  Inasmuch  as  the  problems  of  philosophy  all 
center  in  the  questions  as  to  the  place  of  the  self 
and  society  in  the  universe  of  reality,  it  is  quite 
evident  why  psychology  has  always  lived,  and  should 
continue  to  live,  in  intimate  association  with  philos- 
ophy. It  is  not  for  the  permanent  good  of  either 
discipline  that  they  should  be  kept  asunder.  With- 
out philosophy  psychology's  work  becomes  a  blind 
trafficking  with  physical  instruments  and  physiol- 
ogical measurements.  Without  empirical  psycholog- 
ical foundations  philosophy  becomes  a  dialectical 
exercise  in  spinning  logical  cobwebs. 

2.      LOGIC 

Logic  is  the  systematic  investigation  of  the 
fundamental  processes  or  methods  by  which  thought 
arrives  at  truth,  or  the  right  methods  of  making 
judgments  and  inferences.  Psychology  likewise 
studies  the  processes  of  knowing,  but  from  a  dif- 
ferent standpoint.  Psychology  is  concerned  to 
analyze  and  describe  the  cognitive  processes  simply 
as  mental  events  which  occur  in  individual  minds 
along  with  other  kinds  of  mental  events.  It  is  not 
the  aim  of  psychology  either  to  formulate  the  most 
general  canons  or  norms  of  correct  thinking  or  to 
formulate  all  the  various  methods  by  which  these 
canons  are  applied  in  the  actual  work  of  science. 


DISCIPLINES — THE  SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY     335 

But  this  is  just  what  logic  aims  to  do.  It  is  true 
that  logic  studies  actual  processes  of  thinking  and 
therefore  makes  use  of  psychology,  but  Logic  finds 
its  material  chiefly  in  the  analysis  of  typical  cases 
of  correct  thinking  as  exemplifying  the  norms  of 
knowledge.  Hence  fair  samples  of  correct  thinking 
in  the  practical  affairs  of  life  and  in  all  the  sciences 
furnish  the  materials  of  Logic.  It  studies  analy- 
tically such  cases  in  order  to  determine  the  funda- 
mental procedures,  in  judgment  and  inference,  that 
are  involved  in  them. 

It  is  evident  that  right  judgment  and  inference, 
as  exemplified  in  concrete  cases,  presuppose  and 
imply  certain  most  fundamental  principles  of  knowl- 
edge. These  are  the  laws  or  principles  of  all  sound 
thinking.  Such  principles  are: — ^the  principle  of 
coherence  or  freedom  from  contradiction  (two  con- 
tradictory propositions  cannot  both  be  true)  ;  the 
principle  of  identity  (a  logical  subject  of  thought 
must  be  identical  with  itself)  ;  the  principle  of  suf- 
ficient ground  or  causation  (there  must  be  a  suf- 
ficient ground  for  every  event)  ;  the  principle  of 
uniformity  (the  same  conditions  or  causes  will  have 
the  same  effects) .  Since  this  is  but  a  brief  indica- 
tion of  the  province  of  Logic,  I  shall  not  discuss 
whether  the  above  named  are  the  only  ultimate 
fundamental  principles  of  Logic.  It  will  be  obvious 
to  the  thoughtful  reader  that  the  above  principles 
are  presupposed  in  all  genuinely  scientific  or  sys- 
tematically thoughtful  procedure  of  the  mind  and 
that,  therefore,  a  sound  logical  theory  is  not  only 
implied  in  every  kind  of  scientific  procedure,  but 


336  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

as  well  that  it  is  the  primal  condition  of  sound 
philosophy.  Every  true  judgment  and  inference  in 
practical  affairs,  as  well  as  in  science,  is  a  bit  of 
applied  Logic;  and  metaphysics  is  an  applied  Logic 
of  the  whole  universe  of  reality  or  experience. 

Logic  is  frequently  divided,  in  elementary  text- 
books, into  two  parts  —  Deductive  and  Inductive 
Logic.  Such  a  division,  while  it  may  have  practical 
pedagogical  justification,  overlooks  the  fact  that  in 
the  actual  work  of  science,  deduction  and  induction 
are  both  involved  and,  while  some  sciences  are  more 
inductive  or  deductive  than  others,  no  science  is 
purely  either  the  one  or  the  other. 

3.      ETHICS  AND  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY 

The  central  problem  of  Ethics  is  the  determina- 
tion of  a  standard  of  the  good  or  a  rationally  de- 
finable criterion  of  intrinsic  values,  a  standard  for 
voluntary  conduct.  Is  there  any  common  measure 
for  those  ends  that  are  intrinsically  good  or  have 
value  in  themselves  for  the  human  agent?  If  so, 
what  is  it?  Is  it  a  maximum  of  agreeable  feeling? 
Or  obedience  to  rules  of  reason  ?  Or  is  it  something 
richer,  more  complex  and  concrete  than  either 
pleasurable  feeling  or  the  service  of  reason?  The 
Hedonist  holds  that  the  ethical  standard  is  the  maxi- 
mum of  agreeable  feeling  for  the  individual  agent 
and  his  fellows.  The  Rationalist  holds  that  right 
conduct  consists  in  the  subordination  of  feeling  to 
reason.  The  Energist  or  Self-Realizationalist  holds 
that  the  standard  of  value  is  the  organization  and 


DISCIPLINES — THE  SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY     337 

actuation  of  the  fundamental  interests  of  the  self 
as  a  rational  and  social  agent. 

Another  important  problem  for  Ethics  is  the 
question  of  the  right  relation  between  the  moral 
consciousness  or  conscience  of  the  individual  and  the 
established  social  code  of  conduct  in  the  group  or 
groups  of  which  the  individual  is  a  member.  This 
is  an  extremely  important  and'  difficult  question 
which  involves  two  other  problems,  namely:  —  (1) 
to  what  extent  is  the  individual's  conscience  actually, 
and  to  what  extent  should  it  be  ideally,  the  echo  of 
the  social  or  group-code;  and  (2)  what  are  the  right 
relations  between  the  individual  and  various  social 
groups?  To  what  extent  and  in  what  directions 
should  the  individual  sacrifice  his  private  interests 
to  group  interests,  or  the  interests  of  narrower  and 
more  deep  going  groups,  such  as  the  family  or  the 
trade  or  professional  group,  to  wider  group  in- 
terests such  as  the  nation  ? 

Moral  conduct  is  conduct  that  has  social  refer- 
ence, so  that  Ethics  and  Social  Philosophy  cannot 
be  sharply  distinguished. 

Social  and  Political  Philosophy,  in  distinction 
from  Sociology  and  Politics  which  are  sciences  de- 
scriptive of  actual  social  and  political  institutions 
in  the  present  and  in  history,  is  concerned  with  the 
ethical  ends  or  values  that  are  involved  in  social 
institutions  and  activities.  It  studies  the  facts  of 
social  and  political  life  from  the  standpoint  of  a 
systematic  doctrine  of  the  ethical  values  or  ends 
that  should  be  realized  by  social  institutions,  by 
family,  school,  industry,  the  state.  Social  Philosophy 


ass  THE  FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

is  thus  really  Applied  Ethics — the  system  of  moral 
valuations  applied  to  the  judgment  of  existing  in- 
stitutions such  as  school  organization,  economic  or- 
ganization and  political  organization,  in  the  light 
of  the  intrinsic  human  values  or  human  interests 
which  these  organizations  exist  to  further.  Thus, 
Ethics  is  inseparable  from  Social  Philosophy,  as 
Plato  and  Aristotle  long  ago  soundly  taught.  Ethics 
is  the  philosophical  doctrine  of  human  values,  of 
the  various  inherently  worthful  interests  or  ends 
which  mankind  has  the  right  and  duty  to  aim  to 
attain  and  conserve. 

The  investigation  of  the  problems  of  Ethics 
and  Social  Philosophy  involves  psychology,  since 
their  subject  matter  is  man  as  a  feeling,  thinking 
and  striving  agent.  A  sound  ethical  and  social  doc- 
trine of  ends  and  values  can  be  built  up  only  upon 
an  adequate  psychology — one  which  makes  a  care- 
ful inventory  of  man's  original  nature,  his  inherit- 
ance of  instincts,  impulses  and  more  general  ca- 
pacities such  as  reason  or  intelligence.  But  man's 
original  nature  is  profoundly  modified  by  his  social 
nurture,  including  the  social  and  spiritual  patterns 
and  ideals  of  conduct  which  are  held  up  to  him  for 
admiration  and  imitation  in  his  plastic  period  of 
youth.  A  sound  theory  of  ethical  and  social  values 
can  be  formulated  only  when  the  various  cultural 
or  spiritual-historical  strains  which  shape  and 
stimulate  the  individual  in  society  have  been  ex- 
amined and  evaluated. 

Ethics  and  Social  Philosophy  must,  therefore, 
be  based  on  an  extensive  and  intensive  apprecia- 


DISCIPLINES — THE  SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY     339 

tion  of  the   historical   development  of  the   whole 
spiritual  heritage  of  man. 

4.      AESTHETICS 

Aesthetics  is  the  philosophy  of  aesthetic  feel- 
ing and  judgment.  Since  Kant's  Critique  of  Judg- 
ment was  written  it  has  been  recognized  as  a  di- 
vision of  philosophy.  We  may  investigate  the 
psychological  and  physiological  conditions  of  aes- 
thetic feeling  and,  thus  far,  Aesthetics  is  a  branch 
of  psychology  and  physiology.  We  may  consider 
the  history  of  aesthetic  appreciation  in  relation  to 
the  history  of  art  and,  in  this  regard.  Aesthetics 
is  a  branch  of  the  history  of  culture.  But  we  may 
also  ask,  what  is  the  significance  of  aesthetic  feel- 
ing and  judgment  with  reference  to  man's  place  in 
the  universe?  Does  the  fact  that  the  sounding 
cataract  haunts  one  like  a  passion,  that  one  feels 
oneself  to  be  a  part  of  the  mountains,  seas  and  sky ; 
in  short,  does  the  whole  human  reaction  in  which 
we  feel  beauty,  sublimity,  picturesqueness  in  nature, 
in  which  perhaps,  we  feel  with  Wordsworth  "a 
presence  far  more  deeply  interfused,  a  motion  and  a 
spirit  which  impels  all  thinking  things,  all  objects 
of  all  thoughts,"  does  this  aesthetic  reaction  to 
nature  mean  perhaps  that  nature  is  the  expression 
of  a  life,  of  whose  rich  and  harmonious  meanings 
these  sympathetic  feelings  of  ours  for  nature  are 
the  echoes  or  adumbrations?  Is  Beauty  an  avenue 
to  the  vision  of  reality  ?  Does  it  unlock  gates  other- 
wise closed,  by  which,  even  though  intermittently, 
we  are  permitted  to  enter  into  contact  with  reality 


340  THE   FIELD   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

in  some  of  its  glory?  Or  are  all  our  feelings  for 
nature,  our  sense  of  a  divine  mystery  half  revealed, 
half  concealed  in  the  sunset,  the  mountains,  the 
forest  brook,  the  quiet  lake  and  the  majestic  sea, 
merely  subjective  reverberations  in  our  organisms 
of  a  world  that  in  itself  is  but  the  stony  and  in- 
sensate realm  of  mass  particles  in  motion  or  the 
dead  and  unfeeling  completeness  of  some  static 
Absolute?  These  questions  are  hints  as  to  the  meta- 
physical problem  suggested  by  man's  aesthetic  rela- 
tion to  nature;  and  similar  questions  arise  from  a 
consideration  of  the  ceaseless  striving  of  man  to 
express  and  satisfy  his  emotions  in  art-forms  of 
beauty,  sublimity  and  terror,  and  from  the  con- 
sideration of  the  refining,  purifying,  healing  and 
refreshing  influences  which  have  come  to  men 
through  converse  with  nature  and  art.  It  is  beyond 
the  scope  of  this  introduction  to  discuss  these  ques- 
tions. I  must  leave  the  matter  with  the  suggestion 
that,  perhaps,  the  painters,  the  sculptors,  the  mu- 
sicians and  the  poets,  apprehend  an  aspect  of  reality 
that  is  hidden  from  the  eyes  of  the  dry-as-dust 
scientist  or  arid  dialectician.  It  is  my  own  convic- 
tion, one  that  has  grown  upon  me  with  the  years, 
that  the  aesthetic  experiences  are  more  than  sub- 
jective solaces  or  illusory  refuges  from  the  "fret- 
ful stir  unprofitable  and  the  fever  of  this  world;" 
that  the  beauty  and  the  grandeur  as  felt  in  nature, 
in  human  life  and  art,  are  forefelt  apprehensions, 
though  intermittent  and  fragmentary,  of  an  order, 
a  harmony,  a  concrete  and  meaningful  life  that  be- 
longs somehow  to  the  heart  of  things.     The  true 


DISCIPLINES — THE  SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY     341 

greatness  of  poets  such  as  Wordsworth,  Shelley  and 
Whitman,  and  prose  writers  such  as  Ruskin  and 
Thoreau,  resides  in  the  fact  that  they  have  been 
prophets  of  the  aesthetic  vision  of  a  higher  reality 
beyond  and  yet  interwoven  with  the  dumb  shows  of 
sense.  The  same  fundamental  notion  of  living  order 
or  a  harmonious  organization  of  experience  is  the 
basic  motif  of  science  and  logic  which  aim,  not  at 
reducing  individual  centers  of  activity  and  experi- 
ence to  illusions,  but  at  finding  the  world  to  be  an 
ordered  or  organized  realm  of  individuals.  And 
the  practical,  moral  and  social  activities  of  man 
have  the  same  aim  —  to  construct  a  harmonious, 
well  organized  whole  of  living  centers  of  experience 
and  deed — ^the  ideal  society — in  which  the  law  of 
each  member's  being  is  fulfilled  by  expansion  into 
harmonious  action  and  feeling  with  the  whole,  as 
the  fulfillment  of  the  law  of  the  whole  through  the 
individuality  of  each.  Thus  aesthetic  experience  in- 
terprets and  fulfills,  from  the  standpoint  of  feeling, 
the  vocation  of  man  which,  more  abstractly,  or  in 
more  formal  shape,  urges  on  his  theoretical  and  his 
practical  life  activities.  At  this  point  the  transition 
to  the  consideration  of  the  place  of  religion  in  phil- 
osophical system  is  readily  suggested. 

5.      THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION 

Religion  in  its  most  significant  forms  is  the 
affirmation  of  the  supremacy  in  the  order  of  reality 
of  all  the  organized  and  coherent  values  pertaining 
to  the  life  of  man  in  society.  Religion  idealizes 
man's  values  as  a  socialized  individual,   or  as  a 


342  THE   FIELD   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

society  of  individuals  regenerated  and  redeemed 
through  participation  in  the  common  life.  Religion 
affirms  that  the  system  of  ideal  values  not -only  must 
be  the  paramount  goal  of  human  life,  but  as  well 
that  these  values,  in  their  organic  wholeness  as  ful- 
filled in  the  socialized  individual,  are  securely  seated 
at  the  heart  of  reality  and  control  the  process  of 
things.  God  is  the  incarnation  of  the  system  of 
ideal  values.  Therefore  God  is  essentially  the  per- 
fect social  self — ^the  Supreme  Self — who  lives  and 
fulfills  himself  in  and  through  the  regeneration  or 
development  of  the  spiritual  man  in  and  through 
the  ideal  society.  God  is  the  ideal  embodiment  of 
the  values  which  are  realized  by  the  moral  and 
rational  self  as  a  member  of  a  social  order  which 
functions  to  serve  these  values.  Religion  affirms 
the  ideal  unity  and  ground  of  value  to  be  the  most 
real  being. 

The  business  of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  is 
to  determine  what  religion  means  and  aims  at,  in 
the  successive  and  varied  phases  of  its  development 
in  history  and  in  its  operations  in  the  individual's  ex- 
perience and  the  social  order.  Religion  is  thus  both 
social  and  individual,  both  historical  and  personal, 
and  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  should  evaluate  the 
history  of  religion  or  interpret  the  movement  of  re- 
ligious evolution,  the  religious  experience  of  the 
individual,  and  the  religious  attitude  of  the  social 
group.  From  this  standpoint,  too,  it  should  deter- 
mine the  function  and  meaning  of  the  God-idea, 
of  salvation,  regeneration,  redemption,  atonement, 
the  freedom  and  vocation  of  man. 


DISCIPLINES — THE  SYSTEM  OF  PHILOSOPHY     343 

In  short,  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  is  the 
metaphysics  of  selves,  society  and  values,  applied 
to  the  constructive  interpretation  of  the  religious 
experience  of  the  race  in  the  light  of  the  history  of 
culture  and  psychology.  So  large  and  deep  going  an 
area  of  human  social  life  and  individual  experience 
as  religion  represents  must  be  taken  account  of  by 
the  philosopher;  and,  if  he  cannot  find  room  for  it 
in  his  rubrics,  then  it  is  more  likely  that  his  rubrics 
are  too  small  and  rigid  than  that  the  whole  religious 
history  of  the  race  is  an  illusion. 

REFERENCES 

Psychologies  by  Angell,  Stout,  Titchener,  Calkins, 
Pillsbury,  Kuelpe,  James  (Principles),  Wundt  (Physiolog- 
ical Psychology). 

Logic :  Bosanquet,  Essentials  of  Logic,  and  Logic  or  the 
Morphology  of  Knowledge;  Introductory  Logics  by  Creigh- 
ton,  Joseph,  Aikins;  J.  S.  Mill,  Logic;  B.  Russell,  Principles 
of  Mathematics;  Essays  by  Royce  and  others  in  Windelband 
and  Ruge,  Encyclopaedia  of  the  Philosophical  Sciences,  Vol. 
I,  Logic. 

Ethics:  Introductory  works  by  Mackenzie,  Fite,  Seth, 
Wright  and  Drake.  Paulsen,  Ethics;  Moore,  Principia 
Ethica;  Rashdall,  The  Theory  of  Good  and  Evil;  Green, 
Prolegomena  to  Ethics;  Dewey  and  Tufts,  Ethics;  J.  S.  Mill, 
Utilitarianism;  Alexander,  Moral  Order  and  Progress;  Hob- 
house,  Morals  in  Evolution. 

Social  Philosophy:  Bosanquet,  The  Philosophical  The- 
ory of  the  State;  Hegel,  Philosophy  of  Right;  Mill,  On  Lib- 
erty; Santayana,  Reason  in  Society;  Graham  Wallas,  The 
Great  Society;  McDougall,  Social  Psychology. 

Aesthetics:  Carritt,  The  Theory  of  Beauty;  Santay- 
ana, The  Sense  of  Beauty,  and  Reason  in  Art;  Croce, 
Aesthetics;  Plato  Republic  Book  X,  and  Phaedrus;  Aris- 
totle, Poetics,  trans.  Butcher;  Introduction  to  Hegel's  Philos- 


344  THE  FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

ophy  of  Fine  Art,  trans.  Bosanquet;  Kant,  Critique  of  Judg 
ment;  Schopenhauer,  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  Bk.  3; 
Ruskin,  Modern  Painters,  etc.;  Wordsworth  and  Shelley, 
Poems;  Coleridge,  Biographia  Literaria,  etc. 

Philosophy  of  Religion;  Hoeffding,  Galloway;  Caird, 
The  Evolution  of  Religion;  Balfour,  Theism  and  Humanism; 
Santayana,  Reason  in  Religion;  Boutroux,  Science  and  Re- 
ligion in  Contemporary  Philosophy;  James,  Varieties  of 
Religious  Experience;  Ward,  J.,  The  Realm  of  Ends;  Hock- 
ing, The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

THE  STATUS  OF  VALUES 

Knowing  is  a  human  affair.  The  objects  of 
knowledge  may  be  physical  things,  complexes  of 
sense-qualities,  that  is  groupings  of  the  qualities 
apprehended  through  man's  perceptive  mechanism ; 
or  relations  between  physical  objects  and  events, 
that  is,  laws  of  nature  generalized  by  the  mind  from 
the  analysis  and  comparison  of  sense-perceptions; 
or  selves  and  their  actual  relations  to  the  physical 
order  and  to  one  another;  or,  finally,  the  objects  of 
knowledge  may  be  the  appreciations  or  valuations 
with  which  man  stamps  the  objects  known,  and  the 
aims  and  ideals  by  which  he  determines  his  active 
relations  to  physical  nature  and  to  other  selves. 

Since  man  is  not  a  colorless  and  passive  knower, 
who  might  reflect  the  characteristics  of  his  surround- 
ings as  a  good  mirror  reflects  things  or  as  a  glassy 
water  surface  reflects  its  bank,  but  a  knower  who 
feels  and  acts,  he  judges  the  objects  he  knows  to 
have  various  degrees  and  kinds  of  worth  and  un- 
worth;  and  he  strives  to  so  alter  or  maintain  the 
interaction  of  his  surroundings  and  himself  as  to 
remove  the  experiences  that  have  unworth  for  him 
and  to  maintain  and  increase  these  experiences  that 
have  worth. 

There  are  some  things  in  the  world  of  my  daily 
round  of  experiences  that  have  little  or  no  plus  or 

(346) 


346  THE   FIELD   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

minus  value  for  me.  To  meet  and  apprehend  them 
has  little  or  no  bearing  on  my  weal  or  woe.  Such 
are  most  of  the  buildings  and  many  of  the  people  I 
pass  in  the  streets.  Ordinarily,  I  ignore  them.  I 
am  scarcely  aware  of  their  existence.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  buildings  in  which  I  live  and  work,  the 
members  of  my  family  and  my  professional  asso- 
ciates, and  even  the  weather  have  worth  for  me. 
I  apprehend  them  with  interest  and  I  react  to  them 
with  approval  and  disapproval.  I  exercise  prefer- 
ences in  regard  to  the  actual  and  possible  objects 
of  experience. 

In  short,  man  appreciates,  enjoys,  loves,  ad- 
mires, and  therefore  seeks,  or  he  dislikes,  fears, 
hates,  and  therefore  avoids  certain  objects  and  situa- 
tions. Valuation  is  the  most  persistent  and  char- 
acteristic attitude  in  human  nature.  Man  seeks  to 
acquire  and  retain  knowledge,  power,  wealth,  com- 
fort, fame,  love  and  friendship,  because  he  values 
these  things  as  experiences.  The  systematic  study 
of  the  main  types  of  human  valuation  and  the  rela- 
tions between  them  is  an  important  part  of  phil- 
osophy. As  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  chapter, 
ethics,  aesthetics  and  the  philosophy  of  religion,  are 
sciences  of  human  values  or  axiological  sciences.  The 
word  "axiology"  means  science  of  values.  It  is  de- 
rived from  the  Greek  alto?  (worth)  and  Aoyo?  (rea- 
son). All  these  divisions  of  philosophy  are  con- 
cerned primarily  with  the  central  fact  that  man,  in 
the  various  aspects  of  his  cognitive  and  active  rela- 
tions to  his  world,  is  a  being  guided  by  selective 
preferences  or  interests.    These  preferences,  in  the 


THE  STATUS  OF  VALUES  347 

last  analysis,  are  derived  from  feelings,  from  the 
emotions  and  sentiments  which  constitute  the  affec- 
tive complex  which  is  the  self  considered  as  a 
center  of  feeling  and  source  of  valuation,  choice  and 
volition. 

Here  we  are  concerned  only  with  making  dis- 
tinctions and  definitions  with  sufficient  sharpness  to 
see  what  is  the  problem  of  the  status  of  human 
values  in  reality.  And,  first,  we  note  that  there  is 
an  important  distinction  in  human  values  between 
instrumental  or  mediate  values  and  intrinsic  or  im- 
mediate values.  Wealth,  position,  manual  skill, 
tools,  knowledge  of  foreign  languages,  are  usually 
means  to  ends.  My  pen,  for  instance,  has  only  an 
instrumental  value.  It  mediates  my  getting  my 
thoughts  on  paper,  and  this  achievement,  in  turn, 
is  a  means  to  getting  them  noticed  and  accepted  by 
my  fellows.  On  the  other  hand,  to  love  and  be  loved, 
to  have  friends,  to  be  esteemed  by  one's  fellows,  are 
values  in  themselves.  These  latter  are  intrinsic 
values.  To  live  in  these  experiences  is  to  enjoy  im- 
mediate values.  Even  to  know  the  facts  and  laws  of 
nature,  historical  facts  and  relations,  or  philos- 
ophical principles,  has,  for  some  people,  intrinsic 
value.  One  may  take  satisfaction  in  knowing  things, 
regardless  of  whether  anyone  else  knows  that  one 
knows,  or  esteems  or  rewards  one  for  knowing,  re- 
gardless of  whether  knowing  makes  one  healthier 
or  wealthier,  or  physically  more  comfortable.  One 
values  knowledge  for  its  own  sake  because  one 
feels  that  an  essential  demand  of  one's  life  is  being 
satisfied  by  knowing.     Moreover,  certain  kinds  of 


348  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

knowledge  give  aesthetic  satisfaction.  We  speak 
rightly  of  the  beauty  of  a  piece  of  deductive  reason- 
ing, the  grandeur  or  sublimity  of  a  scientific  prin- 
ciple such  as  that  of  gravitation  or  evolution. 
Aesthetic  experiences  gained  through  poetry,  the 
drama,  fine  prose,  music,  painting,  or  the  enjoy- 
ment of  nature,  are  to  many  people  intrinsically 
worthf ul.    "Beauty  is  its  own  excuse  for  being.'* 

While  many  persons  have  no  joy  in  knowledge 
for  its  own  sake  and,  hence,  knowledge  has  for  them 
no  immediate  worth ;  or,  have  no  keen  joy  in  beauty 
for  its  own  sake  which,  hence,  for  them  has  no  im- 
mediate worth,  there  is  one  type  of  values  which  is 
universal  in  its  appeal.  The  individual  who  has  no 
preferences  in  this  type  is  an  idiot  or  a  monster. 
This  type  consists  of  the  fundamental  valuations  or 
preferences  of  human  persons  as  individuals  and  as 
social  beings.  Every  normal  human  being  desires 
the  companionship,  esteem,  friendship  or  love  of 
some  other  human  beings.  Every  human  being  who 
has  any  self-respect  desires  the  respect  of  others. 
Every  human  being  desires  to  satisfy  the  funda- 
mental interests  of  his  being,  desires  to  feel  and  act 
in  the  ways  that  express  and  realize  what  he 
esteems  his  true  selfhood.  Now,  ethics  is  the  scien- 
tific or  systematic  study  of  these  fundamental  types 
of  human  value  and  of  the  principles  of  social  or- 
ganization by  which  the  achievement  and  perma- 
nence of  these  values  are  furthered.  Honesty,  in- 
tegrity, justice,  fair-mindedness,  active  sympathy, 
conscientiousness,  kindness,  the  spirit  of  service  — 
these  terms  connote  qualities  of  selves  which  con- 


THE  STATUS  OF  VALUES  849 

stitute  fundamental  ethical  values ;  because  they  are 
not  merely  indispensable  means  to  the  maintenance 
of  a  social  order  in  which  selves  can  be  truly  selves, 
but,  moreover,  they  are  intrinsically  worthful  qual- 
ities of  human  nature.  If  "love  is  the  fulfilling  of 
the  law",  that  is  because  love  is  taken  to  include  all 
the  other  qualities  in  the  presence  of  which  man's 
higher  selfhood  can  come  to  its  full  expression. 

And  all  the  movements  which  have  aimed  at 
social  justice,  at  the  bettering  of  the  economic,  in- 
dustrial, educational  and  political  conditions  of 
man's  social  life  are  to  be  judged  by  their  service- 
ableness  in  promoting  the  realization  of  the  funda- 
mental human  values.  It  follows  that  all  intrinsic 
values  are  located  in  the  conscioits  lives  of  selves  or 
persons.  It  is  nonsense  to  talk  about  values  that 
no  self  feels  or  seeks,  about  preferences  that  no 
self  prefers.  The  statics  of  values  in  the  universe 
of  reality  is  the  status  of  selves.  For  selves  alone 
feel,  enjoy,  suffer,  strive  for  and  win  values.  If 
selves,  with  all  their  strivings,  sufferings  and  en- 
joyments, with  all  their  poignant  feelings  and  unre- 
mitting efforts,  are  but  evanescent  spume  cast  up 
by  the  waves  of  the  blind  and  chartless  ocean  of 
being,  then  certainly  love  and  justice,  integrity  and 
loyalty,  and  the  other  ethical  qualities  which  lend 
dignity  and  worth  to  human  life  are  equally  tran- 
sient. The  world  is  not  just  and  not  rational,  much 
less  kind,  if  the  whole  sequence  of  human  life,  in 
which  alone,  so  far  as  we  know  experimentally, 
justice,  reasonableness,  kindness,  are  to  be  found 
in  finite  and  imperfect  but  ever  present  and  ever 


350  THE  FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

growing  forms  of  realization,  is  doomed  to  extinc- 
tion. Indeed,  if  the  life  of  selfhood,  the  life  which 
is  now  throbbing  in  humanity,  does  not  endure  and 
grow  permanently  the  very  norms  of  thought,  the 
logical  values  themselves,  are  homeless  in  the  uni- 
verse and  there  is  no  universe,  only  a  hideous 
bedlam. 

Science  and  logic  postulate  the  rationality,  in 
a  broad  sense  the  justice,  of  the  universal  order. 
Science  and  logic  presuppose  the  validity  of  the 
fundamental  intellectual  values,  presuppose  the 
obligation  to  observe  carefully,  to  think  clearly,  dis- 
interestedly and  persistently  about  whatever  sub- 
ject matter  we  may  be  concerned  with.  In  the  last 
analysis  science,  logic  and  ethics  rest  upon  the  same 
postulate — ^the  rationality  and  justice  of  things,  the 
permanence  of  fundamental  values  in  the  order  of 
reality.  But  to  talk  about  reason,  much  less  justice 
and  love  ruling  the  universe,  if  all  selves  or  souls 
are  ephemeral  phenomena,  is,  I  repeat,  to  talk  non- 
sense. To  talk  of  eternal  values  which  rule  serenely 
in  a  timeless  world  of  being,  if  the  life  of  humanity 
does  not  endure  somehow  as  an  essential  and  worth- 
ful  constituent  in  the  universe  of  reality,  is  to  talk 
"transcendental  moonshine". 

Science,  a  better  social  order,  a  freer,  fuller 
life  for  human  personality,  beauty,  philosophy  it- 
self, are  all  vain  dreams  which  man  conjures  up  to 
hide  from  his  gaze  the  reeking  shambles  of  reality 
which  he  fears  to  face,  unless  the  fundamental 
human  values  endure  through  the  permanence  of 
rational  and  ethical  spirit. 


THE  STATUS  OF  VALUES  351 

The  last  and  deepest  problem  of  philosophy 
which  is,  I  remind  you,  the  reflective  study  of  life 
and  experience  in  their  wholeness,  is  the  problem 
of  religion.  And  religion,  as  I  have  already  pointed 
out,  is  always  at  its  best  an  affirmative  answer  to 
the  final  question  of  humanity — do  our  highest 
values  endure  and  if  so,  under  what  conditions? 

The  true  meaning  of  postulating  a  God,  the 
animating  principle  of  faith  in  God  and  the  higher 
order  of  which  he  is  the  guardian  and  sustainer, 
is  this  affirmative  response  to  the  cry  of  mankind 
for  the  assurance  or  promise  of  the  permanence  of 
the  life  of  most  worth.  Religion  is  the  yea-sayer 
to  all  the  higher  values.  If  it  denies  some  values 
dear  to  the  hearts  of  some  persons,  if  it  calls  to 
renunciation  and  sacrifice  of  the  lower  self,  it  does 
this  in  the  interest  of  higher  values. 

As  to  the  questions,  how  fundamental  values 
come  to  appear  in  the  life  of  humanity,  and  whence 
they  derive  their  authority,  three  chief  answers 
have  been  given —  (a)  Dualistic  Supematuralism, 
(b)  Agnostic  Relativism  or  Subjectivistic  Human- 
ism, (c)  Teleological  Idealism. 

The  dualistic  supematuralist  avers  that  the 
source  and  authority  of  all  supreme  values  is  the 
descent  into  human  life,  at  special  times  and  at 
special  crises,  of  heaven-sent  messengers  authen- 
ticated with  supernatural  power.  The  "Thus  saith 
the  Lord"  has  its  seal  in  miracle  working  and 
mystery  mongering.  Jahweh  thunders  from  Mount 
Sinai.  God  speaks  through  a  divine  revealer  and 
validates  his  utterances  with  physical  portents,  or 


352  THE   FIELD  OF   PHILOSOPHY 

he  leaves,  through  the  divinely  appointed  succession 
of  a  hierarchical  order,  continuous  special  au- 
thorities in  an  ecclesia  or  church. 

(b)  The  agnostic  relativist  points  to  the  fact 
that  the  language  and  the  very  contents  and  mean- 
ings of  the  speech  of  revealers  are  conditioned,  in- 
deed, determined  by  the  whole  social  culture  of  their 
times.  He  points,  with  the  eye  of  the  critical  his- 
torian, to  the  way  in  which  fundamental  values 
have  changed  and  evolved  under  the  influences  of 
industrial,  political  and  scientific  changes.  He 
points  out,  for  example,  that  the  values  authorized 
by  Mosaic  religion  differed  from  those  of  later 
Hebrew  prophetism ;  the  latter  from  those  of  prim- 
itive Christianity.  He  triumphantly  shows,  by  his- 
torical analysis,  that  the  social  values  of  the  prim- 
itive Christian  community  differed  greatly  from 
those  of  a  present  day  Christian  state.  He  shows 
that  the  change  is  due  to  a  mass  of  economic, 
political  and  intellectual  changes.  Finally,  he  calls 
attention  to  the  significant  fact  that  dualistic  super- 
naturalism  rests  upon  a  cosmology  that  is  incon- 
sistent with  modern  science.  The  latter  has  built 
up,  step  by  step,  a  conception  of  the  infinite  extent, 
complexity,  duration  and  orderly  character  of  a 
world  in  which  there  is  no  place  for  the  eruption 
now  and  then  of  miraculous  portents. 

The  agnostic  relativist  concludes  that  the 
human  values  are  the  products  solely  of  the  social 
workmanship  of  man,  a  creature  weak  and 
ephemeral  but  gifted  with  an  indomitable  will  and 
a  strange  capacity  for  planting  and  training  up, 


THE  STATUS  OF  VALUES  353 

amidst  the  savage  wastes  of  the  blind  farces  which 
alone  operate  in  nature,  a  cultivated  plot  of  the 
finer  humanity.  Man,  he  says,  is  engaged  in  an 
incessant  struggle  with  the  savage  and  relentless 
forces  of  nature.  He  will  ultimately  go  down  to 
defeat  and  extinction,  but  in  the  meantime  the  only 
life  of  effort  that  gives  at  least  a  transitory,  though 
pathetic,  gleam  of  grace  and  sweetness  to  life  is 
the  ceaseless  endeavor  to  improve  his  little  garden 
of  the  spirit,  to  tend  and  nurture  in  it  the  fruits 
and  flowers  of  honesty,  integrity,  loyalty,  justice, 
truthfulness,  comradeship  and  sympathy.  These 
values  are  all  doomed  to  ultimate  extinction  but,  in 
the  meantime,  let  us  nobly  strive  and  nobly  help 
one  another. 

The  agnostic  relativist  fails  to  solve  one  riddle. 
How,  if  nature  or  reality  be  as  he  conceives  it,  could 
it  ever  have  given  birth  to  man,  its  insurgent  son? 
If  man,  too,  be  but  the  blind  offspring  of  savage 
and  insensate  forces,  surely  it  makes  an  even 
greater  draft  on  one's  credulity  to  say  that  from 
the  blind  welter  of  mass  particles  in  endless  whirl- 
ing motion  there  could  have  sprung  the  tender- 
nesses, the  heroisms,  the  noble  friendships,  the 
undying  devotions  to  human  kind,  the  willing  self- 
sacrifices  for  those  illusions  of  great  causes  and 
high  enterprises,  which  the  better  part  of  mankind 
displays?  How  could  even  such  illusions  as  justice, 
integrity,  sympathy,  love,  loyalty  and  self-sacri- 
fice have  come  into  being?  Agnostic  relativism, 
which  holds  that  values  have  no  status  except  in 
the  better  members  of  the  living  generation,  hence 


354  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

is  a  subjectivism,  in  which  the  present  living  gen- 
eration of  the  race,  not  the  individual  self,  is  re- 
garded as  the  subject  who  creates  values  out  of 
nothing.  This  view  is,  of  course,  materialism,  and 
the  single  criticism  in  which  all  criticisms  of  mate- 
rialisms concenter  is  that  it  makes  all  human  values 
illusions,  mysteriously  and  episodically  engendered 
by  the  operation  of  blind  physical  forces. 

(c)  Teleological  or  Axiological  Idealism.  This 
view  accepts  the  criticisms  of  dualistic  super- 
naturalism  and  holds,  too,  that  values  are  wrought 
out  by  man  in  history  and,  hence,  are  subject  to 
fluctuation,  to  change  and  evolution,  as  man^s  social 
life  develops  from  simpler  to  more  complex  forms, 
as  his  tools  for  intellectual  analysis  and  economic 
and  social  organization  improve.  But  the  teleolog- 
ical idealist  holds  that  the  persistance  and  evolu- 
tion of  values,  the  change  which  involves  continuity 
of  growth  in  the  process  of  discovering  values  and 
means  to  realize  them,  logically  implies  that  human 
values,  and  the  selves  which  realize  and  enjoy  them, 
are  not  mere  ephemeral  by-products  of  nature.  Man 
is  a  true  and  effective  part  of  reality.  He  is  a 
legitimate  offspring  of  the  universe.  He  must  be 
heir  then  to  a  part  of  the  universal  heritage.  The 
values  he  creates  he  does  not  create  out  of  nothing. 
Values  are  not  vain  imaginings.  It  is  the  same 
being  who  perceives  and  knows  who  likewise  values, 
prefers,  chooses  and  acts.  It  is  the  same  homo- 
geneous world  in  which  he  grows  in  knowledge  and 
power,  and  in  the  consciousness  of  values  and  the 
ability  to  realize  them.    Man  and  his  valuations  are 


THE  STATUS  OF  VALUES  355 

somehow  at  home  in  the  universe.  Man  is  quite  as 
able  to  cash  in  on  his  preferences,  his  valuations, 
as  he  is  on  his  knowledge  or  his  industrial  activity. 
The  universe  which,  in  part,  we  know,  is  a  universe 
which  answers  questions  that  are  rightly  put  and 
to  which  answers  are  persistently  sought.  It  is  the 
same  teleological  order  which  sustains  and  honors 
human  values.  Values  are  neither  mysterious 
visitants  from  an  alien  sphere  nor  phantoms  of 
human  imagination.  Values  are  the  ways  in  which 
the  ruling  purport,  the  ineluctable  life  and  feeling 
of  the  universe,  are  expressed  in  a  multitude  of  finite 
centers  of  feeling  and  action  —  in  the  life  of 
humanity. 

In  almost  all  the  great  historic  systems  of  phil- 
osophy, the  author's  concept  of  value  determines  the 
character  of  his  fundamental  standpoint.^  The  Ideas 
that  play  the  chief  part  in  Plato's  interpretation 
of  reality  are  Ideas  of  Values — logical  relations, 
beauty,  justice,  wisdom;  and  the  supreme  and  ruling 
Idea  is  the  Good.  The  same  is  true  with  regard 
to  Aristotle.  God,  the  pure  form,  is  the  ground  of 
all  forms,  and  the  finite  forms  or  entelechies  are 
the  ordering  principles  in  nature.  The  highest  value 
for  Aristotle  is  the  aesthetic-intellectual  concept  of 
the  pure  self-activity  of  Reason.  Plotinus'  concep- 
tion of  reality  is  controlled  by  the  ideal  of  mystic 
union  of  the  finite  selfhood  with  the  Absolute  Spirit. 
Despite   his    show   of   geometrical    demonstration. 


^  Even  in  systems  of  materialism  it  is  the  apparent 
clearness,  simplicity,  self-evidence  and  cogency  of  the  priri' 
ciples  that  determines  the  standpoint  taken. 


356  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Spinoza's  world  view  is  determined  chiefly  by  his 
vision  of  finite  selfhood  as  finding  its  fulfillment 
and  euthanasia  in  a  blessed  absorption  in  the  divine 
Substance.  For  Leibnitz  the  supreme  values  are  the 
infinitely  diversified  individuality  of  the  monads  and 
the  continuity  and  organization  of  the  universe  into 
a  harmonious  whole. 

Kant's  system  is  controlled  by  his  concept  of 
the  moral  dignity  and  freedom  of  the  human  per- 
sonality ;  of  the  tremendous  seriousness  and  infinite 
significance  of  man's  moral  vocation.  The  same 
motives  determined  the  fundamental  outlines  of 
Fichte's  philosophy.  For  Hegel  the  supreme  value 
is  the  spectacle  of  the  self-realizing  march  of  Spirit 
through  history,  having  as  its  goal  the  harmonious 
organization  of  finite  selfhood  into  conscious  union 
with  the  Infinite  Idea.  For  Schopenhauer  the  peace 
which  comes  from  the  cessation  of  all  desire  and 
the  ending  of  all  inner  discord  is  the  highest  value. 

For  Berkeley  the  vision  of  God,  the  great  other 
spirit,  is  the  highest  value.  For  Hobbes,  Locke, 
Hume  and  Mill  the  highest  value  lies  in  the  recon- 
ciliation of  the  social  and  political  freedom  of  the 
individual  with  the  needs  of  a  social  order  and  au- 
thority. How  to  ensure  to  the  human  individual 
the  liberty  to  develop  and  lead  his  own  life  as  a 
member  of  the  social  order,  without  which  the 
development  and  exercise  of  individuality  is  impos- 
sible— such  has  been  the  dominant  problem  of  Eng- 
lish philosophy  from  Hobbes  to  John  Stuart  Mill. 
Mill  expressly  states  that  he  was  led  to  his  logical 


THE  STATUS  OF  VALUES  357 

investigations  in  order  to  lay  secure  foundations  for 
a  science  of  society. 

It  is  in  this  British  feeling  for  the  worth  and 
rights  of  human  individuality  that  we  find  the  key- 
note of  William  James'  philosophy.  For  the  school 
of  objective  idealism,  (Bradley,  Bosanquet  and 
others),  the  supreme  criterion  of  value  is  the  har- 
monious organization  of  experience  into  a  sys- 
tematic whole,  the  fusion  or  union  of  all  aspects  of 
experience  into  a  living  totality,  in  which  all  differ- 
ences are  unified,  all  conflicts  are  healed,  all  dis- 
cords are  harmonized.  In  this  harmonious  totality 
the  contrast  between  reflective  thinking  and  its 
objects  passes  away  into  a  perfect  intuition  or  state 
of  feeling  in  which  knower  and  known  are  wholly 
one;  the  conflict  between  the  "is''  and  the  "ought- 
to-be",  between  desired  ideal  and  achieved  fact  is 
laid  at  rest.  In  it  all  pain  and  discord  are  contribut- 
ing elements  in  the  harmonious  feeling  which  per- 
vades the  whole.  The  whole  is  the  all-inclusive  indi- 
vidual experience  in  which  all  imperfect  individuals 
are  elements.  Thus  the  highest  value  is  the  highest 
reality.  The  same  standard  obtains  for  truth  as  for 
other  aspects  of  value.  For  the  measure  of  truth 
in  any  system  of  judgments  is  the  internal  coher- 
ence of  the  system. 

Royce's  conception  of  value  does  not  greatly 
differ  from  the  one  just  stated.  Absolute  reality 
is  the  fulfillment  of  all  values,  for  it  is  the  complete 
fulfillment  of  the  meaning  of  all  finite  ideas,  the 
complete  satisfaction  of  all  finite  purposes. 


358  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  chief  objections  raised  to  the  idealistic 
theory  of  value  are:  (1)  in  its  eagerness  to  identify 
the  absolute  value  of  harmony,  internal  coherence, 
perfection  of  organization  in  experience,  with 
reality,  it  overlooks  the  fact  that,  for  human  beings, 
value  is  an  ideal  aim  only  gradually  and  partially 
achieved  in  time,  and  thus  it  seems  to  deprive  the 
human  process  of  striving  for  and  achieving  har- 
monious organization,  the  whole  temporal  life  of 
effort  and  progress  towards  higher  values,  of  any 
final  value.  For,  identifying  absolute  value  and 
absolute  reality,  this  doctrine  assumes  the  timeless 
reality  of  the  ideal  values;  (2)  consequently,  it  is 
objected,  eternalistic  idealism  cannot  find  any  last- 
ing significance  in  the  deeds  and  experiences  of  the 
imperfect  and  striving  human  individual. 

The  pragmatists  and  personal  idealists  have, 
while  admitting  that  the  ideal  of  value  is  har- 
monious experience  or  harmony  of  life  and  feeling, 
protested  against  the  assumption  that  all  value  is 
eternally  or  timelessly  real.  This  protest,  on  behalf 
of  the  human  person's  life  as  a  process  in  time, 
is  the  chief  motive  of  the  tendency  known  as  tem- 
poralism,  which  insists  that  all  reality  must  traffic 
in  time,  that  value  must  inhere  in  the  temporal 
activities  of  selves  and  the  historical  order,  if  there 
be  any  value  in  reality. 

Windelband,  Rickert  and  other  representatives 
of  the  Philosophy  of  Values  in  Germany,  have  in- 
sisted that  the  validity  of  the  norms  of  logical  think- 
ing, the  very  basic  principles  of  knowledge,  no  less 
than  the  acceptance  of  moral  ideals  and  canons  of 


THE  STATUS  OF  VALUES  359 

aesthetic  judgment,  rest  on  the  act  of  the  thinker 
in  accepting  the  conditions  under  which  alone  the 
purpose  and  will  to  know  the  truth,  to  will  the 
good,  and  to  accept  the  beautiful,  can  be  fulfilled. 
In  other  words,  if  you  seek  truth  you  ought  to  and 
must  accept  the  rules  of  the  thinking  game,  just  as 
if  you  seek  the  good  you  must  accept  the  norms  of 
goodness.  This  attitude  of  the  self  in  acknowl- 
edging the  values  of  truth,  goodness  and  beauty  is 
an  act  of  faith  in  universal  purposes  which  rule 
the  time  order. 

From  our  standpoint  the  only  sense  in  which 
we  can  speak  of  eternal  values  is  that  there  are 
universal  purposes  and  meanings  which  maintain 
themselves  and  prevail  in  the  temporal  flux.  In 
other  words  the  eternity  of  values  means  their 
active  perduration  through  the  endless  process  of 
change  and  evolution  and  their  continuing  victory, 
won  in  part  through  the  service  by  human  selves  of 
the  Universal  Purpose  or  Universal  Value. 

This  standpoint  I  call  teleological  idealism.  It 
accepts,  as  the  ideal  or  criterion  of  value,  the  har- 
monious organization  of  experience  in  persons.  It 
finds  such  harmony  fulfilled  in  the  development  of 
truth  through  increasing  coherence,  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  good  through  the  organization  of  human 
interests,  in  the  development  of  feeling  through  the 
fulfillment  of  aesthetic  ideals  and  personal  affec- 
tions. But  it  does  not  admit  that  the  ideal  of  value 
is  in  all  its  fullness  timelessly  fulfilled  in  the  shape 
of  a  completed  reality.  It  does  not  admit  that  the 
present  order  of  facts  is  transparently  and  com- 


360  THE   FIELD   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

pletely  the  fulfillment  or  expression  of  value.  It 
finds  that  the  conflict  between  actual  existence,  and 
ideals,  between  finite  fact  and  value,  is  real  and  it 
is  led  to  suppose  that  only  through  continuous 
activity  by  selves  can  this  conflict  be  overcome. 

Thus  teleological  idealism  admits  the  necessity 
of  postulating  a  ruling  principle  or  ground  of  values 
in  the  universe.  It  can  believe  in  progress  and 
admit  retrogression  in  the  values  of  life.  It  knows 
no  absolute  but  the  absolute  need  that  man,  if  he 
is  to  be  true  to  his  vocation  as  a  spiritual  agent, 
shall  loyally  cleave  to  the  service  of  the  ideal  values, 
to  the  loyal  service  of  truth,  integrity,  justice,  fel- 
lowship, the  furtherance  of  beauty  and  harmony  in 
the  world  of  society  and  in  the  inner  man.  For 
we  know  only  in  part  and  prophesy  in  part,  and 
we  prophesy  in  faith  according  to  the  measure  and 
urgency  of  our  spiritual  needs  and  cravings. 

Teleological  idealism  does  not  deny  that  in 
special  individuals,  and  at  significant  junctures  in 
man's  history,  old  values  are  transformed  and  new 
ones  created.  In  fact  teleological  idealism  sees  in 
the  religious  genius,  the  moral  genius,  the  artistic 
and  scientific  geniuses,  in  the  creative  poet, 
musician,  artist,  discoverer,  organizer  and  pro- 
tagonist of  higher  ideals,  special  organs  through 
which  the  common  life  of  man  is  transformed  by 
the  breaking  forth,  into  a  new  power  of  creative 
utterance,  of  the  Universal  Spiritual  Order,  the  Ever 
Energizing  Cosmic  Meaning  of  Life. 

The  problem  of  the  status  of  value  in  the  uni- 
verse is  the  problem  of  the  status  of  humanity  or 


THE  STATUS  OF  VALUES  361 

selfhood.  The  idea  of  God  is  that  of  a  Supreme 
Reality  or  Spiritual  Order,  in  and  through  which 
human  personality  and  its  values  are  sustained. 
God  is  the  cosmical  ground  of  values,  the  ground 
of  human  personality,  the  Overself  which  is  the 
source  and  goal  of  all  selfhood. 

The  evil  is  that  which  thwarts  values,  which 
impedes  and  destroys  them.  I  cannot  here  enter 
upon  a  consideration  of  the  problem  of  evil.  Let 
me  point  out  that,  from  the  present  standpoint, 
namely  that  God  means  the  Supreme  Principle  or 
Ground  of  Values  and  of  Personality,  the  question 
of  the  origin  of  evil  ceases  to  be  a  question  of  vital 
interest.  The  world  is  as  it  is,  no  matter  what  were 
the  conditions  of  its  origin.  There  is  no  point  in 
crying  over  the  irrevocable  past.  It  could  not  have 
been  otherwise,  either  from  the  point  of  view  of 
materialism  or  of  teleological  idealism.  The  appar- 
ent wastefulness  and  cruelty  of  the  natural  order 
is  to  be  faced  as  a  fact.  These  things  can  be,  and 
are  being  controlled.  Man's  inhumanity  to  man  is 
capable  of  being  remedied.  Nature's  inhumanity 
to  man  has  been  in  part  overcome  and  may  be  still 
more  successfully  lessened,  when  man's  social 
capacities  are  better  organized  and  more  fully 
brought  into  play.  From  our  standpoint  we  are  to 
regard  the  defects  of  nature  and  the  defects  of  man 
as  challenges  to  concerted  human  effort,  by  which 
the  human  values  already  visioned  and  acknowl- 
edged shall  be  enhanced  and  conserved  and,  in  the 
process,  new  and  richer  human  values  shall  be 
engendered. 


362  THE   FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Teleological  idealism  does  not  imply  that  there 
are  no  forces  in  the  universe  hostile  to  the  achieve- 
ment or  conservation  of  values.  It  does  mean  that 
humanity  and  its  values,  being  essential  features  of 
a  universe,  which,  thus  far,  is  humanistic  in  char- 
acter, may  endure  and  win  the  victory.  Thus  it  is 
a  rational  faith  in  human  values;  rational,  because 
values  and  selves  are  the  offspring  of  the  very  uni- 
verse in  which  reason  lives  and  works,  faith,  be- 
cause admittedly  we  can  see  but  a  little  way  and 
that  not  very  clearly,  along  the  pathway  of 
humanity  in  its  course  through  time. 

In  conclusion  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  note  the 
bearing  of  this  position  on  the  traditional  argu- 
ments for  the  existence  of  God.  The  ontological 
argument — the  idea  of  God  is  the  idea  of  a  perfect 
being ;  the  idea  of  a  perfect  being  involves  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  being ;  therefore  God  exists  —  is 
nothing  more  than  the  putting  into  the  form  of  a 
syllogism  of  the  postulate  of  a  Supreme  Principle 
or  Ground  of  Values — the  Perfect  Being.  The 
cosmological  argument  —  that  the  existence  of  the 
world  implies  the  existence  of  a  unitary  Cause  — 
has  no  religious  value,  except  in  sq  far  as  it  is 
assumed  that  the  world  is  good  and,  therefore,  its 
values  must  have  a  single  source.  The  physico- 
teleological  argument  or  argument  from  the  evi- 
dence of  design  or  purpose  in  the  structure  and 
process  of  nature  is  but  a  clumsy  and  round  about 
way  of  stating  the  fundamental  postulate  of  life, 
morality,  science  and  religion,  namely  that  values 


THE  STATUS  OF  VALUES  863 

are   operative   and   controlling   principles    in    the 
universal  order. 

REFERENCES 

Works  on  Metaphysics  and  the  Philosophy  of  Religion, 
previously  cited. 

Huxley,  T.  H.,  Evolution  and  Ethics. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  Three  Essays  on  Religion. 

HofFding,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy. 

James,  The  Will  to  Believe,  and  A  Pluralistic  Universe. 

Miinsterberg,  The  Eternal  Values. 

Bosanquet,  The  Value  and  Destiny  of  the  Individual. 

Windelband,  W.,  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  Pt.  II, 
and  History  of  Philosophy,  pp.  518-528  and  pp.  648-659. 

Rickert,  H.,  Vom  System  der  Werte,  Logos,  Bd.  IV, 
1913,  pp.  295-327. 

Leighton,  Personality  and  a  Metaphysics  of  Value,  In- 
ternational Journal  of  Ethics,  1910. 

Nietzsche,  F.,  Works  trans.  A.  Tille,  especially  Thus 
Spake  Zarathustra,  Beyond  Good  and  Bad  and  Genealogy  of 
Morals. 

Leighton,  Temporalism  and  the  Christian  Idea  of  God, 
The  Chronicle,  Vol.  XVIII  (1918)  Nos.  6  and  7,  pp.  283-288 
and  339-344. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY 

The  philosophy  of  history  must  be  distin- 
guished from  the  philosophical  study  of  history. 
The  latter  consists  of  reflection  upon  and  generaliza- 
tion from  the  study,  either  of  special  periods  of  his- 
tory, or  in  its  widest  form,  of  universal  history. 
Excellent  examples  of  philosophical  historians  are 
Ranke,  Taine,  Lecky  and  Burckhardt.  The  phil- 
osophy of  history  is  the  quest  for  a  determination 
of  the  right  standpoint  from  which  to  view  the 
whole  activity  of  man  as  an  historical  and  social 
being.  What  does  the  life  of  man,  as  an  historical 
being,  mean?  What  ends  or  values  does  the  his- 
torical life  aim  at  and  achieve?  What  is  the  worth, 
the  purpose,  the  promise  of  man's  life  in  time  on 
the  earth?  Is  human  history,  as  the  successive 
generations  run  their  courses,  a  meaningless  and 
futile  tale?  Or  does  man  lay  foundations,  build  up 
values,  partially  see  and  achieve  ends  that  are  in- 
herently worthful,  however  fragmentary  and  im- 
perfect their  fulfillment  at  any  given  time  may  be? 
Does  the  historical  life  of  man  imply  the  further 
progress  and  fruition  of  human  values?  Are  justice, 
rationality,  liberty,  humanity,  the  achievement  of 
fuller  individuality  and  a  finer  social  order,  mere 
dreams  and  illusions  of  a  being  who  is  inexorably 
and    unconsciously    driven    on    by    physical    and 

(364) 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  365 

economic  forces  alone?  Or  does  history  show,  on 
large  scale  patterns,  the  working  out  of  ethical  and 
rational  ends?  To  raise  such  questions  is  to  in- 
dicate that  the  philosophy  of  history  is  the  applica- 
tion of  metaphysics  and  ethics  to  the  spectacle  of 
man's  temporal  life.  On  the  other  hand,  meta- 
physics and  ethics  are  enriched,  given  content,  en- 
dowed with  body  and  blood,  only  by  bringing  their 
categories  down  into,  and  putting  them  to  work  in, 
the  concrete  life  of  man.  Metaphysics  and  ethics 
must  draw,  from  the  contemplation,  on  a  wide  scale 
and  in  sympathetic  manner,  of  the  march  of  man 
and  civilization  through  time,  fruitful  suggestions, 
materials  and  points  of  view. 

The  germs  of  a  philosophy  of  history  are  to  be 
found  in  the  writings  of  Hebrew  prophecy  (in 
Isaiah,  Amos,  Jeremiah,  Ezekiel  and  others)  in 
which  the  course  of  nations  is  for  the  first  time  con- 
ceived and  depicted  as  controlled  by  the  one  divine 
governing  purpose.  Jehovah  is  the  ruler  of  all  the 
nations  and  he  judges  them  and  determines  their 
fates  in  accordance  with  the  eternal  principles  of 
social  righteousness  and  mercy,  which  are  the  ex- 
pression in  human  society  of  his  holy  will.  Special 
privileges  entail  special  obligations  and  Jehovah 
judges  and  allots  to  Israel  its  historical  destiny  in 
accordance  with  the  measure  of  its  loyalty  to  the 
laws  of  social  justice  and  loving  kindness,  which  he 
enunciates  through  the  mouths  of  his  prophets.  In 
this  connection  see  especially  Isaiah  40 :  12  ff.,  42 :  5 
ff.,  45 :  21-23,  Amos  9 :  7,  and  the  whole  treatment 
of  the  relations  of  the  various  peoples  in  Isaiah, 


366  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Amos,  Micah  and  Jonah.  Israel  and  Judah  must 
not  look  for  special  favors  at  the  hands  of  Jehovah. 
He  is  not  their  God  alone  but  the  God  of  the  whole 
earth  and,  indeed,  of  the  whole  universe. 

This  prophetic  conception  of  the  moral  order 
of  history,  that  is,  of  the  course  of  historical  change 
as  the  working  out  of  cosmically  effective  principles 
of  social  or  ethical  value,  was  their  solution  of  the 
ethico-religious  problem  which  confronted  a  group 
of  great  thinkers  who  started  from  the  fundamental 
postulate  of  an  ethical  and  social  religion.  Jehovah 
was  believed  to  stand  in  a  peculiar  relation  to  the 
people  to  whom  he  had  made  known  his  true  char- 
acter and  who  had  accepted  him  by  an  act  of  will 
(the  covenant  relationship) .  Now  political  disaster, 
conquest  and  suffering  confronts  the  chosen  people. 
If  Jehovah  be,  indeed,  the  ethical  will  who  rules 
the  world,  these  disasters  must  be  the  consequence 
of  Israel's  disloyalty.  The  prophets  have  no  dif- 
ficulty in  pointing  to  the  social  corruption,  the 
luxury,  sensuous  indulgence,  dishonesty  and  oppres- 
sion, that  are  rife  in  a  luxurious  state,  as  the  sins 
of  disloyalty,  the  continuance  in  which  brings  dis- 
aster because  the  Judge  of  all  the  earth  is  holy. 
This  new  view  of  the  nation's  relation  to  Jehovah 
carries  with  it  the  ethical  universalism  which  sees 
in  the  vicissitudes  of  all  the  nations  the  work  of 
Jehovah's  will.  Assyria  is  for  the  time  the  rod  of 
his  anger.     Cyrus,  the  Persian,  is  his  instrument. 

The  prophetic  doctrine  of  a  providential  moral 
order,  ruling  the  course  of  history  and  having  its 
consummation  in  the  full  establishment  of  the  King- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  367 

dom  of  God,  is  taken  over  and  further  developed, 
in  the  light  of  the  belief  in  Christ  as  the  fulfiller 
of  the  prophetic  teaching,  by  the  fathers  of  the 
Christian  Church.  It  furnishes  the  means  by  which 
the  civilization  of  Greece  and  Rome  are  set  in  their 
relations  to  the  Hebrew-Christian  process  of  revela- 
tion and  redemption.  St.  Paul  and  the  author  of 
the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  philosophize  on  the  rela- 
tion of  Hebraism  and  Gentilism  to  Christianity. 
See,  in  this  connection,  St.  Paul's  Epistles  to  the 
Romans,  passim,  and  Galatians,  Chapters  3  and  5, 
and  Hebrews,  especially  Chapter  11. 

Justin  Martyr,  Irenaeus,  Tertullian  and  espe- 
cially Augustine,  carry  on  the  work  of  setting  the 
history  of  the  world  in  the  framework  of  the  Chris- 
tian religion  as  the  final  revelation  of  God's  pur- 
pose. Augustine,  in  his  City  of  God,  formulates,  in 
comprehensive  fashion,  for  mediaeval  Christianity 
the  whole  providential  order  of  history.  The  goal 
of  history  is  the  parousia  or  second  coming  of 
Christ,  which  will  mean  the  complete  establishment 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God  on  earth.  The  Christian 
eschatology  or  doctrine  of  last  things  thus  supplies 
the  norm  for  the  judgment  of  historical  progress. 

The  Manicheans  and  Gnostics,  heretical  sects 
in  the  early  Christian  centuries,  conceived  the  his- 
torical process  in  thoroughly  dualistic  fashion  as  a 
battle  of  the  Gods,  a  conflict  between  the  cosmic 
powers  of  Good  and  Evil,  Light  and  Darkness, 
Spirit  and  Flesh.  This  dualistic  interpretation  of 
history  has  its  roots  in  the  dualism  of  the  Persian 
religion  and  in  the  metaphysical  and  ethical  dual- 


368  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ism  of  spirit  and  matter  which  is  so  prominent  a 
feature  of  the  later  Greek  and  Hellenistic-Roman 
speculation,  especially  in  the  Neo-Platonic  school. 
Augustine  was  profoundly  influenced  by  it. 

From  Augustine  to  Herder  one  does  not  find 
any  original  contribution  to  a  philosophy  of  his- 
tory, except  the  isolated  and  unfruitful  attempt  of 
G.  B.  Vico  to  establish  a  science  of  history  (La 
Scienza  Nuova).  Vico  struck  out  the  idea  of  the 
unity  of  history  and  conceived  of  all  history  as  con- 
sisting of  series  of  cycles  which,  although  differing 
from  one  another,  are  all  expressions  of  the  ''eternal 
idea  of  history".  The  burden  of  history  is  the 
realization  of  justice.  The  philosophers  of  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  were  not  in- 
terested in  history,  with  the  exception  of  that  uni- 
versal genius,  Leibnitz,  who  in  this  respect,  as  in 
others,  is  beyond  his  time.  For  Hobbes,  Descartes 
and  Spinoza  and  their  followers  the  norms  of  all 
knowledge  are  mathematics  and  mechanics,  the 
mathematics  of  the  physical  order.  For  Locke  and 
Hume  the  chief  interest  lay  in  the  psychological  and 
epistemological  analysis  of  knowledge.  For  them, 
too,  mathematics  was  the  highest  and  exactest  kind 
of  knowledge,  since  it  dealt  only  with  the  relations 
of  ideas.  The  notion  of  the  gradual  growth  or 
evolution  of  hum.an  institutions  was  foreign  to  their 
thinking.  Everything  social  and  human  was  con- 
ceived to  be  a  deliberate  invention  of  reason  or  the 
result  of  a  voluntary  convention  or  conscious  con- 
tract.    This  attitude  is  not  entirely  true  of  Hume. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  369 

Kant  in  his  Ideas  Towards  a  Universal  His- 
tory does  not  break  away  from  this  type  of 
unhistorical  rationalism.  He  did,  however,  formu- 
late the  idea  of  progress  toward  rationality;  as 
did  also  Lessing  (1729-1781),  who  conceived  the 
historical  process  of  humanity  to  be  a  gradual 
progress  in  God's  education  of  the  race  up  to  the 
goal,  which  is  full  recognition  of  the  religion  of  the 
spirit  and  love,  first  enunciated  in  the  Gospel  of 
St.  John.  Herder  (1744-1803)  in  his  Ideas  for  the 
Philosophy  of  the  History  of  Mankind  has  a  much 
broader  conception.  He  attempts  to  bring  the  whole 
course  of  man's  development  in  time  under  the  con- 
ception of  a  law  of  progress,  whose  goal  is  the  rule 
of  reason  and  love  in  human  society.  Herder  takes 
account  of  the  influence  of  geographical  and  climatic 
conditions  in  the  historical  developments  of  peoples 
and  gives  a  place  to  the  operation  of  the  more  or 
less  unconscious  spirit  or  soul  of  a  people.  The 
goal  of  history  is  the  fulfillment  of  the  ideal  of 
humanity;  that  is,  the  harmonious  development  of 
all  the  capacities  of  man  into  rationality,  aesthetic 
harmony,  social  freedom  and  love.  This  was  the 
ideal  of  Goethe  and  Schiller,  too.  Fichte  and  Hegel 
agree  with  Lessing  and  Herder  in  conceiving  the 
course  of  history  to  be  the  progressive  realization 
in  human  society  of  rational  freedom  and  love.  The 
goal  of  man's  earthly  life,  says  Fichte,  is  that 
humanity,  in  all  its  relationships,  shall  direct  its 
life  with  freedom  and  in  accordance  with  reason. 
Fichte  too  regards  the  Johannine  Gospel  as  the  first 
clear  enunciation  of  the  spiritual  end  and  meaning 


370  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  history.  Reason,  he  says,  works  first  uncon- 
sciously as  instinct,  then  externally  as  the  authority 
of  custom  and  law,  and  finally,  inwardly  in  the  com- 
plete insight  of  conscious  and  rational  freedom. 
Fichte's  doctrine  is  a  metaphysics  of  history  read 
in  terms  of  his  theory  of  ethical  values. 

Hegel's  Philosophy  of  History  is  the  most 
elaborately  worked  out  metaphysics  of  history  pro- 
duced by  the  school  of  absolute  idealism.  In  a  broad 
sense,  Hegel's  whole  philosophy  is  historical,  an 
evolutionary  idealism.  The  dialectic  process  or  de- 
velopment of  the  full  truth  and  meanings  of  things 
through  the  "might  of  the  negative",  that  is,  the 
impulse  resident  in  every  finite  thing  and  event  to 
pass  over  into  its  opposite,  and  for  the  opposites  to 
be  absorbed  into  a  higher  unity  in  which  opposi- 
tion again  breaks  forth,  this  logic  of  passion,  is  ex- 
emplified on  the  grand  scale  in  the  history  of  human 
culture.  The  whole  history  of  humanity  is  the  de- 
velopment of  spirit  to  fully  conscious  and  rational 
freedom,  through  the  incessant  breaking  forth,  and 
reconciliation  on  a  higher  level,  of  the  oppositions 
inherent  in  the  movement  of  spirit  through  the 
finite  forms  of  reality.  Art,  politics  and  religion, 
all  pass  through  this  dialectic  growth,  and  Hegel 
threads  the  whole  history  of  the  religious  and  polit- 
ical institutions  of  the  world  on  his  dialectic  frame- 
work. The  meaning  of  human  history  is  the  pro- 
gressive realization  of  the  consciousness  of  rational 
freedom  on  the  part  of  man.  Rational  freedom  is 
attained  when  there  is  a  recognition  of  the  complete 
harmony  of  the  will  of  the  individual  with  the  uni- 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  371 

versal  will  embodied  in  the  state.  It  is  identical 
with  true  morality,  for  this  consists  precisely  in 
the  conscious  and  complete  acceptance  by  the  indi- 
vidual self  of  the  rights  and  duties  which  are  pre- 
scribed to  him  by  the  whole  spirit  of  the  state.  So 
freedom  is  fully  realized  where  custom,  law  and 
morality  are  wholly  harmonious.  It  is  in  the  state 
that  the  individual  life,  family  life  and  the  life  of 
civil  society,  find  their  fulfillment.  History,  there- 
fore, begins  and  ends  with  the  state. 

The  dialectic  of  history  is  the  struggle  of  the 
succession  of  state  Ideas.  "The  state  is  the  march 
of  God  in  history".  "The  state  is  the  Divine  Idea 
as  it  exists  on  earth."  In  it  are  found  the  union 
of  morality  and  religion.  God  is  the  Absolute  Rea- 
son who  governs  the  world,  and  the  working  out 
of  this  government  is  the  history  of  the  world.  God 
is  the  world-spirit  who  realizes  his  Idea  or  Pur- 
pose in  time.  In  each  successive  great  epoch  of 
history,  one  state  represents  the  aspect  of  the  Divine 
Idea  which  is  then  being  realized.  The  struggle 
between  states  is  the  struggle  between  stages  of 
the  Idea. 

The  victorious  state  represents  a  higher  phase 
of  the  Divine  Idea  than  the  conquered  state.  For 
example,  in  the  ancient  oriental  empires  of  China 
and  India  but  one  man  is  free — ^the  ruler — and  he 
is  capricious  and  despotic.  The  subjects  do  not 
know  that  they  are  free  subjects  and  therefore  are 
only  unconscious  subjects.  The  religions  of  the 
Orient,  especially  Brahmanism,  make  the  Infinite 
all  and  man,  the  finite  individual,  nothing.     Thus 


372  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

they  correspond  with  the  despotic  state  idea.  Greece 
conquers  the  oriental  world  because  Greece,  par- 
ticularly Athens,  represents  a  higher  stage  in  the 
consciousness  of  freedom  and  individuality.  Some 
men,  that  is  the  citizens,  are  free.  Greece  gives 
free  play  to  individuality,  and  her  religion  is  the 
religion  of  the  finite,  of  free  and  beautiful  indi- 
vidualities who  express  the  Greek  ideal  of  humanity. 
But  Greece  succumbs  because  she  does  not  attain 
the  full  consciousness  of  the  identity  of  man  as  man 
with  the  universal,  of  the  finite  with  the  Infinite, 
of  the  identity  of  the  individual  spirit  with  the  spirit 
of  the  social  order.  In  order  that  this  conscious- 
ness of  the  universality  of  freedom  may  be  achieved, 
it  must  appear  in  the  form  of  abstract  universality, 
the  abstract  power  of  the  universal  state.  This  is 
the  Roman  Empire.  Christianity  infuses  into  the 
Roman  world  the  consciousness  of  the  identity  of 
the  Divine  and  the  Human,  the  Infinite  and  the 
Finite,  in  its  doctrine  of  the  God-Man.  Politically, 
this  consciousness  is  realized  in  the  modern  Ger- 
manic world,  in  which  all  men  are  free  as  rational 
beings  who  find  the  substance  of  their  wills  in  the 
complete  but  free  and  rational  identification  of  their 
subjective  or  personal  wills  with  the  universal  will 
embodied  in  the  organization  of  the  state,  in  which 
they  co-operate  as  rational  members.  Thus  the  goal 
of  history  is  reached.  What  remains  to  be  achieved 
in  future  time,  Hegel  does  not  indicate. 

The  great  personalities,  world-historical  indi-' 
viduals,  statesmen,  conquerors  and  rulers  are  the 
chief  organs  of  the  universal  will,  instruments  of 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  373 

the  Idea,  of  the  World-Spirit.  They  pursue  their 
own  aims,  but  the  Idea  in  its  cunning  uses  them 
as  its  tools  to  further  its  unhasting  and  unresting 
movement. 

Hegel's  conception  of  history  thus  differs  from 
the  traditional  Christian  conception  in  that  his 
Providence  is  a  World  Purpose  or  a  World-Idea 
that  is  the  wholly  immanent  driving  force  that 
operates  according  to  the  dialectic  or  logic  of  his- 
tory, using  the  passions  and  wills  of  men,  the  vicis- 
situdes of  empires  and  rulers,  to  achieve  full  con- 
sciousness of  itself,  by  an  immanent  necessity  that 
admits  nothing  contingent,  nothing  that  can  arrest 
its  resistless  progress.  Hence,  the  course  of  history 
is  the  majestic  progress  of  the  true  and  the  good 
in  and  through  all  the  error  and  the  sin,  the  pas- 
sion and  pathos,  the  tragedy  and  comedy  of  man's 
political  and  social  life.  The  Christian  view,  on  the 
other  hand,  regards  man  as  a  free  and  responsible 
agent  who  may  contravene,  although  he  cannot 
finally  thwart,  God's  purposes  in  history. 

Hegel's  Philosophy  of  History  is  a  combination 
of  philosophical  history,  in  which  the  facts  are  often 
badly  distorted  to  fit  his  scheme,  and  metaphysics 
of  history.  For  Hegel  history  is  the  resistless  and 
inevitable  march  of  the  Absolute  Idea  through  time, 
until  it  becomes  fully  conscious  of  itself  in  the 
culture  of  the  modem  Germanic  world  and  dis- 
covers, in  the  Hegelian  philosophy,  what  it  has  all 
meant.  This  victorious  march  of  the  Absolute 
through  time  is  the  metaphysical  ground  of  all 
culture.     It  is  the  progressive  realization  by  the 


374  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

human  spirit  of  its  identity  with  the  Absolute  Spirit, 
which  consciousness  of  itself  through  the  human 
spirit  by  the  Absolute  Spirit  is  the  full  and  true 
meaning  of  freedom.  Karl  Marx,  the  author  of 
Das  Kapital,  the  socialistic  Bible,  stood  the  Hegelian 
philosophy  on  its  head  when  he  proclaimed  that  the 
march  of  the  Absolute  through  time  is  the  march  of 
economic  necessity  and  every  culture  factor,  every 
ideological  motive  in  history,  is  but  a  sublimation 
of  economic  forces.  Marx  in  a  one-sided  fashion 
thus  called  attention  to  a  very  important  considera- 
tion neglected  by  Hegel,  namely  the  influence  of 
economic  factors  in  determining  the  course  of  man's 
historical  evolution.  The  economic  or  materialistic 
interpretation  of  history  has  become  almost  a  com- 
monplace since  then;  but  to  assert  that  economic 
motives  are  the  only  ones  that  rule  in  history  is 
to  take  a  distorted  view  of  human  nature. 

Auguste  Comte  (1798-1857)  regards  historical 
progress  as  due  primarily  to  intellectual  causes. 
There  are,  he  says,  three  stages  in  man's  intellectual 
history.  In  the  earliest  or  theological  stage,  man  ex- 
plains events  by  recourse  to  spirits  (animism)  ;  in 
the  second  or  metaphysical  stage,  explanation  is 
given  in  terms  of  abstract  metaphysical  entities 
(for  example,  to  explain  the  effects  of  opiates  as 
due  to  a  "dormific"  capacity)  ;  in  the  third  or  posi- 
tivistic  stage,  of  which  Comte  was  the  herald,  man 
concerns  himself  only  with  formulating  the  cor- 
relations between  phenomena,  to  the  end  that  he 
may  establish  social  harmony  and  well  being. 
Comte    formulated    a    polity    for    the    positivistic 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  375 

society,  his  social  ideal,  in  which  altruism  as  the 
supreme  motive  and  the  detailed  regulation  of 
social  life  are  to  be  the  chief  factors.  The  goal  of 
history  is  the  perfection  of  man  in  society,  motivated 
by  altruism  and  directed  by  positivistic  science. 
Buckle,  the  English  historian,  was  a  pioneer  in 
showing  the  influence  of  physical  conditions  in  de- 
termining the  course  of  history.  He  did  not,  how- 
ever, deny  the  influence  of  mental  causes. 

Nearly  all  modern  systems  of  sociology  include 
theories  of  historical  progress.  Herbert  Spencer, 
for  instance,  elaborates  at  great  length  the  view 
that  society  has  progressed,  and  is  still  progress- 
ing, from  militarism  with  centralized  organization 
towards  industrialism  with  political  decentraliza- 
tion. Some  sociologists,  such  as  Gumplowicz  and 
Ratzenhofer,  emphasize  the  struggles  of  races  and 
groups  for  political  domination  as  the  chief  cause 
of  historical  change.  Much  use  has  been  made  of 
the  evolutionary  doctrines  of  struggle  for  existence 
and  survival  of  the  fittest  as  ruling  forces  in  his- 
torical changes. 

Social  psychologists  or  psychological  sociol- 
ogists, of  whom  there  are  many  today,  following 
Wundt,  emphasize  the  central  place  of  psychical 
forces,  feelings  and  volitions,  in  historical  change. 
Wundt  holds  that  the  philosophy  of  history  is  ap- 
plied psychology.  There  are  social  psychological 
laws  or  principles  which  are  illustrated  by  the  facts 
of  history.  The  sociologists  in  general  hold  that 
there  are  laws  of  historical  change.  Thus  they  are 
determinists.    But  many  of  them  would  agree  with 


376  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Wundt  that  the  laws  of  historical  causality  are 
psychological  and  thus  differ  from  physical  laws. 
In  a  physical  process  there  is  quantitative  equiv- 
alence between  cause  and  effect.  This  is  not  the 
case  in  the  psychical  sphere.  Here  the  effects  differ 
quantitatively  as  well  as  qualitatively  from  the 
causes  (Wundt's  Law  of  the  Increase  of  Psychical 
Energy). 

A    considerable    and    influential    number    of 
writers  on  the  Logic  of  History,  chief  among  whom 
may  be  mentioned  Dilthey,   Windelband,   Rickert, 
Simmel,  Troeltsch  and  Croce,  deny  that  there  are 
historical  laws  even  remotely  analogous  to  physical 
laws.    They  hold  the  function  of  history  to  be  the 
description  and   interpretation  of  unique,   non-re- 
peatable  occurrences.     The  subject  matter  of  his- 
tory is  the  irreversible  series  of  unique  non-repeat- 
able  events  that  constitute  the  historical  develop- 
ment of  human  culture.     History  does  not  repeat 
itself  and  the  historian  deals  with  individualities, 
chiefly  the  individualities  of  culture  groups,  epochs 
and  movements.     The  historian   employs  general 
concepts  and  makes  generalizations.    But  these  arc 
teleological  concepts  or  concepts  of  value.     In  th 
selection   and    interpretation   of   historical    occur 
rences,  it  is  not  merely  legitimate  but  inevitabl 
that  the  unique  members  of  historical  series  o 
events  should  be  related  or  connected  into  a  sys 
tematic  interpretation,  and  this  relating  takes  plac 
in   terms   of   values   or   teleological  principles 
action.     For  historical  events  are  the  expressioi 
of  the  clashing  and  co-operating  wills  of  men. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  377 

In  conclusion  I  will  briefly  indicate  the  prob- 
lems of  the  Philosophy  of  History.  This  discipline 
has  no  concern  with  the  determination  of  the  facts 
of  history  or  their  empirical  relationships.  That 
is  the  province  of  the  historian.  The  considera- 
tion of  the  logical  processes  or  methods  and  prin- 
ciples of  historical  investigation  and  interpretation, 
and  comparison  of  them  with  the  methods  and  prin- 
ciples of  natural  science  constitutes  the  Logic  of 
History,  an  important  division  of  logical  enquiry. 
Inasmuch  as  the  principles  of  logic  have  the  closest 
connection  with  metaphysics,  the  logic  of  history 
is  intimately  associated  with  the  Metaphysics  of 
History,  In  the  latter  field,  the  chief  questions  are 
the  following :  —  First,  the  determination  of  the  sys- 
tem of  human  values  or  standards  of  judgment,  in 
the  light  of  which  philosophy  can  intelligently 
weigh  the  questions  as  to  the  fact  and  character  of 
human  progress,  the  growth  of  culture  or  civiliza- 
tion. The  general  problem  of  progress  falls  into 
several  divisions — ^the  problem  of  the  nature  and 
fact  of  moral  progress,  political  progress,  economic 
progress,  intellectual  progress,  religious  progress, 
and  their  interrelationships. 

In  the  consideration  of  the  problem  of  progress 
there  are  two  chief  factors  to  be  taken  into  account ; 
first,  the  original  or  biological  nature  of  man.  Is 
human  nature  modifiable  through  the  inheritance  of 
acquired  characteristics?  Man's  inherited  nature 
is  an  original  datum  for  all  theories  of  progress 
and  practical  efforts  towards  progress.  The  changes 
in  the  way  of  improvement  and  decline  in  the  char- 


378  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

acter  of  the  social  inheritance  or  cultural  complexes, 
into  which  the  generations  are  born  and  by  which 
they  are  nurtured,  is  the  second  factor  in  estimating 
progress. 

The  formulation  of  the  system  of  values  is  the 
critical  problem  of  ethics.  Thus  the  philosophy  of 
history  must  rest  on  ethics.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  study  of  history  furnishes  material  for  ethics. 
There  is  here  a  logical  circle.  History  is  interpreted 
and  judged  in  terms  of  a  system  of  ethical  values 
which,  in  turn,  are  derived  from  history.  There  is 
no  escape  from  the  circle.  The  philosopher  must 
simply  do  his  best  to  attain  the  fullest  possible 
objectivity  by  the  fairest,  widest  and  most  penetrat- 
ing survey  of  the  facts  of  cultural  evolution. 

In  the  past  those  who  have  speculated  on  the 
meaning  of  history  have  usually  judged  the  facts 
from  the  standpoint  of  a  standard  of  valuation 
arbitrarily  assumed  or  deduced  from  some  theolog- 
ical or  metaphysical  belief  in  regard  to  the  abso- 
lute or  supreme  values  to  be  served  or  won  by  man. 
Now,  a  candid  or  searching  examination  of  the 
types  of  judgment,  the  conceptions  of  the  good,  or 
the  values  to  be  pursued  by  civilized  man,  as  these 
are  revealed  in  man's  social,  political  and  religious 
deeds  and  aspirations  and  are  expressed  in  his 
literatures  and  philosophies,  will  show  that  there 
has  been  change,  growth  with  improvement  in  cer- 
tain directions,  perhaps  retrogression  in  others. 
The  ideals  of  a  Greek  gentleman,  as  reflected  in 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  differ  quite  markedly  from  those 
of  the  best  Hebrews  of  Isaiah's  day  or  of  a  Greek 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  379 

Christian  or  a  mediaeval  Christian.  The  ideals  or 
values  of  life  for  a  mediaeval  Christian  are  quite 
different  from  those  of  an  eighteenth  century  phil- 
ospher  and  of  a  twentieth  century  American.  The 
ideals  and  values  of  the  latter  differ  from  those 
of  a  good  Chinaman  or  Burmese. 

A  doctrine  of  ethical  and  social  values  or  norms 
of  conduct  and  social  organization,  which  shall  be 
clear  sighted  and  well  rounded,  must  be  based  on 
a  critical  and  sympathetic  examination  of  the  ideals 
of  life  in  their  historical  evolution.  The  doctrine 
of  ethical  values  or  goods  is  really  a  distillation  or 
sublimation  of  the  dynamic  trend,  the  driving  pur- 
port of  the  history  of  man's  inner  or  spiritual 
civilization.  The  attempt  to  construct  such  a  sys- 
tem by  abstract  rationalizing  or  even  psychologizing 
can  only  result  in  a  distorted  skeleton. 

Ethics  cannot  be  based  simply  on  psychology. 
For  the  norms  of  conduct,  which  issue  demands  to 
the  will  of  the  individual  and  which  shape  his  con- 
genital tendencies,  are  the  products  of  the  evolu- 
tion of  social  culture.  These  norms  live  and  operate, 
without  systematic  self-consciousness,  in  the  social 
atmosphere  in  which  the  individual  lives.  The  task 
of  ethics  is,  by  historical  and  sociological  analysis 
and  philosophical  construction,  to  disengage  them 
from  the  mass  of  tradition  and  custom  and  to  or- 
ganize them  into  a  coherent  whole. 

Only  when  this  has  been  done  have  we  a  clear 
and  self-conscious  standpoint  from  which  to  judge 
the  facts  of  history.  Without  a  systematic  theory 
of  moral  values  educed,  J)y  constructive  analysis. 


380  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

from  the  systematic  study  of  the  moral  history  of 
humanity,  judgments  in  regard  to  the  fact  and 
meaning  of  progress,  in  other  words,  in  regard  to 
the  purport  of  history,  can  be  nothing  better  than 
the  expression  of  inherited  beliefs,  personal  prej- 
udices and  subjective  emotional  reactions. 

Inasmuch  as  the  historically  grounded  and 
systematically  organized  doctrine  of  ethical  value- 
judgments  remains  as  yet  largely  unachieved  for 
contemporary  society,  a  society  in  transition,  it  can- 
not be  said  that  we  have  the  instruments  ready  at 
hand  for  formulating  a  philosophy  of  history.  And 
yet,  if  man  is  to  guide  his  further  efforts  towards 
a  better  social  order  and  greater  individual  well- 
being  in  the  clear  daylight  of  an  enlightened  and 
instructed  intelligence,  a  philosophy  of  history  is 
much  to  be  desired.  Certainly  the  struggles  and 
confusions  of  the  present,  the  cataclysmic  upheavals 
in  the  whole  social  and  political  fabric  of  western 
civilization,  constitute  an  urgent  call  to  scholars  and 
philosophers  to  devote  themselves  to  the  task  of 
clarifying  and  organizing  human  convictions  on  the 
true  ends  of  human  life,  the  true  values  to  be  aimed 
at  and  achieved  by  our  social  order.  We  must  not 
go  it  blindly.  We  must  seek  with  all  our  power, 
and  with  all  the  light  available,  to  formulate  an 
ethics  of  social  progress,  and  that  means  to  formu- 
late an  ethical  philosophy  of  history.  Statecraft, 
education,  industrial  society,  stand  in  urgent  need 
of  just  this  guidance.  In  this  sense  philosophy  is 
called  upon  to  be  an  interpreter  of  history  and  a 
guide  to  the  life  of  man  in  society.    The  need  of  a 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  381 

broader-based  and  more  profoundly  conceived  social 
ethics  is  clamant. 

In  the  second  place,  assuming  that  we  have 
attained  a  system  of  ethical  values,  a  normative 
standpoint  from  which  to  estimate  the  relative 
worths  of  the  various  stages  and  factors  of  his- 
torical change ;  in  other  words,  that  we  have  arrived 
at  clearly  defined  standards  of  progress  and  apply 
our  standards  to  the  factual  order  of  history;  a 
candid  examination  of  the  latter  order  up  to  the 
present  moment  will  compel  the  admission  that 
there  is  but  scant  evidence  that  mankind,  taken  as 
a  whole,  is  surely  moving  towards  one  universal 
goal  or  end.  The  course  of  historical  change  is 
exceedingly  complex  and  confusing.  Certain  peoples 
are  stationary  for  long  periods.  Others,  such  as 
the  extreme  Orient  and  the  Occident,  lived  for  many 
centuries  without  influencing  one  another.  Now 
that  the  oriental  and  the  occidental  civilizations  are 
in  closer  contact,  it  is  not  clear  what  the  issue  of 
this  meeting  will  be.  Even  Occidental  civilization 
does  not  show  steady  progress  in  all  directions.  It 
halts  and  even  retrogrades.  Who  would  assert  that 
the  present  world  war  is  not  being  accompanied  by 
profound  ethical  retrogression?  The  occidental 
man  does  not  seem  to  have  mastered  the  vast  in- 
dustrial mechanism  which  he  has  evoked  from  the 
forces  of  nature  to  do  his  bidding.  The  monster 
he  has  created  threatens  to  engulf  the  finer  spirit 
of  life. 

Moreover,  were  it  clear  that  moral  and  humane 
progress  goes  on  even  through  the  welter  of  indus- 


382  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

trialism,  commercialism  and  war,  who  are  to  enjoy 
the  final  fruits  of  the  movement?  Is  it  the  lot  of 
the  living  members  of  each  generation  simply  to 
toil  and  suffer  and  achieve  somewhat,  in  order  to 
hand  on  to  the  following  generation  a  heritage  of 
instruments  and  a  nest  of  problems,  with  and  at 
which  that  generation,  in  turn,  will  labor,  to  pass 
to  the  grave  and  be  forgotten  after  a  brief  toil  at 
an  endless  task;  one  which  is  never  done,  but  con- 
tinues and  changes  throughout  the  centuries  and 
the  aeons  without  final  goal,  without  enduring  re- 
sults in  human  values?  Either  humanity,  as  it 
toils  in  history,  is  engaged  in  an  endless  and  goal- 
less task  and  then  progress  is  a  self-contradictory 
notion;  or  the  goal  is  to  be  reached  by  some  far 
off  generation,  and  then  all  the  preceding  genera- 
tions will  have  been  mere  hewers  of  wood  and 
drawers  of  water  to  serve  the  welfare  of  the  final 
happy  one;  or  there  is,  in  the  lives  of  each  genera- 
tion, as  it  toils  and  suffers  and  aspires  in  the  living 
present,  an  inherent  value  and  then,  since  this  value 
is  only  in  part  achieved  by  it,  must  we  not  postulate, 
if  our  ethical  and  humane  values  are  to  retain  their 
validity  and  dignity,  a  continuous  existence  and 
progressive  fulfillment  of  value  for  the  life  of  man 
beyond  the  visible  bournes  of  the  present  time  and 
space?  Does  not  the  supremacy  of  ethical  values 
imply  the  immortality  of  the  generations  ? 

Furthermore,  while  the  individual  lives  a 
worthy  life  only  in  so  far  as  he  co-operates  man- 
fully in  the  social  work  of  his  own  day  and  place 
as  a  member  of  the  community,  the  nation,  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  383 

group  in  which  his  calling  and  election  give  him 
membership  and,  in  the  widest  sense,  in  the  work  of 
humanity,  the  individual  life  which  alone  feels, 
thinks  and  wills,  alone  knows  the  bitterness  of 
defeat,  the  joy  of  achievement,  alone  feels  the  sor- 
row and  the  happiness  of  the  common  human  lot,  is 
the  actual  agent  and  embodiment  of  ethical  values. 
How,  then,  can  ethical  values  endure  and  grow  if 
individual  souls  are,  in  the  final  outcome,  but  dust 
and  ashes  thrown  on  the  cosmical  scrap-heap  by 
the  winds  and  tides  of  the  blind  cosmical  weather? 

Thus,  the  final  issues  raised  by  ethics  and  the 
philosophy  of  history  are  the  issues  that  lie,  and 
have  always  lain,  at  the  heart  of  man's  whole  prac- 
tical and  affective  life.  These  are  the  issues  out  of 
which  arise  the  cry  for  a  religious  world  view,  and 
assuring  answers  to  which  the  genius  of  religion 
does  and  has  always  aimed  to  give.  For  religion, 
at  its  best,  is  the  consecration  of  the  highest  human 
values;  it  is  the  affirmation  in  faith  and  deed  that 
these  values  are  integral  constituents  in,  or  essential 
qualities  of,  the  universal  and  enduring  order;  that 
the  higher  meanings  and  purposes  of  the  human 
spirit  are  blood  kin  to  the  supreme  meaning  and 
Purpose  of  Reality. 

An  interesting  and  important  application  of 
these  problems  arises  in  connection  with  the  ethics 
of  the  state,  the  most  comprehensive  and  powerful 
form  of  social  organization.  What  ends  does  and 
should  the  state  exist  to  serve  ?  Is  there  discernible, 
in  the  light  of  ethical  values,  any  line  of  political 
progress  in  history?    Should  the  state  be  ordered 


384  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

SO  as  to  promote  primarily  the  universal  self-realiza- 
tion of  the  mass  of  mankind,  to  enable  all  indi- 
viduals to  attain  and  enjoy  a  fair  measure  of 
physical  and  mental  well  being?  If  so,  what  is  a 
fair  measure  of  well  being?  Should  the  means  to 
develop  and  exercise  exceptional  abilities  and 
achieve  distinguished  results  be  denied  the  compara- 
tively few  in  the  interest  of  a  moderate  average 
of  well  being  for  all?  Or  are  both  aims  possible  of 
realization?  In  short,  can  the  democratic  and  the 
aristocratic  ideals  of  social  order  be  reconciled?  If 
so,  how?  Which  is  more  nearly  in  accord  with  the 
highest  ethical  values,  well  being  and  enjoyment 
made  cheap  and  accessible  to  every  one,  or  a  polit- 
ical and  industrial  organization  that  aims  primarily 
at  producing  the  highest  results  in  art,  science, 
literature?  Or  can  these  two  ideals  be  realized 
simultaneously  in  the  same  social  order?  To  seek 
an  answer  to  these  questions  is  to  formulate  a  sys- 
tem of  ethical  values  by  which  history  and  the 
present  social  and  political  orders  are  judged. 

Or  are,  perhaps,  the  Buddhist,  the  Neo- 
Platonist,  the  quietist,  the  contemplative  mystic, 
right  in  holding  that  the  only  permanent  peace,  the 
only  lasting  values,  are  to  be  attained  by  escaping 
from  the  roaring  loom  of  time  to  the  calm  haven 
of  unruffled  contemplation  and  mystic  union  with 
the  One  Changeless  Absolute  in  whose  presence 
all  the  fretful  stir  unprofitable  and  the  fever  of 
this  jarring  world  are  seen  to  be  illusion? 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  385 

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Windelband,  History  of  Philosophy,  pp.  255-262  and 
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Eucken,  Life's  Basis  and  Life's  Ideal,  The  Problem  of 
Human  Life,  and  Art.  Geschichtsphilosophie  in  System- 
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Hegel,  Philosophy  of  History. 

Comte,  Positive  Philosophy,  trans,  by  Martineau. 

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Xenopol,  A.  D.,  Les  principes  fondementaux  de  Vhistoire. 

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Matthews,  Shailer,  The  Spiritual  Interpretation  of 
History. 

Barth,  P.,  Die  Philosophie  der  Geschichte  als  Sociologie. 

Simmel,  Die  Probleme  der  Geschichtsphilosophie,  lite 
Auflage. 

Rickert,  H.,  Die  Grenzen  der  naturwissenschaftlichen 
Begriffsbildung,  lite  Auflage,  and  Art.  Geschichtsphilosophie 
in  Die  Philosophie  im  Beginn  des  Zwansizsten  Jahrhunderts. 

Dilthey,  Einleitung  in  die  Geisteswissenchaften. 

Grotenfelt,  Geschichtliche  Wertmassstabe  in  der  Ges- 
chichtsphilosophie. 

Bernheim,  Lehrbuch  der  historischen  Methode. 


APPENDIX 

(387) 


APPENDIX 


CURRENT  ISSUES  IN  REGARD  TO  CONSCIOUSNESS, 
INTELLIGENCE  AND  REALITY. 

Among  current  philosophical  tendencies,  of  those  lay- 
ing claim  to  novelty  the  most  significant  are:  The  New 
Realism,  which  is  an  epistemological  reaction  against 
idealism;  Neutral  Monism,  which  is  a  metaphysical  theory 
fathered  in  part  by  representatives  of  the  new  realism  and 
which  claims  to  circumvent  the  time-honored  standpoint  of 
dualism  by  recourse  to  a  new  theory  of  identity  or  qualita- 
tive monism  of  being;  Instrumentalism,  a  further  develop- 
ment of  pragmatism,  which,  while  stressing  the  practical 
and  empirical  function  of  the  intellect,  emphasizes  its  active 
and  creative  character  and  would  have  us  forego  the  quest 
for  an  ultimate  reality,  insisting  that  the  only  useful  func- 
tion of  thinking  is  the  organization  of  the  empirical  flux; 
and  finally  Irrationalism,  which,  in  Bradley  and  James  and 
still  more  emphatically  in  Bergson,  proclaims  the  power- 
lessness  of  intellect  or  reason  to  apprehend  the  true  char- 
acter of  reality  and  offers  in  its  place  a  doctrine  of  feeling 
or  intuition  as  the  way  to  direct  contact  with  the  essence 
of  reality.     We  shall  now  discuss  briefly  these  movements. 

1.    The  New  Realism. 

This  term  includes  a  variety  of  standpoints.  For 
instance  S.  Alexander's  statement  of  it  is  one  that  seems 
to  differ  chiefly  in  terminology  from  the  standpoint  of  such 
objective  idealists  as  Bosanquet.  B.  Russell  states  a  type 
of  new  realism  which  finds  a  place  for  the  idealistic  con- 
tention that  what  we  know  immediately  are  sense  data  and 
that  the  objective  world  of  matter  of  the  physicist  is  really 
an  intellectual  construction.     Russell  recognizes  fully  that 

(389) 


390  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  activity  of  the  Ego  or  knowing  subject  is  a  non- 
eliminable  factor  in  knowledge  of  the  world  of  sense  and 
that  the  world  of  physics  is  an  intellectual  construction. 
Thus  Russell  is  a  dualistic  so-called  neo-realist.  Some  of 
the  American  neo-realists  approach  closely  to  the  standpoint 
of  naive  common  sense  in  their  assertion  of  the  complete 
independence  of  the  objects  of  knowledge  over  against  the 
subject  or  knower  (e.  g.,  R.  B.  Perry).  Others  hold,  ap- 
parently, that  reality  is  energy  (Montague)  or  a  strange 
world  of  logical  entities  (e.  g..  Holt).  It  is  not  possible  to 
discuss  here  all  the  variants  of  this  doctrine,  some  of  which 
have  not  much  in  common  except  the  name.  I  shall,  there- 
fore, confine  myself  to  a  brief  consideration  of  the  more 
salient  and  significant  features  of  the  movement. 

The  New  Realism  involves  two  positions  (a),  the  ob- 
jects known  are  independent  of  their  being  known;  (b) 
logical  and  metaphysical  pluralism,  i.  e.,  reality  is  not  a 
system  or  whole  of  interrelated  entities,  but  a  mere  aggre- 
gate of  many  entities  some  of  which  are  interdependently 
related  to  some  but  not  each  to  all  the  others. 

With  regard  to  the  first  position,  the  new  realist 
argues  that  the  idealist  is  guilty  of  equivocation  in  his  use 
of  the  term  "experience".  Because  what  I  experience  seems 
to  me  real  and  I  am  the  experient  the  idealist  argues,  says 
the  new  realist,  that  all  reality  is  experience  and  therefore 
dependent  on  an  Ego.  Because  everything  known  is  thus 
far  related,  by  the  act  of  knowing,  to  an  Ego,  therefore  the 
being  of  everything  known  is  only  being  for  an  Ego.  The 
idealist  thus  begs  the  question  and  calmly  assumes  that, 
since  a  thing  known  is  in  the  knowledge  relation,  therefore 
that  thing's  being  is  dependent  on  a  knower.  This  criticism 
is  doubtless  valid  against  some  forms  of  idealism,  but  not 
against  the  spiritualism  or  idealism  of  Leibnitz,  Hegel, 
Green,  E.  Caird  or  Bosanquet.  For  these  men  do  not  argue 
that,  since  perception  or  experience  is  the  state  or  act  of 
an  Ego,  therefore  all  being  is  the  state  or  act  of  an  Ego 
or  experient.  The  gist  of  their  argument  rather  is  that, 
since  the  organization  of  experience  involves  relations  and 


CURRENT  ISSUES  391 

since  all  that  reality  can  mean  for  us  men  is  a  system  of 
progressively  organized  experience,  reality  must  have  a  ra- 
tional structure  or  texture  and  therefore  is  to  that  extent 
related  to  mind  or  thought. 

Certainly  in  the  very  act  of  knowing  an  object 
(whether  that  object  be  a  physical  thing  or  a  scientific 
principle),  it  is  implied  that  the  object  known  is  distinct 
from  the  act  of  knowing.  Even  in  knowing  my  own  psychical 
processes  /,  as  knower,  am  distinct  from  me,  as  known. 
Furthermore,  by  the  reality  of  a  physical  thing  or  the  truth 
of  a  scientific  law  as  recognized  by  me,  I  do  not  mean  that 
I  have  made  the  thing  or  even  the  law  that  I  now  know 
out  of  whole  cloth  or  out  of  nothing.  A  physical  object, 
if  real,  must  have  being  independent  of  its  being  known  by 
you  or  me.  A  scientific  law  is  not  a  law  if  it  be  valid  only 
for  my  mind,  not  even  though  I  am  its  discoverer.  But 
do  we  not  mean  by  an  objectively  real  physical  object  one 
that  is  accessible  to  all  normal  percipients  under  standardized 
conditions  of  perception?  And  do  we  not  mean  by  a  scien- 
tific law  a  principle  that  would  be  recognized  as  true  by 
all  normal  minds  working  under  the  same  conditions?  That 
there  are  real  physical  energies  which  operate  when  no  finite 
knower  is  perceiving  them  I  do  not  question.  It  seems  to 
me  in  the  highest  degree  improbable  that  any  finite  knower 
is  now  perceiving  what  is  going  on  in  the  center  of  the 
earth  or  of  the  sun.  These  regions  exist  as  inferred  and 
real  objects  of  possible  experience.  And  when  we  ask  what 
these  energies  or  objects  are,  when  we  attempt  to  determine 
their  natures,  we  can  only  do  so  by  a  logical  and  imagina- 
tive construction  based  upon  experience.  It  is  impossible 
to  say  anything  significant  about  any  part  of  reality  with- 
out direct  or  indirect  reference  to  reality  as  experienced  or 
a8  constructed  from  experience.  Therefore  the  attempt  to 
know  or  define  any  aspect  or  region  of  reality  involves 
reference  to  experience.  Further,  the  attempt  to  conceive 
the  most  remote  region  or  recondite  and  microscopic  quality 
of  the  real  involves  the  assumption  that  it  is  intelligibly 
continuous  with  experienced  reality,  that  the  non-experience- 


392  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

able  and  imaged  reality  is  an  element  in  the  whole  system 
of  reality.  Thus  any  meaningful  assertion  or  speculation 
about  any  bit  of  reality  implies  its  possible  presence  to  some 
experient  or  thinker  and  its  actual  membership  in  the  in- 
telligible or  rational  and  coherent  structure  of  reality. 

The  other  chief  tenet  of  new  realism  is  logical  and 
metaphysical  pluralism  —  reality  is  an  aggregate  of  entities 
many  of  which  may  be  in  no  relation  to  many  others.  This 
doctrine  is  a  reaction  from  the  misuse  made  of  the  so-called 
doctrine  of  the  internality  of  relations,  namely,  the  doctrine 
that  since  all  relations  are  internal  to  the  terms  related 
(otherwise  it  is  claimed  the  terms  would  not  be  really  re- 
lated), therefore  all  finite  beings  are  really  parts  of  one 
all-inclusive  being.  We  can  think  of  many  entities  that 
have  no  relevant  interrelations  so  far  as  we  can  see.  For 
instance,  I  see  no  relevant  relation  between  the  flavor  of 
the  apple  I  have  just  eaten,  the  beard  of  Hammurabi  and 
Fuchsian  functions  in  mathematics.  So  far  as  I  am  con- 
cerned the  interrelations  of  these  three  entities  are  so 
negligible  as  to  make  the  terms  external  to  one  another. 
Still  these  three  entities  are  all  parts  of  the  same  universe 
and  must  have  some  sort  of  spatial,  temporal  or  logical  con- 
nections. If  I  were  an  omniscient  being  doubtless  I  should 
see  those  connections.  One's  recognition  of  relevancy  of 
spatial,  temporal,  causal,  quantitative,  qualitative  or  tele- 
ological  relations  between  entities  is  relative,  not  merely 
to  the  limitations  of  one's  actual  knowledge  but  relative 
also  to  the  character  of  one's  purposes.  An  abstract  logical 
or  mathematical  relation  may  be  very  significant  to  Mr. 
Russell  and  meaningless  to  Von  Hindenburg.  There  must 
be  an  indefinitely  numerous  variety  of  degrees  in  the 
relevancy  of  relations  and  there  certainly  are  many  varia- 
tions in  the  relevancy  of  relations  to  the  purposes  of  human 
knowing.  Moreover,  since  reality  is  dynamic,  is  process, 
relations  change.  Old  ones  disappear  and  new  ones  arise. 
Nevertheless,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  universe  or  cosmos  in 
which  we  live,  even  the  rises  and  disappearances  of  relations 
must  be  themselves  cases  of  relations  that  are  somehow. 


CURRENT  ISSUES  393 

somewhere,  sometime,  relevant  to  other  terms  and  rela- 
tions. If  we  take  literally  the  doctrine  of  the  pure  ex- 
ternality or  pluralism  of  relations,  we  have  not  even  "a 
world  of  tiny  absolutes"  as  Bosanquet  puts  it,  but  a  chaos 
of  tiny  absolutes  and,  since  each  of  us  is  either  a  part  or 
whole  of  one  such  absolute,  we  could  not  even  know  that 
there  is  a  chaotic  plurality  of  absolutes.  We  are  elements 
in  a  uni-verse  no  matter  how  little  we  may  know  about  our 
places  and  destinies  therein.  Relations  do  not  make  the 
entities  which  are  related  mere  parts  of  one  inclusive  entity, 
but  relations  are  relevant  to  the  natures  of  the  terms  related 
and  the  natures  of  the  terms  are  relevant  to  the  relations. 
For  example,  the  character  of  a  man  is  relevant  to  the 
societies  he  belongs  to  and,  vice  versa,  the  character  of  the 
social  relations  are  affected  by  the  natures  of  individuals  in 
those  relations. 

Marvin  (History  of  European  Philosophy,  pp.  413-421) 
gives  a  quite  different  statement  of  the  neo-realistic  stand- 
point. He  asserts  that  neo-realism  discards  entirely  the 
traditional  notions  of  substance  and  cause.  It  substitutes 
for  the  concepts  of  physical  and  mental  substances  or  stuffs 
the  concepts  of  concrete  realities  as  having  determinable 
structures,  and  by  structure  it  means  relations  between  parts 
or  organization.  Different  entities  have  different  types  of 
structure  or  systems  of  relation.  The  human  mind  has  a 
definite  and  discoverable  structure  and  the  body  has  a  dif- 
ferent structure.  The  difference  between  the  physical  and 
the  mental  is  a  difference  solely  of  relations  and  not  a  dif- 
ference of  stuff  or  entity.  And,  in  place  of  asking  how  mind 
and  body  interact  causally,  neo-realism  asks,  what  are  the 
functional  relations  between  the  two  structural  systems? 
Certainly,  the  business  of  science  and  philosophy  is  to  deter- 
mine and  formulate  the  chief  types  of  structure,  organiza- 
tion or  systematic  relationships  in  things,  and  the  relations 
of  these  types  to  one  another.  If  this  be  neo-realism  we 
must  all  be  neo-realists.  In  so  far  as  one  means  by  sub- 
stance a  homogeneous  and  unchanging  stuff,  he  is  employ- 
ing a  notion  that  belongs  to  the  childhood  of  thought.    But 


894  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

are  not  parts,  relations,  structures,  organizations  or  sys- 
tematic connections,  entities  or  realities?  Have  they  not 
being  and,  in  many  cases,  dynamic  being?  They  are  as  they 
do  and  they  do  as  they  are.  Certainly,  too,  the  relation  of 
mind  and  body  is  a  case  of  functional  interdependence. 
Knowing  and  willing  are  functions  of  two  variables  —  two 
systems  in  one  system?  But  what  sort  of  function?  Surely 
there  is  a  profound  difference  between  a  purely  logical  func- 
tion of  timeless  implication,  as  when  we  say,  for  example, 
that  the  area  of  a  circle  is  a  function  of  its  radius,  and  an 
efficient  physical  or  teleological  function !  When  one  says  that 
the  distance  the  water  from  a  garden  hose  will  carry  is  a 
function  of  the  angle  at  which  the  nozzle  is  held,  that  is  only 
a  part  of  the  truth.  The  distance  is  also  a  function  of  the 
water-pressure  and  this  is  a  dynamic  factor.  When  one 
says  that  the  amount  of  patriotic  service  that  a  citizen  will 
render  is  a  function  of  his  intelligence  and  character  as 
affected  by  the  social  spirit  of  his  community  and  nation  one 
is  dealing  with  dynamic  and  teleological  factors,  with  tem- 
porally operative  energies  and  agencies;  in  short,  with 
causes  in  distinction  from  logical  and  timeless  systems  of 
implications.  This  brand  of  neo-realism  is  not  realistic 
enough.  It  has  a  tendency  to  evaporate  the  dynamic  and 
temporal  reality  into  a  timeless  system  of  logical  and  mathe- 
matical implications.  It  runs  into  a  pure  logicism.  It  sup- 
plies one  more  instance  of  that  confusion  between  actual 
causation,  as  a  dynamic  and  temporal  process  of  interaction 
or  relevant  and  efficient  interrelation  between  individual 
elements,  and  the  notion  of  a  timeless  system  of  logical  im- 
plications, which  one  finds  in  Spinoza  and  which  recurs  even 
in  Bradley  and  Bosanquet.  Thus  absolute  idealism  and  neo- 
realism  join  hands  in  the  same  error. 

The  ever-recurring  controversies  and  misconceptions 
which  arise  from  the  equivocal  meanings  of  the  terms  "ideal- 
ism" and  "realism"  suggest  that  it  might  be  better  to  discard 
their  use  altogether,  and  to  call  our  standpoint  "rational- 
istic" or  "organizational  experientialism".  Briefly,  this 
standpoint  involves  the  following  propositions:  —  (a)  Things 


CURRENT  ISSUES  395 

perceived  are  selected  and  organized  groupings  of  sense- 
qualities  in  relations;  such  relations  as  spatial,  temporal, 
numerical,  qualitative  (degrees  of  likeness  and  unlikeness), 
quantitative  (equality  greater,  less,  etc.),  dynamical  (phys- 
ical, purposive),  (b)  In  knowing,  true  relations  are  dis- 
covered, not  made  by  the  mind;  in  willing,  man  does,  to  a 
limited  extent,  make  new  relations,  (c)  The  known  world, 
as  a  complex  of  things  and  events  in  relation,  involves  three 
factors:  (1)  the  mind,  with  its  definitive  structure  history 
and  interests;  (2)  the  physical  or  "objective"  grounds  of 
perception;  these  I  conceive  to  be  energy-complexes;  (3)  the 
central  nervous  system  and  the  sense-organs,  which  are  at 
once  parts  of  the  physical  order  and  the  immediate  basis  of 
the  mental  processes  of  perception,  etc.,  and  hence  are  the 
intermediating  links  between  the  mind  and  the  rest  of  the 
physical  world,  (d)  Percepts  are  not  copies  of  things  but 
partial  and  fragmentary  aspects  or  "views"  of  the  real 
external  world  selected  by  the  mind  and  the  sensory  system, 
(e)  The  mind  is  the  "ultimate"  active  selective  and  analytic- 
synthetic  principle  which  discovers  and  takes  note  of  quali- 
ties-in-relation,  and  which  constructs  and  organizes  a  larger 
context  of  reality,  in  which  it  sets  and  interprets  the  imme- 
diate data  of  experience.  The  relation  of  a  perceived  thing 
or  event  or  even  a  scientific  law  to  reality  is  that  of  a  partial 
selected  and  interpreted  aspect  or  fragment  of  an  indefinitely 
complex  totality  of  things,  processes,  qualities  and  relations. 
Reality  involves  much  more  than  any  experience,  but  that 
"more"  is  a  construction  by  the  human  mind  from  the  struc- 
ture of  actual  experience  and  the  nature  of  the  construction 
is  determined  by  the  joint  natures  of  the  experienced  reality 
and  of  the  mind's  own  structure,  (f)  In  error  and  illusion 
the  mind  misinterprets  or  places  in  its  wrong  setting  some 
bit  of  experience  or  generalization  from  experience.  It  may 
either  fail  to  determine  and  analyze  the  data  correctly  or  it 
may  fail  to  set  the  data  in  the  right  connections  with  other 
items  of  reality.  There  can  be  no  unreal  experiences,  only 
untrue,  i.  e.,  wrongly  related,  experiences. 


396  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


2.    Neutral  Monism. 

This  doctrine  owes  its  recent  developments  to  the  es- 
says of  William  James:  Does  Consciousness  Exist?  A 
World  of  Pure  Experience,  etc.,  collected  together  in  his 
Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism.  Intermarried  with  neo- 
realistic  logical  pluralism  it  has  given  birth  to  some  mar- 
velous neutral  progeny,  especially  the  monism  of  Holt  in 
the  Concept  of  Consciousness.  It  has  affinities  with 
Avenarius'  concept  of  Pure  Experience  and  with  the  sensa- 
tionalistic  phenomenalism  of  Ernest  Mach. 

James  proposed  to  get  rid  of  the  duality  of  conscious- 
ness and  its  objects  by  taking  a  radical  step  and  thus  rightly 
called  his  doctrine  "radical  empiricism'".  He  says  there  is 
no  such  entity  as  consciousness.  The  standing  assumption 
of  common  sense  is  that  there  is  a  duplicity  in  experience  — 
knower  and  known,  thought  and  things.  James  says 
"Experience,  I  believe,  has  no  such  inner  duplicity;"' 
"thoughts  in  the  concrete  are  made  of  the  same  stuff  as 
things  are*'^.  "The  instant  field  of  the  present  is  at  all  times 
what  I  call  *pure'  experience"*.  The  sum  total  of  all  ex- 
perence  "is  a  that,  an  absolute,  a  *pure'  experience  on  an 
enormous  scale,  undifferentiated  and  undifferentiable  into 
thought  and  thing"";  "experience  as  a  whole  is  self-con- 
taining and  leans  on  nothing."'.  It  is  "the  selfsame  piece 
of  pure  experience,  taken  twice  over,  that  serves  now  as 
thought  and  now  as  thing.'"  I  am  writing  at  a  desk.  The 
paper,  the  desk  and  the  pencil  are  bits  of  pure  experience. 
If  they  are  taken  in  their  spatial  relations  in  the  house,  they 
thus  become  physical  things ;  but,  if  they  are  taken  as  items 
in  my  personal  biography,  they  thus  become  thoughts.  As 
virginal  experiences  they  are  neither  thoughts  nor  things, 


1  See  especially  Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism. 

^Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism,  p.  9. 

»Ibid,  p.  37. 

*  Ibid,  p.  23. 

ojbid,  p.  134. 

"  Ibid,  p.  193. 

'  Ibid,  p.  27. 


CURRENT  ISSUES  397 

and  their  being  taken  as  either  the  one  or  the  other  is  an 
addition  to  their  original  natures  as  just  pure  experiences. 
As  for  the  relations  which  seem  to  do  the  taking  and  thus 
the  dualizing  or  dichotomizing  of  the  world  of  pure  ex- 
perience, they  too  are  experiences  of  transition  which  no 
Ego  has  or  makes.  They  just  happen.  The  relations  are 
empirical  data  like  the  substantive  bits  of  pure  experience 
between  which  they  are  transitions  or  passages. 

This  seems  a  beautifully  simple  way  of  circumventing 
all  the  difficulties  which  arise  from  the  duality  of  Ego  know- 
ing and  object  known.  It  solves  the  problem  of  the  self  by 
saying  it  consists  of  certain  transitional  experiences.  Con- 
sciousness becomes  a  clumsy  and  misleading  name  for  cer- 
tain empirical  groupings.  There  is  no  longer  any  problem 
of  mind  and  body  on  our  hands,  since  mind  and  body  are 
merely  the  same  pure  experiences  connected  by  other  pure 
experiences  of  relation  or  transition.  Knowing,  affection 
and  willing  consist  of  certain  transitional  feelings  and  ma- 
terial movements  consist  of  other  transitional  feelings.  No 
Ego  feels  the  feelings  or  knows  the  knowledges.  All  things 
flow  and  all  things,  including  the  rates  and  kinds  of  flowing, 
are  simply  experiences.  A  personal  history  is  simply  an 
experience  of  continuous  transition. 

James'  doctrine  has  been  taken  up  by  certain  American 
neo-realists,  especially  by  Perry  and  Holt.  According  to 
the  latter,  the  world  consists  of  neutral  elements,  i.  e.,  ele- 
ments that  are  neither  physical  or  psychical.  These  elements 
are  numerically  many  but  qualitatively  of  the  same  sub- 
stance. They  are  logical  "terms"  and  "propositions",  but 
active  and  generative  of  more  complex  entities.  These  ele- 
ments constitute  an  indefinite  variety  of  complexes,  since 
they  may  enter  an  indefinite  variety  of  group  or  class  rela- 
tions. They  are  the  foundation  stones  of  the  universe.  Mind 
is  a  class  or  group  of  neutral  entities,  as  a  physical  object 
is  another  class  or  group.  A  mind  makes  a  cross  section 
of  the  world  which  is  always  a  group  of  the  neutral  com- 
ponents of  the  object  and  its  immediate  relations.  Con- 
sciousness is  any  part  of  the  field  of  neutral  entities  that  is 


398  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

illuminated.  Mere  illumination  makes  no  change  in  the  na- 
tures of  the  entities.  They  may  exist  the  same  in  relation 
and  out  of  relation  to  consciousness.  Consciousness  is  like 
a  searchlight  that  plays  over  the  entities^  The  work  of 
selection  and  illumination,  which  results  in  consciousness, 
is  done  by  the  central  nervous  system'.  The  processes  of 
the  nervous  system  are  of  a  mathematical  and  neutral 
structure^",  like  all  physical  processes.  Holt  would  even  de- 
fine a  collision  between  two  railroad  engines  as  a  contradic- 
tion between  two  groups  of  logical  entities.  In  short,  reality 
is  resolved  into  an  unearthly  ballet  of  bloodless  terms  and 
propositions.  Neutral  monistic  realism  thus  turns  around 
into  a  pluralistic  logicism. 

Neutral  monism  seems  to  be  but  a  philosophical  aberra- 
tion for  the  following  reasons: 

(1)  It  can  offer  no  explanation  of  why  we  should 
make  a  distinction  between  consciousness  and  its  objects, 
between  knowing  and  the  thing  known,  without  invoking  the 
nervous  system  as  the  real  agent.  Much  less  can  it  account 
for  the  fact  of  self-consciousness.  Can  a  searchlight  search 
for  its  own  searching^? 

(2)  It  cannot  account  for  the  felt  difference  between 
perception  of  objects  as  present  to  the  percipient  and  imag- 
ination of  objects  not  so  present. 

(3)  It  cannot  account  for  memory  since  the  latter 
involves  the  conscious  continuity  of  the  self. 

(4)  It  cannot  account  for  error.  If  consciousness 
be  but  the  passively  illuminated  field  of  objects  selected  by 
the  central  nervous  system,  how  can  there  be  wrong  judg- 
ments? The  theory  of  error  requires  the  assumption  of 
an  active  thinker. 

(5)  Since  consciousness  is  the  illuminated  field  of 
the  present,  how  can  one  believe  in  non-temporal  proposi- 
tions such  as  those  of  logic,  mathematics  and  natural  science? 


8  Holt  in  The  New  Realism,  p.  362  ff. 

»  Holt  in  The  New  Realism,  p.  352  ff.,  and  Perry,  Present  Philosophical 
Tendencies,  p.  299  etc. 

"  Holt,  The  Concept  of  Consciousness,  p.  255,  etc. 


CURRENT  ISSUES  399 

(6)  Neutral  monism  involves  psychological  atomism. 
The  self  is  resolved  into  an  ever  shifting  phantasmagoria 
of  neutral  entities  selected  by  the  brain. 

(7)  Since  the  brain  is  the  real  selective  and  attentive 
agency,  the  searchlight  that  makes  the  illumination  which 
is  consciousness,  neutral  monism  is  but  a  new  and  specious 
name  for  materialism.  It  has  no  right  to  be  called  neutral 
monism. 

James'  standpoint  of  radical  empiricism  is  simpler  and 
not  open  to  all  the  above  objections,  because  it  evades  all 
troublesome  problems  as  to  how  the  "inner  duplicity"  arises 
in  experience  and  would  make  philosophy  a  mere  descrip- 
tion, without  analysis  and  reconstructive  interpretation,  of 
the  flux  of  experience.  James  fails  to  offer  any  account  as 
to  why  or  how  it  happens  that  identically  the  same  bits  of 
experience  get  taken,  respectively,  in  physical  and  personal 
contexts  of  relations.  Personal  biographies,  appreciations, 
judgments,  feelings,  volitions  just  appear  and  disappear 
mysteriously,  hither  and  yon  in  the  flux  of  experience.  It 
is  simpler  and  more  reasonable  to  admit  that  experience 
involves  an  experiencer,  and,  hence,  a  self,  especially  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  one  is  not  only  conscious  but  may  be 
conscious  of  one's  being  conscious,  i.  e.,  be  selfconscious. 

3.    The  Instrumentalist  View  of  Intelligence. 

In  the  latest  development  of  pragmatism  in  the  hands 
of  John  Dewey  and  his  school,  and  to  which  the  name  in- 
strumentalism  is  frequently  given,  the  Jamesian  conception 
of  the  flux  of  experience  is  a  characteristic  feature.  Dewey 
insists  that  we  should  abandon  the  old  problems  of  the  rela- 
tion of  knower  and  known,  the  self  and  nature,  mind  and 
body,  freedom  and  determination,  the  one  and  the  many,  the 
problem  of  evil,  etc.,  and  turn  philosophy  into  an  instrument 
for  the  better  organization  of  human  experience  and  activity 
by  making  it  a  tool  for  solving  practical,  social,  educational, 
political  and  personal  problems.  The  time  honored  problems 
and  theories  of  metaphysics  he  thinks  are  evaporating.   The 


400  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

truly  useful  and  creative  function  of  intelligence  is  the  en- 
richment and  harmonization  of  man's  individual  and  social 
life,  and  we  are  to  take  experience  at  its  face  value.  Every- 
thing is  what  it  is  experienced  as.  But  Dewey  lays  great 
stress  on  the  active  organizing  function  of  intelligence  in 
enhancing  the  values  of  experience.  He  seems  to  regard  it 
as  the  chief  instrument  of  human  progress  and  individual 
as  well  as  social  welfare.  Thus,  while  James  seeks  prag- 
matic justification  for  the  contemplative  side  of  life  as  found 
in  religion,  especially  in  mysticism,  Dewey's  standpoint  is 
more  that  of  a  crusader  on  behalf  of  the  practical,  and 
especially  the  social,  efficacy  of  intelligence.  Bergson  re- 
duces intelligence  to  the  level  of  a  mere  tool  for  action  on 
matter  and  has  recourse  to  intuition  to  satisfy  man's  passion 
to  experience  reality.  Dewey  elevates  intelligence  to  the 
place  of  the  supreme  instrument  which  will  enrich  the  whole 
of  human  life,  while  he  seems  to  deny  the  value  for  life  of 
the  investigation  of  the  classical  problems  and  theories  of 
philosophy  in  the  past. 

In  short,  while  for  James,  Bergson  and  Dewey,  reality 
is  flux  and  intelligence  is  a  biological  instrument  to  improve 
human  behavior  and  the  behavior  of  non-human  nature, 
James  and  especially  Bergson  offer,  in  immediate  experience, 
feeling  or  intuition,  a  way  of  escape  for  the  romantic  long- 
ing of  man,  his  metaphysical  craving  for  the  experience  of 
union  with  the  universe;  whereas  Dewey  apparently  would 
have  man  give  all  the  energies  of  his  intellect  to  control 
and  adjust  himself  to  the  flux  of  experience  in  which  he 
lives  and  of  which  he  is  a  part,  thus  relegating  the  problems 
of  ultimate  reality  and  man's  place  in  it  to  the  position  of 
adolescent  dreams  left  behind  by  the  mind  that  has  attained 
intellectual  maturity. 

The  conception  of  intelligence  as  an  active  organizing 
principle  is  the  last  remaining  legacy  of  the  objective 
idealists,  from  Plato  to  Hegel,  which  our  newest  instru- 
mentalists have  preserved.  But  surely  the  successful  opera- 
tion of  intelligence  as  an  instrument  of  control  or  success- 
ful behavior  in  a  world  implies  that  the  world  is,  at  least 


CURRENT  ISSUES  401 

to  a  predominating  degree,  of  similar  structure.  Mind  can 
make  itself  at  homei  in  a  universe  only  if  the  latter  be  in 
some  sense  a  rational  order.  Moreover,  it  is  a  narrow  and 
unjustifiable  limitation  of  the  function  of  human  intelligence 
to  say  that  it  exists  only  to  exercise  practical,  technical, 
social  and  volitional  controls  andi  invent  make-shift  adjust- 
ments between  human  emotional  and  biological  needs  and 
the  daily  and  hourly  flux  of  experience.  The  functions  of 
consciousness  and  reason  are  not  exhausted  in  meeting  novel 
situations  and  controlling  behavior  by  a  reference  to  the 
future.  When  I  am  engaged  in  aesthetic  contemplation  of 
nature  or  art,  when  I  am  enjoying  the  companionship  of  a 
friend,  when  I  am  contemplating  the  logical  symmetry, 
beauty  and  impersonal  grandeur  of  some  scientific  or  mathe- 
matical construction,  when  I  am  living  in  some  significant 
period  of  the  past,  for  example  Elizabethan  England  or  the 
Athens  of  Pericles,  when  I  am  following  the  career  and 
feeling  myself  into  the  life  of  some  one  of  the  race's  worldly 
or  spiritual  heroes,  my  consciousness,  keen,  vivid  and  ex- 
panding, may  have  no  reference  to  my  own  future  behavior 
or  that  of  anyone  else.  The  human  spirit  lives  not  by  deeds 
of  adjustment  to  external  and  future  situations  alone.  It 
lives  deeply  in  pure  contemplation  and  free  imagination. 
The  instrumentalist  errs  by  taking  one  important  function 
of  conscious  intelligence  and  making  it  the  sole  function. 
Disinterested  contemplation  and  enjoyment  of  the  beauty, 
grandeur,  meaning  and  order  of  things  for  their  own  sakes 
are  for  some  human  beings  inherently  worthful  functions 
of  consciousness.  The  philosopher,  like  Kipling's  world- 
wanderer,  is  moved  by  the  passion  "For  to  see  and  for  to 
admire"  the  universe.  To  become,  in  however  modest  degree, 
the  spectator  of  time  and  existence  is  a  native  human  long- 
ing which  philosophy  exists  to  satisfy.  Nothing  is  more 
truly  a  mark  of  the  distinctively  human  life,  nothing  in 
human  life  gives  more  worth  and  poise,  more  inner  strength 
and  unshaken  fortitude  to  life  than  the  attainment  of  a  con- 
templative insight  in  which  the  intellect's  thirst  for  a  re- 
flective vision  of  reality  is  slaked,  in  which  the  thinker 
becomes,  in  however  imperfect  measure,  consciously  at  one 


402  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

with  the  order  of  the  universe.  The  truest  mainspring  of 
science  and  philosophy  is  not  the  discovery  of  "get-rich- 
quick"  methods  in  either  industry  or  social  organization. 
Philosophy  is  more  than  a  good  economic,  political,  social 
or  even  pedagogical  tool.  Even  to  make  the  economic  and 
social  needs  of  the  proletariat  the  chief  guide  to  its  ruling 
aims  and  methods  will  be  to  ruin  philosophy.  The  theoretic 
or  contemplative  life  is  the  crown  and  guide  of  the  truly 
human  life.  The  rational  life  is  the  coherent  and  harmoni- 
ous life,  in  contrast  with  the  random  and  disjointed  life  of 
blind  feeling  and  impulse.  Universality  of  meaning,  har- 
mony, organization  into  a  coherent  system  —  these  are  alike 
notes  of  the  most  true  in  science  and  of  the  highest  type 
of  social  order  and  individual  life.  The  mainspring  of 
science  and  philosophy  is  the  quest  for  a  coherent  and 
harmonious  life,  including  a  coherent  insight  into  the  mean- 
ing of  life  and  the  nature  of  things.  Reality  is  more  than 
reason,  but  without  reason,  without  disinterested  contempla- 
tion, without  a  life  that  seeks  the  reflective  insight  into  the 
ordered  totality,  the  coherent  organization  of  the  real,  the 
deepest  meanings  and  values  of  reality  do  not  come  into  the 
possession  of  man.  The  truly  human  part  of  man  is  the 
rational  and  spiritual  power  in  him  which  has  fashioned 
and  is  ever  fashioning,  out  of  the  materials  supplied  by 
nature,  an  objective  rational  order  of  social,  moral  and 
spiritual  life;  and  which  creates  science,  art,  religion  and 
philosophy,  not  for  the  satisfaction  of  man's  belly  needs 
but  in  order  that  reason  and  the  creative  imagination  may 
find  themselves  at  home  in  the  spiritual  universe. 

The  danger  of  over  stressing  the  instrumental  char- 
acter of  intelligence  lies  in  covertly  assuming  that,  since 
intelligence  or  reason  is  a  practical  instrument  of  behavior, 
it  is  nothing  more.  The  instrumentalist  a  outrance  con- 
demns all  pure  speculation  and  contemplation,  all  imagina- 
tive musings  over  the  problems  of  metaphysics  and  theology. 
He  demands  that  philosophy  come  down  into  the  market 
place,  roll  up  its  sleeves  and  go  to  work  to  prove  its  utility 
like  the  farm  tractor  or  any  other  piece  of  human  invention. 
He  voices  the  severe  utilitarianism  of  the  practical  Amer- 
ican, especially  the  Middle- Westerner.    Well,  I  will  risk  the 


CURRENT  ISSUES  403 

prophecy  that,  when  our  boasted  nineteenth  century  in- 
dustrialism and  scientific  and  materialistic  commercialism 
have  tumbled  down  about  our  ears,  we  shall  have  to  turn, 
from  cunningly  devised  empirical  and  mechanical  panaceas 
for  social,  educational  and  political  reconstruction,  to  seek 
the  guidance  of  an  idealistic  philosophy  and  the  inspiration 
of  a  simpler  type  of  ethical  and  rational  religion.  Only 
the  acceptance  of  universal  and  ideal  values  will  save  oc- 
cidental civilization  from  ruin. 

4.      IRRATIONALISTIC  InTUITIONISM. 

Bergson  conceives  of  the  power  of  intelligence  as 
rigidly  limited  to  dealing  with  inorganic  solids,  with  mere 
matter.  Intelligence  is  able  only  to  comprehend  and 
formulate  abstract  geometrised  equations  of  identity.  It 
turns  the  mobility,  warmth,  manifold  heterogeneity,  in- 
dividuality, creativity  and  freedom  of  the  life-force  into 
frozen  concepts,  into  inert,  motionless  and  skeletal  travesties 
of  the  rich  and  ever  moving  reality.  Life  for  him  is  ever 
active  and  creative,  reason  is  static  and  uncreative.  Thus 
life,  which  is  reality,  transcends  thought.  The  vital  impetus, 
creative,  mysterious,  unpredictable  and  uncontrollable,  is  the 
power  which  moves  the  world.  Reality  as  life  is  not  only 
incalculable  and  inconceivable  in  its  secret  tendencies,  move- 
ments and  results;  its  secret  essence  can  not  be  communi- 
cated, for  language,  an  instrument  of  intelligence  fashioned 
to  meet  the  exigencies  of  social  intercourse,  is  utterly  power- 
less to  express  the  multitudinous  variety  and  novelty  of  life's 
manifestations.  Words  are  pale  and  colorless  abstractions, 
little  more  than  geometrical  marionettes.  Thus  intelligence 
trails  along  helplessly  in  the  wake  of  life,  picking  up  super- 
ficial uniformities  and  overlooking  the  spontaneous  diversi- 
ties and  novelties  with  which  life  teems. 

But  Bergson  recognizes  that  the  metaphysical  thirst 
of  man  for  contact  with  reality  must  be  slaked.  Intuition 
or  the  immediate  feeling  of,  the  direct  listening  to,  the 
face-to-face  vision  of,  our  inner  selfhood  is  the  key  to  reality. 
In  the  supreme  moments  of  life,  in  great  passional  and 
volitional  crises,  when  man  feels  his  whole  personality  surg- 


404  THE  FIELD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ing  up  from  the  deeps  or  feels  that  he  is  putting  his  whole 
self  into  ian  act:  "Intuition  is  there  however  vague  and 
above  all  discontinuous.  It  is  a  lamp  almost  extinguished, 
which  only  glimmers  now  and  then,  for  a  few  moments  at 
most.  But  it  glimmers  wherever  a  vital  interest  is  at 
stake.  On  our  personality,  on  our  liberty,  on  the  place  we 
occupy  in  the  whole  of  nature,  on  our  origin  and  perhaps 
on  our  destiny,  it  throws  a  light  however  feeble  and 
vacillating,  but  which  none  the  less  pierces  the  darkness  of 
the  night  in  which  the  intellect  leaves  us".  The  function 
of  Philosophy  is  to  unite,  to  deepen  and  dilate  these 
evanescent  intuitions  and  thus  to  enable  man  to  lay  direct 
hold  on  reality. 

Thus  Bergson  is  a  reviver  of  romanticism  and 
mysticism.  Reality  must  be  directly  perceived  or  felt,  by 
an  immediate  contact  or  union  of  the  contemplating  soul 
with  the  reality  contemplated.  If  Bergson  means  that  there 
must  be  immediate  data  of  experience  at  the  basis  of  all 
grninine  knowledge,  thus  far  he  is  right.  He  is  right,  too, 
in  holding  that  the  data  for  the  understanding  of  the  nature 
of  the  self  and  of  all  psychical  and  spiritual  life  must  be 
found  in  the  living  contemplation  of  the  Ego's  own  life.  I 
can,  only  understand  and  appreciate  another  Ego  by  recreat- 
ing his  experiences  and  attitudes  within  myself.  The  key 
to  the  meaning  of  life  is  to  be  found  in  the  experience  of 
living.  But  Bergson's  conception  of  intelligence  is  altogether 
too  narrow.  Intelligence  is  not  tied-up  to  abstract  spatial 
forms.  It  does  not  traffic  alone  in  barren  identities,  static 
formulas  and  concepts.  It  has  other  modes  of  operation 
than  geometry.  The  business  of  intellect  is  to  interpret  and 
organize  the  data  of  experience.  These  data  have  connec- 
tions, relations,  meanings,  and,  thus,  are  intelligible.  If 
diversity,  novelty,  dynamic  change,  increasing  individuality 
and  freedom  are  facts,  the  intellect  does  not  commit  suicide 
in  recognizing  them  nor  does  it  try  to  reduce  them  to  a  dead 
monotony  and  colorless  sameness.  The  intellect  operates 
in  this  variegated  moving  world.  Science  is  organized  com- 
mon-sense   and    philosophy    is    common-sense    and    science 


CURRENT  ISSUES  406 

organized  and  interpreted  as  completely  as  possible.  The 
intelligence  is  the  power  of  reflectively  organizing  the  per- 
ceptions, the  impulsions,  the  deeds,  the  feelings,  the  valua- 
tions of  the  self  and  of  so  interpreting  and  interrelating 
the  whole  life  of  the  self  in  its  organic  interplay  with  nature 
and  humanity;  so  that  thereby  our  impulses  become  dynamic 
elements  in  a  harmonious  personality,  so  that  thereby  our 
deeds  take  on  a  social  and  universal  significance,  so  that 
thereby  our  dumb  and  blind  feelings  learn  to  speak  the 
language  of  reason  and  become  refined  and  transformed  into 
the  higher  sentiments  of  a  well  articulated  personality,  and 
so  that  thereby,  too,  our  valuations  as  the  guides  to  our 
deeds  and  the  finest  fruits  of  our  experiences  become  the 
universalized  and  harmonious  instruments  by  which  the  in- 
dividual self  ^t  once  comes  into  fuller  self-possession  as  a 
richer  and  more  significant  personal  unity  and  comes  into 
fuller  union  with  man,  with  nature  and  with  the  universal 
order.  Perhaps  this  is  what  Bergson  means;  but  it  is  un- 
fortunate that  he  plays  into  the  hands  of  irresponsible  ir- 
rationalism  and  emotionalistic  mysticism  by  offering  us,  as 
a  foundation  for  his  metaphysics,  such  an  erroneous, 
ridiculous,  wooden-image  travesty  of  intelligence  or  reason. 
By  all  means  we  must  seek  reality  first-hand  in  living,  in 
acting,  in  feeling.  But  by  all  means,  if  the  universe  be  not 
a  crazy  patchwork,  or  a  madhouse,  we  shall  find  our  true 
selves,  we  shall  understand  and  control  nature  and  we  shall 
organize  our  lives  into  richer  and  more  meaningful  internal 
and  social  harmony  and  attain  union  with  the  universal 
meaning  of  things,  only  by  the  unremitting  exercise  of  the 
analytic-synthetic,  organizing  and  interpreting  activity  of 
intelligence. 

REFERENCES. 

Thilly,  History  of  Philosophy,  pp.  666-591. 

Marvin,  History  of  European  Philosophy,  Ckapter  XXVIII. 

Works  by  Russell,  James,  Perry,  Marvin,  Holt,  Dewey  and  Bergson 
previously  cited. 

Dewey  and   Others,  Creative  Intelligence. 

Leighton,  A  Defence  of  Reason,  Hobart  College  Bulletins,  Vol.  XI, 
No.  i. 


INDEX 


Abelard,  137. 

Absolute,  The,  119  ff.,  Hegelian 
conception   of,    210,    212    flf.,   253. 

Academy,  44  ff. 

Achilles,  36,  102. 

Acosmic,  207. 

Adaptation,  244. 

Aesthetics,  5,  339  ff. 

Alexander  the  Great,  and  Aristotle, 
77. 

Alexandria,  118. 

Alexandrian    Schools,   96. 

Amos,  365,  ff. 

Analogy,  argument  from,  26. 

Anaxagoras,  38,  ff.;  on  multiplicity, 
38;  on  substance,  39;  relation  to 
animism,  40. 

Anaximander,  30  ff, 

Anaximenes,  272. 

Anselm,  136. 

Apologists,  126. 

Aquinas,  137;  138,  140,  144. 

Archimedes,  183. 

Arguments  of  Zeno,  101;  for  skep- 
ticism, 102  ff. 

Aristophanes,  46. 

Aristotle,  on  science,  2;  criticism  of 
Plato,  64;  theory  of  knowledge, 
77  ff;  on  universals,  77;  on  de- 
velopment, 79;  on  efficient  cause, 
80;  on  soul,  80;  psychology  of, 
80;  on  soul  and  body,  80  ff; 
theory  of  knowledge,  82;  on 
sense  perception,  83;  definitions, 
83;  theory  of  reality,  85;  138,  152, 
185,  186,  249;  on  categories,  270, 
272  ff,  316,  338,  355,  378. 

Arian  heresy,  129. 

Arrow,   36. 

Assumptions,  104. 

Athanasian  doctrine,  129. 

Athens,  44,  118. 


Atomism,  37,  87;  in  science,  91;  its 

fruitfulness,  95. 
Augustine,  Saint,  131,  134,  367  ff. 
Aurelius,  Marcus,  109. 
Avenarius,  396. 
Axiology,  330,  346. 

Bacon,   Francis,  294. 

Bacon,  Roger,  138,  148. 

Beginnings,    290, 

Berkeley,  on  idea,  61;  149,  156,  169, 
178  ff.,  253,  272,  356. 

Bergson,  66,  156,  158,  228,  242,  245, 
249,  389,   400,  403  f, 

Boethius,  136, 

Bosanquet,  156,  157,  188,  210,  253, 
357,  389,  394. 

Bradley,  156,  157,  188,  204,  210,  215, 
219,  320,  357,  389,  394. 

Brotherhood,  universal.  111;  Pytha- 
gorean, 116. 

Browning,  148. 

Bruno,  149,  119. 

Bruhl,  119. 

Buddha,  122, 

Burckhardt,  364. 

Buchner,  156. 

Byron,  186. 

Caird,  E.,  188. 

Calkins,  219,  254. 

Carneades,  99,  100. 

Causation,  296. 

Cause,  final,  68;  efiicient  (Aristotle), 

80. 
Causality,    original   form   of,  22;   its 

relation   to  magic,   22;   of  ideas, 

63;  201,  273  ff. 
Certitude,  100. 
Chalcedon,  130. 
Change,   Heraclitus   on,   S3  ff,;    self 

initiated,  265. 


(407) 


408 


INDEX 


ChaoB,  79. 

Christ,  143. 

Christianity,  124;  ethical  content  of, 
126,  127;  its  origin,  127;  249,  252. 

Chrysippus,  109. 

Church,  Jewish,  125. 

City,  of  God,  367. 

Civilization,  Mediterranean,  Greek, 
29. 

Cleanthes,  109. 

Clearness,  105. 

Classification,  in  Plato,  58. 

Community,  the  Beloved,  204. 

Communion,    110. 

Communism,  in  Plato,  73. 

Comte,    Auguste,    374   ff. 

Conduct,  problem  of,  41. 

Conservation,  of  Value,  246. 

Conservatism,  in  Athens,  46. 

Contemplation,  88,  401  ff. 

Concept,  145. 

Continuum,  200. 

Contradiction,  36. 

Copernicus,  152. 

Cosmogonies,  Greek,  20. 

Cosmology,  330. 

Cosmic  soul,  120. 

Cosmos,  284. 

Cratylus,  105. 

Creation,  Plato's  theory  of,  68. 

Creativity,  of  reason,  81,  245. 

Criteria  of  truth,  314. 

Croce,  376. 

Culture,  Mediaeval,  135. 

Culture  system,  European,  our  re- 
lation to  it,  28. 

Cusa,  Nicholas  of,  148. 

Cycles,  37. 

Cyclic  process,  246. 

Dante,  143. 

Darwin,  34,  230,  234  ff. 
Death,  17. 
Demiurge,  68. 
Democracy,   75. 
Democritus,  87,  90,  272. 


Descartes,  113,  149,  151,  156,  160,  169, 
171,  252,  261,  294  ff.,  316,  368. 

Determinatio,  209. 

Determinism,  263  ff. 

Development,  79,  85;  of  civilization, 
26. 

Dewey,  317,  321,  399  ff. 

Dialogues,  121. 

Dilthey,  376. 

Ditheletism,  131. 

Divisibility,  36. 

Docetic,  130. 

Doctrine,  chemical  anticipated  by 
Anaxagoras,  39. 

Double  aspect  theory,  191  ff. 

Driesch,  241  ff. 

Dualism,  156  ff.,  261. 

Duality,  in  unity,  130. 

Duns  Scotus,  136. 

Durkheim,  287. 

Duty,  Stoic  conception  of.  111. 

Eclectics,  117. 

Education,  70. 

Effulgence,  120. 

Ego,  253. 

Elea,  35. 

Elements,  the  four,  37;  Anaxagoras 

on,   38. 
Emerson,  175. 
Empedocles,  37. 

Energy,  conservation  of,  160  ff.,  176. 
Entelechy,  78,  252. 
Epictetus,  109. 

Epicureanism,  an  atomism,  90,  109. 
Epistemology,   its   problems,   293  ff.; 

330. 
Erigena,  John  Scotus,  136. 
Error,  problem  of,  36. 
Ethics,   nature   of,   5;   in   Plato,   70; 

336  ff. 
Eugenics,  in  Plato,  75. 
Euthanasia,  356. 
Evidence,  self,  105. 
Evolution,    problem    of,    230;    defii- 

nition    of,    231;    aspects    of,    239, 

245  ff,  goal  of,  249. 


INDEX 


409 


Existence,  levels  of,  65;  eternal  85. 
Experience,  Absolute,  220,  390,  396  f. 
Experientialism,  organic,  194. 
Ezekiel,  365. 

Fallacies,  23. 

Fechner,  191  f. 

Feudalism,  150. 

Fichte,  156,  188,  193,  219,  253,  262,  356, 
369. 

Final,  cause,  68. 

Finality,  278  flf. 

Forces,  love  and  hate,  37. 

Form,  in  Plato,  61;  78;  in  Aristotle, 
86  flf. 

Foundations,  of  Christian  philos- 
ophy, 129. 

Freedom,  198,  249. 

Galileo,  152,  153,  188,  186,  302. 

Gassendi,  90. 

Genesis,  20. 

Geometry,  289. 

Gnostics,  367. 

Goal  of  evolution,  249. 

God,  67;  the  one  pure  form,  78; 
first  cause,  86;  epistemologcal  de- 
vice, 172,  181  ff.;  Olympian,  286; 
meaning  of,  342;  855;  371. 

Godhead,  115,  123,  130. 

Goethe,  369, 

Good,  the,  64;  idea  of,  67,  361;  in 
Aristotle,  87;  in  Plato,  87;  Demo- 
critus'  theory  of,  93. 

Gospel,  125. 

Graeco-Roman,  128. 

Green,  156,  188. 

Gumplowicz,  375. 

Haeckel,  156,  191. 

Haldane,  241. 

Hamiltonian,  200. 

Hate  and  love,  37. 

Hegel,  34,  156,  157,  188,  203,  204, 
210  ff.,  253,  261,  271,  286,  294  ff, 
816,  820,  856,  860  ff,  400. 


Hegelian,    doctrine,   205;    conception 

of  Absolute,  210. 
Heraclitus,  33;  on  strife,  34,  40;  230. 
Herder,  233,  368  ff. 
Hesiod  ,20. 
Heymans,  191. 
History,  philosophy  of,  364  ff.;  logic 

of,  377;  metaphysics  of,  377. 
Hobbes,  90,  156,  233,  294,  356,  368. 
Holbach,  156. 
Holt,  390,  397. 
Holy  Spirit,  128. 
Homer,  20. 
Hume,  151,  254,  271,  275,  294  ff.,  316, 

356,  368. 
Huxley,  99,  230,  234  ff. 
Huyghens,  183,  186. 
Hylozoism,  32. 
Hymn  to  Zeus,  113. 
Hypotheses,  working,  106. 

Idealism,  types  of,  178;  Hegelian, 
188;  Berkeleyan,  178;  teleological, 
194;  300,  808,  354,  359  ff;  objec- 
tive, 304,  890  ff. 

Ideas,  in  Plato,  61;  Locke  and 
Berkeley,  61;  transcendence  of, 
64;  immanence  of,  64;  of  values, 
65. 

Identity  theory,  156  ff.,  191  ff. 

Ignorance,  nature  of,  1. 

Illusions,  35. 

Image,  divine,  110. 

Imagination,  in  primitive  thinking, 
17  ff. 

Immanence,  of  formative  principles, 
78;  of  God,  109  ff.;  see  Singu- 
larism. 

Immortality,   in   the  Phaedo,  70. 

Incarnation,  130. 

Individual,  78,  85. 

Individualism,  197. 

Individuality,  140,  245,  278  ff. 

Infinite,  101. 

Inge,  116. 

Inquiry,  106. 


410 


INDEX 


Instrumentalism,      on     intelligence, 

399  ff. 
Intelligence,  39. 
Intent,  127. 

Intuition,   119.     Intuitionism,  403   ff. 
Invention,  368. 
lonians    30  ff. 
Irtnaeus,  367. 
Irreversibility,  248. 
J.cpiah,  200,  365,  378. 

Jakweh,   286,  351. 

James,   Saint,   169. 

James,    William,    119,    151,    157,    158, 

182,      201,      254,      304,      315,      317; 

quoted,  319  ff.;  232,  357,  389,  396 

ff. 
Jehovah,  200,  365  ff. 
Jeremiah,  365. 
Jesus,  127. 
Job,  218. 

Johnson,   Doctor,  181. 
Jonah,  366. 
Justice,    248. 
Justin   Martyr,   126. 

Kant,  151,  156,  211,  225,  253,  262; 
on  categories,  271;  275,  290, 
294  ff,  316,  339,  356,  369. 

Kepler,  152,  186. 

Knowledge,  problem  of,  41;  Aris- 
totle's theory  of,  77  ff;  Plato's 
theory  of,  55;  and  reality,  305; 
ideal  of,  328;  objects  of,  345. 

Laissez  Faire,  197. 

Lamarck,  230,  235. 

La   Mettrie,  156. 

Law,    natural,    83;    of   thought,   106; 

298  ff.;   Roman,   112. 
Lecky,  364. 
Leibnitz,   113,  149,  151,  156,  158,  182, 

191,    192,    222,    272,    294    ff.,    356, 

Lessing,   369. 
Leucippus,  37. 
Liebmann,  186. 


Locke,    on    idea,    61;    149,    151,    156, 

158,    169,    171,    253,    271,    294    ff., 

316,  356,  368. 
Logic,  344  ff. 
Logos,  33;  New  Testament,  doctrine 

of,    68;    110,    117,    125,    128;    and 

Father,  129. 
Lotze,  156,  161." 
Love,    and   hate,   37;    Platonic,    122; 

intellectual,  123. 
Lucretius,  90. 
Luther,  136. 
Lyceum,  77. 

Mack,  157,  254,   306,  396. 

Magic,   12;   and   science,  12  ff. ;  and 

religion,  13;  kinds,  14;  black  and 

white,  16. 
Man,  his  good,  87;  the  measure   of 

things. 
Manichaean,  134,  367. 
Mars'   Hill,   113. 
Martyr,  Justin,  367. 
Marvin,  393  ff. 
Marx,    Karl,   374. 
Materialism,  89,  156,   173  ff. 
Mathematics,  pure,  301. 
Matter,    37,    Plato    on,    62;    78,    79; 

contingent,  86;  168. 
McDougall,  William,  156. 
McTaggart,  221. 
Mechanism,  89,  152,  244,  247. 
Metaphysics,    270    ff.,    task    of,    285; 

its  nature,  330. 
Meta-psychology,  330. 
Micah,  366. 
Middle  Ages,  131. 
Might,  is  right,  46. 
Miletus,  school  of,  30. 
Mill,  J.  S.,  294,  356. 
Mind,    and    matter,    40;    and    body, 

393. 
Modalists,   131. 
Monad,   183. 

Monadology,  Leibnitzian,  182  ff. 
Monism,     epistemological     in     Aris- 
totle, 82;  neutral,  156,  396  ff. 


INDEX 


411 


Monisms,  qualitative,  157;  neutral, 
396  flf.;  objections  to  neutral, 
398  f. 

Monophysite,  130. 

Monotkelitism,  131. 

Montague,  390. 

Morality,  253. 

Moses,   126, 

Motion,  Zeno  on,  36;  paradox  of, 
101. 

Motive,  127. 

Mover,  God  as  universal,  86. 

Multiplicity,  34. 

Mutation,  326  ff. 

Mysteries,  Orphic,  116. 

Mystic  way,  115, 

Mysticism,  115. 

Myth,  types  of,  18;  Persian,  19. 

Mythology,  17  S. 

Nature,   philosophy   of   in  Aristotle, 

80. 
Natures  in  Christ,  the  two,  131. 
Necessitarianism,   198, 
Negatio,  209. 
Negative,  370, 

Neo-Platonism,  115;  its  failure,  123. 
Neo-Pythagoreans,  117, 
New  Realism,  389  ff, 
Newton,  152,  186, 
Nicaea,  Council  of,  129. 
Nietzsche,    239. 
Nopiinalism,  140. 
Non-Euclidian,  289. 
Notions,  general,  110,  178. 
Nous,  of  Anaxagoras,  39;  in  Plato's 

theory,  70. 
Novalis,  207. 

Occam,  William,  138,  142,  145,  148, 
One,  the,  35;   and   all,   35;   120,   the 

eternal,  204  ff. 
Origen,  118,  129. 
Opposites,  unity  of,  149. 
Order,  280  ff. 
Organization,  246. 
Orphic,    cosmogony,    20;    mysteries, 

120, 
Ortkodox,  131. 


Othering,  process  of,  211. 

Pantheism,  Stoic,  108;  definition  of, 
109. 

Paracelsus,  148. 

Paradox,  102, 

Parallelism,    psycho-physical,   191. 

Parmenides,  the  One,  31;  35, 

Particulars,  relation  to  universals, 
60;  definition  of,  66  ff. 

Patripassionism,  130, 

Paul,  Saint,  113,  282,  367. 

Paulsen,   191, 

Pawlow,  241, 

Pearson,  254,  306, 

Perception,  Plato  on,  56;  93,  un- 
trustworthiness  of,  102;  act  of, 
110, 

Perception  petite,  185. 

Perry,  R,  B.,  390,  397. 

Personality,  193  ff. 

Phaedo,  231. 

Phenomenalism,  82, 

Philo,   117,  125,  126. 

Philosopher,  his  activity,  1. 

Philosophy,  defined,  1;  and  science, 
2  ff.;  aim  of,  2;  and  practical 
life,  4  ff.;  and  religion,  6;  main 
problems  of,  6;  and  poetry,  7; 
rise  to  independence,  22  ff.;  de- 
velopment of,  31  ff.;  defined, 
108;  early  Christian,  125;  Me- 
diaeval, 133;  modern,  148;  and 
psychology,  331  ff.;  social,  336  ff. 

Plato,  on  the  philosopher,  1  ff., 
74  ff.;  on  knowledge,  1;  on 
Homer,  20;  relation  to  Socrates, 
43;  and  Academy,  44;  method  of, 
55;  theory  of  knowledge,  55; 
problems  of,  55;  versus  Sophists, 
55;  reminiscence,  56;  on  percep- 
tion, 56;  criticised  by  Aristotle, 
64;  on  creation,  68;  on  the  soul, 
69;  ethics,  70;  communism,  6S; 
on  the  state,  73;  eugenics,  75; 
126,  128,  186,  227,  228,  230,  249, 
256,  272,  316,  328,  338,  355,  378, 
400. 


412 


INDEX 


Platonism,  117. 

Plotinus,  115,  118  f.,  123,  355. 

Pluralism,  64;  and  singularism,  195, 

ff. 
Pluralist,  195. 
Plurality,  36. 
Plutarch,  117. 
Pneuma,  110. 

Poetry,  and  philosophy,  7. 
Politics,  and  ethics,  87. 
Possibility,  164. 
Postulates    of    Greek    thought,    the 

two,  109;  of  knowledge,  327. 
Potentiality,    in    Aristotle,    78;    118. 
Pragmatism,     315;     on     ideas,     316; 

absolute,  323. 
Priestley,  156. 
Primitive  world  view,  9;  breakdown 

of,  22,  26, 
Principle,  vital,  241. 
Principles  of  truth,  106. 
Probability,  degrees  of,  100. 
Problem,   of  conduct,  41;   of  knowl- 
edge, 41;  of  religion,  41. 
Process,  cyclic,  246. 
Protagoras,  homo  mensura,  45. 
Psalmist,  105. 
Psyche,    119. 
Psychology,  331  ff.;  and  philosophy, 

333  ff. 
Purification,  122. 
Purpose,  244;  universal,  359;   world, 

373. 
Pyrrho,  99. 

Pyrrhonic  skepticism,  100. 
Pythagorean,  brotherhood,  116. 

Quadrivium,  136. 

Qualities,  secondary,  93,  104,  169  ff. 

Quantities,  104. 

Ranke,  364. 

Rationalism,  84. 

Ratzenhofer,  375. 

Realism,  140;  types  of,  141  ff.;  naive, 
305;  representational,  306;  trans- 
figured, 307;  critical,  308. 


Realists,  new,  157;  extreme,  227. 
Reality,    Aristotle    on,    85;    problem 

of,    155;    247,    305    ff.;    absolute, 

357;   purpose  of,  383,  391. 
Reason,    70;    creativity   of,   81;    110; 

divine,  125. 
Redemption,   social,   248. 
Reformation,   150. 
Relativity,  104. 
Relations,  57,  392  ff. 
Relativism,  agnostic,  351. 
Religion,    nature   of,    5;    relation   to 

philosophy,  6;  philosophy  of,  341. 
Reminiscence,  Plato  on,  56. 
Renaissance,  150. 
Revolution,  French,  124,  150. 
Renouvier,  271. 
Ribot,   199. 
Rickert,   358,   276. 
Roman,  Empire,  108;  law,  112. 
Romans,    96. 
Rome,  Bishop  of,  135. 
Roscellinus,  142. 
Rousseau,  233. 
Royce,  156,  157,  186  ff.,  188,  204,  210, 

215,  219,  253,  254,  320,  322,  357. 
Ruskin,  341. 
Russell,  B.,  156,  390. 

Sabellians,  131. 

Same,   130. 

Salvation,  129. 

Sarx,  119. 

Savior,  125. 

Schopenhauer,  156,  356. 

Schelling,   157,   191. 

Schiller,  369. 

Science,  and  philosophy,  3;   problem 

of,    23;    origins    in    Greece,    30; 

experimental  in  Greece,  96. 
Scotus,  Duns,  136,  138,  144,  148. 
Selection,   natural,   236. 
Self,  252  ff.;  Hume  on,  254;  Calkins 

on,  254;  Plato  on,  256  ff. 
Self  determination,  246. 
Seneca,   109. 


INDEX 


413 


Sense  perception,  untrustworthlness 

of,  102. 
Senses,    Parmenides    and    Zeno    on 

tke,  36. 
Shelley,  186,  196,  341. 
Simmel,  376. 
Sin,   129,   249. 
Sinai,  Mount,  351. 
Singularism,  and   pluralism,  195  ft., 

205. 
Singularist,  196. 
Skepticism,  Pyrrhonic,  100;  reply  to, 

106;  99. 
Social  Philosophy,  336  ff. 
Socrates,   43   fF. ;    relation   to    Plato, 

43;   charges  against,  48;   method 

of,  48  ff. ;  theory  of  conduct,  49; 

on  definitions,  49;  conception  of 

goodness,  52;  attitude  toward  re- 
ligion, 63;  126,  231. 
Solidarity,  248. 
Sonship,  divine,  127. 
Space,  37,  287  ff. 
Sopkists,  44. 
Soul,   primitive   idea   of,   9   ff. ;    and 

body,  10;  Plato  on,  69;  and  body, 

80   ff.;    atomistic    conception    of, 

92;  cosmic,  120,  246. 
Spencer,   H.,  157,  191,  212,  239,  307. 

332,  375. 
Spinoza,     113,     149,     157,     191,     198, 

203    ff.,    214,    216,    261,    272,    356, 

368,  394. 
Spirit,  10;  pure,  105;  universal,  122; 

Holy,  128. 
Spiritualism,  156,  178. 
Standards,  106. 
State,  70. 

Stoic  pantheism,  108. 
Strife,  Heraclitus  on,  40. 
Substance,    31,    155,    167;    definition 

of,  208;  272  ff. 
Suffering,  348. 
Summa  Theologia,  37. 
Supernaturalism,    351. 
Superstition,  23  ff. 
Sympathy,   127. 
System  of  universals,  67. 


Tabu,  11  ff.,  14. 

Taine,  364. 

Talleyrand,  124. 

Teleology,  of  Plato,  63;  in  nature, 
78;  85;   problem  of,  230,  244. 

Tennyson,  quoted,  201  ff. 

Tertullian,  367. 

Testament,  New,  113. 

Thales,  30  ff.,  199,  272. 

Theism,  109. 

Thermo-dynamics,   162. 

Thomson,  J.  A.,  241. 

Thoreau,  341. 

Thought,  laws  of,  298. 

Timaeus,  136. 

Time,  85,  225,  285   ff. 

Topsy,   234. 

Totemism,  11. 

Transcendence,   of  ideas,  64;   78. 

Trinity,  doctrine  of,  129. 

Trivium,  136. 

Troeltsch,  376. 

Truth,  determination  of,  106;  cri- 
teria of,  314  ff.;  theories  of 
314  ff. 

Truths  ,the  four  noble,  122. 

Unconscious  adaptation,  244. 

Underbill,  Miss,  116. 

Unio  Mystica,  218. 

Union,  with  God,  122. 

Units,  101,  196. 

Unity,  120. 

Universal,  in  Plato,  58  ff.;   relation 

to  particulars,  60;  system  of,  67; 

abstract,  372. 
Upanishads,  203. 
Uranus,  302. 

Valuation,  346  ff. 

Values,    the    fundamental,    5;    246; 

status  of,  345;  types  of,  346  ff.; 

Schopenhauer  on,  356. 
Vico,   368. 

View,  Athanasian,  180. 
Virtues,   cardinal,  71;   practical  and 

theoretical,  87. 
Voltaire,  219. 


414 


INDEX 


Von  Hartmann,  271. 
Von  Huegel,  116. 

Wallace,  230. 

Ward,  James,  158. 

Whitman,  341. 

Will,  primacy  of,  145;   to  live,  262; 

to  power,  262. 
Wilson,  President,  161. 
Windelband,  868,  376. 


Word,  128. 

Wordsworth,    quoted,    57,    186,    S39, 

341. 
World  history,  246. 
World,  Stoic  conception  of,  109. 
Wundt,  262,  375  ff. 

Xenophanes,  35. 

Zeno,  puzzles  of,  36,  305. 
Zeno,  the  Stoic,  101. 


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